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Summary
This dissertation discusses the economic issues surrounding corruption at the
firm-level in Nigeria with a specific focus on bribery. This involves an analysis
of the paying and reporting of bribes by firm managers in Nigeria. The first
chapter uses data from two business surveys to explain the determinants of the
incidence of bribery and the magnitude of bribes, respectively. A two-stage analysis
is conducted to test for the independence of the processes determining the incidence
and the magnitude of bribery. The results show that the propensity to bribe is
determined by required meetings with public officials while the size of bribe is
driven by firm profitability indicators. The second chapter tests the reliability of
methods used to ask individuals sensitive questions on different forms of business
malpractice. Indirect methods are tested against the randomised response method.
The indirect method protects the managers from stigmatisation by asking them
about the behaviour of an agent representative of themselves; the randomised
response method asks the interviewee to base their response on the result of a
private coin-toss. The results show that the indirect method produces higher and
more plausible estimates of wrongdoing than the randomised response method.
The third chapter investigates why the randomised response method sometimes
fails in eliciting honest responses from sensitive questions despite assuring the
managers of anonymity. The roles of trust in the interviewer and the probability of
detection are considered along with other potential explanations. Results indicate
that lack of trust and the fear of detection are associated with underreporting
of sensitive acts. The final chapter examines the relationship between bribery
and ethnic networks. The ethnicities of the managers and their local political
representatives are used to measure ethnic networks. Results show that co-ethnic
firm managers are less likely to pay a bribe than non co-ethnics. Also, there is a
positive association between ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and bribery which,
in fractionalised areas, eradicates the negative effect of co-ethnicity on bribery.
4Acknowledgements
I am grateful to God for my life and for giving me the strength to complete this
dissertation.
I would like to thank my supervisors Professor Alan Winters and Professor
Richard Dickens for their advice and support. I would also like to thank Professor
Barry Reilly and Mike Barrow for comments on my work. I would also like to
express my gratitude to the doctoral researchers at Sussex, including Edgar Cooke,
Farai Jena, Janani Akhil, Grazia Pacillo; whose friendship made the PhD process
much easier. I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Sulu for his encouragement and
advice.
I would also like to express my thanks to employees of the EFCC; ICPC; and
Lambeth Palace Library for their helpful assistance in my research. My thanks
also go to Mr. Folu Olamiti; Ms. Lilian Ekeanyanwu; Mr. Emmanuel Ojo; Ms.
Olamide Adubiagbe; Mr. Olayinka Babatunde; and Mr. Sina Babasola for their
assistance in my research.
I would also like to acknowledge the ESRC for the financial support which
allowed me to complete my research. I would further like to acknowledge the help
and support given to me by the staff within the school of Business, Management
and Economics.
I would like to thank the participants of the Economics of Corruption Course;
EUDN PhD Workshop; Sussex DPhil Lunch Seminar; Sussex Research In Progress
Seminar; Royal Economic Society PhD Presentation Meeting; Sussex Annual DPhil
Conference; PACDEV conference; CSAE Conference; SES Conference; SMYE
Conference; ESRA Conference and EEA|ESEM conference for their comments
on my research
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their confidence and continuous
support throughout this process.
5Contents
Acknowledgements 4
1 Introduction 14
1.1 Corruption At The Firm Level In Nigeria: Comparative Data . . . 20
2 Data On Firm Level Bribery In Nigeria 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 The Definitions of Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 The National Bureau Of Statistics & Economic And Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) Business Survey On Crime, Corruption And
Awareness Of The EFCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 The World Bank Enterprise Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Centre For Law Enforcement Education Survey . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Fieldwork And Primary Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.7 Basic Summary Statistics From The ES and NBS Datasets . . . . . 34
3 Factors Influencing The Propensity To Bribe
And Size Of Informal Payments: Evidence
From Formal Manufacturing Firms In Nige-
ria 37
3.1 Introduction: The Payment Of Bribes When Doing Business . . . . 38
3.2 Literature Review And Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3 Data And Variables Measuring The Determinants And Scale Of
Bribery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.4 Empirical Specification Of The Control Rights And Bargaining Hy-
potheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.5 Comparing The Two Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Summary Statistics From The Enterprise Survey . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.7 Factors Determining Whether Or Not A Bribe Is Paid: First Stage
Probit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.8 Factors Influencing The Size Of Bribe Payment: Second Stage Anal-
ysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.9 Alternative Estimation: Tobit Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.10 Results From The Corruption Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.11 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4 A Comparison Of Randomised Response and
Indirect Questioning Methods In Measuring
6Corruption And Tax Evasion: A Study Of
Companies In Nigeria 86
4.1 Measuring Corruption At The Micro Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Survey Research Methods And A Formal Description Of The Ran-
domised Response Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 Data & Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5 What Drives Reticence? Reporting Bias From
Monopolies And Distrustful Firm Managers 128
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2 Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3 Data & Construction Of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.4 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6 Ethnic Networks And Corruption: Firm Level
Evidence 150
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.3 Data And Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7 Discussion 179
A Appendices 182
A.1 Appendices For Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
A.2 Appendices For Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
A.3 Appendix For Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.4 Appendix For Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
References 299
7List of Tables
1.1 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 Data Description - NBS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Summary Statistics For The Enterprise Survey Dataset . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Summary Statistics Of Bribery And Meeting With Officials - NBS
Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Data Description (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Data Description - NBS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4 Data Description - NBS Data (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5 Prevalence Of Bribery For Both Datasets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6 Distribution Of Bribe Payments (In ’000 Naira) For Both Datasets 59
3.7 Proportion Of Bribing Firms And Subjective Reports On Corrup-
tion As An Obstacle To Operations-ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.8 Correlation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.9 Summary Statistics, by bribe reporting behaviour . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.10 Estimations Using Heckman Two-Step Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.11 Probit Estimations On The Propensity To Bribe . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.12 Regressions On The Amount Of Bribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.13 Tobit Estimations On Bribe Amounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.14 Probit Estimations On The Propensity To Bribe - NBS Data . . . . 71
3.15 Multinomial Logit Models On Different Types Of Bribery - NBS Data 72
3.16 Marginal And Impact Effects From First Stage Probit Estimations . 74
3.17 Probit Estimations On All Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.18 Truncated Tobit Estimations For Bribing Firms Only . . . . . . . . 78
3.19 Relative Risk Ratios For The Multinomial Logit Estimations On
Bribe Reporting Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1 Potential Information Achievable With Different Randomised Re-
sponse Situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 Observed Responses and Estimated Percentage Of Transgressions . 107
4.3 Results From Indirect Questions With Categorical Responses . . . . 108
4.4 Indirect Questions Concerning Bribe Payments And Hidden Sales/Workforce109
4.5 Distribution of Observed Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6 Comparing The Truncated And Reduced Distributions . . . . . . . 112
4.7 Expected Probabilities Under Different Assumptions . . . . . . . . 113
4.8 Distributions of ”Yes” Responses Under Different Levels Of Reti-
cence And Guilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.9 Maximum Likelihood Estimates For Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.10 Maximum Likelihood Estimates For Guilt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
84.11 Answer To The 7th Sensitive Question; by Number of previous pos-
itive answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.12 Probit Estimations Of Response To Final Question On Results From
Previous Questions And Explanatory Variables Used In Clausen at
al. (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.13 Comparing Actual Outcomes With Predicted Outcomes From Pro-
bit & Logit (Model 1) Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.14 ANOVA For Informal Gifts, Controlling for Sector, Size, and Location124
4.15 Adjusted Means Of Bribery, By Firm Size, Controlling for Sector
And Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.16 Contrasts Of Predictive Margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1 Means Of Trust-Related Variables, By Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2 Probit Estimations For Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3 Probit Estimations For Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.4 Comparing Actual Outcomes With Predicted Outcomes From Pro-
bit (Model 9) Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.5 Probit Estimations For Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.6 HAS-Probit Estimations For Reticence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.1 Similar Ethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.2 Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The Firm Level 163
6.3 Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Firm Level:
Selected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample . . . . . 164
6.4 Cross Tabulation Of The Ethnicities Of Firm Managers And Local
Government Chiefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.5 Cross-Tabulation Of Ethnic-Match And Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.6 Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, With Zonal
Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.7 Tests For The Equality Of Coefficients Across Firm Level Models
With Zonal Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.8 Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching And ELF,
With Zonal Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.9 South-West Zone: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On
Matching, With Regional Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.10 Lagos: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching,
With Local Government Area Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.11 Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, Control-
ling For Zonal Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
6.12 Robustness Checks Using Languages Spoken By The Firm Managers 176
A.1 Information On Actions Performed By Companies Which Required
Them To Meet With Government Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
9A.2 Summary Statistics For Meeting With Government Officials And
Bribing Government Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
A.3 Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On
Manufacturing (ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
A.4 Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On All
Firms (ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
A.5 Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On
Manufacturing Companies (NBS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.6 Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On All
Firms (NBS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
A.7 Dummies In Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection188
A.8 Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On Manufacturing (ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
A.9 Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On All Firms (ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
A.10 Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On Manufacturing Companies (NBS) . . . . . . . . . . 191
A.11 Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On All Firms (NBS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
A.12 Summary Statistics For NBS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
A.13 Summary Statistics For NBS Data, (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
A.14 Correlation Matrix-NBS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
A.15 Bribery, by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
A.16 Bribery, by Region, (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
A.17 Bribery, by Region, (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
A.18 Bribery, by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
A.19 Bribery, by Industry, with 95% Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . 198
A.20 Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
A.21 Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . 200
A.22 Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . 201
A.23 Correlation Matrix - WB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
A.24 Probit Estimations On The Propensity To Bribe . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A.25 Marginal And Impact Effects From First Stage Probit Models . . . 203
A.26 Regressions On The Amount Of Bribe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.27 Tobit Estimations On Bribe Amounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
A.28 Estimations Using Heckman Two-Step Procedure . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.29 IV Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.30 Bribery, by Region (NBS Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
A.31 Bribery, by Region (NBS Data) (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
A.32 Bribery, by Region (NBS Data) (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
10
A.33 Summary Statistics Of Bribery And Meeting With Officials - NBS
Data (Manu. and Full) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A.34 Cross-Tabulations Of The Payment Of Bribes, By Interactions With
Public Officials (NBS Data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A.35 Cross-Tabulations Of The Payment Of Bribes, By Interactions With
Public Officials (NBS Data) (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.36 Probit Estimations On The Propensity To Bribe - NBS Data . . . . 212
A.37 Censored Probit Models - NBS Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.38 Censored Probit Models - NBS Data (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A.39 Censored Probit Models - 1st Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
A.40 Censored Probit Models - 2nd Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
A.41 Censored Probit Models - 1st Stage (Cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
A.42 Censored Probit Models - 2nd Stage (Cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.43 Multinomial Logit Models On Perception Of Corruption As An Ob-
stacle To Business Operations - ES Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
A.44 Probit Estimations On All Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.45 Truncated Tobit Estimations For Bribing Firms Only . . . . . . . . 221
A.46 Small-Hsiao Tests For Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives As-
sumption In Multinomial Logit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
A.47 Logit Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
A.48 Calculations Of Misclassification Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
A.49 Summary Statistics For Full Sample And Size, Sector, Region Groups230
A.50 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.51 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.52 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.53 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.54 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.55 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.56 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.57 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.58 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
A.59 Summary Statistics (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
A.60 Summary Statistics (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
A.61 Summary Statistics (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
A.62 Summary Statistics (cont’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
A.63 Tabulation Of Trust-Related Variables, By Reticence . . . . . . . . 236
A.64 Correlation Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
A.65 Second Stage Models Of Bribery And Crime On Matching, With
Zonal Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
11
A.66 Firm Level Bivariate Probit Estimations Of Bribery And Crime On
Matching, With Zonal Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
A.67 Codes For The Classification Of Ethn-ocultural Groups . . . . . . . 256
A.68 Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The State Level
And The Local Government Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
A.69 Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The Firm Level 266
A.70 Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The State Level . . 266
A.71 Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Local Govern-
ment Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
A.72 Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Firm Level:
Selected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample . . . . . 268
A.73 Summary Statistics Of Ethnicities Of Local Government Chairs:
For Selected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample . . . 269
A.74 Cross Tabulation Of The Ethnicities Of Firm Managers And Local
Government Chiefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
A.75 Corruption Measures, By Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
A.76 Diversity Measures, By Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
A.77 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Full
Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
A.78 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Re-
duced Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
A.79 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Full Sample285
A.80 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Reduced
Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
A.81 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisa-
tion - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
A.82 State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisa-
tion - Reduced Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
A.83 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractional-
isation - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
A.84 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractional-
isation - Reduced Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
A.85 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation
- Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
A.86 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation
- Reduced Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
A.87 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic
Fractionalisation - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
A.88 Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic
Fractionalisation - Reduced Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
12
A.89 Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Fractionalisation . . . . . . 295
A.90 Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Polarisation . . . . . . . . . 296
A.91 Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Linguistic Fractionalisation . 297
A.92 South-West Zone: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On
Matching, With Regional Dummies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
13
List of Figures
1 Indirect Costs Of Manufacturing Firms For Different Countries In
The Year 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Evolution Of Governance And Corruption Indices For Nigeria Over
Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3 Comparison Of The Prevalence Of Bribery; And The Average Bribe
Rates Amongst Bribing Manufacturing Firms (in ’000 Naira) For
Both Datasets (NBS & WB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4 Distribution Of ’Yes’ Responses For The Angels Assumption . . . . 98
5 Comparing The Distributions Of Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6 Distribution Of ’Yes’ Responses For The Angels Assumption; Ro-
mania; And Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7 Proportion Of ’Yes’ Responses For Each Question . . . . . . . . . . 112
8 Comparing Distributions Of Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
9 Some Distributions For Different Probabilities of Positive Responses 114
10 Potential Response “Paths” To 7 Randomised Response Questions . 122
11 Most Common Response Patterns To The 7 Randomised Response
Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
12 Kernel Density Estimate Of The Proportion Of Sales Paid In As
Informal Payment/Gifts To Speed Regulatory Processes . . . . . . . 124
13 Kernel Density Estimate Of The Proportion Of Government Con-
tract Paid In Informal Payment/Gifts To Secure Contract . . . . . 124
14 Adjusted Mean Of Informal Payment, By Firm Size . . . . . . . . . 126
15 A Map Of Nigeria Indicating The Different Geo-Political Zones
(NC,NE,NW,SE,SS,SW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
16 Ethnic Composition Of Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
17 The Nested Nature Of The Bribe Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
18 Sum Score Cumulative Distribution Function With Wald Binomial
Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
19 Maximum Likelihood Estimate Of Distribution of Responses Com-
pared To The Actual Distribution And The Angels Assumption . . 227
20 Example Of Questionnaire Used For The Survey Of Managers . . . 238
21 Phylogenetic Tree Of The Most Common Languages In The Nigeria
Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
22 Relationship Between The Main Measures Of Corruption . . . . . . 264
23 A Plot Of Fitted Values For The Corruption Index (1) Against
Ethnic Fractionalisation For Model I Of LG Estimations (Full Sample)279
24 The Relationship Between Fractionalisation And Polarisation: The-
oretical And Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
14
1 Introduction
This dissertation discusses the economic issues surrounding corruption at the firm-
level in Nigeria with a specific focus on bribery. Much of the conceptual and
empirical research on corruption looks at it from the point of view of the corrupt
transaction, where a government official acts based on a cost-benefit analysis of
the gains from accepting a bribe and the expected punishment of being caught
[Becker , 1968]. While the current dissertation allows for this mechanism to take
place, it also considers the influence of market forces on the level of corruption.
With the latter view, potentially corrupt government officials behave like bribe
maximising agents, and the incidence of bribery is determined by the structure of
the market, the demand for the services of the government official, and the degree
to which officials can collude in collecting bribes [Shleifer & Vishny , 1993, Olken
& Barron , 2009].
The current study investigates the influence of market forces on the prevalence
of bribery. This is studied in the context of bribes paid by firm managers to
government officials and local politicians in Nigeria. Firm managers make a variety
of informal payments, including payments to the police; customs officials; and court
officials, to speed up the process of regulation, to access information, to win a court
case, and to avoid fines for illegal behaviour. To investigate these payments, this
study uses a conceptual framework, that was introduced by Svensson [2002], to
describe the forces at work when a firm bribes an official; and the determinants
of the amount of bribe paid in such transactions. Data is taken from 2 waves of
the World Bank Enterprise Survey for Nigeria, conducted in 2007/8 and 2008/9.
In addition to this, data from the Nigeria Bureau Of Statistics and the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission is used to complement the World Bank Dataset.
Also, primary data, concerning characteristics of firm managers, was collected from
a sample frame of 2,110 establishments in Nigeria.
Corruption is defined as the use of public office, or power, for private gain [Leite
& Weidemann , 2002]; bribery is the paying of informal gifts or money to speed
up the regulatory process or to bypass regulation [ Laws Of The Federation Of
Nigeria , 1990]. This dissertation makes many contributions to the body of knowl-
edge; some of the major themes that are present throughout this work include:
the measurement of bribery (Chapters 3, 4 and 5); the data on bribery (Ibid.);
the explanation for the underreporting of bribery (Chapter 5); and the channels
through which bribery operates (Chapters 3 and 6). The four main chapters of
this work discuss: the factors that determine which firms will pay a bribe and how
much they will pay; the preferred ways of measuring bribery (specifically) and cor-
ruption (in general) at the firm level; why firms lie when asked sensitive questions
in surveys when given the assurance of anonymity by the interviewers; the effect
of ethnic diversity on the the proportion of bribing firms in a region; and the effect
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of a (mis)match between the ethnicity of firm managers and the ethnicity of local
government official on the propensity for a bribe to be paid by the firm.
This work fills many gaps in the literature. Despite the growing interest in the
economics of corruption; relatively little has been done on corruption at the firm
level compared to corruption at the country level. Part of the reason for this is the
relative lack of data on corruption amongst firms; this comes from the potential to
underreport due to the sensitive nature of the data [Reinikka & Svensson , 2003].
This study fills this gap by focusing on firms in Nigeria while using information
from the wider economy and the issues involving corruption within Nigeria.
Another gap that is filled by this work is the relative lack of research per-
formed on corruption in Africa, and specifically Western Africa. One explanation
for this is the lack of data for the entire region compared with Western Europe and
Northern America. An outcome of this is that very little work has been done on
firm-level corruption within a Western African context. It is important to under-
stand whether corruption in this region follows the same processes as corruption
elsewhere in the world.
Also, there has been a need for a disaggregation of corruption indices to focus
on the sub-national regional variation in the prevalence of corruption; and the
inter-industry variation in the prevalence of corruption. Whilst a country might
be perceived to be more corrupt than another, it is possible that some regions
and industries within the more corrupt country are less corrupt than some regions
and industries in the less corrupt economy. By focusing solely on country-level
data, some potentially useful information is lost. This study seeks to retrieve this
information and add it to the body of knowledge. This dissertation uses both
parametric and non-parametric methods to analyse corruption at the firm level.
A running theme throughout this work is that useful information can be re-
trieved from firms when asking them about their experiences of bribery. Further-
more, information can be revealed by firms by observing their reporting behaviour
when using different techniques to ask sensitive questions [Iarossi , 2006]. When
asking firms about their behaviour, some methods are preferred to others. For
example, this study finds that asking firm managers if they have ever paid a bribe
indirectly provides more useful information compared with asking them via the
randomised response technique. Essentially the strength of the false-consensus
effect helps to overcome social desirability bias in the case of indirect questions.
The thesis also comments on the different channels through which corruption
can occur. These include: meetings with government officials [Svensson , 2003];
and ethnic cleavages [Mauro , 1995]. A running sub-theme in the analysis is that
willingness to pay and ability to pay have seperate effects on the payment of bribes
and the amount of bribe paid, respectively. Willingness to pay seems to affect the
payment of bribes, whilst ability to pay seems to influence the amount of bribe
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paid, conditional on a bribe being paid.
The analysis is applied to Nigeria for many reasons. In order to carry out
this study, it was necessary to use an economy where corruption exists. Nigeria
has consistently ranked in the bottom quartile of Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index and has had a number of high-profile corruption
cases. This indicates that corruption is present within the Nigerian economy.
Secondly, Nigeria has Africa’s largest population, with over 160 million inhab-
itants. Coupled with a 0.2 share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 2011 GDP, it represents
a relatively large nation with an economy that has a non-trivial impact on African
and World GDP. In the year 2014 its GDP was calculated to be $510 billion; mak-
ing it Africa’s largest economy. Recent policies have aimed to reduce the overall
level of corruption within the country by: introducing due process guidelines; sign-
ing up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); and promoting
the Economic And Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Cor-
ruption Practices Commission (ICPC).
Results from previous research suggest that corruption is inevitable whenever
a country transitions from one type of political regime to another [Huntingdon
, 1968]. For example, a country moving from an autocracy to democratic rule
might see many people vying for power and rents. Nigeria makes for a potentially
interesting study since it recently transitioned from military rule to democracy in
1999. It represents a case study of the nature of corruption amongst firms in a
relatively young democracy. The current study also pays attention to the formal
manufacturing industry in Nigeria. This industry contributed to 4% of Nigerian
Gross Domestic Product; and 8% of GDP growth in 2012.
Summary
The first main chapter of this dissertation investigates the factors that determine
whether or not a firm will pay a bribe; and how much bribing firms pay. This
chapter applies a simplified version of the Svensson [2003] model to data on
Nigeria using a larger sample; a larger vector of explanatory variables; and more
disaggregated variables. These three additions allow for better conclusions to be
made about the supply of bribes in Nigeria. The data for this chapter comes from
two sources: the World Bank Enterprise Survey (ES); and the Nigeria Bureau
Of Statistics & Economic And Financial Crimes Commission Business Survey On
Crime And Corruption (NBS). These surveys use different methods to ask firms
about bribery. The ES survey asks the bribery-related questions indirectly whilst
the NBS survey asks the questions directly.
The conceptual framework; and diagnostic tests on the data suggest the use-
fulness of the two-part model in analysing the data. Nevertheless, findings from
a Heckman-selection model and a censored Tobit model are also presented. The
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results indicate two separate processes driving the propensity to pay a bribe; and
the amount of bribe paid, respectively. Encounters with government employees
are associated with an increased propensity to pay a bribe whilst current and ex-
pected future profitability influence the amount of bribe that is paid. Firms that
are more willing to pay a bribe, i.e. those who are required to deal with one or
more government officials, are more likely to pay a bribe than firms who are not.
Amongst bribing firms, those who are more able to pay, i.e. those with a higher
current and expected future profit, generally tend to pay larger bribes. These
results remain when using different datasets; different econometric specifications;
and different measures of firm level bribery.
The second chapter of this dissertation investigates the preferred methods of
asking firm managers about bribery and illegal behaviour. Three methods are
identified and two methods are tested against each other. The three main methods
are: direct questioning (DQ); indirect questioning (IQ); and randomised response
questioning (RRQ). This chapter fills a gap in the literature by comparing the two
methods which had previously not been compared against each other: IQ & RRQ.
The IQ method of asking sensitive question uses a projective technique by
asking about the behaviour of similar firms. This technique borrows from the
results of the false consensus effect, which finds that people who engage in sensitive
behaviour are more likely to overestimate the prevalence of that behaviour amongst
their peers. The inference from this is that firm managers who bribe are more likely
to report that similar firms also bribe.
The RRQ method of asking sensitive questions attaches the response of the firm
manager to a probability distribution. This is done in private using a randomising
device: a fair coin. Interviewees are asked to base their response to the sensitive
question on the result of a coin toss. Interviewees are told to reveal their true status
only if a specified random event (a heads) occurs, the result of which is unknown to
the interviewer. This procedure helps to remove any social desirability bias from
the sensitive question because the interviewer cannot connect a “yes” response to
guilt on the part of the interviewee.
Parametric and non-parametric methods are used to compare the IQ and RRQ
methods. The respective questioning strategies are tested based on the rate of
admittance of guilt that they are each able to generate. In order to exploit the
nature of the RR design the responses to RRQs are modelled as binary responses
to a sensitive question with the possibility of false-negatives. Results show that the
IQ seems to perform better in getting honest responses from sensitive questions.
The RRQ seems better suited to estimating the level of misreporting behaviour,
labelled “reticence”, amongst firm managers.
The third chapter seeks to explain why firm managers display reticence in RRQs
despite the statistical assurance of anonymity, and the impossibility of detection.
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The role of trust is brought up. It is argued that a lack of trust amongst firm
managers in general might indicate a propensity for the firm manager to distrust
an interviewer. If this is the case then the manager might not trust the interviewer
to keep the results anonymous. Alternatively, the manager might believe that the
technique is a ploy to trick them and might not trust the RRQ process.
Another reason for the observed reticent responses might be the fear of detec-
tion. For example, regardless of the assurances of anonymity, the industry and
region that the firm is located in was not expected to be kept confidential. This
allows for a positive, albeit small, probability of detection, which would decrease
with the size of the industry. So a monopoly, or a firm with very few competitors
in its industry-location cell, might fear detection and lie about bribing much more
than a firm with a heavily populated cell.
This study uses the following variables as indicators of latent trust: the per-
centage of material orders paid for after delivery (instead of: before delivery; or
on delivery); the percentage of sales orders paid for before delivery (instead of: on
delivery; or after delivery); and the percentage of orders that were written (instead
of: oral with witness; or oral without witness). These are used as indicators of
trust within the business environment and might relate to general trust (including
trust in the RRQ/interview process). This chapter measures the fear/probability
of detection using the number of other firms in the industry-location cell; and the
self-reported number of close competitors.
Results show that trust and a higher number of self reported competitors are
associated with a lower probability of reticence, giving credibility to the story
about trust and the fear of detection.
The fourth chapter seeks to address another factor influencing bribery: ethnic
ties. Some work has been done on the relationship between ethnic fractionalisation
and corruption; however, relatively little has been researched on ethnic diversity
and bribery at the micro (firm) level. This is important because there are a number
of different situations that can allow for bribery to show up.
Firm managers who are of an ethnic minority might be discriminated against
and asked to pay larger bribes; and more frequent bribe payments, in this case
firms in ethnically homogeneous areas will pay lower bribes; and bribe less often.
Alternatively firm managers of the majority ethnic group might be more willing to
pay bribes to their own kin group, in this case both the frequency and size of bribe
payments increase with ethnic homogeneity. These two phenomena can also show
up at the individual level, regardless of the level of diversity that occurs at the
regional level. Also, this chapter investigates the use of language and bi-lingualism
in avoiding bribe payments.
The chapter makes multiple contributions. Firstly, it constructs four differ-
ent indices of corruption, at the national and sub-national level, to describe the
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different measures of corruption that have been conceptualised by the literature
(See Appendix A.4.3). It then constructs measures of linguistic, religious and
ethnic fractionalisation & polarisation for Nigeria; something which has not been
done recently due to the unavailability of data. The diversity indices are con-
structed using primary and secondary data. The measures of linguistic diversity
take into account the possibility of bi-lingualism, something that has not been done
before. Bi-lingualism is important to account for because a minority, if discrimi-
nated against, might be able to avoid or reduce the impact of this discrimination
by speaking the same language as the majority group, thereby gaining rapport
and avoiding having to make a bribe payment. A study which attached a person’s
language to their ethnic group would ignore the possibility of multiple languages
being spoken. This chapter overcomes this restriction and allows for a plethora of
language indices to be constructed using the methods proposed in the literature
[Greenberg , 1956]. A regional level analysis is conducted and results show no
significant effect of diversity on any of the corruption indices at the state level;
however, significant result show up when looking at the local government level.
In summary, this dissertation uses both primary and secondary data. It con-
structs indices of corruption and ethnic; linguistic; and religious diversity for Nige-
ria at the National; state; and local government levels, respectively. It analyses
the regional and industry sub-sector variation in the prevalence and magnitude of
bribery amongst formal manufacturing firms in Nigeria. It provides arguments in
favour of indirect questioning over randomised response questioning when asking
sensitive questions; and also provides explanations for the misreporting of data
when using randomised response questioning. The thesis includes the idea that
useful data can be retrieved in the field of corruption by using specific techniques
and that this data can be used to conduct economic analysis at the firm-level in
developing countries.
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows. The next chapter (Chapter
2) describes the data that is used in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 presents
the analysis of the factors influencing: the propensity to pay a bribe; and the
amount of bribe paid, respectively. This chapter uses direct and indirect questions
on bribery to ask firms about their behaviour. The validity of indirect questions
is investigated in Chapter 4. This contribution compares the usefulness of indirect
questioning in comparison with randomised response questioning, concluding that
the former is preferred to the latter in its ability to achieve a higher rate of truth-
telling on the part of interviewees. Chapter 5 asks why the method of randomised
response questioning often fails to achieve its intended purpose of getting honest
answers to sensitive survey questions. Different explanations are presented and
tested. Results show that trust and detection seem to be useful explanations for
the observed state of affairs. Chapter 6 uses data from the survey asking bribe-
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related questions directly; and the analysis of Chapter 3 to analyse the link between
ethnic networks and corruption. Finally Chapter 7 discusses the contributions of
this dissertation; concludes; and proposes extensions for future research. Thus,
Chapter 3 applies a methodology that has been used in the literature to a new
setting: Nigeria. Chapter 4 tests this methodology against an alternative; in
doing this it raises the question of why, despite being guaranteed anonymity, firm
managers are reticent in their responses to sensitive questions. Chapter 5 seeks
to answer this question by investigating the roles of trust; detection; and other
firm characteristics. Chapter 6 uses new data to extend the work of Chapter 3
by looking at the role of ethnicity in business outcomes. In summary, Chapter 3
presents the framework that is used in describing bribery amongst firms; Chapters
4 and 5 justify the use of the methodology that is used in Chapter 3. Given
this justification, Chapter 6 proceeds to extend the framework of Chapter 3 by
including more information to the analysis. Chapter 7 discusses the results of the
main chapters and evaluates the contribution of this dissertation to the body of
knowledge.
1.1 Corruption At The Firm Level In Nigeria: Compara-
tive Data
An international comparison of indirect costs amongst firms in Brazil, China, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa showed that, in all countries, bribes
account for 2% of a firms total annual sales (Figure 1). Despite this, while 25% of
firms in Nigeria perceive corruption to be a serious problem, a higher percentage
of firms in other countries deem corruption to be a serious obstacle to business
operations [Iarossi, Mousley & Radwan , 2009] 1.
Other sources which seek to quantify the impact of corruption on the business
environment also seem to confirm the idea that although corruption is perceived
as a problem in Nigeria, it is not significantly worse than other countries. Trans-
parency International’s Corruption perception index ranks the degree of corrup-
tion in Nigeria as being similar to that of Indonesia, whilst the corruption levels
in Kenya and Venezuela appear to be worse (Table 1.1).
A potential explanation for these results is that firm managers become accus-
tomed to the corruption in the business environment and therefore report lower
levels of it despite the problem being larger than perceived. To rule out this possi-
bility the current study uses objective measures of corruption such as the amount
111 out of Nigeria’s 37 geo-political states were used for this comparison.
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Figure 1: Indirect Costs Of Manufacturing Firms For Different Countries In The
Year 2007
Table 1.1: 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index
Country Rank (out of 180 countries) Index
South Africa 43 5.1
Brazil 72 3.5
China 72 3.5
India 72 3.5
Indonesia 143 2.3
Nigeria 147 2.2
Kenya 150 2.1
Venezuela 162 2.0
The corruption perceptions index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). In
the 2007 CPI Nigeria ranks 147th out of 180 countries.
of informal payments made to conduct business operations. When using these ob-
jective measures the amount of bribes paid in Nigeria is on average lower than the
amount paid in Kenya and similar to that of Indonesia [Iarossi, Mousley & Rad-
wan , 2009]. Looking at the changes in the levels of corruption over time shows
a sustained decrease in the level of corruption over the past decade (Figure 2).
Some of these changes have been attributed to the enacting of the Corrupt Prac-
tices Act and the establishment of anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic
And Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices
and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC). Thus, while corruption appears
to be a problem within Nigeria, respondents seem to consider the efforts to reduce
corruption to be effective and expect the problem to become less of an obstacle
to business in the future [Transparency International , 2007], evidence for this is
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provided in the improving CPI and governance indicators.
Figure 2: Evolution Of Governance And Corruption Indices For Nigeria Over Time
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2 Data On Firm Level Bribery In Nigeria
2.1 Introduction
This investigation uses primary and secondary data. The primary data is col-
lected, by the author, by directly contacting 2,110 firm managers via a telephone
interview. The secondary data is collected from research, government, and non-
governmental organisations including, but not restricted to: the Nigeria Bureau
of Statistics; the World Bank; the Economic And Financial Crimes Commission;
and the Centre For Law Enforcement Education. Many online sources were also
used, including: City Population, Ethnologue, and the World Bank Development
Indicators. Secondary data that is used in the analysis include: a survey of the
names of local government chiefs; collection of spatial data on the local govern-
ment areas; and other data. This data was collected in order to get an insight into
the business environment faced by firms in Nigeria. Some of the uses of the data
include: assigning firms to their respective local government areas; creating esti-
mates of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation for the different regions of the country;
and estimating the population of different ethnic groups within the country.
The fourth main chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 6) uses information on
the ethnic background of managers to investigate a possible link between ethnic
networks and bribe payments between firm managers and local politicians. Field-
work was carried out in order to get this information. The names of the company
owners was available from the Corporate Affairs Commission, the body that reg-
ulates the formation and management of companies. The initial data collection
strategy was to convert the names of the firm managers into their respective ethnic
groups. However, this information was not available in a format accessible to the
public; and extracting this information from would require a substantive number
of worker-hours. Some of the larger firms, and firms with more than one branch
in Nigeria, have information about their managers on the internet, however, the
number of these firms was very small. In order to get the required information
the author contacted the respective 2,110 firms individually by telephone. Firms
were asked for information about the manager in 2007. Data on 1,267 firms was
usable. By contacting the firms directly, and in many cases, speaking directly to
the manager, this investigation was able to retrieve information on the managers’
state of origin; religion; languages spoken as well as their ethnic background. This
data was collected during November 2012 to December 2012.
Other data that was collected for this study include: information on share
prices from the Nigeria Stock Exchange; information on oil revenue from the Nige-
ria Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Finance; Information on household
experiences with corruption from the Afrobarometer survey; and information on
the awarding of government contracts from the Bureau of Public Procurement.
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2.2 The Definitions of Corruption
Corruption is defined as the disregard of rules and regulations in the use of public
office for private gain [Leite & Weidemann , 2002]. This definition covers various
types of corruption: from a police officer overlooking a traffic offence by an indi-
vidual in return for a bribe, to the manipulating of financial statements in order
to hide the theft of funds. This dissertation focuses on the giving of informal gifts
or payments from businesses to public officials in order to speed up business. This
is usually termed as bribery. The Nigerian Criminal Code Act defines “official
corruption” as the giving or promising to give of property or benefits on account
of any act, omission, favour or disfavour of a public official in carrying out his/her
duties or any governmental affairs [ Laws Of The Federation Of Nigeria , 1990].
This study uses this definition of bribery since it contains the giving of informal
gifts or payments to public officials in order to speed the process of doing business.
Such informal payments can be made in order to receive operating licences or to
quicken the pace at which goods are passed through customs.
2.3 The National Bureau Of Statistics & Economic And
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Business Sur-
vey On Crime, Corruption And Awareness Of The
EFCC
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established in 2004
by the Federal Government of Nigeria with the intention of revitalising the Nige-
rian economy. The commission has the authority to coordinate; investigate; and
enforce all economic and financial legislation. The “Business Survey On Crime And
Corruption, And Awareness Of The EFCC” was carried out by the Nigeria Bu-
reau of Statistics (NBS) and the EFCC. Technical assistance was provided by the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as part of the International
Crime and Corruption Business Survey (CCBS). The survey used a structured
questionnaire which consisted of 10 subsections including, but not restricted to:
firm characteristics; crimes; bribery and corruption; intimidation/extortion and
protection money; access to the Justice System; and awareness of the EFCC. The
sample of firms covered 15 economic sectors subject to the International Standards
of Industrial Classifications (ISIC) Revision 3. These were: agriculture; fishing;
mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; building and
construction; wholesale and retail trade; hotels, restaurants and tourism; trans-
port, storage and communication; financial intermediation; real estate, renting and
business activities; public administration and defence; education; health and social
work; and other community, social and personal services.
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The sample frame used for selection of establishments came from the frame
of establishments for: the Economic Survey and Census Division of NBS; the Na-
tional Quick Employment Generation Survey (NQEGS); and the NBS/CBN/NCC
Collaborative Economic Survey. Selection was based on the number of employees
(10 and above); contribution of sector to GDP; and prior performance of the sec-
tor in the economy. Out of 2,775 firms that were selected for the survey, 2,215
(29.8%) were sucessfully contacted; and results from 2,110 (95.3%) of these firms
were useable.
The NBS data includes a series of variables representing operations performed
by companies that required them to meet with with public officials. These are
listed in Table 2.1 and include: clearing goods through customs; obtaining road
worthy certificates; procurement of goods and services from the government; ob-
taining business licenses and permits; getting clearance for environmental or sani-
tary regulations; obtaining residence and work permits; registering a vehicle; being
involved with police investigations; having committed traffic offences; and being in
contact with the courts. These variables are used in Chapter 3 as as measures of
the ways in which public officers might exercise control over the firms operations.
The data also includes information on whether or not a bribe was paid for each of
these activities. This allows for an analysis of the the propensity to bribe condi-
tional on a specific type of contact with a public official; for many different types
of contact with public officials. This data allows for an analysis of differentiated
public officers; and heterogeneity in the effect of meeting with them, respectively.
Looking at different potential bribe attracting activities allows for a distinguishing
of which activities are most likely to attract bribes, and which are less so.
The NBS data also has information on the different ways in which bribery
takes place. That is, whether a firm offers an informal payment to a public officer,
or whether a public official demands a payment from a firm in order to carry
out some special favour. With this information it should be easier to determine
the direction of causality with regards to the payment of bribes; it should be clear
whether the market is created by public officials wanting more money; or by private
firms wanting to bypass or speed up regulations2. The data also includes these
questions for foreign public officials, which allows one to determine who is more
susceptible to engage in corruption with Nigerian firms: foreign public officials or
Nigerian ones3.
The survey also included the street address of each company. This study
2It should be noted that there is the potential for reverse causality in this framework. I.e. a
firm which has been previously demanded for a bribe by an official might tend to offer a bribe
more often. Also, firms being quick to offer bribes might make public officials more likely to
demand them from all firms.
3Comparisons of the behaviour of public officials from different countries is performed by
Fisman & Miguel [2007] and Lambsdorff [1999, 2007]
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Table 2.1: Data Description - NBS Data
Category Variable
Name
Definition Measurement
operation
performed by
companies
conda clearing goods through customs
Dummy
Variable (0;1)
condb obtaining road worthy certificates
condc procurement of goods and services from government
condd obtainig business licenses and permits
conde procurement of goods and services from private companies
condf getting clearance for environmental or sanitary regulations
condg residence and work permits
condh vehicle registrations
condi police investigations
condj traffic offences
condk contact with the court
(company
experience in
corruption)
bribe being
paid in
performing
business
operation
bribea clearing goods through customs
Dummy
Variable (0;1)
bribeb obtaining road worth certificates
bribec procurement of goods and services for government
bribed obtaining business licenses and permits
bribee procurement of goods and services for private companies
bribef getting clearance for environmental or sanitary regulations
bribeg residence and work permits
bribeh vehicle regulations
bribei police investigations
bribej traffic offences
bribek contact with the court
matches these addresses to their respective local government (LG) area using LG
information from the Independent National Electoral Commission [INEC , 2010]
and the City Population database [Brinkhoff , 2013]. The INEC [2010] database
contains information on all the political wards within Nigeria: matched to their
respective local government area; which in turn are matched to their respective
geo-political state. The Brinkhoff [2013] database contains a geographical map-
ping of similar information; it shows the physical location of each LGA within each
state in Nigeria. This information is used in the fourth main chapter (Chapter 6)
to compare the ethnicities of the firm managers to that of the local government
officials to see if sharing a common ethnicity has any effect on the propensity to
pay a bribe (Section 2.6 has more details concerning the primary data collection).
2.4 The World Bank Enterprise Survey
2.4.1 Scope And Coverage
The Enterprise Survey in Nigeria was made up of a series of structured, face-to-face
interviews with the owners and senior managers of a sample of 5,544 companies
across the 36 states and 1 Federal Capital Territory in Nigeria; it was also con-
ducted across most sectors of industrial activity and firm sizes.
The sample was conducted following the International Standard Industrial
Classification Of All Economic Activities (ISIC) revision 3.1 [United Nations ,
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2002]. Following this classification, the following industries were targeted: manu-
facturing; construction; retail and wholesale services; hotels and restaurants; trans-
port, storage and communications; and computer and related activities [World
Bank , 2007]. For companies with 5 or more full-time permanent paid employees
the sample was stratified according to the following categories: {manufacturing;
retail trade; other}. Firms with 4 or less full-time permanent paid employees were
randomly sampled from the population, without stratification. This sample comes
from a population of over 22,000 formal companies [Iarossi, Mousley & Radwan ,
2009, World Bank , 2007] and over 750,000 informal businesses [Iarossi, Mousley
& Radwan , 2009].
2.4.2 Sample Design: Sample Frame
The establishment frames used for selection came from: Nigeria’s Federal Office
Of Statistics, The Corporate Affairs Commission; various governmental depart-
ments and authorities (State Planning Commissions, Revenue And Tax Author-
ity, Ministry of Commerce And Industry, Exporting Zone Authority, Investment
Promotion Agency); the Manufacturers Association Of Nigeria; and the Nigerian
Association of Small And Medium Enterprises [World Bank , 2007].
To check the reliability of the data in the establishment frames, the name,
contact details, sector/activity, and number of employees were verified by phoning
a subset of businesses. 20% of formal manufacturing firms and 5% of formal non-
manufacturing firms were checked during this process. During the survey process,
the establishment frames were updated as new information was received concerning
businesses that had closed or had changed their operations/status, and by doing
so went out of the scope of the study.
2.4.3 Sample Design: Selection Procedure
The sampling strategy was designed to ensure that statistically robust analyses
could be conducted with a level of precision of 7.5% for a 90% confidence interval
for estimates of population proportions at the industry level. The Survey was
stratified by: industry sector; firm size (number of employees); and geographic
location. Stratification by firm-size was performed by dividing the economy into
three groups: small firms (consisting of 5-19 employees); medium sized firms (con-
sisting of 20-99 employees); and large firms (consisting of 100 or more employees).
The stratification by geographic location was conducted to represent the distri-
bution of non-agricultural economic activity in Nigeria. In the current case, this
meant including the main urban areas of the country. For each region, the capital
of each state was chosen as the main centre of population around which non-
agricultural activity is clustered.
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Stratification by sector was done by singling out 9 main manufacturing in-
dustries and grouping the remaining manufacturing industries together into an
additional stratum. Retail and the rest of the non-agricultural economy filled up
the rest of the strata with the rest of the economy being composed of the 3 main
non-agricultural sectors and the rest grouped into another strata. In total, this
added up to 15 different sectors of activity. In order to maintain comparability
with previous studies, food & beverages (ISIC 15) and garment (ISIC 18) man-
ufacturers were included in the sample. The other main industries were chosen
based on the criteria: employment; number of firms; and contribution to GDP.
2.4.4 Gauging The Level Of Bribery
The wording on the questions concerning bribery and tax evasion in the Enterprise
Survey are indirect. Rather than asking how much a firm pays in bribes the surveys
query how much similar firms pay. This method of asking indirectly is thought
to generate more candor on the part of the interviewees about the bribes of their
own firm. This is because the indirect nature of the questions deflects any guilt
away from the firm.
This method of asking indirectly is thought to be useful in gauging the level
of bribe paid by the firm due to the false consensus effect [Ross, Greene & House
, 1977]. This is the phenomenon that people who engage in socially undesirable
behaviour are more likely to overestimate the prevalence of that behaviour amongst
their peers. In this case, firms that pay bribes are more likely to say that similar
firms pay bribes. This helps the current study to interpret the answer to indirect
questions as being representative of the firm itself.
The indirect form of posing questions is similar to that used in the 1998 En-
terprise Survey for Uganda [Reinikka & Svensson , 2003]; the Business Environ-
ment And Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) on the transition countries
[Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann , 2000]; and the North-African Survey of Firms con-
ducted by Universite´ Paris 1 [Delavallade , 2011]. This allows for a higher level of
comparability between different economies than would otherwise be the case.
Further support for the validity of the data concerning informal payments is
provided by the results of similar surveys carried out within Nigeria and in other
countries. In a survey of businesses in Romania [Azfar & Murrell , 2009], there
is no difference in the admitting of bribery between firms asked about their own
businesses and those asked about “businesses like yours”. This lends favour to the
argument that no less information is retrieved by asking bribery related questions
indirectly.
Firm Reports About The Level Of Bribery The data from the world bank
enterprise survey for Nigeria gave firm managers a choice of how to respond to the
29
questions asking for amounts paid in bribes. Firms could choose to report bribe
payments: as a percentage of sales; or in Naira currency. In the dataset used, 52%
of firms said that firms similar to their own paid bribes. Out of the firms that
reported a positive bribe amount; 78% reported this as a percentage of sales; and
22% reported this in Naira.
The dataset includes information on the total value of annual sales, this allows
one to convert the bribes that were reported as a percentage of sales into their Naira
equivalent, and vice versa. Mean comparison tests show that firms who reported
bribes as a percentage of sales report significantly higher values of bribe payments;
bribe payments per employee; profit and amount of moveable capital compared to
the firms that reported positive bribes in terms of Naira amount. Those who
reported in Naira value declared a larger proportion of their sales for tax purposes
and also tended to engage in international importing and exporting more than
the firms who reported in terms of sales. There were no significant differences in
the number of employees; capital per worker; or receipt of government provided
services between the two groups. The median bribe amounts for firms reporting
as a percentage of sales and in Naira were 390,000 and 50,000, respectively.
The disparity between the reports of the firms reporting as a percentage of sales
and in Naira, respectively, is not unique to the Nigerian dataset. Clarke [2011]
documents results from Angola; Botswana; Burundi; the Democratic Republic Of
Congo; the Gambia; Ghana; Guinea-Bissau; Guinea Conakry; Kenya; Mauritania;
Namibia; Rwanda; Swaziland; Tanzania;and Uganda. Results from all of these
countries are the same as the result from the dataset used in this dissertation:
firms that report bribes as a percentage of sales tend to report higher amounts
(when this is converted to a currency figure) than firms who report in terms of the
local currency. Clarke [2011] gives possible reasons for this phenomenon, such as
an imporvement in accuracy when firms report bribes a percentage of sales [Iarossi
, 2006]; alternatively, firms might be less accurate when reporting smaller bribes
as a percentage of sales. Clarke [2011] notes that the differences in reports in his
dataset does not come from outliers biasing the averages or from the possibility
that the two groups of firms are different. Despite this, the current study notes
that in the Nigerian dataset, firms who reported as a percentage of sales have, on
average, a larger amount of moveable capital than firms who reported their bribes
in Naira currency. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) industrial policy on
retail cash collection and lodgement places a limit of 500,000 and 3,000,000 on
cash withdrawals and deposits by individuals and companies, respectively (Before
April 2012, these limits were 150,000 1 million, respectively). Transactions
made above this limit are charged and are subject to investigation by the bank.
For withdrawals, individuals (companies) are charged 3% (5%) for every amount
withdrawn above the limit. For cash deposits, individuals (companies) are charged
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2% (3%) for amounts deposited above the limits (Before April 2012, these charges
were previously between 10% and 20%).
For companies wishing to pay a bribe much greater than this limit, and for
public officials seeking to collect an amount above this limit, this regulation creates
an incentive to use alternative means to make a corrupt transaction. Such a
transaction might occur through the use of moveable capital goods and other
assets. This might explain why firms that report bribes as a percentage of sales
have a higher amount of moveable capital than the firms who report bribes in Naira.
Also, the value of moveable capital might be easier to refer to as a percentage of
sales rather than in Naira amount since it is probably more closely related to the
amount of sales than it is to its (Naira) market value.
2.4.5 Randomised Response Questions
The randomised response (RR) questions in the survey were asked using a variant
of the forced response technique that is described in section 4.2. Interviewees were
given the following instructions:
“Please toss the coin handed to you by the enumerator before each question
is posed without letting him/her see the results. Always answer YES if the coin
comes up HEADS. Answer the question TRUTHFULLY if the coin comes up
TAILS (i.e. answer YES if you have done this behavior; Answer NO if you have
never done this behavior).”
In this case the probability that the interviewee is required to answer the sen-
sitive question truthfully is 1/2, so p = 0.5. The probability of them having to
answer “yes” regardless of the truth is 1/2, so θ = 0.5. Therefore, the probability
that they will be forced to answer “no” regardless of the truth is zero, 1−p−θ = 0.
In this set-up, the respondent is only required to say “no” to a question if he/she
is innocent and he/she receives a tails on the coin flip for that question.
The RR questions used in the analysis are:
1. Have you ever paid less in personal taxes than you should have under the
law?
2. Have you ever paid less in business taxes than you should have under the
law?
3. Have you ever made a misstatement on a job application?
4. Have you ever used the office telephone for personal businesses?
5. Have you ever inappropriately promoted an employee for personal reasons?
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6. Have you ever deliberately not given your suppliers or clients what was due
to them?
7. Have you ever lied in your self-interest?
8. Have you ever inappropriately hired a staff member for personal reasons?
9. Have you ever been purposely late for work?
10. Have you ever unfairly dismissed an employee for personal reasons?
The respondent was allowed to fill in the appropriate answers (yes/no) him-
self/herself. Questions 4,7 and 9 are deemed to be less sensitive [Azfar & Murrell ,
2009]. The behaviour in these three questions are not illegal according to company
law whereas the behaviour concerning the other 7 questions are against the law.
2.4.6 Indirect Questions
The indirect questions used in the questionnaire attempt to get information from
the interviewees by: adjusting the level of detail required in the answers (e.g. by
using categories instead of reported number of occurrences); using longer questions
(which can generate more accurate answers when asking sensitive topics about be-
haviour [Iarossi , 2006]); explaining that the behaviour in question is common;
following a set of warm-up questions (multiple questions concerning the effect of
corruption on business operations are placed in different subsections of the ques-
tionnaire [Warwick & Lininger , 1975, Svensson , 2003]); being asked towards the
middle/end of the questionnaire, by which time the questioner presumably had es-
tablished credibility and trust with the interviewee; being placed amongst a series
of questions about time spent dealing with government regulations, potentially
being less sensitive and more appropriate in such a location; and being phrased
indirectly in order to avoid implicating the interviewee of any wrongdoing. The
survey was carried out by a non public-sector organisation, potentially increasing
participation and attracting the confidence and trust of the participating firms.
Svensson [2003] argues that awareness-raising campaigns about corruption can
help to reduce the sensitivity of the topic. If so, then the presence of such cam-
paigns within Nigeria in addition to media exposure of corruption cases might also
help to make businesses more candid about the issue of corruption.
The indirect questions used in the analysis are:
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
(strongly disagree; tend to disagree; tend to agree; strongly agree)
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 It is common for establishments in this line of business to have to pay
informal payments/gifts to get things done with regard to customs,
taxes, licenses, regulations, etc.
 Establishments in this line of business know in advance about how much
this informal payment/gift is to get things done.
2. We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or
informal payments to public officials to “get things done” with regard to
customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent-
age of total annual sales, or estimated annual value, do establishments like
this one pay in informal payments/gifts to public officials for this purpose?
3. When establishments like this one do business with the government, what
percentage of the contract value would typically be paid in informal pay-
ments/gifts to secure the contract?
4. What percentage of total annual sales would you estimate a typical estab-
lishment in your sector of activity reports for tax purposes?
5. What percentage of the total workforce would you estimate the typical es-
tablishment in your line of business declares for tax purposes?
Indirect questions 1,2 and 3 can provide information on the level of corruption
in the business environment that might be related to RR questions 5, 8 and 10.
However, of potentially greater interest is the relationship between indirect ques-
tions 4 & 5 and RR questions 1 & 2. These questions relate to tax evasion of some
sort. Indirect questions 4 & 5 respectively relate to sales and workers declared
for tax purposes while RR questions 1 & 2 relate to the nonpayment of personal
and business taxes, respectively. This study uses these questions to test the effec-
tiveness of indirect questioning versus RR questioning in getting interviewees to
respond honestly to sensitive questions.
2.5 Centre For Law Enforcement Education Survey
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no data exists for the current level of
ethnic diversity in Nigeria. The 2006 National Census, which was a survey of
all households in the country, did not include any questions asking people about
their ethnic or linguistic group 4. Some of the most widely used measures of ELF
data back to 1972 [Taylor & Hudson , 1972]; and whilst the CIA World Factbook
provides estimates of the population of some of the most populous and politically
4Correspondance with the National Population Commission (2010)
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influential groups, these do not represent a comprehensive or accurate view of
the 250+ ethnic groups contained within the nation [Central Intelligence Agency
, 2013]. This lack of recent data in ethnicities poses a potential problem for the
analysis of ethnicity and bribery.
In order to solve the problem of lack of data on ethnicities in Nigeria this study
uses information from a representative household survey that was conducted in all
36 geo-political states and the Federal Capital Territory. The survey was conducted
by the CLEEN Foundation between February and May 2010. The total sample
size was 10,228, which comprised of equal percentages of males and females of 18
years and above. Data was collected via in-home face-to-face interviews using a
stratified multi-stage random selection procedure. The interviews were done by a
Lagos based social research company, Practical Sampling International.
The survey covered questions about patterns of crime within the country and
also asked respondents for general information, including: marital status; relation-
ship to the head of household; the state and local government area that they reside
in; their religion; and their ethnicity. The question about ethnicity was asked to-
wards the end of the survey, when the interviewer would probably have developed
some rapport with the manager [Svensson , 2003]. This question received no non-
response. The current investigation uses this data to generate national; state; and
local government level indices of ELF for Nigeria and its sub-national states and
local government areas, respectively. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this
is the first study that generates and uses sub-national ELF in this way.
2.6 Fieldwork And Primary Data Collection
Primary data was collected for this study, this comprises of a survey of managers
from the businesses contained in the NBS/EFCC survey described in Section 2.3.
All firms from the NBS/EFCC dataset were contacted. Primary data on the ethnic
group; gender; religion; languages spoken; and state of origin of the managers of the
respective companies in the NBS/EFCC survey is used in this study. This data
was collected by contacting the companies directly. Telephone calls were made
between November 2012 to December 2012 to each of the 2,110 businesses in the
sample. Out of the 2,110 companies, 1,267 companies were successfully contacted,
this represents 60% of the total sample. Results from all 1,267 managers were
analysable. Since the NBS/EFCC survey was conducted in 2007, information was
collected about the managers in 2007 and not the manager at the time of calling.
Information about the ethnicity and state of origin of the managers allows this
study to account for the movement of labour within the borders of Nigeria, it also
removes the restriction of assigning one ethnic group to a geographic area. This
study combines the data on ethnicity with the information on the State and LGA
of the company to create measures of ethnic diversity at the national; state; and
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local government level.
2.7 Basic Summary Statistics From The ES and NBS Datasets
Summary statistics for the Enterprise Survey and the NBS Survey are shown in
Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. The figures in both tables refer only to the
manufacturing firms of the respective datasets.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics For The Enterprise Survey Dataset
Variable Statistic All Firms Non-
Bribers
Bribers
Bribe Amount (in ’000 Naira) Mean 294 0 572
Median 8 0 264
Std. Dev. 652 0 816
Bribe Amount per employee (in ’000 Naira) Mean 20.6 0.0 40.0
Median 0.5 0.0 22.2
Std. Dev. 49.6 0.0 63.3
No. of employees Mean 17 18 16
Median 12 13 12
Std. Dev. 16 18 14
Profit per employee Mean 158.7 155.3 161.8
Median 90.0 77.8 100.1
Std. Dev. 216.8 211.8 221.4
Capital per worker Mean 230.2 190.9 267.2
Median 100.0 75.0 125.0
Std. Dev. 718.8 544.4 850.0
Index of public goods received from govern-
ment (0-2)
Mean 0.29 0.25 0.32
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 0.50 0.48 0.51
Percentage of sales declared for tax purposes Mean 69.6 66.1 72.8
Median 75.0 70.0 75.0
Std. Dev. 27.4 28.2 26.2
N 2001 972 1029
In each column, for each variable, the table reports the mean, median and standard deviation
for each (sub)sample. The last row details the number of observations for each (sub)sample.
The first column of figures in Table 2.2 shows the mean, median and standard
deviation of the variables for all manufacturing firms. The sample size for the
summary statistics in this table is 2,001 firms. The second column of figures
relate to the manufacturing firms who reported that similar firms paid a zero
bribe payment to government officials, while the last column of figures relates to
firms who reported that similar firms made a positive bribe payment to goverment
officials. Profit is measured by deducting the previous years operating costs from
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the value of sales in the previous year. Capital is calculated as the net book value
of machinery, vehicles and equipment at the end of the previous year. The goods,
which were enquired about, that the firm could receive from the government were:
water and electricity. All figures denoting money are shown in ‘000 Naira ().
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics Of Bribery And Meeting With Officials - NBS
Dataset
(1) (2) (3)
Bribery/ Meeting With Official
All Firms Met With
An Official
Bribed An
Official
Met With An Official 0.37 1 1
(Mean) Average Number Of Types Of
Officials Met With
1.66 (2.72) 4.43 (2.74) 4.20 (2.50)
Bribery Episode 0.14 0.36 1
(Mean)Number Of Types Of Bribery
Episodes
0.44 (1.39) 1.16 (2.07) 3.20 (2.31)
Observations 331 124 45
(Mean)Value Of Bribes (’000 )() 0.616 (4.56) 1.65 (7.36) 3.43 (9.49)
The unit of observation is the firm. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
For Table 2.3, non-parenthsised figures are mean averages, the parenthesised
figures are the standard deviations. The sample size for the summary statistics in
this table is 331 firms because of the smaller sample size for the NBS survey. The
first column of numbers is based on all firms; the second column is based on firms
that met with at least 1 of the public officials that were asked about; the third
column of numbers is based on firms that met with at least 1 public official and
bribed at least 1 public official. A total of 11 types of public officials were asked
about and meeting with an official was a pre-condition for paying a bribe to that
official. The table describes the number of types of public officials met with and
not the number of public officials met with. “Met with an official” is a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm met with at least 1 official, 0 otherwise. “Bribery Episode”
is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm paid at least 1 bribe, 0 otherwise.
The figures in the table show that 37% of all firms (124 firms out of 331) met
with at least one type of official in the year preceding the survey. Firms met with
a mean average of 1.66 types of official; this average rises to 4.43 types of official
when focusing solely on firms who met with an official, i.e. ignoring the zeros.
Fourteen percent of all firms bribed an official (45 firms); out of the firms that
met with an official, 36% of them bribed an official. Those who paid a bribe to an
official did so, on average, to 3.2 types of public official. The average bribe paid
by bribing firms was approximately 3,400.
The relevance of this data comes from the fact that the probability of paying
a bribe to a specific type public official can be conditioned on the occurrence of a
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meeting with that type of official. This allows for the analysis to include a two-
stage model that estimates the propensity to meet with a type of public official
(e.g. a police officer); and then estimate the propensity to bribe the same type of
official conditional on meeting them. The nature of the business operations that
the firms engage in mean that they are only able to pay a bribe if they physically
meet with a public official; bribes are not paid electronically. Hence, not meeting
with a police officer is a perfect predictor of not bribing a police officer. Using
this data, the analysis builds on previous work that models the unconditional
propensity to bribe [Svensson , 2002].
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3 Factors Influencing The Propensity To Bribe
And Size Of Informal Payments: Evidence From
Formal Manufacturing Firms In Nigeria
Abstract
This chapter uses two unique datasets on manufacturing firms in Nige-
ria to examine the factors which influence who pays a bribe and how much
is paid. The study finds strong evidence for the control rights hypothesis:
meetings with public officials are positively associated with the incidence of
bribery. Evidence is also found for the bargaining hypothesis: the amount
of bribe that a firm pays will depend on its current and future ability to
pay as well as its outside options. The investigation contributes to the liter-
ature by disaggregating: type of bribe; and instigator of the bribe transac-
tion. Among the different types of informal payment, traffic offences seem
to attract the most bribe demands (from public officials) and offers (from
companies).
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3.1 Introduction: The Payment Of Bribes When Doing
Business
Firm chracteristics and the institutional framework shape the way business is done
and lead to different outcomes with regards to the payment of bribes. Using data
on firms in the formal manufacturing sector in Nigeria, firms are asked about the
bahaviour of similar firms when coming into contact with public officials: whether
they are bribers (similar firms made at least one informal payment in the 12 months
preceding the survey); or non-bribers (similar firms did not make an informal
payment in the 12 months preceding the survey). The distinguishing of firms by
their reports of “similar firms” is a useful strategy to understand the determinants
and consequences of firm-level bribery. Reports of similar firms are believed to
be representative of the firm itself. The bribing behaviour adopted by firms is
seen as the result of an optimising behaviour in an industrial organisation scenario
and is an indicator of firm-level responses to potential constraints in the business
environment. In urban Nigeria, the business environment is characterised by micro;
small; medium; and large enterprises. Few firms comprise a monopoly, and the
decision to allocate money towards bribe payments for the purpose of complying
with regulation is likely to be influenced by the relative lack of alternative options
and the profitability of the firm.
Due to the secretive and somewhat tabooed nature of bribery, it might appear
impossible to collect quantitative information on bribe levels from firms [Reinikka
& Svensson , 2003]. On the face of this, any effort at estimating the proportion of
firms engaging in bribery would be subject to bias from underreporting. However,
this chapter provides evidence for the contrary view: that, by using specially de-
signed data collection strategies, useful information can be retrieved from questions
concerning bribery. This makes it possible to derive estimates of: the proportion
of firms that pay bribes; the amount of bribes that these companies are required
to pay; and the distribution of the bribe payments5.
Company-level bribery can sometimes occur when a firm engages in interna-
tional trade [Lambsdorff , 1998]. An importing or exporting firm might offer an
informal payment to a public official if they are handling banned cargo or have
failed to declare the contents of their cargo and wish the official to overlook this.
A report by the United Nations [United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime ,
2010] states 23 (24) different vulnerabilities of the customs service (transportation
sector) that make it more likely for a business to pay a bribe to a public official.
These include a) the active presence of numerous government agencies in the ports
and; b) the wide powers given to the customs officials.
5Despite the data collection strategies, however, there might still be cases of misreporting
of bribe payments in the sample, nevertheless, this chapter argues that the strategies employed
significantly reduce the bias that might be inherent in answers to sensitive questions.
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Having many types of government agencies at the ports make the potential im-
porter/exporter subject to control by any one of these agencies6. This can lengthen
the process of clearing goods. Furthermore, the clearing process can involve dupli-
cated procedures that send the importers from one government agency to another.
These requirements also create a potential barrier to trade by delaying the clear-
ance of goods. These factors create an incentive for the importing/exporting firm
to give facilitation payments7 (or ”grease money”) to speed the process of goods
clearance [Ibid].
Customs officials are granted powers by the Customs and Excise Manage-
ment Act (CEMA) of 1958 to delay the clearance of cargo without the adjudi-
cation of any independent arbiter. This potentially leaves the process of import-
ing/exporting at the discretion of the customs official. In addition, any fees for
container rental charges or demurrage incurred during any hold up are borne by
the importer/exporter. On top of this, under the regime of destination inspection
(DI) which began in 2006, importers of goods that did not receive a Clean Report
Of Inspection (CRI) were given a deadline of three months to clear them, after
which the goods were up for confiscation by the government. These added con-
straints also increase the chance of a firm providing an official with an informal
gift in order to speed up clearance and avoid the added costs of delay8.
Various policies have been introduced to address corruption. Many of these
reforms, or proposals, have targetted the discretion/power of public officials in
dealing with private agents [The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , 1998, Organiza-
tion For Economic Co-Operation And Development , 1997, United Nations Office
On Drugs And Crime , 2005]. It has been argued that the constant evaluation
of managerial and business performance can reduce administrative problems and
bottlenecks in the public sector and therefore reduce the possibility of bureaucrats
extracting bribes [Rose-Ackerman , 1996, World Bank , 1997, Ades & Di Tella ,
1999, Otusanya , 2013]. This chapter seeks to examine the extent to which public
officials are to blame for the occurrence of bribery within Nigeria. This is done by
examining the causes of: the propensity to pay a bribe; the size of the bribe; the
frequency of the bribe payment; and the instigator of the transaction.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the eco-
6Agencies present at Nigerian ports include: Immigration, the Police, Port Quarantine,
NDLEA (National Drug Law Enforcement Agency), SSS (State Security Service), NAFDAC
(National Agency For Food And Drug Administration And Control), and SON (Standards Or-
ganization Of Nigeria)
7A facilitation payment is defined as any money given to a public official with the purpose of
speeding up a routine government action [The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , 1998] (i.e. money
to speed up the doing of an act which is not illegal).
8The report also presents information on bribery in the transport sector. Payments (“kick-
backs”) for awarding construction contracts or for information on competing bids; and bribes for
overlooking unfit road vehicles were listed as some of the bribe attracting activities.
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nomic literature on bribery and introduces a framework to model the supply of
bribes. It also describes how this study builds on the previous work. The data
and variables to be included in the model are outlined in section 3.3. Section 3.4
presents the methodology to be used. Section 3.5 compares the two datasets that
are used in this study. Sections 3.6 to 3.10 present the empirical results from the
World Bank dataset; and the NBS dataset, respectively. Finally, section 3.11
concludes and suggests potential avenues for future research.
3.2 Literature Review And Conceptual Framework
This section reviews the literature on bribe payments at the firm level; states the
contribution of this chapter to this literature; and explains the significance of this
contribution. The study of corruption is riddled with questions concerning the
validity of the data [Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi , 2006]. This is due to the
socially undesirable and sometimes illegal nature of the act, leading to the under-
reporting of bribery. This makes any measure of bribery prone to measurement
error due to missreporting. Therefore, any estimate of the prevalence of bribery
among a sample of firms is likely to be downward biased.
Another potential source of error when dealing with firm level measures of
bribery is sampling error [Ibid.]. Some industries and regions might be more
prone to bribery than others, therefore, any inference based on these industries
alone might give a biased estimate of the level of bribery. Furthermore, when
dealing with an environment where informal payments are sometimes required
to obtain operating licences and electrical connections, potential firms might be
unable to enter a particular market because of this, i.e. the demand for informal
payments might act as a barrier to entry for some industries. This is another
potential source of sampling error because any estimate of the proportion of bribing
firms will necessarily exclude firms which are not operating due to an inability
or unwillingness to bribe (or both). Nevertheless, the stratified sampling and
indirect questioning methods allow for reasonable inferences to be made about the
sample which can be extrapolated to the population even in the presence of sample
selection.
Previous studies on the factors influencing corruption have used a cross-section
of countries. This body of literature has uncovered the following factors to be
associated with lower levels of corruption: a greater proportion of women in par-
liament, the civil service, and the labour force [Swamy, Knack, Lee & Azfar , 2001];
higher relative9 wages for public officials [Van Rijckeghem & Weder , 1997]; and a
common law legal system [Treisman , 2000]. Many of the determinants do not vary
below the country level; and many are not subject to change from specific govern-
9Ratio of Civil Service wages relative to (private sector) manufacturing wages
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ment policies. The data used in this paper allows for the study of corruption with
variables that vary across firms and types of public official. This contributes to the
economic literature on the study of corruption and provides practical implications
for policy interventions.
Framework For Modelling The Supply Of Bribes This section describes
the theoretical framework that this chapter uses to analyse the factors which affect
the supply of bribes amongst manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The subsequent
empirical analysis is based upon this framework. Svensson [2002] introduces a
model to understand the factors which influence bribery: both the occurrence of
bribery and the amount paid as a bribe. This chapter uses a variation of this
model, developed by the author, to examine the supply of informal payments
amongst firms in Nigeria. The model considers an economy with a large number
of private firms and bureaucrats (public officials), with each company being under
the reach of one bureaucrat. Officials act as profit maximisers, therefore, they seek
to maximise the amount of bribes that they can extract from each firm, subject to
the constraints that: they might get caught and punished; or the firm might exit
the market and no longer remain under their control, therefore being no longer
able to pay them a bribe.
Public officials have the ability to demand payments from firms as much or
as little as they please. This ability stems from their “control rights” over the
firm, that is, the extent to which the firm is bound by regulation to approach
the public official for public goods/services required in the course of business.
These include: business licences; customs clearances; power grid connections; and
special operating permits. These control rights mean that the public official is
able to potentially affect the business decisions and cash flow of the company.
For example, a firm that cannot clear a good through customs, due to a bribe-
demanding official, faces an income constraint due to a restriction in the market
that it can supply to.
The level of control rights that the official has depends on the extent to which
its decisions affect the firms’ outcomes. I.e. low control rights mean that the firm
can refuse to pay a bribe without major consequences on its output decisions or
sales, whilst a bureaucrat with a high degree of control is more able to influence
the decisions of the firm by demanding a bribe. A bureaucrat might be said to
have a low level of control rights over firms in the informal sector due to their
activities being relatively unseen and/or unregulated, and a high degree of control
rights over companies in receipt of government services, such as electricity or water
supply, in order to run their business. Firms who import or export directly can
also be said to be under an official with high control rights due to the clearance of
goods depending on the discretion of a customs official.
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A relatively simple case of two sectors, S = {s1, s2}, is proposed. Firms in
sector s1 can refuse to pay bribes without inconvenience, whilst firms in sector s2
must pay bribes if demanded. A public official who interacts with a firm in sector
s2 will demand a bribe if the expected benefit from receiving a bribe is more than
the expected cost. That is, b − pcb > 0, where b is the amount of bribe; p is
the probability of being caught and punished; c is the cost of being caught and
punished10.
Moving to the demand for bribes, the distribution of c is allowed to be uni-
formly vary between [0, c¯] (as in [Erard & Feinstein , 1994, Ades & Di Tella ,
1999]), therefore allowing for the existence of both honest and corrupt officials.
Furthermore, all bureaucrats face an exogenously given probability 1− f of being
fired, allowing for the uncertainty of their post. The wage rate in each sector is
normalised to zero and at time t = 0 officers must choose which sector to work in.
Each sector employs half of the population of officials. An official who is indifferent
between working in either sector is randomly assigned to a sector that has room
for employment.
In equilibrium, all bureaucrats with cost c ≤ 1/p choose to work in sector s2,
while those with cost c > 1/p are randomly assigned to the remaining posts. The
probability g that a randomly selected official in sector s2 will ask for an informal
payment is
g =
{
1− 1/(2pc) if pc > 2
1 otherwise
(3.2.0.1)
.
Public officials who wish to demand bribes will choose to work for government
sectors where control rights are high.
A randomly picked company is required to pay a bribe with probability:
d(i) = ρ(i ∈ s2) ∗ g (3.2.0.2)
, where ρ(i ∈ s2) is the probability that firm i operates in sector s2.
Given that a firm interacts with a corrupt bureaucrat in a given period t, it is
possible to solve the probability of the firm being demanded a bribe in each future
period evaluated from time t. This probability function is defined as: dt+n =
fn + (1 − fn)g = fn − fng + g. Hence, if a firm has already been matched with
a corrupt official in period t, then the probability of the firm being asked to pay
a bribe in period t + n will be the summation of: the probability that the official
is not fired by period t+ n; and the probability that the next bureaucrat will ask
for a bribe in period t+ n (if the initial official had been fired by period t+ n).
10This assumes the the cost of being caught is proportional to the amount of bribe paid.
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Each firm has the objective of maximising the present value of discounted
cash flows (profits minus informal payments). Firms in sector s2 have capital
k and firm specific knowledge τ of production. τ is distributed according to a
known distribution function T (·). The share of capital that can be resold and/or
reinvested is denoted by κi. This measures the degree to which capital is (not)
sunk (a low κi implies a larger share of sunk capital). At time 0 each firm has the
choice of investing in either sector s1 or s2 but not both.
Companies in sectors 1 and 2 produce goods x1 and x2, respectively. Both goods
are traded internationally. The country is a price taker and so market prices in
sectors 1 and 2 are given by 1 and δ, respectively. Production technologies are
given by xi1 = f(k
i, li) and xi2 = f(k
i, li, τ i) where l is labour; and production
is increasing with τ . The supply of labour is unlimited at the given wage rate w.
The price of the second good is uncertain, i.e. δt ∈ [δ, δ¯] is a random variable that
is independently & identically distributed over time.
Profit is sector s1 is given by:
pi(k, l(w)|s1) = f(k, l(w))− wl(w).
Profit in the second sector s2 at time t is given by:
pi(k, l(w/δt); τ, δt|s2) = δtf(k, l(w/δt); τ)− wl(w/δt)11.
In a situation with no bribery, firm i has the value function:
Vt(k|S) = Et(
∞∑
n=1
βn−1pi(k, ·|S)) for S = {s1, s2}.
where Et(·) represents the expectation of the term enclosed in brackets condi-
tional on the level of information at time t.
Once requested for a bribe, firms in sector s2 can choose to either pay the bribe
or exit the industry. Firms will choose to exit the market if the gain from exiting
(the alternative return from using their capital elsewhere) is greater than the gain
from paying the bribe and staying in the market (current and future net profits).
∞∑
n−1
βn−1pi(κk, ·|s1) ≥ pi(k, τt, ·|s2)−b(τt)+Et
∞∑
n−1
β[pi(k, τt+n, ·|s2)−dt+n(s2)b(τt+n)]
(3.2.0.3)
where b(τt) is the amount of bribe paid in period t as a function of τt. The
first term of this expression is the discounted profit the firm would receive if it
11Firm subscripts have been dropped. The labour demand function is given by l(w/δt). The
first order condition: δtfl(k, l; τ)− w = 0 means that firms adjust their number of employees to
make the marginal product of labour equal to the real wage rate.
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sold and reinvested its capital in sector s1 during period 1. The first two terms on
the right hand side denote net profit when faced with a bribe demanding public
official. The third term on the right hand side represents discounted future net
profits.
Firms cannot borrow in order to pay bribes so in each period net profit must
be non-negative:
pi(k, τt, ·|s2)− b(τt) ≥ 0 ∀ t. (3.2.0.4)
The amount of bribery in equilibrium is determined as follows. Given (3.2.0.4),
the bribe maximising official will demand payments so that (3.2.0.3) becomes an
equality. Also, expected future net profit Etpi(·) is constant and independent of
the price of x2 because bribes absorb any excess over reservation level. Therefore,
each period, the exit constraint (3.2.0.3) is identical except for the first term on
the right hand side, current profit. Rearranging this expression with an equality
constraint gives:
b(τt) = pi(k, τt, ·|s2)+Et
∞∑
n−1
β[pi(k, τt+n, ·|s2)−dt+n(s2)b(τt+n)]−
∞∑
n−1
βn−1pi(κk, ·|s1)
(3.2.0.5)
This expression has b(τ) on both the left hand side and the right hand side. It
therefore maps b(τ) onto itself. The fixed point value of b(τ) is determined by:
b∗i(τt) = pi(k, τt, ·|s2) + d′′(1 + d′)−1p¯i(k, li, ·|s2)− (1− β)(1 + d′)pi(κk, ·|s1)12
(3.2.0.6)
Equation (3.2.0.6) states that the amount that a business will need to give in
informal payments is positively related to current and expected future profits, and
negatively related to the profit gained from reallocating capital elsewhere (pi(κk)).
I.e. higher current or future profits weakens the firms “bargaining power”13 whilst
lower sunk costs strengthen its bargaining position.
Equation (3.2.0.6) also implies that the equilibrium bribe amount b(τt) is neg-
atively related to g but that the expected bribe amount, d ∗ b(τt) is positively
related to g. That is, a lower probability of a public official demanding a bribe will
mean a lower expected bribe to be paid but a higher equilibrium bribe to be paid
(when a firm interacts with a corrupt official). The reason for this comes from
the explanation about bargaining power. A lower probability of bribe demands
12Where p¯i(k, ·|s2) ≡ Etpi(k, τt+n, ·|s2) for all n ≥ 1, and d′ ≡ β(f(1− β) + g(1− f)(1−
β)−1(1− fβ)−1), and d′′ ≡ β(1− f)(1− g)(1− β)−1(1− fβ)−1.
13The ability to bargain for a lower bribe amount.
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will increase expected future profits, these will weaken the bargaining power of the
firm, so the bureaucrat can demand a higher payment14.
Solving equation (3.2.0.4) to find the conditions under which this constraint
holds gives:
1− (1− fβ)pi(κk, ·|s1)
β(1− f)p¯i(k, li, ·|s2) ≤ g. (3.2.0.7)
This means that a sufficiently high probability of a bribe being demanded, g,
ensures that the equilibrium bribe amount is less than profit [Shleifer & Vishny
, 1993]. Equations (3.2.0.2) and (3.2.0.6) present two formulas with which to
estimate the behaviour of bribe payments amongst firms in Nigeria. Whether or
not a firm pays a bribe depends on where it chooses to locate (industry-wise) and
the expected cost of the bureaucrat being punished for engaging in corruption. In
the case that a firm meets with a public official and pays a bribe, the amount paid
will depend on company specific characteristics. These include: current profits;
expected future profits; and the sunk cost component of capital. The current study
extends the empirical specification of this model by including more variables to
measure the control-rights hypothesis. This allows for a broader view of the things
that potentially determine whether or not a firm pays a bribe.
Certain assumptions are inherent in this analysis. In the real world public
officials do not have full information about firms. Price shocks, τ , and profits, pi,
are not observable. This potentially gives the firm a stronger bargaining position
than is shown in the model. Nevertheless, introducing asymmetric information into
the model does not affect the qualitative results [Svensson , 2002]. In the model,
each firm is matched to only one bureaucrat. If the firm can meet with more than
one bureaucrat, each providing the same service/licence, then the results will not
be qualitatively affected if both officials choose to collude. If, however, they choose
to compete for bribes (i.e. outbid each other by demanding a lower bribe than
the other bureaucrat(s)) then the refusal power of the firm might increase [Shleifer
& Vishny , 1993]. In the case where a firm needs two complimentary licences in
order to function, each of which is provided by a different public body, providers
of these licences will tend to act independently: different ministries and agencies
set their own bribe level to maximise their individual bribe revenue rather than
the combined revenue of the bribe collectors. This scenario is prevalent in Nigeria
(amongst other African countries), India and post-Communist Russia [Ibid.]. In
order to start a business in Nigeria a company is required to register with the
Corporate Affairs Commission; the Federal Board of Inland Revenue; the Ministry
of Finance; and the State Tax Office. This is in addition to receiving inspection
14A fall in the probability of meeting a corrupt official, d, cannot be outweighed by an increase
in bribe payment b(τt). This is because this would suggest that a lower d would increase b(τt)
and therefore result in lower expected future net profits and lower b(τt), a contradiction.
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from the local government and paying fees at a designated bank [World Bank ,
2011]. These facts tend to suggest that the model adequately describes the nature
of bribery in Nigeria.
Another assumption in this model is that profits are not determined by the
amount of bribes paid, and that entry & exit into the market do not affect equi-
librium profits. Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that these restrictions
are valid in this model. Firstly, the sample of firms used is populated with mainly
small-sized firms (a median of 12 employees in the enterprise data). Research
suggests that the regulatory system is not captured by such firms but by bigger
companies with a relatively large amount of political power [Delavallade , 2011].
Secondly, the nature of uncertainty surrounding a public officials tenure in office
[Thomas, M. , 1999] suggests that they heavily discount the future. Therefore,
any graft scheme that aims to maximise bribe revenue by controlling entry and
exit into a market does not seem plausible because bureaucrats will try to acquire
as much bribe income as they can as quickly as possible in case they are soon fired
or transferred to a new position. This seems to occur within the Nigerian Police
Force, reports [Human Rights Watch , 2010] detail police officers being required
to pass on a portion of their collected bribes up the chain of command to their
superior officers who pay their superior officers in turn. Officers sometimes bribe
their superior officers in order to be assigned to positions which have a relatively
better opportunity to demand bribes from civilians. In return, superior officers
sometimes set monetary targets to be achieved by the lower-rank officers in these
positions. Individuals that fail to collect (and pass on) a minimum amount of
bribes can be transferred to another position with a lesser chance of collecting (an
receiving) bribes. Despite these arguments in favour of the conceptual framework
there is literature that predicts a positive relationship between bribes and profits
[Bliss & Di Tella , 1997]. Section 3.6 attempts to empirically resolve the issue of
reverse causality issue by instrumenting for profits. The next section discusses the
data used to estimate the supply of informal payments.
Empirical Work On The Supply Of Bribes Svensson [2003] uses data on
Ugandan firms to describe the factors driving: the giving of informal payments;
and the size of these gifts. The first of these is linked to the level of required
contact that the firm has with public officials (the control rights hypothesis). On
the other hand, the amount of bribe that is paid is linked to the firm’s ability
to pay and refusal power (bargaining power). Whilst the results are statistically
significant, the analysis suffers from a relatively small sample size (230). Out of
230 companies, only 176 answered the bribery-related question. Out of these firms
only 143 reported a positive bribe, therefore, the analysis on bargaining rights was
restricted to this sub-sample. Also, the estimation included outliers which, in a
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smaller sample, are more likely to bias the results. The current chapter builds on
this work by using a much larger sample size, this gives more power to the study
and decreases the probability that the results are driven by outliers.
This study also builds on the previous literature by increasing the number of
variables used as measures of meetings with government officials. In addition to the
receiving of public services; whether or not the company engages in international
trade; and the amount of tax that is declared, the analysis includes a dummy indi-
cating whether the government was the principal purchaser of the establishment’s
output; and an index of tax exemptions (section 3.4). Adding to the number of
variables that fall under the control rights hypothesis helps to strengthen the re-
sults. If all variables (original and added) return significant coefficients and their
expected signs, then this will give more weight to the argument that increased
contact with public officials (who have discretion over the granting of services and
the receiving of bribes) increases the chance of a company paying a bribe.
[Delavallade , 2011] explores the link between tax evasion and bribery. This
adds to previous work which finds bribery and tax evasion to be substitutes (firms
leave the formal sector in order to avoid bribes; and firms in the formal sector are
less able to escape being targeted for bribes) [Rand & Tarp , 2010] and work that
suggests that their relationship might be complementary [Johnson, Kaufmann,
McMillan & Woodruff et al. , 2000] (companies might pay bribes to tax officials in
order to be allowed to hide their sales). Delavallade finds a threshold level of tax
evasion15, before which the complemantary relationship persists and after which
the substitutary effect dominates. One potential limitation of the Delavallade
[2011] paper is that the measure of bribery is a categorical ordered response to
the question of whether similar firms have to give informal gifts to public officials
in order to work. The responses are: never; seldom; sometimes; often; mostly;
and always. Whilst this gives a measure of the frequency of bribery, it does not
measure the level of bribes. Previous work [Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda , 2010] shows
that an estimate of the prevalence of bribery can change depending on whether one
uses the absolute frequency of bribe paying transactions; the frequency of bribe
paying transactions as a share of the total number of transactions; or the aggregate
amount of money paid in bribes. The current study adds to the literature by
complementing the categorical measure of bribe frequency with a currency measure
denoting the actual bribe amounts paid (in ’000 Naira) by bribing firms. This
allows an analysis of not only the factors contributing to the propensity to bribe
and frequency of bribe payment, but also the factors influencing the bribe amount.
In doing this, the current chapter will use two16 out of the three bribe measures
15The threshold occurs where the firm hides 55% of sales.
16The analysis in chapter 6 uses all three measures defined in [Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda , 2010]
and adds a fourth. The results of these estimations are shown in the Appendix Section A.4.3.
48
stated in Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda [2010], the previous studies listed [Svensson , 2003,
Delavallade , 2011, Rand & Tarp , 2010] use only one of the three measures. In
doing this, this paper will provide a more comprehensive discussion of the nature
of bribery and the factors determining the prevalence; magnitude; and frequency
of bribe payments amongst manufacturing firms in Nigeria.
Adding bribe amounts to the analysis will also help to decrease potential re-
sponse bias that can occur when a question is asked that requires the opinion of the
interviewee. Two firms, both identical in observable features, might have to pay
the same amount of bribe the same number of times per month. Nevertheless, the
firms might respond differently to the bribery related question used in Delavallade
[2011]. This bias hinders an unbiased comparison between firms (whether similar
or not), however, the use of bribe amounts might help to reduce this bias.
Unbundling the concept of corruption can help to make progress with finding
out facts relating to it (Mishra, 2009)17. Fan, Lin & Treisman [2010] showed that
different types of corruption can have different effects on an economy and economic
agents might settle for certain types of corruption as a second best option due to
the worse effects of other types. This variability in the nature of corruption can also
be applied to bribery: different types of bribery might have different drivers. Due
to the variety of activities which may involve a bribe payment, having to pay bribes
“to be able to work” is open to different interpretations which might lead to a bias
in the responses of firms. The response to the question might depend on what work
the company was involved in. Paying bribes in order to clear goods with customs
would be different from paying bribes in order to bypass punishment for traffic
offences, yet both activities might be what different firms mean by being able to
work18. A bribe to a customs official might also be much higher than that paid to
a traffic police officer. This chapter adds to the adds to the body of knowledge by
unbundling the concept of bribery. The prevalence and reasons for different types
of bribery are laid out. This allows for an understanding as to which activities
attract the most graft. The data used in the rest of this chapter is described in the
next subsection. The next subsection also outlines the construction of variables
and their use in the analysis.
17Correspondance with Mishra.
18The survey contains two other bribery related questions, one of which asks whether similar
firms had to make informal payments to start their activity, and the other asks whether they
have to make informal payments to accelerate administrative procedures.
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3.3 Data And Variables Measuring The Determinants And
Scale Of Bribery
Data for this chapter is taken primarily from business surveys within Nigeria.
These are: the Nigeria Bureau Of Statistics (NBS) and the Economic And Fi-
nancial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Business Survey On Crime And Corruption
And Awareness Of The EFCC; and the Enterprise Survey For Nigeria. Both NBS
and Enterprise surveys include businesses from all 36 states of Nigeria as well as
the Federal Capital Territory. The datasets also cover the manufacturing sector,
which is the focus of this chapter. Both surveys also ask questions on bribery,
and more specifically, the relative frequency with which bribes are paid and the
amount paid.
Variables Used This section describes the variables used in the forthcoming
analysis. The data is described in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the first (World Bank)
data set; and Tables 3.3; and 3.4 for the second (NBS) set of data. All currency
figures are measured in ’000 Naira. In general, the variables represent either the
control rights or the bargaining mechanisms, respectively.
Current profit is measured as the value of total sales minus operating costs and
interest payments19 20. Capital stock is calculated as the resale value of machinery,
vehicles and equipment. The sunk cost component of capital stock represents the
ability to reallocate capital elsewhere. It is estimated using data on the resale and
replacement value of capital stock21. The resale value is how much it would cost
to purchase the equipment in its condition at the time. The replacement value of
capital is defined as the cost of replacing all machinery, vehicles and equipment
with new ones. The ratio of the resale value to the replacement value of capital
represents capital mobility and the extent to which it has physically depreciated:
older capital is less productive and has a lower resale to replacement value. To
measure capital mobility, this chapter follows the method used in Svensson [2003]
and regresses the resale/replacement ratio on a constant and the average age of
capital stock. The residual of the regression represents that amount of the re-
sale/replacement ratio that is not captured by the age of machinery, vehicles and
19Operating costs are measured as the sum of the following costs: raw materials and interme-
diate goods; labour (including wages, salaries and bonus/social payments); depreciation; rent of
land/buildings, equipment and furniture; electricity; fuel; water; transportation (excluding fuel)
and communication services.
20Loan providing financial institutions include: private commercial banks; state-owned banks
and government agencies; non-bank financial instutions; and informal sources of credit.
21This is similar to Ramey & Shapiro [2001], who use the resale price to reflated initial cost
of capital to measure the cost of reallocating capital across firms and sectors.
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Table 3.1: Data Description
Variable Name Definition
bribereport Dummy=1 if bribe reported in Naira, 0 if as a percentage of sales
bribe naira Reported bribe payment (in ’000 Naira)
bribe dummy Dummy=1 if positive bribe reported, 0 otherwise
bribe gov contract % of gov contract paid in bribe to secure the contract
tax exemption Index (0-4) of tax exemptions. Import, profit, VAT, and export taxes.
request government services Index (0-6) of request for services in last 2 years: phone/electricity/water
connection; import/operating license; construction permit
tax visit Dummy=1 if firm was visited, inspected by or required to meet tax officials
in last year
tax percentage Percentage of sales reported for tax purposes
employee total Total number of full-time (permanent and seasonal/temporary) and part-time
workers
size 1 size==small (5-19 employees)
size 2 size==medium (20-99 employees)
size 3 size==large (100 employees and more)
foreign Dummy=1 if foreign ownership(in %) is greater than or equal to 20%, 0
otherwise
age Age of firm in years
gov customer Dummy=1 if principal buyer of output is government or government agencies,
0 otherwise
competitors 1 No Competitors
competitors 2 1 Competitor
competitors 3 2-5 Competitors
competitors 4 6+ Competitors
trade Dummy=1 if firm imports or exports directly, 0 otherwise
electric Dummy==1 if firm receives state provided electricity for production
water Dummy==1 if firm receives state provided water supply for production
infraserv Index (0-2) of availability of public services (electricity&water). Sum of ”elec-
tric” and ”water” variables.
security naira Annual cost of security in ’000 Naira
regulation realtime Hours of senior mgt’s time spent dealing with govt regs each week
external consultant naira Amount(’000Naira)spent on external consultants hired to deal with govern-
ment regulations
equipment22. This is a measure of the degree to which capital is sunk. A positive
value indicates that the capital stock is mobile. In order to make the interpreta-
tion of this residual easier, the value is multiplied by -1, so that a positive value
represents a higher degree of sunk cost (capital is less reversible).
Also included as an explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating whether
the government is the principal buyer of the establishment’s output. A bribe can
be paid in order to secure a government contract that makes a company the sole
supplier of a good that the government uses. Even in the absence of this situation,
a bribe can be paid in order to get the public official to carry on choosing that
particular company as a supplier.
A variable denoting the number of tax exemptions that the company is in
receipt of is also included as a control rights measure. This variable is an index
created by summing 4 dummy variables each denoting exemption from: import
22 resalei
replacei
= γ0 + γ1 ∗ log(age) + κi
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duties; export taxes; profit tax; and Value Added Tax, respectively. A value
of 1 indicates that the firm receives exemption from the respective tax scheme.
In order to receive exemption from a tax, a company must approach the Federal
Inland Revenue Service with its financial statements and incorporation documents.
This encounter might also create the possibility for a bribe to be exchanged.
The NBS data includes a series of variables denoting operations performed by
companies which required contact with public officials. These are listed in Table
3.4 and include: clearing goods through customs; obtaining road worthy certifi-
cates; procurement of goods and services from the government; obtaining business
licenses and permits; getting clearance for environmental or sanitary regulations;
obtaining residence and work permits; registering a vehicle; being involved with
police investigations; having committed traffic offences; and being in contact with
the courts. These variables serve as measures of the control rights hypothesis since
they measure, to some extent, ways in which public officers might exercise control
over the firms operations. The data also includes information on whether or not
a bribe was paid for each of these activities. This allows for an analysis into the
the propensity to bribe conditional on a specific meeting; for many different types
of meetings with public officials. This builds on the previous data set by allowing
for a heterogeneity of public officers and contact with them. Looking at different
potential bribe attracting activities allows for a distinguishing of which activities
Table 3.2: Data Description (cont’d)
Variable Name Definition
sales t 1 Sales in previous year (’000 Naira)
sales t 4 Sales 4 years previously (’000 Naira)
profit Profit (’000 Naira) =sales - (operating costs+interest payments)
capital stock Resale value of machinery, vehicles & equipment (’000 Naira)
net book value Net Book Value of capital stock (in ’000 Naira)
replace value Cost of replacing capital stock with new equipment
un sunk cost Residual from regression: capital stock
replace value
= log(age) + 
alternative return capital stock*sunk cost
profit employee Willingness to pay: log(profits per ft employee)
ebribe naira Bribe per employee
eprofit Profit per employee
ecapital stock Capital Stock Per Employee
eun sunk cost Un sunk cost Per Employee
ealternative return Alternative Return Per Employee
esecurity naira Annual cost of security (in ’000 NGN) per employee
eexternal consultant naira Amount (’000 NGN) Spent On External Consultants Per Employee
external auditor Dummy=1 if annual financial statements checked by external auditor, 0 oth-
erwise
university Dummy=1 if owner/majority shareholder has a university degree, 0 otherwise
capital labour K/L ratio (labour=ft employees)
ind loc eprofit Industry-location profit(’000 Naira) per employee averages
electricity Cost of electricity (’000 NGN)
pay tax log of (1+ percentage of sales reported for tax purpses)
african Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is african, 0 otherwise
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Table 3.3: Data Description - NBS Data
Type Variable Name Definition Measurement
advantage informal advantage of informal over formal business
Frequency And
Knowledge Of
Different
Types Of
Bribery
bribe offer official A company offers gifts or money to a public official,
directly or indirectly, in order that the official, in the
exercise of his/her official duties, behaves in a way to
facilitate the obtaining of what the company desires.
(Very Frequent; Fairly
Frequent; Not Very
Frequent But Not
Unusual; Never
Happens)
bribe demand official A public official asks a company for gifts, money or
career advantages for his/her relatives, in order to de-
part from his/her normal behaviour in the exercise of
his/her official duties
bribe offer foreign official A company offers gifts or money to a foreign public
official, directly or indirectly, in order that the official,
in the exercise of his/her duties, behaves in a way to
facilitate the obtaining of what the company desires
bribe demand foreign official A foreign public official asks a company for gifts,
money or career advantages for him/her or his/her
relatives, in order to depart from his/her normal be-
haviour in the exercise of his/her official duties
are most likely to attract bribes, and which are less so.
The NBS data also has information on the different ways in which bribery takes
place. That is, whether a firm offers an informal payment to a public officer, or
whether a public official demands a payment from a firm in order to carry out
some special favour. This data allows one to decipher how bribery actually takes
place: whether the firm offers or the official demands a bribe payment. With this
information it should be easier to determine the direction of causality with regards
to the payment of bribes; it should be clear whether the market is created by public
official wanting more money; or by private firms wanting to bypass or speed up
regulations23. The data also includes these questions for foreign public officials,
which allows one to determine who is more susceptible to engage in corruption
with Nigerian firms: foreign public officials or Nigerian ones24.
Gauging The Level Of Bribery The wording on the questions concerning
bribery and tax evasion in the Enterprise Survey are indirect. Rather than asking
how much a firm pays in bribes the surveys queries how much similar firms pay.
This method of asking indirectly is thought to generate more candor on the part
of the interviewees about the bribes of their own firm. This is because the indirect
nature of the questions deflects any guilt away from the individual/firm.
23It should be noted that there is the potential for reverse causality in this framework. I.e. a
firm which has been previously demanded for a bribe by an official might tend to offer a bribe
more often. Also, firms being quick to offer bribes might make public officials more likely to
demand them from all firms.
24Comparisons of the behaviour of public officials from different countries is performed by
Fisman & Miguel [2007] and Lambsdorff [1999, 2007].
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Table 3.4: Data Description - NBS Data (cont’d)
Category Variable Name Definition
bribe dummy Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
bribe dummy direct Dummy=1 if firm paid a bribe in 2006; 0 otherwise
bribe dummy indirect Dummy=1 if firm indirectly admitted to bribing; 0
otherwise
bribe naira amount paid as bribe (’000 Naira)
zone Geo-Political Zone (NC;NE;NW;SE;SS;SW)
foreign Foreign ownership =25%
security Dummy=1 if company using security service
age Age of firm (years)
lage Log of age
trade Dummy=1 if firm engages in international trade, 0
otherwise
operation
performed by
companies/
bribe paid
given that the
company
performed the
operation
conda/bribea clearing goods through customs
condb/bribeb obtaining road worthy certificates
condc/bribec procurement of goods and services from government
condd/bribed obtainig business licenses and permits
conde/bribee procurement of goods and services from private com-
panies
condf/bribef getting clearance for environmental or sanitary regu-
lations
condg/bribeg residence and work permits
condh/bribeh vehicle registrations
condi/bribei police investigations
condj/bribej traffic offences
condk/bribek contact with the court
This method of asking indirectly is thought to be useful in gauging the level
of bribe paid by the firm due to the false consensus effect [Ross, Greene & House
, 1977]. This is the phenomenon that people who engage in a socially undesirable
act are more likely to overestimate the prevalence of that act amongst their peers.
In this case, firm managers who pay bribes are more likely to say that similar firms
also pay bribes. This helps the current paper to interpret the answer to indirect
questions as being representative of the firm itself.
The indirect form of posing questions is similar to that used on the 1998 En-
terprise Survey for Uganda [Reinikka & Svensson , 2003]; the Business Environ-
ment And Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) on the transition countries
[Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann , 2000]; and the North-African Survey of Firms con-
ducted by Universite´ Paris 1 [Delavallade , 2011]. This allows for comparability
between different countries.
Further support for the validity of the data concerning informal payments is
provided by the results of similar surveys carried out within Nigeria and in other
countries. In a survey of businesses in Romania [Azfar & Murrell , 2009], there
is no difference in the admitting of bribery between firms asked about their own
businesses and those asked about “businesses like yours”. This lends favour to the
argument that no less information is retrieved by asking bribery related questions
indirectly.
54
3.4 Empirical Specification Of The Control Rights And
Bargaining Hypotheses
3.4.1 Empirical Models To Test The Control Rights And Bargaining
Hypotheses
The control rights theory can be formally described as:
di = η
′Ci + ui (3.4.1.1)
where di is the probability that company i pays a bribe; Ci is a vector of vari-
ables denoting mandatory interactions with public sector officials; η′ is a vector of
coefficients; and ui is an error term.
The bargaining theory can be stated as:
bi = α0 + α1pii(k) + α2Epii(k) + α3Epii(κk) + i (3.4.1.2)
where bi is the amount of bribe paid by company i; pii(k) is current profit;
Epii(k) is expected profit in the next period; pii(κk) is expected return if the
company reallocates its capital in another market; and i is an error term. Based
on the preceding analysis (section 3.2), α1 and α2 are expected to be positive while
α3 is expected to be negative.
In order to derive an equation describing the bribe behaviour of firms this
analysis formulates this problem into that of a latent variable model, describing the
propensity to bribe, consisting of a selection equation and an outcome equation.
The selection equation describes whether or not the firm pays a bribe and the
outcome equation describes the amount of bribe paid by firms that pay a bribe.
Selection:
y1 =
{
1 ify∗1 > 0
0 ify∗1 ≤ 0 (3.4.1.3)
Outcome:
y2 =
{
y∗2 ify
∗
1 > 0
− ify∗1 ≤ 0 (3.4.1.4)
where y∗1 is the (unobserved) propensity to pay a bribe; y1 is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm pays a bribe, 0 otherwise; and y2 is the observed bribe
payment.
This lends itself to the use of a selection model:
p[bribe] = x′1β1 + 1 (3.4.1.5)
y2 = x
′
2β2 + 2 (3.4.1.6)
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Where 1 and 2 are possibly correlated. This paper assumes that 1 and 2 are
joint normally distributed and homoskedastic. That is:
1 ∼ N(0, σ21) (3.4.1.7)
2 ∼ N(0, σ22) (3.4.1.8)
and Cov(12) = σ12. The value of σ
2
1 is normalised to 1 because the value for
y∗1 is not observed but the sign is. The likelihood function for this model is:
L =
n∏
i=1
[Pr(y∗1i ≤ 0)]1−y1i [f(y2i|y∗1i > 0)× Pr(y∗1i > 0)]y1i (3.4.1.9)
where the first term represents the contribution to the likelihood function when
the propensity to bribe is less than or equal to zero; and the second term represents
the contribution when the propensity to bribe is positive. This model is estimated
using a censored Tobit model with density function:
f(y2i) =
[
1√
2piσ2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
(y2i − x′2iβ2)
}]bi
[Φ {(−x′2iβ)/σ2}]1−bi (3.4.1.10)
Where b = 1 if the firm pays a bribe, 0 otherwise.
From Equation 3.4.1.5; E(y2|x, y∗1 > 0) = x′2β2 + E(|y∗1 > 0). Given the as-
sumption that the errors are normally distributed, then: E(|y∗1 > 0) = σ12λ(x′1β1)
The expected value of bribe to be paid, y2, for the non-censored observations
is therefore given by:
E(y2|x, y∗1 > 0) = x′2β2 + σ12λ(x′1β1) (3.4.1.11)
where λ(·) = φ(·)/Φ(·), φ is the standard normal density function; and Φ is the
standard normal cumulative distribution function. An OLS regression of y2 on
x2 would suffer from omitted variable bias due to the missing variable φi/Φi, this
would yield an inconsistent estimate of β2. This missing variable can be generated
by collecting the pseudo-residuals from a probit model of y1 on x
′
1. An OLS
regression of y2 on x2 and λ(x
′
1β1) provides a semiparametric estimate of β2 and
σ12. If the nonselection hazard λ(x
′
1β1) is revealed to be insignificant, then an OLS
regression on the uncensored sample (bribing firms) will yield consistent estimates
of β2.
In describing the bribe behaviour of firms, it may be the case that the factors
which determine bribery also determine the amount of bribe paid. In such a case,
all companies who do not pay a bribe are thought to pay a bribe of amount zero.
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Due to the censored nature of the data on bribes (the amount of bribe paid cannot
be negative), such analysis can be performed using a censored Tobit model, this
would allow for the inclusion of all firms in the bribery equation. A characteristic of
this model is that it restricts the sign of the effect of a covariate on the probability
of paying a bribe to be the same as the effect of the variable on the amount of
bribe paid.
Officials in a heavily regulated sector-region might demand more bribes from
firms, however, because of this, the amount of bribe that they require from each
company might be less than other industry-locations. In such a case the sign for
a dummy that shows whether or not a firm is located in that industry-location
would be positive for the selection equation (propensity to bribe) and negative for
the outcome equation (amount of bribe paid). This restriction is tested using a
likelihood ratio-test (Tobit specification test), which is described in section 3.9.
In the absence of selection bias (if the non-selection hazard term in 3.4.1.11 is
insignificant) then a two-part model can be used to estimate the factors influencing
the occurence of bribery and the amount of bribe that is paid. This model is com-
posed of a probit estimation on all firms, and an ordinary least squares regression
on those firms that report a positive bribe payment. In the absence of selectivity
the two-part model is more robust than the full-information maximum likelihood
or two-step Heckman procedure [Puhani , 2000].
In the two-part model the propensity to bribe is estimated as a probit model:
Pr[BribeDummyi = 1] = Φ(η
′
CCi + α
′
BBi) (3.4.1.12)
where [BribeDummyi = 1] is the case where a firm reports a positive amount of
bribe. Ci are the variables in line with the control rights hypothesis: the receiving
of public services; whether or not the firm imports or exports directly; and the
share of sales that the firm reports for tax purposes. Bi represents the variables in
line with the bargaining hypothesis: current profit; expected future profit; and the
alternative return on the firms capital stock. Φ is the standard normal distribution
function.
The second part of the two-part model estimates the amount of bribe that is
paid using a reduced sample ordinary least squares regression:
Bribei = β0 + β1Profiti + β2E[Profiti,t+1] + β3AlternativeReturni + β
′
cCi + vi
(3.4.1.13)
where Profiti denotes the current profit of the firm; E[Profiti,t+1] represents
expected future profit; and AlternativeReturni is the expected return if the firm
reallocates its capital for use in another sector. C is the vector of variables repre-
senting the control rights hypothesis.
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Empirical Models To Analyse The Propensity To Meet With A Public
Official And The Conditional Probability Of Bribing A Public Official
The NBS data used in this study has information concerning whether or not a
company met with a public official in the previous year; and whether or not a firm
paid a bribe to a public official during the previous year. Coming into contact
with a public official is necessary in order to bribe that public official, therefore,
not coming into contact with a public official is a perfect predictor of not bribing
a public official. The discussion in subsection 3.2 suggests that whether or not a
company comes into contact with a public official depends upon the industry that
the firm is located in, whilst the payment of a bribe to an official depends on firm
specific factors.
In order to investigate the factors influencing the coming into contact with
public officials and the payment of bribes to public officials one might use two
separate binary outcome models. However, this would impose the assumption
that the unobservable factors that influence the propensity to meet with a public
official are independent of the unobservables that influence the propensity to bribe
a public official [Dolton, 2012]25. For example, a new piece of legislation that
imposes a fee on firms that produce over a certain level of CO2 emissions might
lead firms to pay the official in charge a bribe (that is less than the fee) in order to
bypass the paying the fee. Estimating two separate binary outcome models would
not allow for this correlation between the two processes of meeting with a public
official and of bribing a public official
In order to relax the assumption that the errors from the two equations are
independent of each other this study uses a bi-variate probit analysis to analyse
the meeting with and paying of bribes to public officials. However, in order to
fit the current data, the model must allow for the fact one does not observe the
bribe payments of the companies that do not come into contact with public officials.
Therefore, this chapter uses a bivariate probit model with sample selection26. This
model allows for both selection on observed regressors and unobserved errors. In
the current study this model is formed of a participation equation which models
the propensity (or decision) to meet with a public official:
y∗1j = X1ijβ1j + u1ij (3.4.1.14)
where
y1j =
{
1 if y∗1j > 0
0 if y∗1j ≤ 0 (3.4.1.15)
and an outcome equation that models the propensity (decision) to pay a bribe
25Correspondence with Author
26This model has also been referred to as: double probit; censored probit; and bivariate probit
with partial partial observability.
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to a public official:
y∗2j = X2ijβ2j + u2ij (3.4.1.16)
where
y2j =
{
y∗2j if y
∗
1j > 0
− if y∗1j ≤ 0 (3.4.1.17)
and Cov [u1ij, u2ij] = ρ 6= 0, or:
u1ij = ηij + 1ij
u2ij = ηij + 2ij
(3.4.1.18)
Where y1j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm met with public official
type j, 0 otherwise; and y2j is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid a
bribe to public official type j, 0 otherwise. In this case, the probability of bribing
official type j, is equal to the probability of meeting with offical type j times the
probability of bribing official type j conditional on meeting with official type j.
Formally:
P (y2j = 1) = P (y1j = 1) ∗ P (y2j = 1|P (y1j = 1)) (3.4.1.19)
or
P (y2j = 1) = P
[
y∗1ij > 0
] ∗ P [y2ij = 1|y∗1ij > 0] (3.4.1.20)
There are three types of observations within this framework: those who do
not meet with public officials and therefore do not pay any bribes (y1j = 0);
those who meet with public officials and do not pay any bribes (y1j = 1 &
y2j = 0); and those who meet with public officials and pay bribes (y1j = 1 &
y2j = 1). The respective probabilities of each of these events can be described as:
P [y1j = 0] = Φ(−x′1β1); P [y1j = 1, y2j = 0] = Φ(x′1β1) − Φ2(x′1β1,x′2β2, ρ); and
P [y1j = 1, y2j = 1] = Φ2(x
′
1β1,x
′
2β2, ρ).
The log likelihood for this model is:
lnL =
N∑
i=1
(1− y1ij)lnΦ(−x′1β1)
+ y1ij(1− y2ij)ln [Φ(x′1β1)− Φ2(x′1β1,x′2β2, ρ)]
+ y1ijy2ijlnΦ2(x
′
1β1,x
′
2β2, ρ)
(3.4.1.21)
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3.5 Comparing The Two Datasets
This section compares the respective companies in the enterprise and NBS surveys.
It looks at the proportion of bribe paying firms and the average amount of bribes
paid for each sample and performs a test to see if there is a significant difference
between the two datasets.
Results - Descriptive Statistics Firms in the Enterprise Survey showed a
greater willingness to report bribery than those in the NBS survey. 52% of firms
in the ES reported a positive bribe payment compared to 27% of the NBS sample
(Table 3.5). Nothing changes when focusing on the manufacturing firms within
the respective datasets.
Table 3.5: Prevalence Of Bribery For Both Datasets
Dataset Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
WB 3668 .52 .50 0 1
NBS 2110 .27 .44 0 1
The average bribe payment for the ES full sample (All Industries) was 293,400.
Focusing on bribe paying firms alone raises this average to 562,200 (Table 3.6).
Table 3.6 also shows a wide disparity in the average reported bribe payments be-
tween companies who report in terms of the absolute Naira amount and those
who choose to report their bribe payments as a percentage of sales. Focusing on
firms who reported paying a bribe (the lower subsection of table 3.6), the aver-
age reported bribe payments amongst sales reporters was 690,000; whereas those
who reported their bribe as a Naira figure reported, on average, 73,700. The
distribution of bribe payments for firms in the NBS sample appears to be closer
to that of the ES Naira reporters: the average reported bribe payment for this
sample of firms is 53,400. These results are also seen when looking solely at
the manufacturing industry in Nigeria. Average bribe payments for bribing sales
reporters, Naira reporters, and NBS firms , respectively, are: 710,300; 85,500;
and 77,900.
Table 3.6: Distribution Of Bribe Payments (In ’000 Naira) For Both Datasets
Dataset Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
WB (All Firms) 3668 293.4 667.4 0 5880
WB (Bribing Firms) 1914 562.2 838.2 1 5880
WB(Sales Reporters - All Firms) 3246 322.49 703.5 0 5880
WB (Sales Reporters - Bribing Firms) 1517 690 897.5 1.2 5880
WB(Naira Reporters - All Firms) 422 69.353 92.29586 0 768
WB (Naira Reporters - Bribing Firms) 397 73.7 93.5 1 768
NBS (All Firms) 2110 4.5 73.9 0 3000
NBS (Bribing Firms) 177 53.4 250.5 .01 3000
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Figure 3: Comparison Of The Prevalence Of Bribery; And The Average Bribe Rates Amongst Bribing Manufacturing
Firms (in ’000 Naira) For Both Datasets (NBS & WB)
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The regional distribution of bribe incidence and the average bribe payments per
state are shown in figure 3. The lower part of the diagram corresponds to table 3.5.
It shows the proportion of bribe reporting firms across different states in Nigeria for
all firms (all industries) of the ES and NBS samples. Results indicate a relatively
higher prevalence of bribing firms in the South-South region of Nigeria. These
include Rivers, Imo and Akwa Ibom and these results are consistent between both
datasets. Kogi State also has a relatively high prevalence of bribery. Focusing
on the average bribe payments for bribe reporting manufacturers, companies in
Adamawa appear to consistently report a higher bribe payment in both samples.
Perceptions Versus Reality Perception based indicators of corruption can
suffer from bias [Carlin & Seabright , 2007]. More productive companies have a
higher valuation of the business environment than productive firms. Accordingly,
any constraint to the business environment serves as a higher cost to operations
compared with less productive companies. Following from this, relatively more
productive firms are more likely to complain about constraints to the business
environment than less productive ones. Therefore creating a bias in perception
indices of the state of the business environment.
One possible solution to this, in the case of bribery, is to compare subjective
reports on the extent of corruption to the actual reported bribe payments. If all
firms face the same business environment, and in the absence of misreporting and
bias; companies in areas where bribery is more pervasive should report this in their
subjective valuations of the business environment.
Companies in the Enterprise Survey were asked: “Do you think that the follow-
ing present any obstacle to the current operations of your establishment?” with
“corruption” being one of the options.27
Results from table 3.7 shows some evidence that businesses are revealing some-
thing when they give subjective evaluations of the business environment. Only
39% of those who said that corruption presented “no obstacle” to business oper-
ations paid a bribe to deal with business regulations whereas 69% of those who
reported that corruption posed a “very severe obstacle” to operations reported
paying a bribe. The values for the proportion of bribing firms increases as one
moves across the table from ‘no obstacle’ to ‘very severe obstacle’. The proportion
of bribing firms decreases as one moves from the ‘moderate obstacle’ group to the
‘major obstacle’ group, however, this difference is not statistically significant at
the 10% level. This pattern is also present in the NBS dataset.
27To be sure, the term “corruption” encompasses a number of acts, so companies might have
been referring to bribery amongst other things when responding to this question. However, the
data in table 3.7 provides some information as to the relationship between bribery and the other
elements that come under the term “corruption”.
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Table 3.7: Proportion Of Bribing Firms And Subjective Reports On Corruption
As An Obstacle To Operations-ES
Corruption As An Obstacle to Business Operations
Bribing Behaviour No Obstacle Minor Ob-
stacle
Moderate Ob-
stacle
Major Ob-
stacle
Very Severe
Obstacle
Total
Non-Bribers (Row %) 35.60 20.78 20.06 16.67 6.89 100.00
Non-Bribers (Column %) 60.81 52.06 41.58 44.88 31.31 48.58
Bribers (Row %) 21.67 18.08 26.63 19.34 14.29 100.00
Bribers (Column %) 39.19 47.94 58.42 55.12 68.69 51.42
Total (Row %) 28.44 19.39 23.44 18.04 10.69 100.00
Total (Column %) 100 100 100 100 100 100
This non-decreasing relationship between observed corruption and reported bribery is also present in the NBS
dataset.
Different Types Of Bribe Results from sections 3.6 to 3.10 describe a positive
correlation between firms meeting with officials and firms paying bribes to officials.
The story that seems to be coming out of the data is that having to meet with
a public official is related to a higher probability of paying a bribe (to a public
official) to speed regulation or assist with business operations in some other way.
A potential limitation of the previous analysis is that it does not identify the
exact purpose for which the bribe was paid. A firm might regularly meet with
public officials from different arms of the government (e.g. police; customs; the
courts) but might only pay bribes to some of them and not others. The preceding
analysis does not allow one to identify which public officials have been bribed out
of all of the officials that have been met with. Tables A.1 to A.11 (in Appendix
Section A.1) present the results of the Bivariate Probit Analysis of the bribery of
public officials that distinguishes between different types of public officials.
3.6 Summary Statistics From The Enterprise Survey
This section discusses the results from the data. It provides an analysis of the
factors affecting whether or not a company pays a bribe, and the amount that the
firm has to pay. Summary statistics for the Enterprise dataset are shown in Tables
3.8 and 3.9. 80% of firms were small in size (5-19 full-time permanent employees);
19% were medium sized (20-99 employees); and 1% of firms had more than 100
employees. The mean age of the firms is 14 years. Less than 1% of firms were
foreign owned but roughly 2% of the sample engaged in some form of international
trade (either exporting directly or importing directly)28. 25% of firms received
government provided water in their production process, the figure for electricity
was 2%. On average, the firms operate for 62 hours per week, (on average) 3 of
which are spent by senior managers dealing with government regulations.
281.1% of firms solely imported; 0.45% of firms solely exported; and 0.15% of firms engaged in
both importing and exporting
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Table 3.8: Correlation Matrix
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bribe naira 1
bribe dummy 0.4∗∗∗ 1
profit 0.3∗∗∗ 0.0003 1
employee total 0.2∗∗∗ -0.04 0.3∗∗∗ 1
gov customer 0.06∗ 0.04 0.009 0.0003 1
trade -0.0009 0.004 0.05∗ 0.07∗∗ -0.02 1
infraserv 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.02 0.01 1
african -0.04 -0.06∗∗ 0.005 -0.03 0.003 -0.05∗ 0.02 1
foreign -0.02 -0.03 0.05∗ 0.02 -0.006 0.07∗∗ 0.05∗ -0.04 1
regulation realtime 0.04 0.05∗ 0.04 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02 0.006 0.07∗∗∗ -0.02 0.008 1
tax form time -0.06∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.1∗∗∗ -0.01 0.02 -0.04∗ 0.02 0.008 0.05∗ 1
tax visit -0.01 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.04 0.07∗∗ -0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.003 -0.005 -0.03 0.02 1
capital stock 0.1∗∗∗ 0.04 0.2∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.03 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗ -0.008 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 1
un sunk cost -0.10∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.02 -0.05∗ 0.02 0.08∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.006 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.03 -0.05∗ 1
tax percentage 0.06∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.007 -0.02 0.008 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.07∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.02 1
electricity 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.007 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗ 0.01 -0.004 0.03 0.2∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.9: Summary Statistics, by bribe reporting behaviour
Variable Statistic All Firms Bribe=0 Bribe > 0 Bribe > 0
(Sales %)
Bribe >
0(Naira)
bribe naira Mean 294 0 572 710 86
Median 8 0 264 390 50
Std. Dev. 652 0 816 876 87
ebribe naira 20.6 0.0 40.0 49.4 6.6
0.5 0.0 22.2 32.3 3.8
49.6 0.0 63.3 68.7 7.5
employee total 17 18 16 16 17
12 13 12 12 13
16 18 14 13 14
eprofit 158.7 155.3 161.8 167.2 142.6
90.0 77.8 100.1 102.0 95.8
216.8 211.8 221.4 233.9 169.3
capital labour 230.2 190.9 267.2 282.1 214.5
100.0 75.0 125.0 131.4 100.0
718.8 544.4 850.0 943.0 362.3
un sunk cost -0.88 -0.88 -0.89 -0.88 -0.89
-0.88 -0.88 -0.89 -0.88 -0.90
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
infraserv 0.29 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.32
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.50 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.47
tax percentage 69.6 66.1 72.8 70.5 80.9
75.0 70.0 75.0 75.0 100.0
27.4 28.2 26.2 25.7 26.3
trade 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.18
N 2001 972 1029 802 227
In each column, for each variable, the table reports the mean, median and standard deviation for each
(sub)sample. The last row details the number of observations for each (sub)sample.
The average annual cost of dealing with requirements imposed by the govern-
ment was 464,000, of which 48,500 was spent on external consultants used to
deal with regulations. 83% of firms were visited, inspected by, or required to meet
tax officials in the previous year, and firms took an average of 16 hours to fill in all
forms and requirements to pay local taxes. The average amount of sales that firms
reported for tax purposes was 70%, compared with 61% of employees reported for
the same purpose. The average level of total employment (full-time; part-time;
and temporary/seasonal) was 17 workers. 9% of firms had their financial state-
ments checked by an external auditor and 3% of business owners had a university
degree.
Average sales declined from 4 years previously to the year before the survey
was taken, from 11.3 million to 8.4 million. The average value of machinery,
vehicles and equipment for the manufacturing industry was 3.4 million. The
average annual cost of electricity was 148,000.
65
Bribe Reporting The correlation matrix in Table 3.8 shows a statistically sig-
nificant positive relationship between the receipt of public services (“infraserv”)
and the payment of bribes (“bribe dummy”), with a correlation of 0.07 which is
significant at the 5% level. The percentage of sales reported for tax purposes
(“tax percentage”) is also significantly related to the payment of bribes, with a
correlation of 0.1 that is significant at the 1% level. Both variables are also sig-
nificantly positively correlated with the amount of bribe paid (0.08 [1%] and 0.06
[5%], respectively). Profits and size of firm (employees) are also positively corre-
lated with the bribe payment (0.3 and 0.2, respectively, both significant at the 1%
level).
Table 3.9 shows summary statistics of the main control rights and bargain-
ing variables for all firms, and then disaggregated by the reporting behaviour of
the firm: firms either reported no bribe; a positive bribe as a percentage of total
sales; or a positive bribe in Naira. There were no non-respondents to the bribery
question in this sample. Firms were allowed to report their level of graft as a per-
centage of sales or in Naira. The majority of firms who reported a positive bribe
chose to report in terms of sales percentage (802 versus 227). Mean comparison
(Student’s t) tests show that firms reporting in terms of sales report significantly
higher values of bribe payments, bribe payment per employee, profit and amount
of moveable capital than Naira reporters. While Naira reporters declare a larger
proportion of their sales for tax purposes and (on average) engage in more interna-
tional trade than sales reporters29.There are no significant differerences, however,
in their number of employees; capital per worker; or their receipt of public services.
The median bribe for the firms reporting bribes in Naira amounts were 50,000
whilst this value for sales reporters was 390,000.
Results show that 51% of companies admitted to paying a bribe (Table 3.9).
The sample contained no non-respondents to the bribery related question. Amongst
companies that reported a positive bribe, the average amount paid was 572,00030
per year with a median of 264,000 (£1050). This corresponds to 40,000 per
employee (or 6% of operating costs). Looking at the entire sample reduces these
averages to 294,000; 20,000 per employee; and 3.3% of operating costs, respec-
tively. Out of the firms that reported a positive bribe amount; 22% reported this
in Naira and 78% reported this as a percentage of sales.
Chemical manufacturing and wood manufacturing had the highest within-
industry percentage of bribe paying firms31 (57% and 56% respectively). Electron-
ics and garment manufacturing were the least graft-intensive industry subsectors
29Results for bribe; bribe per employee; moveable capital; and tax percentage are significant
at the 1% level of significance. The result for international trade is significant at the 5% level.
30
£2270 in October 2007(£1:251.97)
31Excluding “Other Manufacturing” with a high of 67% firms reporting graft.
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with 17% and 43% of firms reporting bribes in each industry respectively32. The
most bribe-intensive states were Benue; Taraba; and Yobe, with each state having
all of its firms admitting to paying some bribe. Lagos and Cross River state had
the lowest percentage of bribing firms (19% and 27% respectively).
Sample Selection A potential concern with the analysis is sample selection bias.
Equations 3.4.1.12 and 3.4.1.13 can be interpreted as a selection model. If the
error terms in these two equations are correlated, an OLS regression on equation
3.4.1.13 will return biased estimates. The selection model can be estimated by a
two-step procedure where 3.4.1.12 is estimated by probit and 3.4.1.13 with OLS;
and using an estimate of the inverse Mills ratio from the first step to correct
for selection bias. This study chooses to identify the model by excluding public
services and trade from the second stage of the estimation. The support for this
exclusion restriction is based on section 3.2, that interactions with public officials
do not affect the amount of bribe paid. Table 3.10 presents the results from the
two-step procedure and compares it with the OLS estimates. The top half of the
table displays results from the second stage of the two-step procedure while the
bottom half has results from the first stage.
In the first stage analysis the variables for: having the government as the
principal buyer of goods; and receiving public services have the largest positive co-
efficients on the probability of paying a bribe. The proportion of moveable capital
and the number of competitors have the largest negative coefficients. Profit and
capital per worker enter into the second stage model with significant coefficients
while the percentage of sales reported for tax purposes and access to public ser-
vices enter insignificantly. In all specifications the coefficient on the inverse-mills
ratio enters insignificantly which suggests an absence of selection bias in the data.
This also explains the similarity in bargaining coefficients between the Heckman
model and OLS. Due to the absence of evidence for selection bias, the two-part
model and Tobit can be used to analyse the factors determining the probability of
paying a bribe and the amount of bribe paid.
The Two-Part Model The next sections elucidate the two-part model con-
sisting of a probit model on the entire sample and a subsample OLS regression
on the bribing firms alone. Due to the low correlation between the errors in the
selection equation and outcome equation (and therefore absence of selection bias;
[section 3.6]) and moderate degree of censoring, this model is more robust than
the Heckman model.
32Only 0.3% of the sample (6 firms) were from the electronics manufacturing sector.
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Table 3.10: Estimations Using Heckman Two-Step Procedure
m1 m2 m3 m9 (OLS)
Outcome Equation
eprofit 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.153*** 0.094***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.025)
capital labour 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.004 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002)
un sunk cost -165.540* -166.170* 552.696
(91.874) (92.014) (1076.681)
competitors 4 -11.208 -11.872 55.515 -7.244*
(10.272) (10.300) (103.909) (4.210)
eexternal consultant naira 0.605*** 0.597*** 1.273 0.027
(0.153) (0.153) (1.122) (0.184)
african -3.637 -4.017 54.564 -6.632**
(9.132) (9.151) (90.450) (3.041)
trade -24.885** -16.972***
(11.805) (6.381)
eun sunk cost -88.986***
(24.672)
Constant -132.563 -134.154 689.522 5.397
(97.258) (97.407) (1218.583) (6.422)
Other control variables YES YES YES YES
Selection Equation
infraserv 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
tax percentage 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
capital labour 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
un sunk cost -4.260*** -4.260*** -4.260***
(1.127) (1.127) (1.127)
competitors 4 -0.428** -0.428** -0.428**
(0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
gov customer 0.504* 0.504* 0.504*
(0.265) (0.265) (0.265)
regulation realtime 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
eexternal consultant naira -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
african -0.382*** -0.382*** -0.382***
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146)
Constant -3.530*** -3.530*** -3.530***
(1.027) (1.027) (1.027)
Other control variables YES YES YES N/A
Inverse-Mills Ratio 16 17 -253
(28.1) (28.2) (391.4)
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001
Censored Observations 972 972 972
Chi-Squared 711.3 713.4 38.2
F-Stat 4.83
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable of selection equation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the firm reported a positive bribe payment; 0 otherwise. Dependent variable of outcome equation is bribe
amount in ’000 Naira. Other control variables for the outcome equation include: percentage of sales reported for
tax; whether or not the government is a customer (dummy); number of managers hours spent dealing with
government regulations per week; and infraserv (category). The coefficients on these variables are all
insignificant. Other control variables for the selection equation include: trade (dummy); and profit per
employee. The coefficients on these variables are all insignificant.
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3.7 Factors Determining Whether Or Not A Bribe Is Paid:
First Stage Probit Analysis
The first set of results use the enterprise survey dataset while the second set of
results use the NBS dataset. The main results from the two-part model are shown
in tables 3.11 and 3.12. Results from robustness checks, using the Tobit model,
are displayed in Table 3.13. Further analysis using the multinomial logit model is
shown in Table 3.19. The main results using the NBS dataset are found in Tables
3.14 and 3.15. The former table deals with the factors affecting the propensity to
bribe while the latter looks at the instigator of the bribe transaction.
Probit estimations representing equation 3.4.1.12 are shown in Table 3.11.
All variables have their expected signs33. In addition, all variables retain their
sign when entered sequentially in the order shown. Supporting the conceptual
framework, firms that receive public services (infraserv), engage in international
trade (trade), and report a higher percentage of their sales for tax purposes
(tax percentage) have a higher probability of having to give an informal payment
or gift with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations and services. The coeffi-
cients on public services and tax are statistically significant at the 1% significance
level in every model. It thus appears that having to deal with government officials
means that a firm is more likely to be under bureaucratic control and therefore
more likely to have to pay a bribe.
The control rights measures represent contact with government officials (or a
signal of being in the formal sector), despite this, these three variables are not
highly correlated (Table 3.8) and can be used within the same model. The sign,
statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients on these variables do not
change when they are jointly entered into a model compared to when they are
entered using 3 seperate partial-effect models.
33“trade” fluctuates between positive and negative but remains insignificant for all specifi-
cations. Out of a total of 34 firms (1.7% of the sample) that engaged in the direct import-
ing/exporting of goods, just over half (18) reported a positive bribe payment
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Table 3.11: Probit Estimations On The Propensity To
Bribe
m1 m2 m3 m4 m12
infraserv 0.175*** 0.170*** 0.172***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.067)
trade 0.039 0.023 -0.000
(0.217 (0.216) (0.241)
tax percentage 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
profit 0.000*
(0.000)
capital labour 0.000
(0.000)
un sunk cost 0.060
(1.319)
regulation realtime 0.032***
(0.008)
african -0.499***
(0.157)
Constant -0.014 0.035 -0.356*** -0.401*** 2.600**
(0.032) (0.028) (0.078) (0.079) (1.286)
Other control variables NO NO NO NO YES
Industry Dummies NO NO NO NO YES
Region Dummies NO NO NO NO YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0 0.011 0.014 0.200
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Log-Likelihood -1381.4 -1386.2 -1371.2 -1366.7 -1109.2
Chi-Squared 9.3 0 29.4 38.2 348.4
Ind-Chi-Squared N/A N/A N/A N/A 9.4
Ind-P Value N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.224
Reg-Chi-Squared N/A N/A N/A N/A 193
Reg-P Value N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if firm reported a positive bribe payment; 0
otherwise. Other control variables include: number of competitors (category);
whether or not the government was a customer (binary); and the amount of
money spent on external consultants (Naira). The coefficients on these
variables are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
Table 3.12: Regressions On The Amount Of Bribe
m0 m1 m10
bribereport -42.928*** -42.958*** -35.826***
(2.401) (2.403) (3.065)
infraserv 1.999 1.955 2.102
(3.68) (3.675) (3.653)
import -9.195
(11.654)
export 4.416
(19.624)
tax percentage 0.024 0.023 -0.058
(0.065) (0.065) (0.062)
trade -5.737 -9.213
(10.454) (7.084)
eprofit 0.155***
(0.035)
capital labour 0.006**
(0.003)
eun sunk cost
un sunk cost -5.058
(59.839)
Industry Dummies YES
Region Dummies YES
Constant 47.195*** 47.264*** 44.830
(5.431) (5.43) (48.844)
Other control variables NO NO YES
F 65.652 82.062 .
Adjusted R-squared 0.075 0.076 0.527
Observations 1029 1029 1029
Ind-F 1.6
Ind-P Value 0.128
Reg-F 4
Reg-P Value 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is bribe amount in ‘000 Naira. Other Control variables
inlclude: number of competitors (categorical); government as a customer
(dummy); amount of manager’s time spent dealing with (state and local)
government regulations per week; amount of Naira spent on external
consultants per employee; and whether or not the owner is of African descent.
These variables return insignificant coefficients in model 10.
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The full specification (Model 12) shows no evidence for the (current or ex-
pected) profitability of a firm influencing whether or not it pays a bribe. The
coefficient on profit (profit) and capital stock per employee (capital labour) are
both zero and insignificant in all models (Models 5 to 12, shown in Table A.24 in
Appendix A.1 Section A.1.2). This means that firms with high and low profits are
forced to pay bribes if they are required to interact with public officials relatively
frequently. Moreover, firms reporting bribes and those reporting no bribes do not
differ as a group in terms of profits (current or expected). The coefficients for
(un)sunk cost (un sunk cost34) are negative and significant at the 1% level. This
result gives support to the idea that firms consider outside options when faced
with the possibility of paying bribes (Equation 3.2.0.3). It is also consistent with
the idea that industries with a high level of sunk cost are more likely to be targeted
by bribe demanding officials (e.g. the petroleum manufacturing industry).
The variables gov customer and regulation realtime measure whether or not
the government is the principal buyer for the firms output and the amount of
hours per week that senior managers spend dealing with requirements imposed by
state/local and federal government regulations, respectively. These two variables
help to increase the number of measures used to test the control rights theory. Both
enter significantly into the estimation. Having 5 competitors or less also increases
the probability that a firm will have to pay a bribe, as does a firm with an owner
whose ethnic origin is not African. Expenditure on external consultants to deal
with requirements imposed by federal government regulations is not a statistically
significant predictor of bribe payment.
A likelihood ratio test for the coefficients on the bargaining measures being
equal to zero fails to reject the null hypothesis of a zero effect of profit, capital
stock and alternative return on the propensity to bribe. A test on the subsector
dummies fails to reject the null of equality among the manufacturing sectors.
Nevertheless, there appears to be regional differences in the propensity to bribe
because a Wald test on equality of regional dummies rejects the null hypothesis of
equality.
The coefficients in the probit model report the effect of an infinitesimal change
in the explanatory variables (for continuous variables) or a discrete change from 0
to 1 (for dummy variables) on the standardised probit index associated with the
paying of bribes. In order to understand the magnitude of the regressors on the
probability of paying a bribe, marginal and impact effects must be computed using
information from the standard normal probability density function and cumulative
34This variable measures the resale to replace value of capital stock (controlling for loss of
value due to depreciation). A higher value indicates that the firm is able to retrieve a relatively
higher share of its initial investment by selling. A low value means that a larger amount of the
initial expenditure is gone (sunk), leaving the firm in a weaker bargaining position (less of an
option to sell and relocate elsewhere.)
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Table 3.13: Tobit Estimations On Bribe
Amounts
m0 m1 m10
model
infraserv 10.027*** 10.037*** 6.373*
(3.861) (3.859) (3.429)
import -4.338
(13.769)
export -12.407
(24.374)
trade -9.123 -10.933
(12.543) (11.756)
tax percentage 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.065
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
eprofit 0.106***
(0.028)
capital labour 0.007***
(0.002)
un sunk cost 14.372
(66.191)
competitors 2 1.887
(11.910)
competitors 3 18.610**
(8.359)
competitors 4 13.238
(8.665)
gov customer 20.643
(16.180)
regulation realtime 1.522***
(0.366)
eexternal consultant naira 0.221
(0.240)
african -13.315**
(6.237)
Constant -31.799*** -31.869*** 61.734
(7.603) (7.615) (56.849)
sigma 77.757*** 77.752*** 59.710***
(10.586) (10.586) (6.396)
Industry Dummies YES
Region Dummies YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.0015 0.001 0.057
Observations 2001 2001 2001
Log-Likelihood -6547.6 -6547.6 -6184.2
F 5.9 7.8 5.6
Ind-Chi-Squared 1.5
Ind-P Value 0.158
Reg-Chi-Squared 4
Reg-P Value 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent
variable is bribe amount in ’000 Naira
Table 3.14: Probit Estimations On The
Propensity To Bribe - NBS Data
0 12
employee -0.031 -0.074
(0.09) (0.102)
trade 0.907*** 0.549
(0.223) (0.352)
foreign -0.693*** -1.074***
(0.229) (0.311)
lage -0.073 -0.073
(0.099) (0.116)
condb -0.844*
(0.475)
condg -0.789**
(0.357)
condh 1.067***
(0.375)
condj 2.048***
(0.348)
condk -1.067**
(0.534)
Constant -0.751 -1.627***
(0.654 (0.462)
Other control variables YES YES
State Dummies YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.383
Observations 287 287.000
Log-Likelihood -137 -99
Chi-Squared 50.1 104.6
Reg-Chi-Squared 21.78 39.12
Reg-P Value 0.3 0.0
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reported
paying a bribe; 0 otherwise. Other control variables, for
both models, include: number of employees; and the log
of firm age. The coefficients on these variables are not
significant. Other control variables for model 12
include: condc; condd; conde; condf; and condi. The
coefficients on these variables are not significant.
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Table 3.15: Multinomial Logit Models On Different Types Of Bribery - NBS Data
1 2 3 4
Dependent
Variable
bribe offer official bribe demand official bribe offer foreign official bribe demand foreign official
very frequent very frequent very frequent very frequent
trade 0.135 -0.001 -32.736*** -37.845***
(0.8) (0.93) (2.714) (1.349)
condb 0.041 -1.177 81.932*** 33.557***
(0.755) (1.187) (5.966) (1.308)
condc -1.486 -1.846 -162.073*** -13.930***
(0.932) (1.759) (17.417) (2.252)
condd 1.435* 2.292** -176.051*** -71.154***
(0.815) (1.1) (3.448) (2.020)
conde 2.761*** 1.453 210.280*** -36.502***
(0.893) (1.216) (3.305) (2.829)
condf -0.622 0.007 -211.968*** -37.365***
(0.827) (1) (4.256) (1.213)
condg -1.716* -0.994 -67.154*** 9.368***
(0.995) (1.526) (3.763) (1.674)
condh -0.741 -2.141** -76.649*** -38.522***
(0.66) (1.071) (7.07) (1.014)
condi 1.233 -2.391 54.870*** 40.055***
(1.36) (1.673) (7.193) (1.476)
condj 3.023*** 4.686*** -11.833*** -21.215***
(0.756) (1.103) (1.914) (2.833)
condk -0.263 1.992 279.969*** 38.685***
(1.423) (1.494) (23.027) (2.843)
Constant -23.772 -28.020*** -1.908 -5.575
(61.865) (1.483) (.) (.)
State Dummies YES
Other control
variables
YES
Pseudo R-
squared
0.335 0.375 0.483 0.424
Observations 284 282 248 245
Log-Likelihood -229.4 -201.6 -87.4 -82.6
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Options were: never happens; not very frequent but not unusual; fairly
frequent; and very frequent. Other control variables include: number of employees; foreign ownership (dummy);
and the log of age of the firm.
distribution function, respectively. The marginal effect is: δPr[BribeDummyi=1]
δxk
=
φ(x′iβ)× βk. The impact effect is: ∆ = Φ(x′iβ + γ)− Φ(x′iβ).
Where φ represents the standard normal probability density function; β is the
coefficient on the continuous variable and γ is the coefficient on the dummy vari-
able. Table 3.16 shows the marginal and impact effects from the probit estimations.
Dummy variables are labelled with a (d). The largest impact effect comes from
selling mainly to the government. Having the government as the principal buyer
of the firms output raises the probability of paying a bribe by 0.193. The public
services variable is an index from 0 to 2. Results from model 12 show that firms
who receive either water or electricity from the government35 have an increased
probability of paying bribes of magnitude 0.068 compared to firms who do not
3524% of the sample report that they receive one of the two public services.
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receive either of the public services36. A 1% increase in the precentage of sales
that are reported for tax purposes corresponds to an increased chance of paying a
bribe of 0.2% (0.002 probability points).
Once again the amount of profit or capital stock has no effect on the probability
of paying a bribe. Having more than 5 competitors for the main product decreases
the likelihood of paying a bribe by 0.067 probability points. Every hour (per week)
spent dealing with government regulations increases the probability of paying a
bribe by 0.013 probability points. On average, firms spent a mean of 3 hours
per week dealing with government regulations. This translates to an increased
probability of paying a bribe equal to 0.039 compared with firms who did not spend
time dealing with government regulations. The values for (un)sunk cost ranged
from -0.94 to -0.84. This translates into 39% to 43% of capital being transferrable.
A decrease in this value of 1% translates to a decrease in the non-sunk cost variable
of 0.025, which corresponds to a decreased probability of 0.0006.
3.8 Factors Influencing The Size Of Bribe Payment: Sec-
ond Stage Analysis
Table 3.12 shows the results for the second stage of the two-part model. The
dependent variable is reported bribe payments (in ‘000 Naira). Firms who reported
their bribe payments in Naira paid significantly less in bribes per employee than
those who reported their bribes as a percentage of sales. Results from the full
specification (model 10) report that, on average, this difference is 36,000. Profits
and alternative return both have their expected signs. Profit has a positive and
significant effect on the amount of bribe paid, giving evidence for a company’s
“ability to pay” determining the amount of bribe that it pays, given that it pays
a bribe. The coefficient on alternative return is negative and also significant,
hinting that firms who are able to re-allocate their resources in another trade will
pay lower bribes than businesses who are not so able. Similar to the first stage
analysis, firms who have many competitors pay less in bribes and those that sell to
the government pay more in bribes. A wald test for a zero coefficient on the control
rights measures does not reject the null hypothesis that these parameters are zero
at the 5 percent level. Together with the result from the probit estimations test
statistic, this suggests that the factors that determine the occurrence of bribery
(interaction with government) do not strongly influence the amount of bribe paid.
Also, the factors that influence the amount paid (willingness/ability to pay) do not
influence the propensity to pay. The models presented in Table 3.12 also seem to
explain the data relatively well. The Adjusted R-Squared for model 10 is 0.52737.
3674% of the sample report that they receive both public services.
37The Adjusted R2 value in Svensson (2000) was 0.21.
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Table 3.16: Marginal And Impact Effects From First Stage Probit Estimations
m1 m2 m3 m4 m12
infraserv 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.068***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
trade (d) 0.015 0.009 -0.000
(0.086) (0.086) (0.095)
tax percentage 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
profit 0.000*
(0.000)
capital labour 0.000
(0.000)
un sunk cost 0.024
(0.520)
competitors 2 (d) 0.020
(0.133)
competitors 3 (d) 0.109
(0.084)
competitors 4 (d) 0.058
(0.086)
gov customer (d) 0.121
(0.105)
regulation realtime 0.013***
(0.003)
external consultant naira 0.000
(0.000)
african (d) -0.183***
(0.052)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
reported paying a bribe; 0 otherwise. (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
3.9 Alternative Estimation: Tobit Analysis
Results from the Tobit estimations are presented in Table 3.13. The first two
columns (models 0 and 1) only include the variables denoting the control rights
hypothesis as explanatory variables. The first model disaggregates the trade vari-
able into imports and exports. The coefficients on interactions with public officials
(“infraserv”) and percentage of sales reported for tax purposes (“tax percentage”)
have their expected signs (both positive) and are statistically significant at the 1%
significance level. This significance remains from model 0 to 9 for “tax percentage”
and from model 0 to 1 and 4 to 10 for “infraserv” (All Models are shown in Table
A.27 in Appendix A.1 Section A.1.2). Therefore, the results point to the conclu-
sion that the level of bribe payments is increasing in the receipt of public services
and the reporting/revealing of sales for tax purposes, respectively.
Model 2 adds profit per employee to the estimation, the coefficient on this
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variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This is augmented
by the capital stock measure (“capital labour”: the value of machinery, vehicles
and equipment per worker) in model 3, which is positive and significant at the 5%
level. These results suggest that visibility and ability to pay are positively related
to the amount of bribe paid by the firm. Furthermore, they also suggest that the
ability to pay now is more important than future ability to pay in determining
the amount of bribe paid by firms. This is evident from the larger size and higher
significance of the coefficient on profit compared to that of capital stock in all Tobit
models. This tends to suggest that firms heavily discount the future when faced
with a bribe demanding official. This is consistent with there being an increased
level of uncertainty in a business environment where bribes are demanded.
Firms also seem to place a great emphasis on their outside options. Model 3
adds moveable capital per employee (“eun sunk cost”38) to the analysis which has
a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. Thus, companies with a
relatively larger proportion of moveable capital pay significantly less in bribes, con-
forming with the bargaining theory. Model 5 introduces dummy variables denoting
the number of competitors (1 competitor; 2 to 5 competitors; 6+ competitors) into
the model (the reference category is: no competitors). Firms with more than 5
close competitors tend to pay less in bribes (significant at the 1% level), suggesting
that a higher level of economic activity might decrease the amount of bribe to be
paid (per firm) to a public official to keep him/her satisfied.
Having the government or government agencies as the principal buyer for one’s
product (“gov customer”) corresponds with a higher bribe payment (model 6;
significant at the 10% level). This is coherent with the idea that firms pay bribes in
order to secure public procurement contracts from the government. Firms engaging
in international trade pay less in bribes than firms that do not. One reason for this
could be that customs officials demand less in bribe payments than other types
of public officials. The presence of many different types of government officials at
Nigerian ports might increase the probability of being caught soliciting a bribe,
this threat is likely to push down the bribe amounts for firms who import or
export directly. When distinguishing between firms that import and those that
export (model 0) it appears that importing firms pay more in bribes than exporting
firms. This may be because exporting firms have the option of not exporting and
cancelling an outstanding order, whereas an importing firm has probably paid for a
cargo of goods. Also, the survey question asking whether or not the firm inported
was in reference to inputs into the production process, it would seem plausible
that a firm importing inputs might see the process as more urgent than one who
was exporting due to hold up costs of production.
38This variable is constructed by dividing un sunk cost by the total number of employees
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Specification Tests The likelihood function for the standard censored Tobit
model can be expressed as the product of two likelihood functions; the likelihood
functions for the truncated standard tobit model and for the probit model, respec-
tively [Lin & Schmidt , 1984]. Recalling the likelihood function for the standard
(censored) tobit model:
l =
∏
y>0
[
φ[(yi − x′iβ)/σ]
σ
]∏[
1− Φ[x
′
iβ
σ
]
]
(3.9.0.22)
where y = 0 denotes the left-censored observations and y > 0 denotes the
uncensored observations. Multiplying this expression by:∏
y>0
Φ
[
x′iβ
σ
]∏
y=0
1
Φ[x′iβ/σ]
(3.9.0.23)
is equivalent to multiplying by one, therefore the original expression remains
unaltered. The following function is obtained:
l =
ltt︷ ︸︸ ︷∏
y>0
[
φ[yi − x′iβ/σ]
σΦ[x′iβ/σ]
]
×
∏
y=0
[
1− Φ[x
′
iβ
σ
]
]∏
y>0
Φ
x′iβ
σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
lp
(3.9.0.24)
where ltt =
∏
y>0
[
φ[yi−x′iβ/σ]
σΦ[x′iβ/σ]
]
is the likelihood function for the truncated tobit
model and lp =
∏
y=0
[
1− Φ[x′iβ
σ
]
]∏
y>0 Φ
x′iβ
σ
is the likelihood function for the
probit model. Taking logs of equation 3.9.0.24 gives:
L = LTT + LP (3.9.0.25)
where L = logel; LTT = logeltt; and Lp = logelp. A likelihood ratio test
(LRT) can be conducted to test for the restriction on parameters that the standard
censored tobit model imposes. The unrestricted log-likelihood value is provided
by equation 3.9.0.25 (reported in Table 3.17) and the restricted log-likelihood is
reported in table 3.13. The LRT statistic is computed as: LRT = −2[LCT−(LTT +
LP )], where LCT is the log-likelihood value for the censored tobit model. This gives
a formal test of the assumption that the factors that influence the (non)payment
of a bribe retain the same sign when analysing their effect on the amount of bribe
paid. Tables 3.17 and 3.18 report the results from the probit estimations and the
truncated Tobit models, respectively. The LRT statistics are reported in Table
3.17 and results from all specifications do not reject the null hypothesis that the
Tobit model is correctly specified.
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Examining Differences Among Types Of Bribe Report As stated previ-
ously (section 3.6), firms were allowed to report their bribe payments either as a
proportion of sales or in Naira value. This question structure lends itself to the
analysis of whether or not there are any differences in the explanation of the type
of response given by the firm. If there are some differences in the explanations for
the responses, then the control rights & bargaining variables will be significantly
different across the two group (Sales Percentage reporters & Naira reporters). This
question can be explored using a multinomial logit model where:
yij = 1 if the i
th firm responds via the jth alternative and yij = 0 otherwise,
where j = {1, 2, 3}. Denoting Prob[yij = 1] = pij, then pi1 + pi2 + pi3 = 1; since
the individual probabilities must add up to one.
The multinomial logit for this model can be expressed as: pi1 =
ex
′
iβ1
e
x′
i
β1+e
x′
i
β2+e
x′
i
β3
;
pi2 =
ex
′
iβ2
e
x′
i
β1+e
x′
i
β2+e
x′
i
β3
; and pi3 =
ex
′
iβ3
e
x′
i
β1+e
x′
i
β2+e
x′
i
β3
To ensure identification, the Thiel normalisation is used by setting β1 = 0.
After normalising the model becomes:
pi1 =
1
1 + ex
′
iβ2 + ex
′
iβ3
(3.9.0.26)
pi2 =
ex
′
iβ2
1 + ex
′
iβ2 + ex
′
iβ3
(3.9.0.27)
pi3 =
ex
′
iβ3
1 + ex
′
iβ2 + ex
′
iβ3
(3.9.0.28)
The log-odds ratios for these parameters are: loge[
pi2
pi1
] = x′iβ2; loge[
pi3
pi1
] = x′iβ3;
and loge[
pi3
pi2
] = loge[
pi3
pi1
]− loge[pi2pi1 ] = x′iβ3 − x′iβ2 = x′i[β3 − β2].
Estimation of the parameters of the multinomial logit model is performed by
using the following log-likelihood function:
L =
n∑
i
3∑
1
yijloge(pij) (3.9.0.29)
where pij represents equations (3.9.0.26) to (3.9.0.28).
Marginal effects for a small change in one of the explanatory variables on the
probability of one of the events occuring are given by (subscripts are dropped
for convenience):
∂pj
∂x
= pj[βj −
∑
k βkpk] for j 6= k for the non-normalised
categories (pi2 and pi3) and
∂p1
∂x
= p1[−β2p2 − β3p3] for the normalised category
(pi1).
Impact effects are given by: ∆2 =
ex
′
iβ2+γ2
1+e
x′
i
β2+γ2+e
x′
i
β3+γ3
− ex
′
iβ2
1+e
x′
i
β2+e
x′
i
β2
; and ∆3 =
ex
′
iβ3+γ3
1+e
x′
i
β2+γ2+e
x′
i
β3+γ3
− ex
′
iβ3
1+e
x′
i
β2+e
x′
i
β2
where γ is the coefficient on the dummy variable.
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Table 3.17: Probit Estimations On All
Firms
p0 p1 p10
infraserv 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.182***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.067)
import 0.174
(0.262)
export -0.183
(0.361)
tax percentage 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
trade 0.023 0.010
(0.216) (0.237)
eprofit -0.000
(0.000)
capital labour 0.000
(0.000)
eun sunk cost
competitors 2 0.054
(0.341)
competitors 3 0.294
(0.223)
competitors 4 0.158
(0.216)
gov customer 0.337
(0.293)
regulation realtime 0.032***
(0.008)
eexternal
consultant
naira
0.001
(0.002)
african -0.507***
(0.157)
un sunk cost -0.025
(1.317)
Industry
Dummies
YES
Region Dum-
mies
YES
Constant -0.398*** -0.401*** 2.572**
(0.079 (0.079) (1.284)
Pseudo R-
squared
0.014 0.014 0.199
Observations 2001 2001 2001
Log-
Likelihood
-1366.4 -1366.7 -1110.8
L -7092.4 -7092.8 -6468.5
Lrt -1089.6 -1090.4 -568.6
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent
Variable: Dummy=1 if bribe paid, 0 otherwise. L: the
sum of the log-likelihood for the truncated tobit model
and the log-likelihood for the probit model. This is the
log-likelihood for the unrestricted model in the tobit
specification test. LRT: the likelihood ratio test statistic
for the tobit model specification test.
Table 3.18: Truncated Tobit Estimations
For Bribing Firms Only
tt0 tt1 tt10
infraserv 2.228 2.161 2.589
(3.81) (3.807) (3.682)
import -18.347
(12.432)
export -0.171
(22.321)
tax percentage -0.086 -0.087 -0.122*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.063)
trade -14.815 -12.515
(11.35) (7.747)
eprofit 0.155***
(0.034)
capital labour 0.007**
(0.003)
eun sunk cost
competitors 2 -0.217
(9.617)
competitors 3 5.517
(5.931)
competitors 4 6.999
(6.541)
gov customer 15.720
(14.424)
regulation realtime 0.081
(0.456)
eexternal
consultant
naira
0.720
(0.475)
african 4.375
(3.978)
un sunk cost 20.741
(60.197)
Industry
Dummies
YES
Region Dum-
mies
YES
Constant 45.806*** 45.892*** 63.599
(5.598) (5.602) (49.687)
sigma 63.161*** 63.170*** 44.160***
(10.604) (10.603) (4.985)
Pseudo R-
squared
0 0 0.065
Observations 1029 1029 1029
Log-
Likelihood
-5726 -5726.1 -5357.7
F 1 1.1 14.3
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent
Variable is Bribe (’000 Naira) per Employee
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Results Taking the exponential of the reported multinomial logit coefficients
provides the relative risk ratios for the estimation:
pij
pi1
= ex
′
iβj (3.9.0.30)
where j = 2, 3. This gives the proportionate change in the relative risk of choosing
alternative j rather than “no bribe” from a unit increase in an explanatory variable.
The relative risk ratios for the estimation are reported in Table 3.19. This table
uses the same explanatory variables as model 12 of the probit model in table 3.14.
As stated above, firms had the option of reporting no bribes, positive bribes as a
percentage of sales, or positive bribes in Naira. The base group for the reported
results is the non-payment of bribes.
Results indicate that firms who report bribes in Naira are more responsive
to the factors affecting bribery, compared to the base group of non-bribers, than
firms who report in sales percentage. The regressors in model 12 are jointly signif-
icant (chi-squared value of 126197) and the Pseudo R-squared is larger than that
of more sparse models. The coefficients on tax percentage; regulation realtime;
and african are all jointly significant at the 1% level, those on infraserv and ex-
ternal consultant naira are significant at the 5% level; while the coefficients on
profit and capital labour are significant at the 10% level. All coefficients for jointly
significant variables remain the same between the two groups within each model39.
In this table, coefficients that are less than 1 imply that a unit change in the
explanatory variables decrease the probability of choosing that particular reporting
style. So in model 12, a one unit increase in regulation realtime, corresponding
to an extra hour spent dealing with government regulations, leads to the relative
odds of reporting a bribe in sales rather than reporting a zero bribe that are
1.054 times what they were before the change, therefore the relative odds have
increased. Consistent with previous results, changes in profits do not change the
relative odds of reporting bribes in either Naira or sales relative to reporting no
bribe at all. Acquiring access to another public good (water or electricity) increases
the relative risk of reporting a bribe (in either Naira of sales), compared to not
reporting, that is greater than any other explanatory variable. regulation realtime
has the second largest relative risk ratio that is greater than 1, and tax percentage
has the third. This implies that an extra hour spent dealing with government
regulations is associated with an increased relative risk of paying a bribe that is
larger than a 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of sales reported for
tax purposes.
39Excluding external consultant naira and capital labour, which, in model 12, have a zero co-
efficient for sales reporters and a negative and significant coefficient for Naira reporters
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Table 3.19: Relative Risk Ratios For The Multinomial Logit Estimations On Bribe
Reporting Behaviour
ml12
Sales Reporter Naira Reporter
infraserv 1.338** 1.106
(0.152) (0.209)
tax percentage 1.004* 1.015***
(0.002) (0.004)
profit 1.000** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
capital labour 1.000 1.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
regulation realtime 1.054*** 1.066***
(0.016) (0.023)
external consultant naira 1.000 0.996**
(0.000) (0.002)
african 0.436*** 0.550
(0.114) (0.268)
Industry Dummies YES YES
Region Dummies YES YES
Constant 518.315*** 0.272
-1243.178 (0.975)
Other control variables YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.226
Observations 2001
Log-Likelihood -1493.4
Chi-Squared 126197.5
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent Variable={No bribe;Bribe(Sales %); Bribe()}. Reference
group: Non-bribers. Other control variables include: trade (dummy), capital mobility; the number of
competitors (category); and whether or not the government was the principal buyer of the firm’s output
(dummy). The coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant.
The Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption One potential
flaw with using the multinomial logit (MNL) model in this analysis is that it is
equivalent to a series of pairwise logit models. Following from this, it assumes that
the probability under consideration is unaffected by all other alternative choices.
I.e. the odds of choosing to report bribes in Naira rather than no bribes does not
depend on how many other options there are in total. This assumption reduces the
MNL model to a series of binary choice logit models (this can be seen in Equation
3.9.0.30, the conditional probability of one event occuring , e.g. Naira, does not
depend on the other probabilities). This is called the “independence of irrelevant
alternatives” assumption (IIA) and is potentially problematic when some choices
are close substitutes for one another. In the current case, there seems to be a very
close substitutability between reporting a bribe in Naira and reporting a bribe as
a percentage of total sales. These two options are not complementary because no
firms reported bribes both in terms of Naira and percentage of sales. In order
for the MNL model to be valid, the IIA assumption must be tested. To do so,
this study follows the convention; the procedure and results of the IIA testing are
explained in Appendix A.1 Section A.1.4.
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3.10 Results From The Corruption Survey
This section augments the previous results by including data from the NBS survey
into the analysis. The previous analysis has two potential limitations: Firstly, the
data on bribery does not specify one particular act for which the bribe was paid
but a host of acts. Firms were asked whether payments were made with regard to
“customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc”. One the one hand, asking a
question in this manner might attract a higher estimate of the proportion of bribing
firms i.e. asking if a firm paid a bribe for a number of activities might increase the
reporting of bribery. On the other hand, this measure does not distinguish between
the bribes paid for different activities. Therefore, any conclusions based on this
data might give a biased view of the business environment in Nigeria: a large
proportion of firms might have paid a bribe in order to avoid punishment for an
offence committed, rather than to bypass cumbersome regulation. In order to get
a better view of the nature of bribe payments, the NBS data asks specific questions
concerning what the bribes were paid for. This data allows for an analysis into
the processes which attract the highest proportion of bribes.
Another potential problem with the previous data set is that it does not dis-
tinguish between the offfering of bribes (by firms) and the demanding of bribes
(by public officials). The analysis in section 3.2 suggests that the supply of bribes
is determined by the probability that an official will ask for a bribe, and the firms
willingness to pay. If a bribe is paid it could be the case that a bribe was first
offered by the firm, or that a bribe was initially demanded by the bureaucrat. The
previous analysis suggests that a bribe is demanded by an official and that the firm
either pays of refuses. The NBS data distinguishes between bribes being demanded
by public officials and bribes being offered to public officials. This allows for an
investigation into the nature of causality surrounding bribe payments in Nigeria.
The current section looks at the factors determining bribery by introducing
a disaggregated set of variables which represent meetings with public officials.
Tables A.1 to A.11 (in Appendix Section A.1) use these variables along with a
disaggregated set of bribery dummy variables to address the first potential prob-
lem mentioned above of different types of bribery. It presents the results of the
Bivariate Probit Analysis of the bribery of public officials that distinguishes be-
tween different types of public officials. The final part of this section (Section 3.10)
uses both sets of variables to address the second problem of causality in the bribe
transaction.
The Propensity to Bribe Table 3.14 presents results of the probit analysis on
bribe payments. The dependent variable for the models in this table is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm admitted to paying any bribe, and 0 if the firm
did not. Results show that involvement in international trade is associated with
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an increased probability of paying a bribe. The coefficient on trade is positive
and statisticaly significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on foreign is negative
and also significant at the 1% level, suggesting that amongst these firms, foreign
owned businesses were less likely to pay bribes than Nigerian ones. The number
of employees and age of a firm both have negative coefficients but neither are
significant at the 10% level.
All of the coefficients for variables relating to contact with public officials
(conda-condk) are positive when entered seperately into the model . The variables
denoting traffic offences (condj); clearing goods through customs; police investiga-
tions (condi); vehicle registrations (condh); getting clearance for environmental or
sanitary regulations (condf); and obtaining business licenses and permits (condd)
all enter significantly into their respective models (in decreasing order of size).
Hence, traffic offences, customs process and police investigations are the processes
which seem to make a firm most likely to pay a bribe. The parameters of the
partial effects models are jointly significant and have chi-squared values all above
53. There does not appear to be much evidence in favour of differences between
regions in the payment of bribes: a Wald test for equality of the state dummies
fails to reject the null of equality in all but one specification out of the partial
effects models 40.
In the full model (model 12) which includes all of the public-official variables,
only the variables for traffic offences and vehicle registrations enter positively and
statistically significantly (both at the 1% level) into the model. The parameters
of the model are jointly significant and the model also rejects the null hypothesis
of equality of state dummies. The model has the highest Pseudo R-Squared value
(0.384).
Instigator Of The Bribe Transaction Finally, table 3.15 helps to shine light
on the instigator of the typical bribery transaction. This is done by using a series
of categorical response questions which ask the firms how frequently bribes are
demanded and offered to public officials and foreign public officials. Firms were
given a choice of responses: never happens; not very frequent but not unusual;
fairly frequent; and very frequent. The base category used in Table 3.15 is “never
happens”.
The only variable that seems to have a strong effect across all models is the
indicator variable representing coming into contact with public officials because of
a traffic offence. This variable seems to be a good predictor of a bribe being offered
to and demanded from a domestic public official, respectively. Unsurprisingly, this
variable is negatively related to a bribe bribe being offered to and demanded from
40The model where the null of equality is rejected (model 10) has the best fit out of all partial
effects models (Pseudo R-squared of 0.314).
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a foreign public official; this is because traffic offences are dealt with by domestic
officials and not foreign ones.
Starting with model 1, committing a traffic offence is associated with an in-
creased log-odds of reporting that firms offer bribes to public officials very fre-
quently relative to reporting that this never happens. Also, procuring goods and
services from private companies increases the log relative-risk of saying that com-
panies offer bribes to officials on a very frequent basis relative to that of saying
that this never happens. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
This increased risk holds for the “fairly frequent” and “not very frequent but not
unusual” categories as well.
In addition to an increased risk of offering an official an informal payment,
being involved in a traffic offence increases the log of the relative-risk of reporting
that officials demand bribes very often relative to not at all (model 2). This result
also holds for the other two categories. It therefore seems that traffic offences
attract bribe demands from public officials and propel bribe offers from firms.
The obtaining of a business licence or permit (condd) is also associated with an
increased relative risk of a bribe being demanded relative to no bribe being de-
manded. Models 3 and 4 show a positive association between the acquiring of road
worthy certificates and the log relative-risk of both being demanded for a bribe by
and offering a bribe to a foreign public official. This result also holds for residence
work permits, police investigations and contact with the courts.
3.11 Conclusions
Bribery at the firm level is a relatively unexplored topic. The lack of research in
this area is partly due to data issues. This chapter sought to uncover some of the
mechanisms at work when a firm manager pays a bribe to a government official by
using firm level data that includes information on informal gift giving from firms
to government employees. Information from two datasets of Nigerian firms was
applied to an established conceptual framework provided by Svensson [2003] and
results were significant and supportive of the previous literature.
The control rights and bargaining hypotheses were tested using a number of
empirical models including: a tobit model; the Heckman Two-Step model; and
the two-part model. Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity; absence of selec-
tion; and preference for increased flexibility, the Two-Part model was used as the
preferred model. This model allowed for the independence of the determinants of
the incidence of bribery and the magnitude of bribery (the Tobit does not); does
not require an exclusion restriction (the Heckman does); and is the most robust
simple estimator in the presence of multicollinearity [Puhani , 2000]. The models
controlled for regional and industry fixed effects.
With suitable data, a bivariate probit model with sample selection was used
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to simultaneously model the propensity to come into contact with a government
employee and the propensity to bribe that government employee conditional on
coming into contact with them. This enabled the investigation to test for selectivity
in the meeting and the bribing of officials. This amounted to a relaxing of one of
the assumptions of the conceptual framework.
A major contribution of this work is the use of data that distinguishes between
bribe payments made to different types of government official. This is the first
study to do so at the firm level and it allowed for the examination of which types
of bribery are most prevalent in the economy. Another significant contribution
was the use of data concerning how likely it is for a firm to offer a bribe to a
public official; and for a public official to demand a bribe from a firm. This
information was available concerning domestic and foreign public officials. This is
important because it relaxes some of the assumptions of the conceptual framework;
it also provides a framework that can possibly be extended and investigated by
the experimental literature.
The findings revealed evidence for both the control rights hypothesis and the
bargaining hypothesis amongst manufacturing companies in Nigeria. Despite the
potential sensitivity of the topic, various methods have been used in order to
extract honest responses about bribery from firms. These responses lend to some
analysis on the nature of bribe payments amongst Nigerian firms. Questions asking
about the behaviour of other firms help to remove the stigma from admitting to
doing a sensitive or illegal act.
The incidence of bribery seems to be positively related to coming into contact
with government officials. Results also suggest that the magnitude of bribe is
determined by factors representing a firm’s ability to pay and outside options.
These findings are robust to different econometric specifications. Results point
to the notion that firms pay bribes because they desire items and/or services in
order to carry out their business, which sometimes require them to pay informal
gifts in order to either receive, or speed up the process of receiving them [Leite
& Weidemann , 2002]. In the case of Nigeria, 65% of manufacturing firms state
that the government’s interpretation of laws and regulations are consistent and
predictable. 51% of firms report a positive bribe amount that is required in order
to speed the process of regulations.
By distinguishing between the different purposes for which a bribe was paid
and who brought up the issue of a bribe, this investigation was able to find out
which activities were more likely to attract bribes and to assess the direction of
causality in the bribe transaction. The data presented in the preceeding analysis
builds on the literature that analyses specific reasons for such payments.
Variables denoting meetings with public officials were found to be positively
related with the propensity to pay a bribe and were also related (although not as
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strongly) to the amount of bribe paid. Firm specific characteristics such as profit
and capital stock were found to be relatively good indicators of the level of bribe
paid. Further work can build on this study by investigating whether informal
payments have a significant effect on the future profitability and competitiveness
of companies. This will allow for a better interpretation of the effect that expected
future profits has on the level of bribe paid. Work that investigates the effect of
competitors paying bribes would also add to the analysis of the supply of bribes.
The inference from the ES dataset relied on indrectly asking firm managers
about their bribing habits. Much of the inference about firms bribing was based
on their responses to these indirect questions. The next chapter calls the validity
of such inference into question by testing the effectiveness of indirect questioning
in getting honest responses from sensitive questions compared to another widely
used method of asking sensitive questions.
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4 A Comparison Of Randomised Response and
Indirect Questioning Methods In Measuring
Corruption And Tax Evasion: A Study Of Com-
panies In Nigeria
Abstract
When using business surveys to study bribery, one must overcome the
problem of acquiring valid data on such acts. Firms must be provided with
an incentive to reveal their true behaviour if the data is to be trusted. This
might be achieved by increasing the benefit accrued from truth-telling; or
by reducing the perceived cost of truth-telling. Different mechanisms have
been used to do this; these include the randomised response technique; and
indirect questioning methods. These methods shield interviewees from being
identified as guilty whilst providing some information about the level of guilt
within the sample. This paper assesses the usefulness of these techniques in
obtaining information about corruption and tax evasion amongst companies
in Nigeria. Results from the randomised response procedure are compared
with indirect questioning methods that are used to get truthful responses
to sensitive questions. Through a model that allows for false-reporting this
study calculates a lower bound estimate of the rate of truth-telling/lying.
Results from previous studies using data from other countries are compared
with the results from the Nigerian sample. This chapter finds that whilst
the randomised response technique provides an incentive to tell the truth;
many firms choose not to do so. Furthermore, asking indirect questions
about tax evasion and corruption seems to generate more honest answers
than using the randomised response technique. Companies in Romania seem
more willing to admit to guilt than companies in Nigeria.
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4.1 Measuring Corruption At The Micro Level
The main result of the previous chapter used indirect questions asked to firm man-
agers about their committing of bribery. The firms were not asked about their own
behaviour but about the behaviour of similar establishments. Nonetheless, their
responses were interpreted as describing their own behaviour. The justification
for this interpretation of the data comes from the results of the false consensus
effect: that people who engage in socially undesirable behaviour are more likely to
over-estimate the prevalence of such behaviour amongst their peers. Thus, firms
engaging in bribery are more likely to over estimate the prevalence of bribery by
similar establishments. The current chapter seeks to compare the effectiveness
of indirect questioning against an alternative method of asking interviewees for
sensitive information.
Using survey data to ask firm managers about corruption and tax evasion can
generate bias due to misreporting. Managers are likely to underreport the amount
of illegal activities they engage in due to either psychic costs or the risk of their
responses being leaked to authorities [Tourangeau, Rips & Rasinski , 2000]. Tech-
niques have been developed with the aim of getting honest responses from sensitive
survey questions; these include: the assurance of the interviewee’s anonymity; and
indirect questioning. Both of these methods seek to acquire information about
the respondent’s behaviour whilst protecting them from the costs of confessing to
an illegal or socially tabooed act [Lensvelt-Mulders et al. , 2005b]. Making the
responses to a survey anonymous reduces the chances that any individual trans-
gressor is punished; indirect questioning involves asking questions about similar
firms or “firms like this one” rather than asking direct questions about the firm.
This allows the firm to admit that an illegal act is common amongst similar firms
without running the risk of being identified as guilty.
Another method that has been used in empirical research is the randomised
response (RR) technique [Warner , 1965]. This procedure aims to get information
about people’s behaviour by partly removing the interviewee’s true behaviour from
their response. The method that is used in the current dissertation is equivalent
to posing an innocuous question alongside the sensitive question and having the
interviewee answer only one of the questions: either the sensitive question; or the
non-sensitive question. The question that the interviewee is required to answer
is determined by the occurrence of a random event (a heads on a coin toss), the
result of which is known only to the interviewee, but the probability of which is
known to the interviewer. The idea behind this procedure is that interviewees
would be more willing to tell the truth if the interviewer or the users of the data
do not know which question is answered. If uncertainty about which question
was answered causes interviewees to be honest in their responses, then it is trivial
to calculate unbiased estimates of the prevalence of sensitive behaviour [Kraay &
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Murrell , 2013].
In the case of the dichotomous response to a question such as: “Have you
failed to pay some of your taxes in the past 12 months?”. The response (yes/no)
is attached to a probability distribution that is independent of the interviewee’s
guilt, for example, receiving a heads from a coin toss. The probability of the event
occurring is known to the interviewer, and the interviewee is instructed to answer
“yes” based on the outcome of the random event. Under these conditions a “yes” is
answered, according to a known probability, regardless of whether or not the person
in question is guilty or not. The interviewer observes the response (“yes” or “no”)
but does not know the true status of the interviewee or the result of the random
event. The assurance that a “yes” response does not necessarily imply guilt on the
part of the interviewee is meant to reduce the incentive for the interviewee to tell a
lie; since he/she could just be following instruction. Using the proportion of “yes”
responses and the known probability of observing a “yes” response, the interviewer
is able to get an estimate of the proportion of interviewees who are guilty of the
act in question. This technique has been used in the economics, sociology, and
psychology literature to estimate the prevalence of sensitive behaviour [Locander,
Sidman & Bradburn , 1976, Lensvelt-Mulders et al. , 2005b] and identify indicators
of sensitive and illegal behaviour [St. John; Keane; Edward-Jones; Jones; Yarnell
and Jones , 2011, Kerkvliet , 1994a,b].
The current study uses the RR technique and indirect questioning methods
to analyse the prevalence of corruption and tax avoidance amongst businesses in
Nigeria. The methods are tested against each other in order to see which one gets
more honest responses from interviewees. In testing these methods this study uses
the “more is better” assumption [Tourangeau & Yan , 2007] which states that the
method which yields a higher estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive behaviour
is the more accurate method. This assumption applies only to questions that are
generally underreported. For questions concerning socially desirable behaviour the
opposite assumption, “less is better”, applies.
The chapter also discusses the use of the RR technique in dealing with the
response bias that arises out of asking questions about sensitive topics. Through
the use of the RR technique this study is able to get an estimate of the level
of misreporting (as done in previous literature [Azfar & Murrell , 2009, Clausen,
Kraay & Murrell , 2010]). The analysis is applied to Nigeria.41
It has been relatively difficult to collect accurate data on acts such as tax
evasion and corruption because they are usually carried out in secret due to their
being illegal [Otusanya , 2011]. Furthermore, firms have been deemed to be unlikely
41This study builds on multiple strands of literature, including: misclassification error in a
binary dependent variable; response bias when answering sensitive questions; improving the
efficiency of the RR technique; testing the effectiveness of indirect questioning versus randomised
response questioning; and estimating a likelihood function for data subject to RR.
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to admit to their committing an illegal act. Empirical work on topics involving
crime have sometimes generated new techniques in order to measure, create proxies
for, or instrument for the variables of interest [Golden & Picci , 2005, Fisman &
Miguel , 2007, Reinikka & Svensson , 2005]. Faced with the problem of quantifying
an action that is socially undesirable, researchers have created indicators of such
phenomena from observables that are related to these acts. Golden & Picci
[2005] use public data about the amount of funds set aside for the building of
public infrastructure in Italy and compare this to independent estimates of the
costs of the public projects to estimate the amount of funds being stolen. They
use this as a measure of corruption. Fisman & Miguel [2007] use the number of
parking violations committed by foreign diplomats in New York as an international
corruption index. Reinikka & Svensson [2005] use a natural experiment where
local residents are provided with information about the level of funding given to
Ugandan schools to gauge how governance and accountability reacts to the public
provision of information. These techniques have allowed researchers to examine
the rate at which funds are being unlawfully expropriated for agents’ private use;
and also how a culture of corruption and lawlessness can manifest itself outside
the borders of a particular country [Fisman & Miguel , 2007, Barr & Serra , 2010].
Another data collection strategy has been to acquire information sourced in the
public domain. These include: parliamentary reports; court proceedings; newspa-
per reports; and papers from regulatory bodies [Otusanya , 2011]. Each source has
its own relative strengths and weaknesses. Most suffer from at least one form of
selection problem. In the case of judicial proceedings the selection bias occurs in at
least 2 stages. Firstly, individuals/companies must be selected in order to be tried
and prosecuted; and not all perpetrators of the act might be selected. Secondly,
the judiciary decides whether or not the information of the proceedings are made
publicly available. Another data collection strategy is to randomly select individ-
uals from a telephone directory [Abeler, Becker & Falk , 2012]. However, this also
suffers from the selection bias and nonresponse bias [Porcano , 1988]. The current
chapter does not use such information directly but uses firm-level surveys to get
information on tax evasion and corruption. The argument is put forward that
valid information can be acquired by companies on the nature of their dealings
through the use of indirect questions. These include questions about firms that
are similar to the one in question rather than direct questions about the firm itself.
Compared to RR questions, these seem to generate a higher rate of admitting ones
guilt.
The current study contributes to the body of knowledge by introducing a for-
mal analysis of the responses to a series of randomised response questions with
reticence; and by introducing new approaches to survey research. Corruption esti-
mates are generated via the randomised response method, these are compared to
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estimates from the indirect questioning method (Section 4.5.1) . The distribution
of responses to the set of randomised response questions are analysed in order to
identify which firm managers are reticent and which ones are not (Section 4.5.2).
The likelihood of observing the distribution of responses is modelled using a sim-
ple binary response framework, this is used to derive estimates of reticence and
guilt from the sample of firms (Section 4.5.3). This method can be used to derive
estimates of reticence and guilt from any sample of observations that use a set of
RR questions. The RR questions were asked in a given order. The current study
looks at whether or not there is a trend in the responses to a series of RR ques-
tions, it does this by observing the predictability of the response to the final RR
question based on the responses to the previous RR questions (Section 4.5.4). This
discussion is followed by an investigation on the order of the resposnes to all RR
questions, common trends in the responses to the questions are identified (Section
4.5.5). The indirect questions were asked about firm that are similar to the firm
being interviewed, the current study seeks to find out how much information the
response to these questions might contain by investigating the responses of firms
in the same sector-size-location cell (Section 4.5.6).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: The next section discusses the
formation of the IQ and RR techniques. Section 4.3 discusses the data used in
this study to investigate firm behaviour and illegal practices amongst companies
in Nigeria. Section 4.4 specifies the methodology that is used to compare the two
techniques. Section 4.5 analyses the results. Section 4.6 concludes and proposes
possible extensions to the study.
4.2 Survey Research Methods And A Formal Description
Of The Randomised Response Model
Firm-level data on production processes, pricing, expectations and appraisals of
the business environment have been collected in many countries over many decades.
These surveys range from monthly studies like the ones conducted by Office For
National Statistics (United Kingdom) to less frequent ones such as the World Busi-
ness Environment Survey (conducted by the World Bank). Historically, business
surveys have been used to provide information for macroeconomic analysis, such as
generating indicators for the business cycle. Recent progress in microeconometric
methods have made it possible to use business surveys to test the microeconomic
theory of the firm. For example, the use of business surveys has allowed for the
empirical measurement of firm production functions and estimates of efficiency
[Greene , 2008, Pham, Dao & Reilly , 2010].
When using surveys to come to conclusions about the business environment
it is important for the data to be measured as accurately as possible [Good &
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Hardin , 2006]. In order to do this, questions must be constructed effectively.
Inaccurate responses can have a significant impact on a study via inaccurate point
estimates and biased regression coefficients [Hausman, Abrevaya, Scott-Morton ,
1998, Bound, Brown & Mathiowetz , 2001]. The importance of question structure
is even more relevant when asking sensitive questions. Sensitive questions deal
with behaviour that, when answered truthfully, is seen by society as illegal or
undesirable, or is seen by the interviewee as an invasion of their privacy [Iarossi
, 2006]. Some examples include questions concerning the payment of bribes, tax
evasion, and the breaking of laws. Such questions tend to have a relatively higher
risk of response error and non-response than non-sensitive questions. Respondents
are likely to distort their answers in order to present themselves in the most socially
positive way. Also, some their interviewees might refuse to answer the sensitive
questions. If the pattern of non-responses is not random, as is likely, then the
results will be biased; those with the most to hide might be the least likely to give
a response. Another potential source or error that applies to sensitive questions
is the bias generating by the interviewer’s sponsoring agency. When a survey is
conducted by a government agency sensitive questions on sales, corruption and
the perception of corruption tend to be underreported compared to when the
questionnaire is conducted by a private local survey company [Iarossi , 2006].
Two major forces are thought to be at work to distort the answer to a sensitive
question. These are: the desire to avoid an answer that could pose a threat to
the respondent; and the desire of the interviewee not to look bad [Fowler , 1995].
Different methods have been used to reduce the impact of these forces and get more
accurate responses to sensitive questions. One method is to change the format of
the question. This can be achieved by adjusting the level of detail required in the
answers to the questions. Instead of asking for answers to be made in absolute
values it might be easier for the interviewee to respond in percentages (e.g. the
amount of bribe paid as a percentage of total sales) or categories (e.g. bribes
are paid: not at all; sometimes; frequently). However, although changing the
format of a sensitive question can improve the response rate, a potential downfall
of this strategy is the loss in accuracy that might occur from the responses to the
adjusted question. Whilst a direct sensitive question is subject to the sources of
error mentioned above: underreporting, nonresponse and survey agency effects; a
question that asks for a bribe amount as a percentage of sales might be subject to
misreporting of bribes, misreporting of sales and miscalculation of the percentage
[Clarke , 2011].
Another strategy used to reduce the bias that arises from asking sensitive
questions is to adjust the length of the question. The length of a question can serve
to reduce the threatening nature of a question. In addition to this, experiments
have shown that longer questions generate more accurate answers when asking
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about sensitive topics concerning behaviour [Sudnam & Bradburn , 1974, Peterson
, 2000]. A similar strategy is to reduce the perceived sensitivity of the topic by
explaining the various reasons why somebody might engage in the behaviour in
question. This might help to reduce the extent to which the interviewees feel their
response will be viewed in a negative fashion. Another way in which this can be
done is to use words that imply that the same behaviour is done by their peers.
This may assist in making the interviewee feel less stigma in admitting to guilt.
Also, the interviewer can ensure the interviewee that their answers will be made
confidential and that none of the responses will be traceable back to them.
Sometimes a question is perceived to be sensitive because the interviewee does
not understand why it is being asked in the questionnaire; perhaps they do not see
the connection between the question and the purpose of the survey or do not see
the importance of their answer. The interviewer can help to reduce this sensitivity
by explaining to the interviewee the reason why the question is included in the
survey. The sensitivity can also be reduced by putting the topic in a list of less
sensitive topics [Plateck, Pierre-Pierre & Stevens , 1985].
The location of the sensitive question within the questionnaire can also be
of importance when trying to get accurate answers. Placing the question where
it is less sensitive, e.g. where the topic being questioned is apt for a sensitive
question, has been advised [Iarossi , 2006]. The general consensus seems to be
that interviewers should try to gain trust42 from the interviewee before asking a
potentially threatening questioning, therefore, sensitive questions should not come
at the beginning of a questionnaire. It is also thought to be good practice to
introduce the sensitive questions with a series of warm-up questions [Warwick
& Lininger , 1975], for example by placing multiple questions on corruption in
different subsections of a questionnaire [Svensson , 2003].
Another method that can be used to deal with sensitive topics is the randomised
response (henceforth, RR) technique. With this technique the interviewee is pre-
sented with 2 questions: a sensitive question and a non-sensitive question43. The
process of choosing which question to answer relies on a randomising device (e.g. a
coin). The interviewee chooses which question to answer according to a predeter-
mined probability (e.g. a coin toss. Heads: sensitive question; tails: non-sensitive
question). The interviewer observes the interviewee’s answer but does not see the
result of the randomising procedure; so they do not know which question the inter-
42The potential role of trust in getting honest answers to sensitive survey questions is investi-
gated in Chapter 5.
43The second question might be related or unrelated to the (sensitive) question of interest.
For example, if the sensitive question is: “Have you paid a bribe this year?” the second question
might be related: “Have you refrained from paying a bribe this year?” or unrelated: “Does your
birthday land in August?”. The initial RR framework [Warner , 1965] used the first type of
question (the related question) as the second question.
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viewee is answering. This is meant to reduce the perceived threat of the question
and encourage honesty on the part of the interviewee. One can calculate the sam-
ple value of the sensitive question by using a weighted average of the probability
of selecting each question [Moser & Kalton , 1971].
The Randomised Response Technique The RR technique increases the anonymity
of the interviewee by attaching their response to a chance event. There is a chance
that they are answering the sensitive question, and there is a chance that they
are not. This uncertainty is meant to lower the threat associated with answering
sensitive questions and encourage the person to respond with the truth. The RR
method was initially developed by Warner [1965] to get estimates of the per-
centage of a sample that was guilty of a sensitive act. More recent papers have
used the procedure to study the determinants of sensitive behaviour [St. John;
Keane; Edward-Jones; Jones; Yarnell and Jones , 2011], and also to see if there
is a link between lying about sensitive questions asked via RR and misreporting
other questions [Azfar & Murrell , 2009, Clausen, Kraay & Murrell , 2010].
Asking a room full of 100 firm managers to raise their hands if they had paid
a bribe in the past year might not achieve many raised hands. However, if one
asks them to all flip a coin and after the coin toss to raise their hands if they had
paid a bribe in the past year or if they had got a head on the coin toss, one might
expect the number of raised hands to be more than the direct question approach.
Furthermore, if, after using the RR approach, 64 people raised their hands, it can
be expected that roughly 50 people got a heads and raised their hands regardless
of whether or not they had paid a bribe. The other 14 hand raisers would suggest
that 14 out of the (approximately) 50 who received a tail on the flip of the coin
had paid a bribe in the past year. Therefore an estimate of the proportion of the
sample who had paid a bribe would be 14/50 or 28% 44. Thus it is possible to
estimate the prevalence of a sensitive trait with the RR technique, even though
one is not able to find out which of the hand raisers are amongst the bribers.
To illustrate this more formally, consider an interviewer asking an interviewee
two statements that are logical opposites45:
Statement 1: “I have paid a bribe to a public official in the past 12 months”
Statement 2: “I have not paid a bribe to a public official in the past 12 months”
The interviewee is given a fair randomizing device (e.g. a die) that follows a
bernoulli distribution46 and is instructed to use the device (e.g. by rolling the die)
without letting the interviewer see the outcome, and to confirm or deny one of the
44With 95% confidence intervals: {27.997:28.003} calculated using the variance formula in
section 4.2
45Part of the following analysis is borrowed from [Fox & Tracy , 1986]
46A discrete distribution with 2 possible outcomes: a success (1) occurring with probability p,
and a failure (0) with probability 1− p
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two statements depending on the outcome of the device. For example, in the event
of a success (with probability p), respond to statement 1; in the event of a failure
(with probability 1− p) respond to statement 2.
Using this set-up, the total number of positive (yes) responses (λ) can be
described in terms of the probability of being guilty of the sensitive act (pi) as
follows:
P (yes) = (P (Statement1) ∗ P (yes|Statement1)) +
P (Statement2) ∗ P (yes|Statement2) (4.2.0.31)
Substituting p ≡ P (Statement1) and pi ≡ P (yes|Statement1) into the above
gives:
λ = ppi + (1− p)(1− pi) (4.2.0.32)
Since p and λ are known to the interviewer, this equation can be solved to find
an estimate of the proportion of the sample with the sensitive trait47 pˆi :
pˆi =
λ+ p− 1
2p− 1 for p 6= 0.5 (4.2.0.33)
Randomising devices for this method can include a die (if it lands on 1 or 2
then answer question 1; if 3,4,5 or 6 then answer question two, or some other
combination such that p 6= 0.5).
The RR technique outlined above (and described formally in equations (4.2.0.31)
to (4.2.0.33)) was the original method posed by Warner [1965]. Since the initial
paper was published many variants of the technique have been developed in order
to increase the interviewees’ level of truth telling and improve the efficiency of the
RR estimator. These different methods include: the unrelated question technique
and the forced-response technique. The current study uses the forced-response
technique.
The Forced Response Technique The formal model of the forced response
technique is statistically equivalent to the unrelated question RR with known pop-
ulation prevalence (see section A.2.1). The interviewee uses a randomising de-
vice but this time he/she is instructed to answer the sensitive question truthfully
with probability p; to answer “Yes” with probability θ; and “no” with probability
1− p− θ. In this case, the probability of observing a “yes” response is given by:
λ = p(question1) ∗ p(yes|question1) + p(forced) ∗ p(yes|forced) (4.2.0.34)
47With sample variance V ar(pˆi) = pi(1−pi)n +
p(1−p)
n(2p−1)2 [Lensvelt-Mulders et al. , 2005a]
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The estimate for the prevalence of the sensitive trait is given by48:
pˆi =
λˆ− ((1− p)θ)
p
(4.2.0.35)
Use of the forced forced response technique could involve a coin: if heads then
answer “yes” regardless of the true answer and if tails then answer truthfully. This
reduces the need for a second sample49 and also does not require a second question
to be asked. Lensvelt-Mulders et al. [2005a] assess the RR designs mentioned
above (Warner’s original method; the two unrelated question designs; and the
forced response technique) as well as two others and find the unrelated question
technique with known population prevalence and the forced response technique to
be the most efficient RR designs. The current chapter uses the latter method to
compare with the indirect questioning method.
Evaluating The Usefulness Of The Randomised Response Technique
In Applied Work On Sensitive Topics The Randomised response technique
has been used to estimate the prevalence of illegal drug use [Kerkvliet , 1994b],
cheating in classrooms [Kerkvliet , 1994a], corruption [Azfar & Murrell , 2009,
Clausen, Kraay & Murrell , 2010, Jensen & Rahman , 2011] and illegal poaching
[St. John; Keane; Edward-Jones; Jones; Yarnell and Jones , 2011]. Previous
work has been done which compares the RR technique to other survey methods
including telephone interviews, self reported questionnaires and direct face-to-face
interviews. These studies work on the assumption that a higher rate of admitting
to a sensitive act is a more accurate measure than a lower one. The general
consensus from this branch of research seems to be that the RR technique is at
least as good at getting honest responses as the other methods
Beyond its initial aim of estimating the proportion of a sample with a sensitive
trait, the RR technique has also been used in regression analysis to identify the
determinants of the sensitive trait [Kerkvliet , 1994a, St. John; Keane; Edward-
Jones; Jones; Yarnell and Jones , 2011]. The procedure has also been used as a
screening mechanism to identify dishonest interviewees. This is done by using a
series of different RR questions and removing the people who respond “No” to
every question due to the low probability of this occurring.
Despite its use as a truth revealing mechanism the RR technique suffers from
many problems. Many of these problems arise as a result of the randomising pro-
cess: i.e. attaching the interviewee’s response to a probability distribution. Firstly,
the introduction of randomness in order to provide anonymity to the interviewee
48This estimator has a sample variance of: λˆ(1−λˆ)np2 .
49In the unrelated question technique with unknown population variance, two separate samples
are required.
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leads to an inflated variance for the estimate of the sensitive trait (Var(pˆi)). There-
fore, the efficiency of the estimator is reduced. Furthermore, there is evidence to
show that despite the protection that the randomisation process gives to the in-
terviewee, people still choose to lie about their status in relation to the sensitive
question [Azfar & Murrell , 2009]. The problem of dishonesty with the RR proce-
dure means that the estimated proportion of people engaging in the sensitive act
(pi) might sometimes lie below 0; and conversely the estimated proportion of people
not engaging in the sensitive act can lie above 1 [Azfar & Murrell , 2009]. Thus,
the combination of randomisation and dishonesty can potentially make any RR
point estimate meaningless50. To be sure, dishonesty also has potential detrimen-
tal effects on estimates made from direct questions. However, the mismeasurement
that arises from misreported direct questions does not necessarily generate a sta-
tistically impossible estimate. Any mismeasured direct questioning (henceforth,
DQ) estimate of the proportion of guilty interviewees will lie between 0 and 1
(inclusive).
Another issue with the RR procedure is that, by design, it does not allow
anybody to identify those who are admitting to engaging in the sensitive behaviour.
With a direct questioning method one can tell who bribes and who (allegedly)
does not; however, the RR process hides this by adding random noise to the data.
Furthermore, the randomisation process requires an increased sample size in order
to be confident in the results. This can be seen from the variance of the estimators:
V ar(pˆiwarner) =
pi(1− pi)
n
+
p(1− p)
n(2p− 1)2 (4.2.0.36)
V ar(pˆiforced response) =
λˆ(1− λˆ)
np2
(4.2.0.37)
All 3 methods need a relatively large sample size in order to improve the ef-
ficiency of the estimator. Many of these problems could potentially disappear if
one increased the value of p. That is, if one increased the probability that the
interviewee was posed with the sensitive question. However, doing this brings the
RR procedure closer to DQ (for DQ: p = 1) and reduces the incentive for the inter-
viewee to respond honestly. There seems to be a trade-off between efficiency and
information (cooperation) provided by the respondent [Warner , 1965]. Many of
the RR designs used in the economic literature seem to ignore some of the general
guidelines for asking sensitive questions. These are discussed at the beginning of
section 4.2 and include: adding more detail to the question; and increasing the
length of the question. Failing to take these strategies into account can also reduce
50An estimate of -30% of people paying bribes is not necessarily useful for determining the
prevalence of bribery.
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the cooperation of the interviewee and distort the estimate of the sensitive trait.
Also, despite its use in estimating the determinants of sensitive behaviour, the ran-
domisation process and potential dishonesty provide added noise to the estimates,
if dishonesty is correlated with the independent variables, then the coefficients in
such a regression will be biased. To the author’s knowledge there is no study on
whether a randomised response maximum likelihood estimation is superior to a
standard maximum likelihood estimation using a direct questioning approach for
the dependent variable. However, to the extent that it adds noise to an already
(potentially) mismeasured variable, the RR maximum likelihood estimation seems
to have more problems to overcome than an ordinary probit or logit model applied
to direct questions.
The Angels Assumption And Expected Distributions Instead of using a
single RR question to estimate the prevalence of a sensitive trait, some studies have
used a series of RR questions, each asking about whether or not the interviewee had
a sensitive trait or was guilty of committing a socially undesirable act [Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. , 2005a]. A common procedure is to hand the interviewee a fair
coin 51 and to give them the following instructions:
“Please toss the coin handed to you by the enumerator before each question is
posed without letting him/her see the results. Always answer YES if the coin
comes up HEADS. Answer the question TRUTHFULLY if the coin comes up
TAILS (i.e. answer YES if you have done the behaviour; Answer NO if you have
never done this behaviour” (ES, Manufacturing Questionnaire. 2007)
The result of this exercise will be a series of positive (yes) and negative (no) re-
sponses. Cruyff, Van den Hout & Van der Heijden [2008] label the sum of positive
responses the “sum score” of the RR questions. Azfar & Murrell [2009] introduce
the concept of the “angels assumption” to investigate the distribution of yes/no
responses to a series of independent randomized response questions52. The angels
assumption is the expected distribution that would arise if no interviewee has the
sensitive trait in question and all respondents give honest answers53. If there are
seven independent randomised responses questions, then the Angels Assumption
would be identical to the binomial probability distribution with p = 0.5 and n = 7.
This is shown in Figure 4. Under these conditions, the probability of observing a
51A coin with equal probability of landing on heads and tails: P (Heads) = P (Tails) = 0.5
52The answer or refusal to answer one question did not have any bearing on whether the
interviewee was posed another question; all questions were posed to all interviewees; and all
answers were coded as responded by the interviewees.
53So no false responses and no non-response
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‘Yes’ is 0.5, P (Yi = 1) = 0.5. Under the Angels Assumption, both the expected
number of yeses and nos is 3.5. 54
Figure 4: Distribution Of ’Yes’ Responses For The Angels Assumption
In reality, the responses to a set of RR questions show a positively skewed
distribution with much of the sample answering “no” six or seven times. The
relatively high number of firms who report ‘No’ seven times is used as evidence
of missreporting. Previous studies have chosen to label the firms who report ‘No’
seven55 times (or equivalently; those with a sum-score of 0) as ‘reticent’ and the rest
of the firms as ‘Possibly Candid’. Although this method is very likely to identify
some of the misreporting, it is possible that some firms labelled as ‘Possibly Candid’
are in fact reticent. Also, the possibility still exists (though it is relatively small)
that some firms labelled as reticent did in fact follow the rules and report honestly.
The current investigation adds to the measure of reticence by seeing how the
estimated proportion of reticent respondents change as the threshold for reticence
changes. This is done by labelling everybody who reports 6 ‘Nos’ or more as
reticent; then 5 ‘Nos’ or more; then 4 ‘Nos’ or more.
In Azfar & Murrell [2009], interviewees were asked ten questions; 7 of which
were sensitive and 3 of which were labelled as sensitive but to a lesser degree. The
survey included the 3 less sensitive questions in order to allow the firms to say
“yes” a few times while still answering “no” to the 7 more sensitive questions.
In identifying the firms who misreported their status, previous studies have only
used the 7 sensitive questions and have ignored the three less sensitive questions.
However, it might be useful to bring the 3 less sensitive questions into the analysis.
54The mean, median, and mode for this distribution is 3.5
55There are seven sensitive questions in total. So 7 is the maximum number of ‘Nos’ that a
firm can give
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Using these 3 extra questions can allow different levels of reticence to be identi-
fied. Firms that responded ‘No’ to all seven sensitive questions and the three less
sensitive questions might be defined as “Extremely reticent”, whereas firms who
answered “No” to the seven sensitive questions and “Yes” to the three less sensitive
questions might simply be labelled as “Reticent”56. This will account for at least
two things: 1) The fact that answering “no” seven times in the main questions
is nearly impossible under the null-hypothesis of the Angels Assumption; and 2)
That, all other things being equal, the probability of answering ‘no’ 10/10 times
(to the 10 sensitive questions) is smaller than the probability of answering ‘no’ 7/7
times.
Previous literature uses the Angels Assumption as a starting point. The largest
difference between the observed responses and that of the Angels Assumption is
used as a lower bound estimate for the level of misreporting [Azfar & Murrell ,
2009, Clausen, Kraay & Murrell , 2010, Clarke , 2012]. I.e., if, for 3 RR questions,
the percentage of “yes” responses are: 35%, 40% and 45%, then the lower bound
estimate for reticence is 30% (=2*(50-35)%), so at least 30% if the sample are
believed to be reticent 57
This discussion suggests that whilst the RR provides protection for the in-
terviewee, it is not clear that one can be more confident in the results of a RR
estimator compared to estimators from other questioning strategies. The RR suf-
fers from random noise due to the randomising device, an inflated variance, issues
with sample size as well as concerns about the accuracy of the estimator. From the
literature, it is unclear whether (in light of these problems) it is strictly preferred
to other questioning methods. However, there might still be some avenues for fur-
ther development of the RR technique in the economic literature. Employing some
strategies for asking sensitive questions might improve the accuracy of estimates
from the RR procedure.
Indirect Questioning Another approach to asking sensitive questions that has
been used in the literature is to ask the interviewees indirectly. The indirect
questioning approach can take several forms, from asking what somebody like
the interviewee would do [Svensson , 2003], to asking what they would do in a
hypothetical situation [Kantor , 2003]. The type of indirect question asked can
depend on the purpose of the question. Sometimes the aim is to avoid implicating
the person of wrongdoing [Sood, Burger, Yoong, Kopf & Spreng , 2011], whilst in
other cases the aim is to try to find out the person’s true status rather than their
56It is important, however, to remember that some of the firms labelled as “Reticent” might
indeed be innocent of the acts in question (both sensitive acts and less sensitive acts).
57For any individual question, the expected percentage of “yes” responses under the Angels
Assumption is 50%.
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imagined status
Nega, Mathijs, Deckers & Tollens [2009] use the level of trust to analyse the
relationships between gender, social capital and empowerment among households
in Ethiopia. Due to trust being potentially difficult to measure, in part because it
can be interpreted differently by different people, the authors choose an indirect
approach when trying to quantify the level of trust amongst Ethiopian households.
An example of a direct questioning approach in the measurement of trust would
be to ask: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”. The authors ask
this question in the survey but state a preference for a more indirect approach.
The interviewers state that “In this village/neighborhood, one has to be alert or
someone is likely to take advantage of you” and give the households a choice of
five options: agree strongly; agree somewhat; neither agree nor disagree; disagree
somewhat; and disagree strongly. In this case, the indirect question approach is
used in order to minimise the level of bias that can arise from the households’
different interpretations of “trust”.
In a study on how conflict and violence affects individuals, households and
communities, Bru¨ck, Justino, Verwimp & Avdeenko [2010] use indirect questions
as a way of protecting the interviewees from the harm associated with recalling a
traumatic event. Instead of asking directly if any household member was injured
during the previous conflict, the authors suggest asking about individual house-
hold members experiences during different time periods - with one time period
corresponding to the time of the conflict. By reducing the level of threat to the
interviewee the authors hope to reduce the rate of non-response and improve the
validity of the data. A potential flaw in this is that interviewees, in an attempt to
not relive the traumatic experiences, might give an answer that satisfies the ques-
tion but is unrelated to the traumatic event. Whilst providing the interviewer with
an honest answer, this might fail to answer the question that the interviewer was
actually interested in, any subsequent analysis of such questions might wrongly
infer the absence of an injury within the household.
Another approach is to ask the interviewee about the behaviour of people
“similar to themselves”, people like them, or typical people. In the case of company
surveys, interviewers might ask about the behaviour of “a firm in your line of
business”. Such indirect approaches have been used to ask questions about firm-
level bribery [Svensson , 2003]; the use of informal labour [Almeida & Carneiro ,
2005]; and failing quality standards in companies [Sood, Burger, Yoong, Kopf &
Spreng , 2011]. The idea is that by asking what somebody similar to them would
do, the question is removing the threat from potentially admitting to a sensitive or
illegal act because the interviewee can plausibly claim that they were not referring
to their own behaviour but the behaviour of somebody else. Such measures tend
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to receive a higher response rate and a higher rate of positive responses than
direct questions on sensitive questions. One potential flaw of this approach is
that it might be difficult to actually identify who the interviewee was referring to,
themselves or their peers - this lack of knowledge might add some noise to the
response. This can have implications for empirical research, for example if trying
to identify the effects of bribery on firm-level growth. Paying a bribe to get a
government contract might be beneficial for the firm that pays but detrimental to
its competitors, likewise if a “similar firm” pays a bribe, it might be good for that
firm but bad for other firms. Thus, using a variable that describes “firms like this
one”, where it is not necessarily clear which firm is being referred to, might make
empirical analysis of bribery and growth more difficult to conduct.
It might help to distinguish between the mechanisms by which the RR tech-
nique and the indirect questioning approach seek to reduce the threat of answering
a question and encourage truthful responses. With the indirect approach, the inter-
viewee can plausibly claim innocence and state that they are describing somebody
else. With the RR technique, the interviewee can claim innocence and state that
they are responding to a different question or instruction. The implication of this
is that with the indirect questioning approach, it is not necessarily easy to deter-
mine who the interviewee is referring to: themselves or people similar to them.
With the RR question it is impossible to determine which question each person
was answering, the sensitive one or the non-sensitive one. Therefore, both RR
technique and indirect questioning have a degree of uncertainty attached to them.
4.3 Data & Research Questions
This section describes the data used in this study and the research questions
that this study addresses. Information used in this section includes RR ques-
tions on business operations; indirect questions on company behaviour; opinion
based questions on the impact of corruption on business operations; and company
characteristics.
4.3.1 Survey Data
Introduction Part of the data used in this study consists of information from a
business survey that was carried out as part of a study on the business environment
in Nigeria. Firms were asked about different things ranging from their company
characteristics to their subjective opinions on the business environments. Firms
were also asked a set of RR questions about their company practices as well as
indirect questions about company behaviour [World Bank , 2007].
The scope and coverage; sample frame; and selection procedure for the data
are as described in Section 2.4.
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Randomised Response Questions The specific RR questions used in the sur-
vey are outlined in Section 2.4.5. The RR questions in the survey were asked using
a variant of the forced response technique described in section 4.2.
Indirect Questions The indirect questions used in the questionnaire attempt
to get information from the interviewees by: adjusting the level of detail required
in the answers; using longer questions; explaining that the behaviour in question is
common; being introduced by a set of warm-up questions; being asked towards the
middle/end of the questionnaire, by which time the questioner presumably had es-
tablished credibility and trust with the interviewee; being placed amongst a series
of questions about time spent dealing with government regulations, potentially be-
ing less sensitive and more appropriate in such a location; being phrased indirectly
in order to avoid implicating the interviewee of any wrongdoing; and being car-
ried out by a non public-sector organisation, potentially increasing participation
and attracting the confidence and trust of the participating firms. Details of the
specific questions used; and the reasons for their use, are outlined in section 2.4.6.
4.4 Methodology
This section explains the models used in the subsequent analysis. This is the
first study to formally model the RR technique for a series of RR questions with
reticence. The model is created by considering the likelihoods of responding “Yes”
and “No” to a RR question, respectively. After considering these likelihoods, the
likelihoods for observing x “yes” responses to a series of RR questions is modelled.
A distinction should be made between the results from a single RR question
and a set of RR questions. A further distinction should be made between the
results from questioning an individual and the results from questioning a sample
of individuals. It is possible to analyse results from a single RR question asked to
an individual; a single RR question asked to a sample of individuals; a set of RR
questions asked to an individual; and a set of RR questions asked to a sample of
individuals.
Table 4.1: Potential Information Achievable With Different Randomised Response
Situations
Number Of
Questions
Number of Inter-
viewees
Potential Information Achievable
1 Question 1 Individual Observed response (Yi)
1 Question Sample of N> 1 in-
dividuals
Estimated average prevalence of sensitive attribute (b)
10 Questions 1 Individual Reticence of individual (ri)
10 Questions Sample of N> 1 in-
dividuals
Average reticence level; Average prevalence of sensitive attributes
(Within-individual and between individual) (r;
∑10
i=1 bi
10
;
∑10
i=1 b
10
)
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Analysing the responses of a sample of individuals to 1 RR question will allow
one to estimate an interval of the proportion of reticent respondents. Analysing
the responses of a sample of individuals to a set of RR questions will allow one to
identify the reticent interviewees. The response from a single RR question to an
individual does not necessarily provide any useful information to the interviewer.
However, the set of responses from a series of RR questions can provide information
concerning reticence.
4.4.1 Randomised Response Design & The Estimation Of False Re-
porting
The RR method used in this study is a variant of the “forced response technique”58.
Using this method, a respondent is given a fair coin and asked to privately toss the
coin59 before answering each RR question60. The interviewee is then instructed
to answer “yes” if the result of the coin toss is a heads, and to answer truthfully
if the result of the coin toss is a tails. Representing the probability of getting a
heads as p; the probability that the company is guilty of the act in question as b;
the probability that the person is reticent as r and the observed responses as:
Yi
{
1 if the ith person responds “Yes”
0 if the ith person responds “No”
(4.4.1.1)
then, in the absence of missclassification error, the probabilities of observing
“yes” and “no” responses are:
p(Y ES) = p(Heads) + (p(Tails) · p(guilty)) (4.4.1.2)
p(NO) = p(Tails) · p(innocent) (4.4.1.3)
Which can be expressed as:
Y ES : p(Yi = 1) = p+ (1− p)b (4.4.1.4)
NO : p(Yi = 0) = (1− p)(1− b) (4.4.1.5)
However, in the presence of misclassification error (reticence), one must control
for 1) the people who flip a heads but are dishonest; and 2) those who flip a tails
and are guilty but are dishonest. Doing this gives:
58See Lensvelt-Mulders et al. [2005b] for a meta-analysis of RR research.
59The interviewee is supposed to flip the coin without letting the interviewer see the result of
the coin-toss.
60The RR questions are dichotomous response questions.
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Y ES : p(Yi = 1) = p+ (1− p)b− rp− r(1− p)b (4.4.1.6)
NO : p(Yi = 0) = (1− p)(1− b) + rp+ r(1− p)b (4.4.1.7)
or:
Y ES : p(Yi = 1) = p+ (1− p)b− rp− rb+ rpb (4.4.1.8)
NO : p(Yi = 0) = (1− p)(1− b) + rp+ rb− rpb (4.4.1.9)
Re-arranging this gives:
p(Yi = 1) = p(1− r) + (1− p)b(1− r) (4.4.1.10)
p(Yi = 0) = (1− p)(1− b) + (p+ b− bp)r (4.4.1.11)
Where r = Pr(yobs = 0|ytrue = 1). So, a “yes” is observed if: (the person flips
a heads or (the person flips a tails and is guilty)) AND the person is not dishonest.
A “no” is observed if: (the person flips a tails and is innocent) or ((the person flips
a heads and is dishonest) or (the person flips a tails and is guilty but is dishonest)).
This assumes that firms that are not guilty of the act do not lie and say they
performed the act: q = Pr(yobs = 1|ytrue = 0) = 061. This assumption has been
maintained in the literature [Jensen & Rahman , 2011]. A justification for this
assumption is provided in section 4.4.2.
There is a question of whether there are different types of reticence. I.e.
whether the reticence, r, of somebody that is guilty of an act but will still say
“no” regardless of the outcome of the coin-toss (br); is different from the reticence
r of somebody who is innocent of the act but is unwilling to say “yes” if they
get a heads (pr(1 − b)). In other words, one might want to treat the innocent
pleading their innocence as different from the guilty avoiding their guilt. Allowing
for different types of r might make a difference in the results. In order to deal with
this, it might be useful to recall the literature’s definition of a reticent interviewee:
as somebody “who gives knowingly false answers with a nonzero probability when
honest answers to a specific set of survey questions could lead to the inference
that the respondent might have committed a sensitive act” [Azfar & Murrell ,
2009]. This definition encompasses both those who are guilty and those who are
innocent of the act in question. Therefore, it seems plausible to continue with
the analysis using an aggregation of the different possible types of reticence, r.
61Another assumption is that the probability of being reticent is independent of both the
probability of committing the act; and the result of the coin-toss. So: r‖b, p, (1− p).
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Furthermore, when reticence is considered as misclassification error (in the frame-
work of Hausman, Abrevaya, Scott-Morton [1998]), it seems reasonable to use one
single reticence measure 62.
If the probability that a particular company is reticent, ri, is the same for all
firms; and that this is equal to the proportion of firms in the sample that are
labelled as reticent, r; so ri = r ∀ i. Then an estimate of b can be obtained by:
b =
λ− p(1− r)
(1− p)(1− r) (4.4.1.12)
where λ represents the proportion of people who respond “Yes”63. This gives
the average level of guilt (bribery/tax evasion) for all firms.
This study adds to the literature by introducing validation data for b and esti-
mating the level and behaviour of the misclassification error, r, using the formula:
r = max
{
0, 1− λ
p+ (1− p)b
}
(4.4.1.13)
The current study uses the forced-response technique as described in section
4.2. Since the procedure uses a fair coin, p = 0.5 and Equation 4.4.1.13 becomes:
r = max
{
0, 1− 2λ
1 + b
}
(4.4.1.14)
4.4.2 Justification For Treating Probability Of False-Positives As Zero
This chapter treats the probability of observing a “1” when the true value is a “0”
as zero (i.e. that q = 0). This is the assumption that is maintained in the literature
[Art´ıs, Ayuso & Guille´n , 2002]; and there is both intuitive and empirical support
for working with this assumption, which is explained below.
The intuitive justification for assuming that the error from miscoding a 0 as a
1 is zero is because people will not confess to anti-social acts if they did not do it.
This result occurs even with the use of the RR technique [Lensvelt-Mulders et al.
, 2005b]. This is due to the psychic cost of admitting to an illegal act as well as
the small probability of leakage.
The empirical support for setting q = 0 is observed in the literature [Azfar &
Murrell , 2009]. When observing responses from a set of binary choice questions,
the distribution of responses tails out to the right64 and the proportion of observed
positive responses is lower than the expected value of positive responses. This lends
62Certainly, misclassification can arise from different sources.
63The sample variance of this estimator when there is no reticence, (r = 0), is: V ar(bˆ) =
λˆ(1−λˆ)
N · 1p2 ( [Lensvelt-Mulders et al. , 2005b]).
64This implies that r > q.
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support to the idea that there is not much force pushing people to response “Yes”
to these questions. Taken as a whole, these factors give credibility to setting q = 0
and continuing with an analysis of the effects of r.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 The Prevalence Of Sensitive Behaviour
Table 4.2 shows the 10 RR questions used in the survey and the percentage
of interviewees who responded yes/no to these questions. The values are then
transformed into estimates of the prevalence of these acts using the equation:
b = max{0, λ−0.5
0.5
}, where b is the proportion of guilty people and λ is the propor-
tion of “Yes” responses to the respective RR questions. This gives the unadjusted65
estimate for the prevalence of these behaviours. If the estimate of the prevalence is
negative, a zero has been placed in the appropriate cell, this occurs on seven occa-
sions (Questions: 2; 3; 5; 6; 8; 9; and 10). A negative estimate for the prevalence of
an act can be a red flag for the presence of misreporting amongst the respondents.
If there were no misreporting the expected domain for the values of λ would be
between 0.5 and 1. Any value of λ statistically less than 0.5 is a potential sign
of underreporting of the act in question. The highest number of positive (“Yes”)
responses were generated by question 7, the question concerning lying in one’s self
interest. 51.8% of firms admitted to doing this, suggesting an unadjusted estimate
of 3.6% of firm managers who lie in their self interest.
Focusing on the last row of Table 4.2, 36.1% of people answered “Yes” when
asked “Have you ever unfairly dismissed an employee for personal reasons?”. This
suggests that at least an estimated 13.9%69 of the interviewees responded “no”
when they flipped a heads when they should have said “yes”. Since half the
sample would have tossed a heads, this implies an estimate of at least 27.8%
reticent respondents. This is how the final column in Table 4.2 is calculated. One
must note that this estimate is a lower bound estimate for the level of reticence
because it assumes that nobody is guilty of the act (nobody fired an employee for
personal reasons). If 10% of the firms were actually guilty of firing an employee for
personal reasons, then (using the question r = max{0, 1 − 2λ
1+b
}) the estimate of
65This estimate is labelled as unadjusted because it does not take misreporting into account.
64Confidence Intervals are calculated using the variance for the RR estimator as shown in
Lensvelt-Mulders et al. [2005b].
65This lower bound is based on the assumption that every interviewee is innocent of the act
in question.
66This upper bound is based on the assumption that every interviewee is guilty of the act in
question.
69(50-36.1)%
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Table 4.2: Observed Responses and Estimated Percentage Of Transgressions
Question Observations (%) Estimates (%) 95% Confidence Intervals66 Lower Bound
Estimate
Of Reti-
cence(%)67
Upper Bound
Estimate
Of Reti-
cence(%)68
“Yes” “No” “Yes” “No”
1 Have you ever paid less in per-
sonal taxes than you should have
under the law?
50.3 49.7 0.6 99.4 0.5994 0.6006 0 49.7
2 Have you ever paid less in busi-
ness taxes than you should have
under the law?
42.5*** 57.5 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 15 57.5
3 Have you ever made a misstate-
ment on a job application?
42.9*** 57.1 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 14.2 57.1
4 Have you ever used the office phone for
personal businesses?
50.5 49.5 1.0 99.0 0.9994 1.0006 0 49.5
5 Have you ever inappropriately
promoted an employee for per-
sonal reasons?
40.4*** 59.6 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 19.2 59.6
6 Have you ever deliberately not
given your suppliers or clients
what was due them?
37.9*** 62.1 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 24.2 62.1
7 Have you ever lied in your self interest? 51.8++ 48.2 3.6 96.4 3.5994 3.6006 0 48.2
8 Have you ever inappropriately
hired a staff member for personal
reasons?
40.7*** 59.3 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 18.6 59.3
9 Have you ever been purposely late for
work?
47.8*** 52.2 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0006 4.4 52.2
10 Have you ever unfairly dismissed
an employee for personal reasons?
36.1*** 63.9 0C 100.0C 0C 0.0005 27.8 63.9
Number of Observations: 3,200. Questions in bold highlight the relatively more sensitive questions (Clausen et
al., 2010). *(+) stars (crosses) display the significance of one-sided binomial test that the observed frequency is
smaller (larger) than 50.0% (*(+)=10% level, **(++)=5% level, ***(+++)=1% level). P-value=0.000 for
questions 2,3,5,6,8,& 10. P-value=0.008 for question 9. P-value=0.019 for question 7. C denotes a censored
figure.
reticent respondents is 34.4%. If, as per Clausen, Kraay & Murrell [2010]70, one
treats firm managers who are reticent in answering one question as being reticent
on all other questions as well then the results from this table give an estimated
lower bound for the percentage of reticent respondents of 27.8% 71. These results
are illustrated in Figures 5 & 7 which show the response to each question and the
sum score of the sensitive questions respectively.
Table 4.3 shows the results from the indirect questions that allow for a cate-
gorical response. In each case, the categories are: strongly agree; tend to agree;
strongly disagree; tend to disagree. The majority of firms did not believe that
bribery was common. However, the majority of those who did agree that it was
prevalent also said that firms know in advance how much payment is expected from
them. This tends to agree with the notion of corruption being prevalent within
70I.e. setting r = max{0, 1− 2λ1, 1− 2λ2, ..., 1− 2λ10}, where subscripts refer to the question
number and r is the lower bound estimate for reticence.
71I.e. the highest lower bound estimate.
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the business environment in Nigeria [Smith , 2007].
Table 4.3: Results From Indirect Questions With Categorical Responses
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
It is common for establish-
ments in this line of busi-
ness to have to pay infor-
mal payments/gifts to get
things done with regard
to customs, taxes, licenses,
regulations, etc.
Establishments in this line
of business know in ad-
vance about how much this
informal payment/gift is to
get things done.
(Firms who answered
“strongly agree/tend to
agree” to question 1)
Establishments in this
line of business know in
advance about how much
this informal payment/gift
is to get things done.
Strongly agree 8% 7% 13%
Tend to agree 30% 27% 54%
Tend to disagree 38% 38% 21%
Strongly dis-
agree
24% 28% 12%
N 3199 3198 1215
Results from the rest of the indirect questions are shown in Table 4.4. In
this final set of questions firms were asked to report bribes, hidden sales, and
hidden workforce72. They were allowed to report either in percentage of sales or
Naira (for bribes) and percentage of total amount (for hidden sales and hidden
workforce). The data in Table 4.4 is generated by creating a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm reported a positive amount of bribery or hidden activity and
0 otherwise. With the indirect questions on bribery, firms were asked: i) what
percentage of total annual sales, or estimated value, that similar establishments
pay in informal payments/gifts to public officials to speed regulatory processes or
acquire government services; and ii) what percentage of contract value would be
paid in informal payments/gifts in order to secure a government contract. For
these two questions, the dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the firm reports
a positive value, and 0 otherwise. For the questions concerning hidden activity,
firms were asked: i) what percentage of total annual sales that similar firms in the
same sector of activity report for tax purposes; and ii) what percentage of the total
workforce similar establishments declare for tax purposes. For these variables, the
dummy takes a value of 1 if the firm reported less than 100% (suggesting the
presence of hidden activity), and 0 otherwise.
Table 4.4 shows that 71% of firms reported that they did not declare some
amount of sales for tax purposes. A similar percentage of firms (68%) said that
some of their workforce were not declared for tax purposes. In total, 81% of firms
reported that firms like them did not declare at least one of the two activities for
tax purposes, and 32% reported not declaring either one or the other (but not
both). From these results it seems that indirect questioning generates a higher
percentage of honest responses than randomised response questions. Recalling the
72Questions are listed in section 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Indirect Questions Concerning Bribe Payments And Hidden
Sales/Workforce
Bribe For Gen-
eral Government
Services
Bribe For Gov-
ernment Con-
tracts
Unreported
Sales
Unreported
Workforce
Yes 53% 57% 71% 68%
No 47% 43% 29% 32%
RR questions on business taxes in Table 4.2, the estimated percentage of firms
who paid less in business taxes than they were supposed to under the law was 0%.
However, by asking questions indirectly, at least 81% of firms have hidden sales
or workers from their tax forms. To be sure, the IQ asks about sales/employees
reported for tax purposes while the RRQ asks about what is paid in business taxes.
For the comparison to be valid it must be the case that when firms reported about
the amount of business tax paid/unpaid, they were basing their answer in relation
to the amount that should have been paid and not on the amount (of sales or
employees) that they had reported for tax purposes.
Nevertheless, another result which favours indirect questioning over randomised
response questioning is the relatively large disparity in admitting between the two
techniques. Indirect questioning generates a minimum level of admitting of 53%
while the maximum estimate of guilt from the randomised response questions is
3.6%. This tends to suggest that people favour the reduced stigma that comes
from the longer questions, face-saving wording, and projective nature of the indi-
rect questions compared to the randomisation process of the randomised response
questions. One must note that this survey only includes a RR process with a prob-
ability of selection, p, of 0.5. It is possible that randomising devices with a lower
probability of selecting the sensitive question might yield more candidness on the
part of the interviewees. However, such a design would reduce the efficiency of
any estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive behaviour in question (see Equation
4.2.0.37) and require a larger sample size to provide useful results.
4.5.2 The Distribution Of Responses
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of responses for Romania73; Nigeria; and the
Angels Assumption. The Angels Assumption [Azfar & Murrell , 2009] represents
the expected distribution of answers if the following conditions hold: Everybody is
innocent of the sensitive act in question; there is no non-response; and everybody
follows the procedure by answering truthfully. If these conditions are satisfied then
the distribution of responses to the seven sensitive questions follow a binomial
distribution with p=0.5; n=7. The large proportion of Nigerian & Romanian
73Data from Azfar & Murrell [2009].
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Observed Responses
Frequency
of Yes
Re-
sponses
Binomial
Probability
Distribution
with p=0.5
Angels As-
sumption
Romania
(N=514)
Nigeria
(N=3200)
0 0.0078 0.78 10.5 12.9
1 0.0547 5.47 7.8 9.5
2 0.1641 16.41 18.0 15.7
3 0.2734 27.34 20.4 21.9
4 0.2734 27.34 20.9 22.2
5 0.1641 16.41 14.1 12.6
6 0.0547 5.47 7.1 3.8
7 0.0078 0.78 1.8 1.4
Nigerian firms show more reticence (as defined by Azfar & Murrell [2009]) than Romanian ones
firms who never answered “Yes” to any of the questions compared to the Angels
Assumption74 implies the presence of reticence (r 6= 0). Furthermore, the higher
proportion of firms who answered “No” 6 or 7 times (out of a total of 7 questions)
in Nigeria suggests that Nigerian firms are more reticent than Romanian ones.
Figure 5: Comparing The Distributions Of Responses
N=3200. Dashed line==0. The distribution of responses to the seven sensitive questions is a discrete
distribution; the outcome of interest can only be an integer value. For convenience, this diagram displays the
distribution of responses as continuous.
This information is also shown in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 compares the
expected distribution of responses under the Angels Assumption to the observed
distribution of responses from the Nigerian sample; it also shows the difference
between the two. Figure 6 shows a bar chart combining Nigeria, Romania, and
the Angels Assumption. The x-axis shows the number yes responses (moving from
left to right). The y-axis represents the percentage of firms. For both Nigeria and
Romania there is initially a relatively high percentage of firms who report 7 “No”
responses, after which this percentage drops and the distribution follows a more
symmetrical pattern, tailing off to the right. Taken in full, this distribution of
74The top row of numbers.
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responses represents a departure from the Angels assumption. Since non-response
to the RR questions were minimal, this means that there is a high probability that
at least some firms were not answering truthfully.
A general result seems to be coming out of the information contained in Figure
5 and Table 4.5. There seem to be two things determining the distribution of
responses. Reticence seems to be driving the distribution to the left, creating more
“nos” than would be expected under the null hypothesis of the Angels Assumption.
Also, guilt seems to be driving some of the distribution to the extreme right. This
is because there are more firms who answered “yes” seven times than would be
expected under the null hypothesis of the Angels Assumption. So there appears to
be at least some firms who committed some of the acts in question and truthfully
report this.
Figure 6: Distribution Of ’Yes’ Responses For The Angels Assumption; Romania;
And Nigeria
This result is also shown in Figure 7 which shows the observed proportion of
“Yes” responses for each question. The dashed line represents the expected pro-
portion of “Yes” responses under the Angels Assumption (50% for each question).
Bars with peaks which are significantly less than this value imply the presence of
underreporting. The empty (white) bars represent the less sensitive questions and
the filled bars represent the relatively more sensitive questions. In general, fewer
“yes” responses come from the more sensitive questions.
Due to the presence of misreporting by some companies, it might be useful to
temporarily ignore these firms and look at the distribution of responses for the
truncated sample. One route to take is to estimate the distribution of responses
ignoring those who said ‘No’ 7 times. Another route is to drop those that said ‘No’
7 times and re-estimate the distribution of responses. Both avenues are considered
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Figure 7: Proportion Of ’Yes’ Responses For Each Question
N=3200. Dashed line represents the expected value under the Angels Assumption.
in Table 4.6 and Figure 8.
Table 4.6: Comparing The Truncated And Reduced Distributions
Number
of ‘Yeses’
Observed
Responses
Binomial Prob-
ability Distri-
bution(p=0.5;
n=5)
Truncated
Sample(No
Reticent)
Binomial Prob-
ability Distri-
bution(p=0.4,
n=6)
0 (0.1294) (0.0078) - 0.0467
1 0.0947 0.0547 0.1088 0.1866
2 0.1572 0.1641 0.1805 0.3110
3 0.2188 0.2734 0.2513 0.2765
4 0.2222 0.2734 0.2552 0.1382
5 0.1256 0.1641 0.1443 0.0369
6 0.0384 0.0547 0.0441 0.0041
7 0.0137 0.0078 0.0158 -
Focusing on the initial set of responses but ignoring those who said ‘No’ 7 times
(the left panel of Figure 8), the distribution of responses appears to be similar to
that of a Binomial probability distribution with n=7 and p=0.5 (ignoring the
first category). Similarly, if one believes that the reticent are all to be discarded
from the data entirely and were to re-estimate the distribution of responses (the
right-hand panel) the remaining data appears to be similar to that of a binomial
distribution with n=6 and p=0.4 (but shifted to the right)75.
4.5.3 Deriving Estimates Of Reticence And Guilt From The Likelihood
Function
Recalling the estimated probabilities of observing a “1” and a “0” from the ran-
domised response procedure:
75This result was obtained by comparing the data with that contained in the table of binomial
probabilities.
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Figure 8: Comparing Distributions Of Responses
N=3200.
p(Yi = 1) = p(1− r) + (1− p)b(1− r) (4.5.3.1)
p(Yi = 0) = (1− p)(1− b) + (p+ b− bp)r (4.5.3.2)
Table 4.7 shows a set of expected probabilities (p(Yi = 1)) given a set of values
for reticence, r, and guilt, b. The table allows r and b to each take on values of 0;
0.5 and 1. Given the 9 different combinations of values for r and b, the expected
probabilities of observing a “yes” response fall among the following values: {0;
0.25; 0.375; 0.5; 0.75; 1}. Table 4.8 shows the distribution of responses that would
be observed when the probability of observing a “yes” from a single question is
0.75, 0.375, and 0.25 respectively.
Table 4.7: Expected Probabilities Under Different Assumptions
XXXXXXXXHonesty
Guilt
Everybody is guilty (b=1) 50% are guilty, 50% are inno-
cent (b=0.5)
Everybody is innocent (b=0)
Nobody gives honest responses
(r=1)
100% ”No” responses p(Yi =
1) = 0
100% ”No” Responses p(Yi =
1) = 0
100% ”No” responses p(Yi =
1) = 0
50% are reticent, 50% are hon-
est (r=0.5)
p(Yi = 1) = 0.5 p(Yi = 1) = 0.375 p(Yi = 1) = 0.25
Everybody gives honest re-
sponses (r=0)
100% ”Yes” responses p(Yi =
1) = 1
p(Yi = 1) = 0.75 Angels Assumption (binomial
probability distribution with
p=0.5and n=7) p(Yi = 1) =
0.5
Recalling the actual distribution of responses that is observed in the data: 0
(12.9%); 1 (9.5%); 2 (15.7%); 3 (21.9%); 4 (22.2%); 5 (12.6%); 6 (3.8%); 7 (1.4%);
it is possible to turn the preceding analysis upside down by finding the values of r
and b that are most likely to generate the observed data. This is done in the rest
of this subsection.
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Table 4.8: Distributions of ”Yes” Responses Under Different Levels Of Reticence
And Guilt
p(Yi = 1) = 0.75 p(Yi = 1) = 0.375 p(Yi = 1) = 0.25
0 0.01 3.73 13.35
1 0.13 15.64 31.15
2 1.15 28.16 31.15
3 5.77 28.16 17.30
4 17.30 16.90 5.77
5 31.15 6.08 1.15
6 31.15 1.22 0.13
7 13.35 0.10 0.01
Figure 9: Some Distributions For Different Probabilities of Positive Responses
The answer to a single RR question can be modeled as a dichotomous random
variable that adopts a value of 1 with probability:
p(1− r) + (1− p)b(1− r) (4.5.3.3)
and adopts value of 0 with probability:
(1− p)(1− b) + (p+ b− bp)r (4.5.3.4)
The distribution of this random variable is characterised by the parameters:
n, the number of trials (the number of RR questions); and p, the probability of a
“yes” in a single trial. The mean of this random variable is:
n (p(1− r) + (1− p)b(1− r)) (4.5.3.5)
In the current study n = 7. Therefore, the information concerning the prob-
ability mass function (pmf) for the answer to the RR question can be described
as:
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f(1) = p(1− r) + (1− p)b(1− r) (4.5.3.6)
and
f(0) = (1− p)(1− b) + (p+ b− bp)r (4.5.3.7)
Where f(·) denotes the probability distribution function. With the design of
the current investigation it is known that p = 0.5, therefore the pmfs become:
f(1) = 0.5(1 + b)(1− r) (4.5.3.8)
and
f(0) = 0.5((1− b) + (1 + b)r) (4.5.3.9)
Given a set of responses to a series of RR questions, e.g.: {1,0,0,1,1,0,1}; the
joint probability of observing 4 ones and 3 zeros, ignoring the order of responses,
76 77 is given by:
f(1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) = f(1)× f(1)× f(1)× f(1)× f(0)× f(0)× f(0)
= (0.5(1 + b)(1− r))× (0.5(1 + b)(1− r))
× (0.5(1 + b)(1− r))× (0.5(1 + b)(1− r))
× (0.5((1− b) + (1 + b)r))× (0.5((1− b) + (1 + b)r))
× (0.5((1− b) + (1 + b)r))
= (0.5(1 + b)(1− r))4 ∗ (0.5((1− b) + (1 + b)r))3
(4.5.3.10)
It is possible to calculate the value of r that maximises the joint probability of ob-
serving {1,0,0,1,1,0,1}. This can be done numerically by choosing different values
for r and seeing which one maximises the joint density f(1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0). It can
also be done analytically by interpreting the joint density (Equation (4.5.3.10)) as
the likelihood function; taking the derivative of this with respect to r; equating
this to zero; and solving for r. The solution for the general case is as follows:
Using the same notation and also defining n ≡ the total number of RR questions
asked; and s ≡ the number of questions that a firm answers “yes” (sum-score).
The likelihood for a set of RR questions can be described as:
L = ((p+ (1− p)b)(1− r))s × ((1− p)(1− b) + r(p+ (1− p)b))n−s (4.5.3.11)
The Log-likelihood function is:
764 “yeses’ and 3 “nos”.
77Assuming that the observations are independent.
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logL = slog(p+ (1− p)b) + slog(1− r) + (n− s)log((1− p)(1− b) + r(p+ (1− p)b))
(4.5.3.12)
With first order condition for a maximum:
∂logL
∂r
=
−s
1− r +
(n− s)(p+ (1− p)b)
(1− p)(1− b) + r(p+ (1− p)b) = 0 (4.5.3.13)
r = 1 +
s
n((b(p− 1)− p)) (4.5.3.14)
Since p = 0.5 and n = 7 this reduces to:
r = 1− 2s
7(b+ 1)
(4.5.3.15)
Recalling Figure 5 and using the data from Table 4.5, one can calculate the
mean number of yes responses, s. This works out as: 2.91. So, on average, firms
said “yes” 2.91 times out of 7. Inserting this value into equation 4.5.3.15 gives:
r = 1− 5.82
7(b+ 1)
(4.5.3.16)
Using this formula allows one to calculate a maximum likelihood (ML) estimate
of the level of reticence required to produce the distribution of responses in Figure
5 & Table 4.5 under different levels of guilt. Some results for this estimation are
shown in Table 4.978
Table 4.9: Maximum Likelihood Estimates For Reticence
b r P (Yi = 1)
0 16.9% 0.416
0.25 33.5% 0.416
0.5 44.6 0.416
0.75 52.5% 0.416
1 58.4% 0.416
So, under the assumption of innocence from any transgression; the level of
reticence would have to be 16.9% to produce the distribution of responses observed
in the data.
78 The second order condition for a maximum is:
−s
(1− r)2 −
(7− s)(p+ b(1− p))2
((1− p)(1− b) + r(p+ (1− p)b))2 < 0 (4.5.3.17)
Which is always true for any value of b when p = 0.5 and s = 2.91.
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Alternatively, given a set of values for the level of reticence, one can try to
solve the log-likelihood function to get an estimate of the level of guilt. To do this,
a similar procedure can be followed, by maximising equation 4.5.3.12 with respect
to b instead of r. Doing this gives:
∂logL
∂b
=
(1− p)s
p+ b(1− p) +
((1− p)r + p− 1)(n− s)
(p+ b(1− p))r + (1− b)(1− p) = 0 (4.5.3.18)
With s = 2.91; n = 7; and p = 0.5 this turns into:
b =
−291
350(r − 1) − 1 (4.5.3.19)
Using this equation, one can derive ML estimates for the level of guilt within
the sample. This is done in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Maximum Likelihood Estimates For Guilt
r b P (Yi = 1)
0 -16.9% 0.416
0.1294 -4.4% 0.416
0.395 37.4% 0.416
0.5 66.3% 0.416
The second value for reticence in Table 4.10 was selected by calculating the
proportion of the sample with a sum score of 0/7 (Table 4.5). This figure of 12.8%
corresponds to a level of guilt of -4.4%. Since, it is impossible to have a negative
level of guilt this results suggests that this estimate of reticence is too low to
generate the observed distribution of responses. This same reasoning applies to
the first reticence figure of zero.
4.5.4 Predicting The Last Response
Table 4.11: Answer To The 7th Sensitive Question; by Number of previous positive
answers
H ave you ever unfairly dismissed an employee for personal reasons?
Number
of
Yeses
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Full
Sample
No 93 73 63 56 56 54 30 64
Yes 7 27 37 44 44 46 70 36
N 446 372 641 817 634 227 63 3200
Figures for responses are in percentages.
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The previous section showed that there is still a degree of underreporting of
behviour even with the perceived protection of the randomised response technique.
One reason for this could be that some respondents are unwilling to admit to an
undesirable trait no matter what the actual state of affairs. This might be true for
some of the firms that responded “No” to every single question, these people might
be guilty of the sensitive acts and be trying to deny their guilt; or they might be
innocent of the acts and be attempting to proclaim their innocence. Another thing
to note is that more people had a sum score of 7 (7 yeses) than would be expected
under the null of the angels assumption, so despite the downward bias that occurs
when asking sensitive questions, at least some of the sample seem to be following
the instructions79.
The RR questions were asked as a series of questions with binary responses. It
is possible that some interviewees decide to tailor their latter responses based on
their earlier responses. Managers might be strategic in this manner because they
do not want to be discovered as cheating. This study tests this proposition by
predicting the response to the final sensitive question based on the the responses
to the previous 6 questions. Table 4.11 shows the answers to the final question,
disaggregated by the number of positive responses to the first 6 sensitive questions.
The table seems to suggest a non-decreasing relationship between the number of
previous questions answered in the affirmative, and the probability of answering
the last question positively. In other words, firms that responded positively to the
first 6 questions also seemed to say “yes” the final sensitive question as well.
The probit estimations in Table 4.12 seem to agree with this result. In all
models within this table the dependent variable is the answer to the final RR
question. The estimation controls for the firm specific variables that were used in
Clausen, Kraay & Murrell [2010] including the gender of the owner; the age group
of the owner; the level of formal education achieved by the owner; the sector of the
firm; the size of the firm; the region of the country that the firm is located; and the
wave in which the survey was conducted. These variables were chosen to estimate
the correlates of reticence. In the first model (columns (1) & (2)) the independent
variable of interest is the sum score from the previous 6 sensitive RR questions.
Results from this estimation show that the response to the final question is highly
correlated with the sum score of the previous 6 sensitive questions. The response to
the last question is positively correlated with the number of ‘yeses’ to the previous
6 sensitive questions that the firm answered.80 The probit coefficient on the sum
score variable is 0.226, this is significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect for
79Another explanation could be that they were not taking the exercise seriously and simply
reported “yes” to every question. However, due to the potential costs of admitting to a tabooed
act, this explanation is ruled out (see section 4.4.2).
80The correlation coefficient for these two variables is 0.255 and this is significant at the 1%
level.
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this variable is 0.083. This means that answering one more of the first 6 sensitive
questions in the affirmative is associated with an increased probability of answering
the last question with a ‘yes’ of 0.083 probability points (0.082 probability points
for the logit model). At the extremes, the difference in probability of answwering
the last questiong with a ‘yes’ is 0.50 probability points higher for somebody who
answered all of the 6 sensitive questions in the affirmative compared with somebody
who answered ‘no’ to all of the first 6 sensitive questions.
The second model of Table 4.12 (columns (3) & (4)) separates the sum scores
into dummy variables for each group (Sum score={6;5;4;3;2;1;0}). The category
“sum score=0” is excluded from this estimation and used as a base category.
Results suggest that, relative to those with a sum score of 0, positive sum scores
are related to an increased probability of answering “yes” on the final question.
Furthermore, the size of the coefficients increase with the size of the sum score.
All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. Wald tests
of the equality of these coefficients reject the null of equal coefficients of the groups
with a sum score of 6 and 5 at the 1% level (Prob.>chi2=0.0011). The coefficients
on the groups with a sum score of 5 and 4 are not statistically different using this
test. The coefficients on groups 4 and 3 are also not statistically distinguishable
using this test81. Groups 3 and 2 are statistically different at the 10% significance
level (Prob.>chi2=0.068); and groups 2 and 1 (Prob.>chi2=0.005) are significantly
different at the 1% level. The same results remain when using a logit model to
estimate the parameters.
The final model within this table, uses the dichotomous (0/1) responses to the
individual questions (questions 1 to 6) as the independent variables of interest.
The coefficients on all of the dummies are positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level except for that of question 3 (job application misstatement), which
is positive but not statistically significant.
This study now turns to the task of comparing predicted outcomes with actual
outcomes. In total, 36% of the sample asnwered the last question positively and
64% answered “No” to this question. Setting yˆ = 1 if F (x′β) > 0.5 and yˆ = 0
if F (x′β) ≤ 0.5, one can measure goodness of fit as the percentage of correctly
classified observations. This is done in Table 4.13 which compares fitted values
and actual values from the first model of Table 4.12. The percentage of correctly
specified values in this case is 64.1682. In this case, 233 observations are misclas-
sified as 1 when the correct classification is 0, and 878 values are misclassified as
0 when the correct value is 1. The remaining 1762+227=1989 observations are
correctly specified.
81The coefficients for groups 3 and 5 are also not statistically different from each other
82The percentage of correctly specified values from the second and third probit models are
64.77% and 64.45%, respectively.
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Table 4.12: Probit Estimations Of Response To Final Question On Results From
Previous Questions And Explanatory Variables Used In Clausen at al. (2010)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Sum Score: Q1-
Q6
0.226*** 0.083***
(0.015) (0.006)
Sum Score=1 (d) 0.844*** 0.326***
(0.115) (0.043)
Sum Score=2 (d) 1.149*** 0.433***
(0.104) (0.036)
Sum Score=3 (d) 1.275*** 0.474***
(0.101) (0.034)
Sum Score=4 (d) 1.301*** 0.485***
(0.104) (0.034)
Sum Score=5 (d) 1.353*** 0.496***
(0.125) (0.036)
Sum Score=6 (d) 1.969*** 0.612***
(0.191) (0.027)
Question 1 (d) 0.291*** 0.107***
(0.052) (0.019)
Question 2 (d) 0.310*** 0.115***
(0.051) (0.019)
Question 3 (d) 0.036 0.013
(0.050) (0.018)
Question 4 (d) 0.290*** 0.108***
(0.050) (0.019)
Question 5 (d) 0.294*** 0.110***
(0.050) (0.019)
Question 6 (d) 0.132*** 0.049***
(0.049) (0.018)
Constant -0.946*** -1.446*** -0.943***
(0.110) (0.141) (0.111)
Other control vari-
ables
YES YES YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.075 0.063
Observations 3100 3100 3100
Log-Likelihood -1904.4 -1868.4 -1891.6
Chi-Squared 244.0 253.4 264.2
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is the response to the last RR question (0=no; 1=yes).
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Other control variables include: gender of owner
(dummy); age of owner (category); education of owner (category); industry of firm (category); size of firm
(dummy); region (dummy); and wave (dummy). The coefficients on these variables are not statistically
significant.
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Table 4.13: Comparing Actual Outcomes With Predicted Outcomes From Probit
& Logit (Model 1) Estimations
True Outcome
Predicted No Yes Total
No 1762 878 2640
Yes 233 227 460
Total 1995 1105 3100
Using Table 4.11 to generate predictions with the same method produces similar
results. For each sum-score group, if the proportion of people who said “Yes” is
less than or equal to 0.5, then the predicted value for each member of that group
is set to 0; and conversely, if the proportion of people in a group who said yes
is greater than 0.5, then the predicted value for those firms are set to 1. Using
this method, all those who said “yes” 6 times are predicted to say “yes” to the
final question, while all other firms are predicted to say “No” to the final question.
This method correctly specifies 64.69% of firms83. The significance of this is that
it might be useful to focus on the order of the questions when analysing responses.
If later questions are based on earlier ones then adding more weight to the first
set of questions might be more useful in finding out the level of malfeasance.
One outcome of this analysis is that the responses of firms who have said “yes”
more often than not are treated with more confidence than firms who say “no”
more often. Therefore, despite the possibility that by saying yes most of the time a
firm is potentially admitting to graft and malpractice, they are treated as “honest”
in the framework of the RR questions. There is a question of whether or not these
responses can be trusted. By answering a higher amount of questions with a yes
these firms are effectively displaying their honesty and their corrupt nature at the
same time. Previous literature has questioned whether reticent respondents can
bias firm-level surveys; another possible question is whether truth-telling corrupt
firms might bias these surveys as well. If reticent managers (RR liars) might bias
sensitive surveys then non-reticent (“honest”) but corrupt firms might seek to hide
the truth when the questions do not have the protection of the RR design.
4.5.5 The Order Of Responses For The Randomised Response Ques-
tions
Another method to detect strategic responses with the RR questions is to look at
the order in which the responses were given. If a set of seemingly reticent responses
were quite common this might give evidence for systematic underreporting by the
respondents. Looking at the order of responses potentially adds another dimension
83The corresponding values for the logit estimations for the respective models are: 64.16%;
64.74%; and 64.58%
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to the data. For example, interviewees might have been honest for the first set of
questions, but, as the questions continued, might have wanted to avoid seeming
corrupt or looking bad and so reported “no” for the rest of the questions. Such an
interviewees set of responses might look something like: {1,1,1,1,0,0,0}. Looking
at the order of responses allows one to potentially distinguish such an interviewee
from somebody who reported the same number of yeses but was being honest in
their responses. Somebody who was being honest, yet responded “yes” to the same
number of questions might have had a set of responses similar to: {1,0,1,0,1,0,1}.
Given 7 questions and 2 possible answers to each question (yes or no) there
are 27 = 128 possible types of responses. One can illustrate the sets of all possible
yes/no combinations that give rise to a given sum score using a diagram that tracks
each firms set of responses, giving a sum of “+1” for every yes and “-1” for every no.
This is illustrated in Figure 10. In this figure, the connecting points represent the
questions, the paths heading upwards represents questions answered with a “yes”
and the paths heading downwards represent the questions that were answered with
a “no”. The numbers on the far right hand side of the figure represent the sum
scores. As previously mentioned, two firms can have a different set of responses
yet still have the same sum score, and therefore arrive at the same final point.
Figure 10: Potential Response “Paths” To 7 Randomised Response Questions
In the data there are five set of response combinations (paths) that occur on
more that 50 occasions. These are: {0,0,0,0,0,0,0}84; {0,0,0,0,0,1,0}85; {1,1,0,0,0,0,0}86;
{1,1,1,0,0,0,0}87; and {0,0,1,0,0,0,0}88. These patterns are illustrated in Figure 11.
84414 Firms (13% of the sample) have this response pattern.
8588 firms (3%) have this response pattern.
8683 firms (3%) have this response pattern.
8757 firms (2%) have this response pattern.
8855 firms (2%) have this response pattern.
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Figure 11: Most Common Response Patterns To The 7 Randomised Response
Questions
The most common patterns displayed in this figure show that amongst these
firms “no” responses are more common than “yes” responses. Hence the downward
trend in the graph and the sum scores being equal to 3 or less. This is significant
because it can aid future research in RR questioning to test if the order of ques-
tions is relevant for the trend of yeses and nos.
4.5.6 Analysis Of Peer Group Reporting
The nature of the indirect questions might raise the issue of who the firms were
referring to when they gave their responses: themselves or their peers. If the firm
was referring to itself, then the answer can be interpreted in relation to that firm,
however, if the firm was referring to other establishments, then the answer might
be interpreted as an average figure for a group of similar firms. Figures 12 & 13
show that the responses from the two indirect questions that ask for bribe figures
are clustered around 0%, 5%, 10% and 15%. This relationship remains when the
sample is disaggregated by size-sector-location cells.
Table 4.14 presents an analysis of variance for the proportion of total sales paid
in informal gifts/payments. The overall test of firm size is not significant at the
10% level (F=1.93, p=0.146). Therefore, after adjusting for industry and location,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average bribe (as a proportion of
sales) is equal amongst the different firm sizes. The average bribe seems to vary
between sectors and regions. Table 4.15 shows that the adjusted mean bribe value
for small firms is 2.5% of total annual sales. Figure 14 shows these adjusted means
with their repective 95% confidence intervals. Much of the variation in bribe
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Figure 12: Kernel Density Estimate Of
The Proportion Of Sales Paid In As In-
formal Payment/Gifts To Speed Regula-
tory Processes
N=3,200
Figure 13: Kernel Density Estimate Of
The Proportion Of Government Contract
Paid In Informal Payment/Gifts To Se-
cure Contract
N=2,865
payments amongst firms of different sizes comes from the difference between small
firms and medium sized firms, this is shown in Table 4.16 which shows the results
from pairwise and joint chi-squared tests of equality for each respective group,
controlling for location and industry. The figures in this table are derived from
pairwise comparisons of the average bribe (as a proportion of sales) conditional
on being in each size category: small; medium; and large. Results from this table
indicate that at the 5% level the average predicted bribe (proportion) between
small firms and medium sized firms; small and large; and medium and large firms,
are not significantly different from one another. This suggests that bribe amounts
(in Naira) increase with firm size and that this variation supports the argument
that the firms are reporting about themselves.
Table 4.14: ANOVA For Informal Gifts, Controlling for Sector, Size, and Location
Number of obs = 3200 R-Squared=0.038
Root MSE=0.037 Adjusted R-Squared=0.037
Source Partial
SS
d.f MS F Prob>F
Model 0.171 5 0.034 25.41 0.000
Size 0.005 2 0.003 1.93 0.146
Sector 0.008 2 0.004 3.11 0.045
Region 0.161 1 0.162 119.86 0.000
Residual 4.309 3194 0.001
Total 4.481 3199 0.001
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Table 4.15: Adjusted Means Of Bribery,
By Firm Size, Controlling for Sector And
Region
Margin Delta-
method
Std.
Err.
z P>|z| 95% Confi-
dence Inter-
val
Firm
size
Small 0.025 0.001 33.98 0.000 0.023 0.026
Medium 0.028 0.001 19.30 0.000 0.025 0.031
Large 0.021 0.011 1.90 0.057 -0.001 0.043
Table 4.16: Contrasts Of Predictive Mar-
gins
Contrast Delta-
method
Std.
Err.
95% Confi-
dence Inter-
val
d.f Chi2 P>chi2
Firm
size
Small
vs.
Medium
-0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.000 1 3.69 0.0547
Small
vs.
Large
0.004 0.011 -0.018 0.026 1 0.11 0.736
Medium
vs.
Large
0.007 0.111 -0.015 0.029 1 0.38 0.537
Joint 2 3.85 0.146
4.6 Conclusion
Despite the significant influence that corruption is believed to have in much of
the developing world, the difficulty in directly observing corrupt acts has led to
an absence of evidence, and consequently consensus, on the most effective ways
to reduce its potential adverse impact on an economy. The accuracy of corrup-
tion measures is important because of their use by academics and institutions to
measure corrupt behaviour around the world [Olken , 2009]. Corruption measures
such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) [Lamb-
sdorff , 2003] and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators [Kaufmann, Kraay &
Mastruzzi , 2005] are formed on the basis of corruption perceptions data and are
used to asses governance at the national and sub-national levels. Such data has
also been used to discuss the determinants of corruption89.
The current study set out to discuss some of the methods that have been used
in the economics literature to get honest answers from sensitive questions, includ-
ing questions about personal experiences with crime and corruption. Some of the
literature concerning such issues use direct methods of asking businesses and in-
dividuals about their behaviour with regard to the tabooed acts. However, it has
been recognised that such methods of data collection are subject to misreporting
bias. Other techniques have been developed in order to improve the data on sensi-
tive topics by reducing the guilt or taboo associated with such acts. A number of
survey methods have been discussed, including different specific question strategies
used to get more honest responses. The wording of questions was also raised as a
potential issue of importance.
This study identified two main strategies that have been applied to the study
89A survey of this literature can be found in Rose-Ackerman [2004].
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Figure 14: Adjusted Mean Of Informal Payment, By Firm Size
of corruption and illegal activities. These are: indirect questioning (IQ); and
randomised response questioning (RRQ). Both methods aim to get more positive
answers by reducing the guilt associated with saying ‘Yes” in response to a positive
question. The indirect methods that were discussed do this by asking a question
about somebody who is similar to the interviewee, rather than the interviewee
themselves. This is meant to allow the respondent to admit to performing an
illegal act whilst possibly maintaining that they were referring to somebody else.
The taboo of affirming a trait that is socially looked down upon is meant to be
reduced because only the interviewee knows who he/she is referring to. The RR
method seeks to reduce the taboo associated with similar questions by allowing
the interviewees answer to depend on a random event, the result of which is only
known to the interviewee, Therefore, similar to IQ, RRQ allows the interviewee to
say “Yes” without necessarily admitting to an undesirable trait.
This chapter put both methods to the test by analysing the results of a firm-
level survey that used both methods to ask similar sensitive questions to managers
in Nigeria. Results from section 4.5 were in favour of indirect methods as a means
of getting honest responses to questions about bribery and tax avoidance. While
the highest RR estimate for the prevalence of a sensitive act came to 3.6% of the
sample, the lowerst indirect estimate for any sensitive trait was 53%. Possible
reasons for the relative failure of the RR technique might be the design of the
procedure. Another set of questions using a randomising device with a lower
probability of selecting the sensitve question might possibly yield a higher rate of
admission. However, this would also lead to a decreased efficiency in any estimate
of transgression.
The distribution of responses showed a positively skewed graph that tailed out
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to the right. The presence of reticence (the unwillingness of some interviewees
to respond positively to a sensitive question even when required to do so by the
RR technique) was given as a reason for the skewed distribution and for the much
higher number of firms with a sum score of zero. This situation suggests two
separate distributions, one for those who follow the rules and one for those who
do not (Van Den Hout, 2012)90.
This study added to the literature on the RR by developing a model of reticence
and the response to RR questions. This model allowed for the calculation of a
lower bound estimate of reticence to be made. This lower bound was based on
the assumption that nobody committed any of the acts in question and came to a
value of 16.9%. This study was also able to generate a prediction of the response
to the final question of a series of RR questions based on the responses to the
previous questions and a set of explanatory variables. This model was able to
correctly predict the final response for 64.16% cases.
Finally, an analysis of peer group behaviour was conducted. The reason behind
this was to dig deeper into who the firms were referring to when answering the
indirect questions. Size, sector, and regional comparisons were made with the
result that after controlling for sector and region, relatively little variation in bribe
payments was due to firm size. The variation that did occur between firms of
different sizes were mostly due to the differences between small and medium sized
firms.
This work has provided evidence for the superiority of indirect questioning over
randomised response questioning in getting honest responses from sensitive survey
questions. Previous work has studied the effectiveness of randomised response
questioning over direct questioning. Further work can seek to simultaneously study
the point estimates and efficiency of the direct questioning, indirect questioning
and randomised response questioning methods.
Despite these conclusions, this investigation has raised the question of why firm
managers continue to be reticent, when asked RR questions, despite being given
anonymity. The next chapter investigates possible reasons for this phenomenon.
90Correspondence with author.
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5 What Drives Reticence? Reporting Bias From
Monopolies And Distrustful Firm Managers
Abstract
This chapter examines the determinants of underreporting (reticence)
on randomised response questions. By looking at the relationship between
firm-specific reticence and other firm-specific and industry-location specific
variables it is found that (mis)trust, indicated by the proportion of con-
tracts arranged before delivery, is a significant predictor of reticence. This
seems to suggest that firm managers who are more cautious in their business
dealings are also more cautious with the randomised response technique. In
such cases, weighted estimates of the prevalence of sensitive traits might be
derived without the use of the RR technique but through the use of variables
relating to the nature of firm-level contracts.
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5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter compared the indirect questioning and randomised response
questioning methods against each other to see which one is preferred when asking
sensitive questions. In doing so, another problem was raised: why do firm managers
exhibit reticence when asked sensitive questions via randomised response despite
being given assured anonymity? The current chapter seeks to answer this question.
This study investigates the reasons for underreporting of sensitive acts by firms,
even when those same firms have protection against being found guilty of those
acts. The role of trust and the perceived risk of detection is examined and found to
have significant effects on the propensity to report truthfully. The results suggest
that some of the factors which affect the nature in which companies engage in
economic activity might also affect the exchange of sensitive information.
A number of reasons have been provided for the lack of reliability of survey
data. These include: social desirability bias; cognitive problems; and the effect
of attitudes on responses. In the previous chapter, social desirability bias was
provided as one of the main reasons for the underreporting of questions about
corruption. Interviewees generally want to avoid looking bad in front of the in-
terviewer91. Such bias is of special importance when the interviewer; research
organisation; or framework92 can be associated with the questions in the survey.
For example, reported prejudice can decrease when a survey is administered by
an ethnic minority; and might increase if interviewees believe that they are be-
ing psychologically monitored for lie-detection [Bertrand & Mullainathan , 2001].
Also, bribery is likely to be underreported if the survey is conducted by an anti-
corruption agency and if the interviewees are aware of this. The current study
seeks to overcome this potential problem by using data that was not acquired by
an anti-corruption agency. Also, the questions concerning corruption are towards
the end of the survey when the interviewer would have gained some rapport with
the interviewee [Svensson , 2003]. Furthermore, a few questions concerning crime
and corruption are scattered throughout the survey, therefore, the topic is unlikely
to come as a shock to the interviewee.
On the other hand, some research has uncovered the effect of cognitive processes
on the way that interviewees respond to survey questions93. Findings from this
literature suggest that simple changes can significantly alter the processing and
manipulation of survey questions. One such change is the altering of the order
91Some studies have tried to reduce this effect by increasing the physical and social distance
between the interviewer and the interviewee [Fischbacher & Heusi , 2008, Abeler, Becker & Falk
, 2012].
92For example, the purpose of the study.
93Experimental evidence on the effect of cognitive processes on survey responses can be found
in Tanue [1992] and Sudman, Bradburn & Schwarz [1996].
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of questions. Changing the order might affect the responses to questions because
people try to provide answers that are consistent with their previous answers in the
survey. Another potential issue is that previous questions might stir up attitudes
or memories which can affect the responses to future questions. A further channel
through which cognitive processes can affect responses to questions is through
question wording. One example [Rugg , 1941] relates to the respective responses
of comparable cross-sections of the public to the two following questions:
 Do you think that the United States Of America should allow public speeches
against democracy?
 Do you think that the United States Of America should forbid public speeches
against democracy?
Whilst three-quarters of the first sample of respondents reported “No” to the
first question; just over half of the respondents in the second sample reported
“Yes” to the second question. In this case it seems to be a framaing effect that
causes the difference in responses to the two respective questions rather than an
ordering effect that might occur if both questions, in different orders, were asked
to both samples. The questions asked to the firm managers in this chapter were
asked in the same order and had the same wording for all interviewees, suggesting
that responses can be comparable across managers. Problems can also occur with
different scales, for example, when given the choice between reporting bribes as a
percentage of sales and in local currency value, reporters in local currency tend to
report lower amounts, when converted, than those who report as a percentage of
sales [Clarke , 2011]. Also, when asked how much television they watch per day,
interviewees respond differently depending on the size of the first category and
the size of the subsequent increments for each category. The RR questions in this
study do not have this problem since they require a dichotomous (yes/no) response.
Finally, there might be a problem if interviewees do not use much mental exertion
in answering the questions. When given a list of responses interviewees often pick
the first and/or the last option in the list. The questions in this study do not require
a list so this problem should not occur here. The absence of attitudes, sometimes
respondents think that they should report having an opinion on something when
questioned about it; the confusion over the specific attitude that one holds and/or
why one holds that attitude; and the presence of conflicting attitudes can also
affect the way that people respond to survey questions. These should not be a
problem in this study since the questions used concern actions and not attitudes.
5.2 Framework
This section outlines the framework used to study the determinants of reticence.
The following subsections correspond with the analysis conducted by Sah [2007]
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by treating a firm’s behaviour as being determined by previous experiences; firms
use the state of affairs in the previous period to inform their decisions in the present
period.
5.2.1 Managers (Agents)
Consider an economy consisting of firm managers who interact with each other
in order to purchase and sell goods and/or services. Each manager has a level of
(dis)trust, r, for every other manager in the economy. Trust is based upon the
managers’ previous dealings in the economy with other managers. Trust also affects
how the manager will engage in business in the future. Managers are randomly
allocated to each other in each period, no manager knows who they will meet in the
next period. The choice of how much to trust the next manager is made by each
manager in each period and depends on his/her estimate of the mean proportion
of trustworthy managers in the economy.
5.2.2 Interviewers (Principals)
In this economy, there exists a predetermined number of interviewers. Interviewers
are employed by a research institute for the purpose of acquiring information
from the managers. All interviewers are employed by the same research institute.
Researchers employ the interviewers with the purpose of acquiring information
from the managers. Interviewers would, therefore, like the managers to reveal
some potentially sensitive information to the interviewer.
5.2.3 Two Scenarios
This study considers two potential scenarios:
1. Firm managers see the questions up front and know how many questions
are going to be asked. In this case they choose s (the number of yeses) to
maximise their utility from remaining in business and continuing to receive
the stipend provided by future interviews. This will be dependent upon
re-interview and whether or not the information is leaked.
2. Managers do not know how many questions they will be asked. In this
case they play the game (tell truth/lie) after being asked each question, and
the equilibrium evolves: either the optimal strategy is to tell truth or lie,
in which case managers display honest and reticent behaviour; or to play
a mixed strategy, in which case managers display behaviour identified as
possibly candid/possibly reticent.
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5.2.4 Meetings Between Interviewers And Managers
At time tint > 0, managers are randomly matched with 1 interviewer in a (poten-
tially) one-shot game. tint can vary for different managers. At time tint > 0 each
interviewer is matched with 1 manager, however, interviewers are matched with
more than one manager over the course of the total time frame, t1...tT , where T
is the final time period. This model allows for the game to go on forever so that
T =∞, it also allows for a limited time frame, T = c <∞.
Therefore, interviewers are matched with m > 1 managers. Interviewers want
the managers to reveal some potentially sensitive information to the interviewer.
When matched to the interviewer, each manager has a choice of one of two options:
reveal the truth, or lie. Revealing the truth could lead to, with a very small prob-
ability, G, the information being leaked and used against the manager. However,
this probability is not known to the managers, although managers have an idea
about the value of this probability, g(r). Managers are not certain about their
evaluation of the probability of leakage. The managers’ idea about the probabil-
ity of leakage, g(r), is a range from a minimum probability, g(r), to a maximum
probability, g(r). g(r) and g(r) are known to the managers. The size of the range,
g∗ ≡ g(r)− g(r) remains the same for all managers. However, the position of g(r)
on the [0, 1] interval is allowed to vary amongst managers. The lower bound of
g(r) is 0 and the upper bound of g(r) is 1. Therefore, g(r) can take a value within
the interval [0, g(r)−g∗] and g(r) can take a value within the interval [g(r)+g∗, 1].
Therefore:
g∗i = g
∗ for all i
g(r) ∈ [0, g(r)− g∗]
g(r) ∈ [g(r) + g∗, 1]
The managers’ actions in this game depends on their level of trust, r, at time
tint.
If the true probability of leakage, G, is on or above a threshold, then the
information will be leaked to the authorities. If it is below this threshold, then the
information will not be leaked. For simplicity, let this threshold be 0.5, and let
this information be known to all managers. Doing this makes the problem one of
discerning whether or not the probability of detection, G, is greater than or less
than a half.
Since the managers do not know the probability of detection, but only have
an estimate about the range that it can take, g(r) = g∗ ≡ g(r) − g(r), then
the managers’ problem is to decide whether the range lies above the threshold,
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g(r) > 0.5, or below the threshold, g(r) < 0.5. In the first case, if g(r) > 0.5,
the manager believes that the probability of leakage, G, is greater than a half and
the information will be leaked. In the second case where g(r) < 0.5, the manager
believes that the probability of leakage is less than a half and that the information
will be kept secret.
In the case where part of the range lies above the threshold and part of it lies
below the threshold, the larger portion of the range will carry the most weight for
the manager’s decision. So if g(r) − 0.5 > 0.5 − g(r) the manager believes that
the probability of leakage, G, is greater than a half and that the information will
be leaked. Alternatively, if g(r)− 0.5 < 0.5− g(r), the manager believes that the
probability of detection is less than 0.5 and the information will not be leaked.
In the limiting case where g(r)−0.5 = 0.5−g(r), the manager believes that the
probability of detection is equal to a half and that the information will be leaked.
This setup is equivalent to each individual manager taking the expected value of
g(r) to be
g(r)+g(r)
2
and using this to make a judgement about the value of G.
If the information is leaked to the authorities. Managers face a punishment
cost, c(s), where s represents the number of yes responses that the manager gives.
This study posits that δc(s)
s
> 0, so that a higher admission to corruption will earn
a more severe punishment from the authorities.
The firm managers are given a payment, pt, for participating in this game,
regardless of their actions. At the end of the game, the interviewers judge how
truthful they believed the managers’ responses were. If the responses are judged
to be sufficiently truthful, then the interviewer will allow the manager to be inter-
viewed again at some time in the future, in which case the manager would receive
payment, pt+1. If the interviewer believes that the manager gave false answers in
the game, i.e. that the manager did not give sufficiently truthful responses, then
the interviewer will report this to the research institute, who will not allow the
firm to be interviewed again, in which case their future payoff from the interview
process is zero,
∑∞
t=int+1 pt = 0.
The firm managers have to maximise the utility of revealing this sensitive
information subject to the constraint that: 1) The information might be leaked
and their (potential) guilt might be revealed. If this information is revealed and
the firm is guilty of corruption, then the manager faces a cost of punishment, c(s).
2) Perceived lying would result in the dissaproval of the interviewer and would
result in a reduced probability of the manager being approached for an interview
again94. If this is the case, the firm would lose out on a payment for participation,
pt(s(g(r))), where p is the present discounted value of the future payments for
future interviews.
94Alternatively, the probability of a future interview could be reduced to 0 by placing the
manager on a “blocked list”.
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When each individual manager maximises his/her utility subject to these con-
straints, three types of individuals/actions follow:
1. Individuals who are driven by the probability that their actions will be re-
vealed. These choose to lie despite the potential lost future income. For this
to occur(c(s)) must be greater than p(s(g(r))).
2. Individuals who are driven by the potential future income that they will
receive from telling the truth. These will choose to tell the truth despite
the probability of leakage. For this to occur(c(s)) must be smaller than
p(s(g(r))).
3. Individuals who face a flat region in their mazimisation process. So that nei-
ther constraint is binding. For this to occur(c(s)) must be equal to p(s(g(r))).
5.2.5 Possibility Of Re-Interview
The possibility of another interview, and by implication, another chance to earn
the stipend for taking part in the interview process, is related to the (dis)approval
of the interviewer. This disapproval is a function of the binomial distribution,
which the responses are related to. Since the expected number of yeses under
the angels assumptions is 3.5, then any number below this value suggests lying
behavior and will attract disapproval from the interviewer, decreasing the chance
of a future interview.
In order to allow for more flexibility, this study takes a continuous approach
to the decision for a re-interview. The expected future payoff depends on the
probability of re-interview, which is a function of the observed number of yeses
and the expected number of yeses: pt+1(s, E(s)) = f(Pr(Re − Interview)) =
f(M, r, θ, b). Where M is the number of RR questions, 1 − θ is the probability
of being required to answer the RR question truthfully, b is the nature of the
manager’s level of guilt. In the current setup, this simplifies to: pt+1(s, E(s)) =
f(Pr(Re− Interview)) = f(7, r, 0.5, b).
The probabilitiy of being re-interviewed increases with the level of guilt and
decreases with the level of reticence. More formally: pr < 0; pb > 0; and pbr =
prb < 0. This means that reticence has a greater impact on future payoff than
guilt95.
Since E(s) = 3.5 is the benchmark by which a dishonest response is identified,
this is incorporated into the re-interview function to give:
Re− Interview =
{
0 < Pr(Re− Interview) ≤ 1 s ≥ 3.5;
0 s < 3.5
95This result was shown in the previous chapter.
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5.2.6 Leakage Of Information
The probability of leakage of information is calculated by the manager. This prob-
ability is positively related to the number of yeses. In other words, the manager
believes that if they respond yes to a relatively large number of questions, then
the research institute will reveal it to the authorities: Pr(Leak) = f(γ0, γ1 · s).
Where γ0 represents the belief, by the managers, that information might be leaked
regardless of the answers provided; and γ1 represents the part of the decision to
leak that is based on the answers to the RR questions. From the previous discus-
sion, it is believed that γ0 ≥ 0 and γ1 > 0. The manager chooses the number of
positive responses, s, in order to minimise the probability of leakage, Pr(leak).
This analysis informs the empirical section to come by creating expressions which
can be used to represent the latent trust in the interviewer and the desire not to
be seen as socially bad. The term γ0 can be interpreted as the latent trust in the
interviewer not to leak the answers independent of the responses given. On the
other hand, the term γ1 is more closely linked to the desire not to appear bad
to the interviewer, and the contribution of this term to the probability of leakage
depends on the responses of the manager. Whereas Sah [2007] modelled the firm’s
business deals being determined by previous deals with other firms; the current
study models meetings between the manager and interviewer being determined by
a firm’s previous business deals and its experience of the business environment.
5.3 Data & Construction Of Variables
This subsection describes the data used in this study. Descriptions of the variables
used in the analysis are provided in subsection A.3. Summary statistics for the
data are provided in subsection A.3.1. The data used in this chapter comes from
the Enterprise survey which was described in Section 2.4. The firm-specific vari-
ables come from the questionnaire that was used in the survey; the information
concerning industry-location population is taken from the sample survey method-
ology [World Bank , 2007, Iarossi, Mousley & Radwan , 2009].
5.3.1 Trust And Experience In The Business Environment
This study uses three variables as the main indicators of trust. These are: the
percentage of total orders that are written, as opposed to oral with a witness
and oral without a witness; the percentage of material orders that are paid for
after delivery, as opposed to on delivery or before delivery; and the percentage of
sales orders that are paid for before delivery, as opposed to on delivery or after
delivery. These variables are chosen because they seem to represent things that a
non-trusting company should care about.
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This study also uses a dummy variable for whether or not a company subcon-
tracted any part of its production process to another company. Subcontracting
work to another company arguably requires a level of trust that the company will
perform the work and will do it to a certain standard. Also, the number of years
that the company has known the primary supplier for its main input is used as
an explanatory variable. This is meant to denote the level of mistrust. The years
of experience of the senior manager and its squared term are also used to see the
effect of business experience on reticence.
5.3.2 Level of Anonymity And The Fear Of Detection
One reason for reticence might be the fear of detection. Reticent companies might,
arguably irrationally, reason that the answers from the RR procedure might be
used against them somehow. If so, since the surveys were carried out anony-
mously, the possibility of detection would be related to the possibility that the
firm could be identified by observables. One of these is the number (population)
of other companies in the industry-location cell. If a company is the only chemical
manufacturing business in Bauchi state, then it might fear that this fact might
make it identifiable. On the other hand, if a company is one out of a hundred
wood manufacturing businesses in Lagos, then it might be more at ease with an-
swering sensitive questions, since the possibility of detection, as described above,
would be reduced.
The preceding analysis suggests the use of the number (population) of compa-
nies in the industry-location cell as a variable to measure the level of identifiability
of the company. The preceding analysis suggests that the larger the population of
companies, the lower the propensity to be reticent. This study also includes the
number of close competitors, as reported by the company itself, as an explana-
tory variable. Due to the fact that this variable is self-reported by the company,
it might be more closely related to reticence than the total population of firms.
The total population of firms is, arguably, less known to the individual company
than the number of close competitors. Also, the total population in the industry
location cell might include somewhat different companies in terms of both prod-
uct and location. Another argument in favour of using subjective reports of the
number of close competitors is that this question was asked before the randomised
response questions and also before the questions about corruption; therefore there
is no danger of the managers using their perception to justify their behaviour.
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5.4 Empirical Methodology
5.4.1 Misclassification Of Reticence
The definition of reticence is a manager that answers “No” with a positive probabil-
ity when they are supposed to answer “Yes”, when doing so might be interpreted
as them having committed a socially undesirable act [Azfar & Murrell , 2009,
Clausen, Kraay & Murrell , 2010]. This definition does not require that reticent
managers always give untruthful response, but that they do so on at least some
occasions. In practice, the measure of reticence that is used is the number of
“yeses” on a series of randomised response questions. A manager with zero yeses
is classified as reticent, a manager with at least one yes is classified as possibly
candid.
One potential problem with trying to find the causes of reticence is that the
traditional measure of reticence might be misclassified because of misreporting er-
rors. Labelling all firms who answer “No” all the time as reticent and the rest
of the sample as possibly candid potentially misclassifies some of the reticent as
possibly candid. This can be described using the latent variable specification of
a binary outcome model [McFadden , 1984, Greene , 2003] and the notation of
Hausman, Abrevaya, Scott-Morton [1998], where ytruei is a latent variable, and i
ranges from 1 to the sample size, N . The latent variable can be described by:
ytruei = x
′
iβ + i
where i is an independent and identically distributed error term. The observed
response can be represented as:
yobservedi = 1(y
true
i ≥ 0)
where yobservedi is the reported answer; and 1(E) represents the indicator func-
tion that is equal to 1 if E is true and zero if E is false. In the absence of misclas-
sification of the binary variable the observed response is also the true response.
This study focuses on the type of misclassification in which the misclassification
error depends on the true response, ytruei , but is independent of the explanatory
variables, xi.
The definition of reticence used previously can be represented as:
r =
{
1 if s = 0;
0 if s > 0.
where r represents reticence and s is the number of yeses to a series of ran-
domised response questions. This criterion has the possibility that some firms are
misclassified as 0 (possibly candid) when in fact they should be 1 (reticent). In such
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a case where some 0s should be 1s: α1 = Pr(y
observed
i = 0|ytruei = 1) 6= 0, where α1
is the false-negative misclassification error. Due to the relatively sensitive nature
of the questions and the relatively low probability of getting 7 tails from 7 coin flips
and being innocent of all acts, this study argues that the alternative misclassifica-
tion error is not significantly different from zero: α0 = Pr(y
observed
i = 1|ytruei = 0).
Despite this, the false-positive misclassification error, α0, will be incorporated into
the analysis and tested for significance.
In the standard case of miclassification of a binary dependent variable, the
expected value of the observed dependent variable is:
E(yobservedi = 1|xi) = Pr(yobservedi = 1|xi) = α0 + (1− α0 − α1)F (x
′
iβ) (5.4.1.1)
Where F is the cumulative distribution function of i. The probability of
observing a zero is given by: Pr(yobservedi = 0|xi) = (1−α0) + (α0 +α1−1)F (x′iβ).
This collapses to the usual respective expressions: F (x
′
iβ) and 1 − F (x′iβ), when
there is no misclassification error in the binary dependent variable.
In the present setup, the measurement error is negatively correlated with the
accurately measured variable, therefore, the classification error will lead to a down-
ward bias in the estimates of the effect of x on ytrue [Bound, Brown & Mathiowetz
, 2001]. To see this, note that the marginal effect of an explanatory variable on
the observed response is:
δPr(yobservedi = 1|xi)
δx
= (1− α0 − α1)f(x′β)β (5.4.1.2)
which is always less than the marginal effect on the true response: f(x
′
β)β.
Moreover, the marginal effect on the observed response always differs from the
marginal effect on the true response by a factor of (1 − α0 − α1), no matter at
what value of x the marginal effect is evaluated.
The parameters α0; α1; and β can be estimated via the maximum likelihood
method by maximising:
lnL =
1
n
N∑
i=1
yobservedi ln(α0 + (1− α0 − α1)F (x
′
iβ))
+ (1− yobservedi )ln((1− α0) + (α0 + α1 − 1)F (x
′
iβ))
(5.4.1.3)
with respect to α0; α1; and β.
An additional condition is required for identification of the parameters in the
model. This condition, the monotonicity condition, states that the sum of the
misclassification errors must be less than 1.
Monotonicity Condition (MC1): α0 + α1 < 1.
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This can be seen when considering a symmetric function, F , where F (d) =
1− F (−d)). Defining: α˜0 = 1− α1, α˜1 = 1− α0 and β˜ = −β. Then:
α˜0 + (1− α˜0 − α˜1)F (x′i − β˜) =1− α1 + (1− (1− α1)− (1− α0))(1− F (x
′
iβ))
=1− α1 + (1− 1 + α1 − 1 + α0)(1− F (x′iβ))
=1− α1 + (α1 + α0 − 1)(1− F (x′iβ))
=1− α1 + α1 + α0 − 1− (α1 + α0 − 1)F (x′iβ)
=α0 + (1− α0 − α1)F (x′iβ)
(5.4.1.4)
Therefore, any estimators based on Equation 5.4.1.1, such as maximum like-
lihood and non-linear least squares, cannot distinguish between (α0, α1, β) and
(1 − α1, 1 − α0, −β). MC1 rules out this possibility since if α0 + α1 < 1, then
(1− α1) + (1− α0) > 1.
Since this study argues that α0 is not significantly different from zero, then the
MC1 condition implies that α1 < 1, which appears to be reasonable. The only
way in which this could be violated is if α1 = 1 which does not agree with the
data since the actual distribution of “yeses” shows that more yeses are observed
than expected under the angels assumption, therefore, at least some respondents
appear to be answering truthfully. Using this result, it appears that the mononicity
condition is satisfied in this study and the parameters (α0, α1, β) can be identified
using maximum likelihood estimation.
5.4.2 Possible Extensions
The previous subsection argued that since the 0/1 measure of reticence might mis-
classify some firms as possibly candid when they were indeed reticent, this might
cause a source of bias. One way to control for this bias is to estimate the misclas-
sification errors, α0 and α1, along with the coefficient of the model, β. Another
potential solution is to use the number of yeses, 0 to 7, as a dependent variable
instead of the binary measure of reticence. This would transform the model from a
binary outcome model to a multiple outcome model. Doing this would potentially
increase the amount of information used in the estimation and would bypass the
problem of misclassifying some reticent managers as possibly candid. To be sure,
there still exists the possibility that some of the firms were lying, so somebody
who said 2 yeses should have actually stated 3 yeses. Nevertheless, to deal with
the potential misclassification of the number of yeses, one can use the analysis of
mismeasured discrete dependent variables used in Abrevaya & Hausman [1999],
which extends the binary response framework to deal with ordered discrete choice
variables with more than 2 possible values.
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5.5 Empirical Results
This section looks at the empirical results of the analysis. Summary statistics
from the data are discussed. Results from an econometric exercise that models the
propensity to be reticent are also analysed.
5.5.1 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for trust-related variables are shown in Table 5.1. Different
sets of variables are presented within this table. The first set of variables relate
to the companies’ orders. Companies were asked to state the percentage of their
customers’ purchase orders that were: written; oral, with a witness; and oral,
without any witnesses. These respective percentages add up to 100%. The second
set of variables relate to the annual purchase of material inputs made by the
companies. The companies were asked to state the percentage of total annual
material inputs or services that were paid for: before delivery; on delivery; and
after delivery. These percentages also add up to 100%. The next set of variables
relate to the sales of the establishment. Companies were asked the percentage of
sales that were paid for: before delivery; on delivery; and after delivery. These
percentages also add up to 100%. Companies were also asked if they subcontracted
any part of their production to another company. Finally, the survey asked the
companies the number of years that they had known the primary supplier of the
main input used in their production process.
The summary statistics in table 5.1 are presented seperately for the reticent
and the possibly candid. On average, 45.3% of the purchase orders from reticent
companies are written. This is in comparison to 32.1% for the possibly candid set
of companies. Therefore, using this as a measure of trust, reticent firms seem to
trust other companies less than possibly candid firms. The last column shows that
the average ratio of written orders to oral-with-witness orders for reticent firms
is 2.43. On the other hand, the same ratio for the possibly candid companies is
1.05. This tends to suggest that the reticent are more cautious in their business
transactions than the possibly candid group.
Both groups receive payment for the majority of their sales either before deliv-
ery or on delivery. Only 12-13% of their payments are received after delivery. The
reticent seem to know the primary supplier of their main input for a year longer
than the possibly candid group.
5.5.2 Predicting Reticence
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show probit estimations for reticence, these are the main results.
The dependent variable in every model is a dummy equal to one if a company is ret-
icent (as defined by Clausen, Kraay & Murrell [2010]) and 0 otherwise. Standard
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Table 5.1: Means Of Trust-Related Variables, By Reticence
Means Relative Shares
(Division Of
Means)
Relative Shares
(Division of
Means, By
Firm)
Description Variable Possibly
Candid
Reticent Possibly
Candid
Reticent Possibly
Candid
Reticent
Percentage of their customers’
purchase orders that were:
written 32.1 45.3 1.10 2.53 1.05 2.43
oral, with witness 29.3 17.9 1 1 - -
oral, without witness 38.6 36.8 1.32 2.06 0.59 0.87
Percentage of total annual
purchases of material inputs
or services that were:
paid for before delivery 28.5 38.7 0.50 0.93 0.73 1.13
paid for on delivery 56.6 41.4 1 1 - -
paid for after delivery 14.9 19.9 0.26 0.48 0.50 0.55
Percentage of establishment’s
sales that were:
paid for before delivery 33.2 36.7 0.60 0.72 0.97 0.96
paid for on delivery 54.9 50.7 1 1 - -
paid for after delivery 11.9 12.7 0.22 0.25 0.34 0.36
Percentage of establishment’s
total sales that came from sell-
ing:
intermediate products
and services
6.9 11.1
Did you subcontract any part of your production? 0.13 0.10
For how many years have you known the primary sup-
plier of the main input used?
7.07 7.70
For each set of trust-related variables; columns 5 and 6 choose the middle category as the base category and
divide the means of the other categories by the mean of the base category. The figures in columns 7 and 8 are
generated by doing the same thing for each respective firm and then taking the mean of these figures. The last
set of figures, in columns 7 and 8, are based on a lower sample size due to division by zero for some firms.
Wilcoxon signed rank sum tests for the equality of shares (last 2 columns) reject the null hypothesis of equality
for each pair of shares at the 5% level for the first pair, and at the 1% level for all other pairs.
errors are calculated using the Huber-White heteroscedasticity-consistent estima-
tor. The first set of variables are the same as those used in Clausen, Kraay &
Murrell [2010] as predictors of reticence, these are: gender of owner, age of owner,
formal education of owner, industry of company, size of company, region, and
wave of survey. Companies with owners who are 55 years old or above are less
likely to be reticent than the base group of 46-55. Companies in manufacturing
and retail are also shown to be more reticent than the base group, other, which
includes: information technology, construction & transport, and hotels & restau-
rants. Companies located in the southern states of Nigeria are also more likely to
be reticent than those in the Northern states. Also, companies that were surveyed
in the second wave, showed more reticence than those who participated in the
first wave. One potential reason for this is because the regions surveyed in each
wave were chosen based on the state’s committment to reform and the nature of
its governance; therefore this result might arise because firms in states with lower
perceived levels of governance have higher levels of reticence. A second potential
reason is that in the second wave firm managers had been involved in an another
RR exercise before the current one; this previous exercise might have generated
reticence in these managers [Clausen, Kraay & Murrell , 2010].
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Table 5.2: Probit Estimations For Reti-
cence
Dependent
Variable:
Dummy=1 if firm is
reticent; 0 otherwise
6 7 8
age:≤30
(Dummy)
-0.147 -0.081 -0.116
(0.102) (0.164) (0.104)
age:31-45
(Dummy)
-0.023 -0.057 -0.017
(0.071) (0.092) (0.071)
age:≥55
(Dummy)
-0.198* 0.011 -0.242**
(0.106) (0.135) (0.111)
manu (Dummy) 0.218*** 0.176**
(0.076) (0.077)
retail (Dummy) 0.244** 0.211**
(0.095) (0.096)
south (Dummy) 0.241*** 0.325*** 0.242***
(0.063) (0.085) (0.063)
wave2
(Dummy)
0.564*** 0.894*** 0.536***
(0.068) (0.111) (0.068)
industry-
location popu-
lation
0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
orders written 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mat paid
after delivery
0.003*** 0.009*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
sales paid
before delivery
0 0.005*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
subcontract
(Dummy)
-0.118
(0.135)
primary supplier 0.014**
(0.006)
Constant -1.838*** -2.431*** -1.898***
(0.148) (0.21) (0.153)
Other control
variables
YES YES YES
Pseudo R-
squared
0.058 0.118 0.058
Observations 3100 1699 3073
Log-Likelihood -1132.5 -604 -1112.8
Chi-Squared 137.6 132 137.5
P Value 0 0 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if firm is reticent, 0
otherwise. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Other control variables include: gender of
owner (dummy); education level of owner (category);
and size of firm (category). The coefficients on these
variables are not statistically significant at the 10%
level.
Table 5.3: Probit Estimations For Reti-
cence
Dependent
Variable:
Dummy=1 if firm is
reticent; 0 otherwise
8 9 10
age:≤30
(Dummy)
0.036 0.05 0.031
(0.17) (0.171) (0.170)
age:31-45
(Dummy)
-0.019 -0.009 -0.038
(0.095) (0.095) (0.096)
age:≥55
(Dummy)
0.058 0.06 0.038
(0.141) (0.141) (0.144)
secondary
(Dummy)
0.159* 0.158* 0.162*
(0.088) (0.088) (0.089)
tertiary
(Dummy)
-0.157 -0.144 -0.132
(0.277) (0.277) (0.276)
south (Dummy) 0.329*** 0.327*** 0.320***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087)
wave2
(Dummy)
0.852*** 0.846*** 0.823***
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111)
mgr experience 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.020)
mgr exp2 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
competitors:1
(Dummy)
-0.05 -0.057 -0.043
(0.319) (0.319) (0.319)
competitors:2-5
(Dummy)
-0.504** -0.504** -0.516**
(0.203) (0.203) (0.204)
competitors:6+
(Dummy)
-0.875*** -0.871*** -0.887***
(0.189) (0.19) (0.190)
orders written 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mat paid
after delivery
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
sales paid
before delivery
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
subcontract
(Dummy)
-0.104
(0.137)
primary supplier 0.002
(0.009)
Constant -2.103*** -2.103*** -2.043***
(0.309) (0.309) (0.312)
Other Control
Variables
YES YES YES
Pseudo R-
squared
0.149 0.149 0.146
Observations 1697 1696 1682
Log-Likelihood -580.8 -580.5 -566.7
Chi-Squared 174.8 175.7 169.1
P Value 0 0 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if firm is reticent, 0
otherwise. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Other control variables include: gender of
owner (dummy); and size of firm (category). The
coefficients on these variables are not statistically
significant at the 10% level. The firms in these
estimations are located in the manufacturing industry.
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Turning attention to the trust-related variables, the coefficients on the three
main measures of mistrust have their expected positive sign; and are statistically
significant when they enter the estimations seperately in Models 3, 4 and 5. The
coefficients on the percentage of written orders and the percentage of material
purchases that were paid for before delivery are both significant at the 1% level.
The percentage of sales that were paid for before delivery is significant at the
10% level. Furthermore, the percentage of written orders and the percentage
of material inputs that were paid for before delivery both keep their sign, size
and significance when all three variables enter jointly into the model (Model 6).
Their size, in magnitude, is also similar to their size in the previous models where
they enter seperately into the estimation. The coefficient for the subcontracting of
production has its expected sign but is not statistically significant at the 10% level.
The number of years that the company has known its primary supplier also has
the expected sign, is positive, and is statistically significant at the 10% level. The
squared term for the length of time that the primary supplier has been known did
not enter significantly into the model and is omitted from this table. These results
add support for the idea that companies who are less trusting in their business
operations are more likely to be reticent in answering randomised response survey
questions. The coefficients on all variables maintain approximately the same size
and significance throughout all models; including when the variables are added
sequentially.
Turning attention to the variables representing the risk of detection, the popu-
lation of the company’s industry-location cell had a zero effect on reticence. This
effect did not change throughout the models in Table 5.2. In order to use a po-
tentially better measure of the perceived risk of detection, the models in Table 5.3
use dummies for the number of competitors that the firm faces, as reported by
the firm. These are: 1 competitor, 2-5 competitors, and more than 5 competitors.
The excluded category is: no competitors. Hence, the dummy for 1 competitor is
equal to 1 if the firm reported having 1 competitor, and 0 otherwise. The other
dummy variables are constructed similarly.
The coefficient on the dummy for 1 competitor has its expected sign but is not
significant in any of the models. Therefore, there is some evidence that, relative to
the base group of no competitors, having one competitor decreases the probability
of being reticent. However, this finding is not statistically significant at the 10%
level. Nevertheless, the coefficients for the 2-5 and 5+ dummies both have their
expected signs and are both statistically significant at the 1% level in most models.
Furthermore, the coefficient on the variable for 5+ competitors is always larger,
in absolute value, than the coefficient for 2-5 competitors, which, in turn, is also
larger, in absolute value, than the coefficient for 1 competitor. This suggests that
the more competitors in a market, the less likely a company is to be reticent.
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These results provide evidence for the perceived risk of detection as a determinant
of reticence amongst companies.
The three main trust variables, percentage of written orders, percentage of pre-
paid material orders, and percentage of postpaid sales orders, all enter sigificantly
into the models in Table 5.3 and all keep their expected signs. The variables for
subcontracting work and length of time that the primary supplier is known for also
keep their expected signs but do not enter significantly into these models. Finally,
the coefficient on the number of years of experience of the senior manager has its
expected sign, is positive, and is significant in all models. The coefficient on the
squared term for the years of managerial experience is negative and significant in
all specifications. This suggests that an increased level of experience is initialy
associated with an increased level of reticence, but that this relationship reverses
after a point.
Using the information from the model with the highest Pseudo R-squared
(Model 9), predicted values of the dependent variable are constructed. These
values lie between 0 and 1. These values are transformed into predicted values for
reticence using the following rule: if they lie below 0.5 they are converted to a 0;
if they lie above or equal to 0.5 they are converted to a 1. Here, a 1 means that
the firm is predicted to be reticent based on the explanatory variables, and a 0
means that the firm is predicted to be possibly candid based on the explanatory
variables. Table 5.4 shows the results from this exercise. The predicted values
are tabulated along with the actual values. Overall, this model is able to predict
86.4% of the actual outcomes correctly. To be sure, these results only apply to the
manufacturing sector (since only firms in manufacturing were asked about their
perceived number of competitors), nevertheless, this provides some evidence in
favour of the models presented in this study.
Table 5.4: Comparing Actual Outcomes With Predicted Outcomes From Probit
(Model 9) Estimations
True Outcome
Predicted Possibly
Candid
Reticent Total
Possibly
Candid
1448 218 1666
Reticent 13 17 30
Total 1461 235 1696
5.5.3 Controlling For Interviewer And Supervisor Effects
One potential cause of observed reticence amongst companies is the interviewer.
It is possible that some firms chose not to answer honestly because they did not
trust the interviewer that was asking the questions. Another possibility is that
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the interviewer did not understand the process. This also might have affected
the responses of the companies. Finally, the interviewers had supevisors to make
sure that the interview was being conducted correctly. It is possible that the su-
pervisors had an effect on the reticence of the companies. To examine whether
or not the interviewers and/or their supervisors had any effect on the reticence
of companies this study uses dummies for both interviewers and supervisors, re-
spectively. Also, an interaction term is included for each interviewer-supervisor
combination. These variables are only available for the second wave of the survey.
Results of this analysis are shown in Table 5.5. The first column of results (Model
1) shows the coefficients from Model 9 of Table 5.3. Models 2 and 4 show some
interviewer effects at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively; however, these cannot
be distinguished from the wave effects mentioned earlier. When all three variables
are included (Model 5), Wald Tests for the equality of the coefficients on inter-
viewer, supervisor, and interviewer-supervisor, respectively, are conducted. These
tests fail to reject the null of equality of the respective coefficients at the 10%
level. This suggests that there were no statistically significant systematic effects of
interviewers, supervisors, or combinations of interviewers and supervisors on the
reticence of companies.
5.5.4 Controlling For Potential Political Connections
Although there seems to be no observable relationship between guilt and reticence,
there might be a possible relationship between companies with political connec-
tions and reticence. One potential scenario is that a company with very strong
political connections would have less reticence because they could potentially ad-
mit to engaging in any act and get away with it due to their links with powerful
people. Alternatively, a company with strong ties to the government might want
to hide all acts of wrongdoing so as to protect their associates in the government.
Companies in the first wave of the survey were asked to give the reason that
they chose to locate in their particular state. Multiple answers to this question
were allowed. Options included: it was the state of origin of the owner; the state
has key natural resources that the firm uses; the state government gave concessions
and benefits which made it more attractive to locate there; a location feasibility
report concluded that the state was preferable to other states; and “other”.
In order to test the political connections hypothesis, this study uses the re-
sponse to this question as a proxy for the political connections of the company.
Companies that chose to locate in a state because of concessions given by the
state government are defined as being more politically connected to the state than
companies who did not choose this option. The result of this exercise is shown in
Model 6 of Table 5.5. There seems to be no statistically significant relationship
between this measure of political connectedness and reticence.
146
Table 5.5: Probit Estimations For Reticence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
owner male 0.031 0.027 0.076 0.069 -0.076 -0.135
(0.146) (0.199) (0.193) (0.203) (0.234) (0.245)
oage 1 0.050 0.206 0.256 0.238 0.213 0.220
(0.171) (0.227) (0.222) (0.227) (0.267) (0.328)
oage 2 -0.009 0.128 0.091 0.121 0.084 0.030
(0.095) (0.121) (0.117) (0.122) (0.136) (0.224)
oage 4 0.060 0.190 0.090 0.220 0.193 0.003
(0.141) (0.187) (0.185) (0.188) (0.210) (0.370)
secondary 0.158* 0.090 0.086 0.068 0.050 0.306
(0.088) (0.113) (0.110) (0.113) (0.130) (0.206)
tertiary -0.144 -0.152 -0.208 -0.113 -0.265 0.653
(0.277) (0.365) (0.379) (0.352) (0.337) (0.459)
size 2 -0.089 0.122 0.123 0.097 -0.017 -0.240
(0.111) (0.144) (0.139) (0.148) (0.162) (0.245)
south 0.327*** 0.056 0.025 0.068 0.125 0.711***
(0.086) (0.113) (0.112) (0.115) (0.126) (0.209)
wave2 0.846***
(0.112)
mgr experience 0.054*** 0.059** 0.060*** 0.059** 0.045 0.176**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.030) (0.086)
mgr exp2 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
competitors 2 -0.057 -0.375 -0.250 -0.387 -0.508 5.142***
(0.319) (0.420) (0.395) (0.428) (0.496) (0.730)
competitors 3 -0.504** -0.660** -0.562* -0.675** -0.927*** 4.078***
(0.203) (0.304) (0.294) (0.312) (0.355) (0.308)
competitors 4 -0.871*** -0.891*** -0.805*** -0.904*** -1.162*** 3.655***
(0.190) (0.289) (0.278) (0.297) (0.348) (0.265)
orders written 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
mat paid after delivery 0.007*** 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
sales paid before delivery 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
subcontract -0.104 -0.232 -0.185 -0.225 -0.255 -0.047
(0.137) (0.176) (0.182) (0.174) (0.191) (0.271)
reason govt -0.160
(0.226)
Constant -2.103*** -2.050*** -1.501** -2.024*** -1.189* -6.919***
(0.309) (0.592) (0.643) (0.577) (0.714) (0.756)
Interviewer Dummies NO YES NO YES YES NO
P-Value 0.0000 0.0163 0.9037
Supervisor Dummies NO NO YES YES YES NO
P-Value 0.0000 0.4004 0.9670
Interviewer-Supervisor Dummies NO NO NO NO YES NO
P-Value 0.9481
Pseudo R-squared 0.149 0.266 0.274 0.274 0.228 0.141
Observations 1696 927 1083 927 661 564
Log-Likelihood -580.5 -356.9 -378.4 -352.6 -314.0 -108.0
Chi-Squared 175.7 211.3 218.5 221.0 191.3 498.9
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if firm is reticent, 0 otherwise. Heteroskedastic robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Interviewer and supervisor dummies are only available for the
second wave of the survey, so “wave2” is dropped from models 2 to 6.
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5.5.5 Controlling For Misclassification Error Using The HAS-Probit
Model
This study now turns to the potential problem of misclassifying some of the reticent
managers as possibly candid. Using the methodology explained in Section 5.4.1
and Equation 5.4.1.3 estimates are derived for the coefficients on the variables
which are believed to affect reticence and also for the misclassification errors:
α0 and α1. Results are shown in Table 5.6. Table 5.6 shows estimates from
the ordinary probit estimation and the misclassification-adjusted probit estimates
(labelled HAS-Probit). Table 5.6 also shows the marginal effects from both models.
The ordinary probit model used in Table 5.6 is model 9 from Table 5.3. Co-
efficients for the HAS-Probit model are similar to those for the probit model.
Imposing the restriction that the probability of observing a false positive is zero,
the estimate of the probability of a false negative is 0.215. This is taken to mean
that possibly 21.5% of the sample were misclassified into the possibly candid group
when they were in fact reticent. This value is consistent with the result, from the
previous chapter, that the proportion of reticent firms must be at least 16.9%
(Table 4.9 in Section 4.5.3). Furthermore, using this result suggests that the level
of guilt required to give rise to the observed distribution for the number of yeses
must be 6.0%96.
As expected, the absolute value of the marginal effects from the HAS-Probit
model are larger that those of the ordinary probit model. Results from the HAS-
Probit model suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in the percentage of
written orders is associated with an increased probability of being reticent of 0.01
probability points. This also applies to the percentage of material paid for after
delivery and the percentage of sales paid for before delivery. The coefficients on
these three variables have the same sign, the same sized marginal effect, and are
all significant at (at least) the 5% level.
The largest marginal effect from the HAS-Probit model came from the dummy
variable for having more than 5 close competitors. A company with more than
five perceived close competitors is 25 percentage points less likely to be reticent
compared to a company with no perceived close competitors.
96r = 0.215 and Pr(yobservedi ) = (0.5 + 0.5b)(1− r) = 0.416). This suggests that b = 0.05987
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Table 5.6: HAS-Probit Estimations For Reticence
(9) (HAS-Probit) (9 - Marginal Effects) (HAS - Probit - Marginal Effects)
secondary (d) 0.152* 0.179 0.028* 0.036
(0.088) (0.112) (0.016)
tertiary (d) -0.164 -0.170 -0.027 -0.034
(0.276) (0.288) (0.040)
south (d) 0.321*** 0.385** 0.060*** 0.076**
(0.086) (0.166) (0.017)
wave2 (d) 0.851*** 0.937*** 0.130*** 0.166***
(0.112) (0.206) (0.014)
mgr experience 0.053*** 0.059** 0.010*** 0.013**
(0.020) (0.026) (0.004)
mgr exp2 -0.001** -0.001* -0.000** -0.000*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
competitors 2 (d) -0.028 0.003 -0.005 -0.006
(0.319) (0.406) (0.055)
competitors 3 (d) -0.476** -0.534* -0.071*** -0.090*
(0.202) (0.282) (0.025)
competitors 4 (d) -0.844*** -0.947*** -0.198*** -0.252***
(0.189) (0.317) (0.054)
orders written 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
mat paid after delivery 0.007*** 0.008** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.000)
sales paid before delivery 0.004*** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
subcontract (d) -0.100 -0.114 -0.017 0.022
(0.137) (0.155) (0.022)
Constant -2.124*** -2.074***
(0.308) (0.382)
Other control variables YES YES
alpha0 0.000
(Imposed)
alpha1 0.215
(0.336)
Pseudo R-squared 0.148
Observations 1704 1704
Log-Likelihood -582.2 -582.1
Chi-Squared 174.7 30.4
P Value 0.000 0.033
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if firm is reticent, 0 otherwise. Heteroskedastic robust
standard errors in parenthesis. Other control variables include: gender of owner (dummy); age
of owner (category); and size of firm (category). The coefficients on the other control variables
are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
(d) for dummy variable.
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5.6 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to investigate the factors that drive reticence amongst
companies when answering randomised response questions. The characteristics
of the managers and their dealings were explored as potential indicators of the
reasons for reticence. The latent factors behind these characteristics include: so-
cial desirability bias; cognitive problems; and the effect of attitudes on responses.
Reasons were provided to rule out the impact of cognitive problems and attitudes
on reticence. The impact of trust and the risk of detection, respectively, were
examined in detail. These two factors are thought to have an effect on reticence
via a desire, by firm managers, to appear socially just.
Trust was measured using information on the nature of contracts for the pro-
curement of goods/services and the sale of good/services. A higher: proportion of
procured goods that were paid for after delivery, instead of before delivery or on
delivery; proportion of sales where the payment was received before delivery, in-
stead of on delivery or after delivery; and proportion of purchase orders that were
written, instead of oral with a witness or oral without a witness, were interpreted
to indicate a lower level of trust. The nature of the purchase or sales orders was
not interpreted as a causal variable but an indirect measure of trust.
Evidence was found for both trust and perceived detection to influence reti-
cence. This seems to suggest that companies are more willing to exchange po-
tentially sensitive information with another agent if they have trust in that agent
and if there is relatively little chance of them being identified. In the context of
corruption, this suggests that people are more likely to admit to something if there
is less of a chance that the information they pass on can/will be used against them.
The study gave evidence to rule out the possibility of interviewer and supervisor
effects biasing responses and inducing reticence in the interviewees. Controlling for
interviewer effects; supervisor effects; and interviewer-supervisor effects does not
significantly affect the results. Findings were also able to rule out the possibility
of political connections biasing the results. However, no significant relationship
between political connectedness and reticence was found.
All questions were asked in the same order for all managers and all questions
were worded in the same manner. Taken in full, these findings suggest that despite
the absence of interviewer and supervisor effects, a lack of trust that the data will
not be used against them might cause interviewees to be reticent when asked
sensitive questions.
Given the discussion of the RR technique in this chapter and the previous
chapter. The following chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 3 by looking at
the impact of ethnic networks on the propensity to bribe.
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6 Ethnic Networks And Corruption: Firm Level
Evidence
Abstract
This study investigates whether the ethnicity of firm managers has any
impact on whether or not they pay a bribe to local government officials.
Micro-level data is taken from an individual-level and a firm-level survey in
Nigeria; primary data concerning the firm managers’ ethnic groups is also
used. Indices of ethnic diversity are constructed and the ethnic group of firm
managers is compared to that of the local government politician. Findings
reveal that firm managers who belong to the same ethnic group as the local
politician are less likely to pay a bribe than firm managers who do not belong
to the same ethnic group as their local politician. This result is robust to
the inclusion of standard variables which are believed to have an effect on
the propensity to pay a bribe. Conditional on covariates, the propensity to
pay a bribe is significantly higher in the South-Western region, particularly
in Lagos. However, within Lagos there ceases to be a significant effect of
ethnicity on the propensity to pay a bribe. Further results suggest that
ethnicity is only important in regions with a relatively low index of ethnic
diversity. In sufficiently heterogeneous regions (like Lagos) ethnicity ceases
to have a significant impact on the propensity to pay a bribe. This suggests
that ethnic discrimination in the payment of bribes is more pronounced in
less ethnically diverse regions. The data seems to confirm this idea when
ethnic diversity (measured by the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation)
is measured at the local government level.
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6.1 Introduction
Given the justification of the indirect questioning method (Chapter 4) and the
investigation into the driving forces behind reticence in answering sensitive RR
questions (Chapter 5), the current chapter extends the analysis of Chapter 3 by
seeing what happens when ethnic networks are added to the list of potential in-
fluencers of corruption. This chapter proceeds by using primary collected data on
firm managers’ reports of their ethnic background; state of origin; and languages
spoken. This information is used to generate national; state-level; and local gov-
ernment level measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF). The study also
measures whether or not the manager belongs to the same ethnic group as the
local government chairperson; and whether or not they speak the same language
as the local government chair. This information is used in models similar to those
in Chapter 3 to see the effect of ethnic diversity on the propensity to bribe.
The labour economics literature has empirically examined the effect of a teacher
and pupil sharing the same ethnicity on pupil outcomes such as: exam marks, ab-
senteeism, and subjective evaluations. Findings have shown that teachers tend to
give higher subjective evaluations to students of the same ethnic group [Ehrenberg,
Goldhaber & Brewer , 1995]; and students have a lower rate of absenteeism when
their ethnic group matches that of the teachers [Farkas, Grobe, Sheehan & Shuan ,
1990]. Evidence has been shown for a positive effect of a shared ethnicity on exam
marks for some ethnic groups, but a zero effect for others [Klein, Le & Hamilton ,
2001]. Nevertheless, these relationships are not restricted to the labour economics
literature and there is a much wider base that the current study builds upon.
For example [Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul , 2005] use a collection action frame-
work and present results which suggest that, conditional on the share of workers
that are of the same nationality, productivity amongst workers increases with the
number of workers of the same nationality. A similar effect can also be found at
the sub-national level where the characteristic that varies is ethnicity (See Section
6.2.1).
The current study looks at the relationship between ethnic background and
economic outcomes in meetings between firm managers and local politicians. The
proposition that discrimination based on nationality exists within the economy
is not necessarily a controversial one within the literature. Studies have shown
evidence for differing levels of pay; and for varying rates of assimilation into a
labour market for foreign versus domestic workers; between migrants from different
countries; and for migrants of varying levels of religious closeness, respectively
[Dickens & McKnight , 2008, Pierne´ , 2013]. Part of this effect seems to come
from the majority/minority ethnic group dichotomy, with agents in the minority
groups being at more risk of discrimination [Pham, & Reilly , 2009, Baulch, Pham
& Reilly , 2012]. Furthermore, evidence has also been found for wage inequality
152
between people of different sounding accents within the same ethnic group [Grogger
, 2011], suggesting that racial discrimination has not only a visual aspect but also
an auditory one that can be based on speech syntax; morphology; acoustics; and/or
phonology.
A related topic to ethnic discrimination is ethnic diversity. Some of the po-
tential costs and the benefits of ethnic heterogeneity have been assessed in the
literature [Alesina & La Ferrara , 2005, Moradi & Baten , 2005]. The level of eth-
nic diversity within a country can have policy implications for an economy. Given
a fixed proportion of an ethnic group within an economy, a higher probability
of being randomly paired with somebody from another ethnic group seems to be
related with lower levels of nationalist sentiment among minority ethnic groups
Masella [2013]; also, being exposed to a language at school that is different to
one’s mother-tongue seems to have a similar effect [Clots-Figueras & Masella ,
2013]. The effect of personal connections on within-firm outcomes have also been
investigated [Bandiera, Barankay & Rasul , 2009, 2010]; the present study builds
on this work by looking at the effect of political connections on outcomes external
to the firm.
The current paper applies a similar analysis to the study of corruption. It tests
the effect of a shared ethnicity between a local politician and a firm manager on
the propensity for corruption, in the form of the manager paying a bribe to the
politician, to take place. It is crucial to note that this study focuses on bribery
and not other forms of corruption that might be affected by the existence of a
shared ethnicity between both parties.
This paper is the first empirical study to look at the links between ethnicity
and corruption at the micro-level. Using a set of unique data sources this study
identifies the ethnic identities of household individuals; firm managers; and local
government politicians. This data is used to provide evidence for the existence
of ethnic networks in business and the effect of such networks on the payment of
bribes to public officials.
The study is the first of its kind to use disaggregated data that is able to
identify the ethnic group of a person. The data used in this investigation covers
the individual; the household; the local government area; and the geo-political
state. The primary research question is whether a firm manager who belongs to
the same ethnic group as a local politician will be more or less likely to pay a
bribe to that politician in the running of his/her business operations. The study
identifies two plausible channels through which a shared ethnicity might affect the
propensity to bribe: redistribution along ethnic lines will lead to a positive effect
of a shared ethnic group on bribery as similar ethnic groups are more willing to
pay their kin a bribe rather than a non-kin member; discrimination along ethnic
lines will lead to a negative effect of a shared ethnic group on bribery as dissimilar
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ethnic groups are extorted for more bribes.
The study also uses information on the languages spoken by the managers to
see the impact that this might have on the propensity to bribe. Speaking the
same language as the local politician might allow some non-local managers to gain
rapport with the politicians; or pretend that they are of the same ethnic group.
This might have an impact on their propensity to bribe the politician.
The secondary research question involves the use of an index of ethnolinguistic
fractionalisation (ELF). Combined with the information regarding a similar eth-
nicity this paper investigates whether the effect of having the same ethnicity as
the local politician on bribery varies depending on the level of ELF in the region
(state and local government area, respectively). The study also considers a poten-
tial non-linear effect of ELF on bribery. With the results of the aforementioned
analysis, the study uses ethnic networks as an instrument for bribery to see if bribe
paying firms are more or less likely to to report being the victim of a crime (See
Appendix A.4.3).
Thus, the study addresses research questions at the firm level; local government
level; and state level. The study looks at the effect of a shared ethnicity on bribery
at the firm level; while the effect of ELF on corruption is investigated at the local
government level and the state level. It is important to look at the relationship
between sub-national ELF and sub-national corruption because many of the claims
of a relationship between ELF and corruption are based of cross-national data
despite being used to make inferences about sub-national economic activity. The
current investigation intends to shed light on the story behind ELF and corruption
and what might be driving the relationship.
Results from the analysis suggest that ethnic networks matter in the payment
of bribery: belonging to the same ethnic group as the local politician is associated
with a reduced probability of paying a bribe. Thus, the effect of discrimination
seems to outweigh the effect of kinship redistribution. This suggests that bribery
can occur through (discriminating) ethnic networks. Secondly, the effect of eth-
nic networks is most pronounced in areas with low levels of ethnic diversity. In
cosmopolitan regions, where people are more used to dealing with different eth-
nicities, the effect of sharing the same ethnicity as the local politician disappears.
This suggests that discrimination is more prevalent in less diverse regions and
bribe discrimination will be reduced the more cosmopolitan a society is. Finally,
amongst firms that have been a victim of crime, bribe paying firms are less likely
to report the crime. This suggests that estimates of business malpractice will be
reduced in corrupt environments.
Thus, this study makes the following major contributions: it uses disaggregated
individual level; household level; firm level; local government level; and state level
information on the ethno-linguistic makeup of Nigeria. Despite the absence of
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information on ethnicities from the national census and government data sources,
this study is able to generate estimates of local government level and state level
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. These indices of ELF are calculated using over
90 ethno-linguistic groups. The study generates a method for the analysis ethnic
networks; this is labelled the Similar-Ethnicity variable. The study also applies
the analysis of the relationship between ELF and corruption to the micro level,
using the Similar-Ethnicity variable gives significant results which have not been
done before using empirical data.
6.2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature relating to bribery and ethnicity in the field of
economics. Recent evidence for a link between ethnicity and patronage has been
provided by Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria & i Miquel [2011] and Do, Nguyen
& Tran [2013]. Both of these studies tell a story about individuals in power passing
on resources to members of their own ethnic group instead of the population as
a whole. Whilst some evidence exists for politicians allocating resources to other
ethnic groups, this seems to be driven by a need to get more votes in order to win
an election, rather than altruism or a lack of patronage on ethnic grounds. Burgess,
Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria & i Miquel [2011] focus on Kenya and document the
construction of roads in areas dominated by people of the same ethnicity as the
political leader whilst Do, Nguyen & Tran [2013] talks about the distribution
of resources, by recently promoted officials in Vietnam, to their home districts.
The flipside of this is that some individuals might extort people from other ethnic
groups while choosing not to do so to members of their own ethnic group. The
current study considers both of these explanations while looking at the supply of
bribes in Nigeria. It could be the case that ethnicity drives firm managers to be
more willing to transfer resources to public officials of the same ethnic group; on
the other hand it might be the case that ethnicity drives public officials to demand
more bribes from firm managers of a different ethnic group.
6.2.1 Some Concepts In The Literature On Ethnicity
This section considers three respective ways that ethnic diversity can directly affect
economic choices, these are: through preferences; strategies; and the production
function. Results from the social identity literature suggest that individuals might
derive utility from the well-being of members of their own ethnic group and disutil-
ity from the well being of members of other ethnic groups [Tajfel, Billig, Bundy &
Flament , 1971]. Alesina & La Ferrara [2000] formalise this concept by analysing
group participation within a heterogenous population, where the utility gained
from joining a group is positively related to the proportion of groups members
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who have the same type as oneself; and negatively related to the proportion of
other types.
Ethnic diversity can affect economic activity by influencing the strategies that
individuals play. In the absence of any preferences for or against heterogeneity it
might be optimal to give preferential treatment to one’s own ethnic group. This
might occur due to market imperfections: e.g. to maintain a reputation mech-
anism by exchanging information on opportunistic behaviour in the presence of
asymmetric information [Greif , 1993]. However, preferential treatment of ones
own ethnic group can occur in the absence of market imperfections. When con-
tracts cannot be legally enforced, being a member of an ethnic group increases
the set of dominating group strategies, this is because reciprocity and punishment
can be more direct at both the individual and the other members of the group [La
Ferrara , 2003].
Finally, in a production function where more variety in intermediate inputs
leads to increased output, one can interpret a higher variety of individual skills
as having the same effect [Alesina, Spolaore & Wacziarg , 2000]. In this example
the costs of heterogeneity lie outside the production function, as a result, more
heterogeneity is always better than less when trying to maximise output. When in-
corporating the costs of heterogeneity, for example the difficulty in communication
between people who do not speak the same language or have different methods,
then there is an optimal level of heterogeneity which will lie below that of the
previous example. This optimal point will depend on the trade-off between the
gains from heterogeneity and the costs of heterogeneity [Lazear , 1999a,b].
Recent work on ethnic groups has posited that higher levels of ethnic hetero-
geneity is associated with more social cohesion [Be´cares, Stafford, Laurence &
Nazroo , 2011]. Other studies have highlighted that an increased ethnic density
(defined as the proportion of ethnic minorities in a region) is associated with: lower
levels of discrimination; a smaller negative effect of discrimination on outcomes;
and improved health outcomes [Be´cares, Nazroo & Stafford , 2009]. If this is the
case, then it might follow that increased diversity will lead to a lower level of dis-
crimination based on ethnic lines. The arguments in the previous two paragraphs
support the idea that the more heterogeneous a population, then the less of an im-
pact that ethnicity has on economic outcomes. I.e. ethnicity only matters if there
is an obvious majority or minority; the more fractionalisaed an area is then the less
likely it is that ethnicity has an impact on economic outcomes. This implies that
more ethnically homogeneous regions will see a larger effect of racial discrimina-
tion or racial patronage than lesser ethnically homogeneous regions. This suggests
a negative relationship between corruption and ethnic fractionalisation. Cerqueti,
Coppier & Piga [2012] argue for an inverse-U shaped relationship between corrup-
tion and fractionalisation; the highest levels of corruption are seen at the lowest
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and highest levels of fractionalisation. The previous argument is not at odds with
this result so long as the data for Nigeria lies on the downward sloping section of
the theoretical corruption-fractionalisation curve.
6.2.2 Shortcomings Of The Literature And The Contribution Of This
Chapter
When trying to see if politicians favour members of their own ethnic group at least
two things seem to be of importance: the ethnic group of the favoured/unfavoured
individual; and the ethnic group of the politician doing the discrimination. As-
signing ehnic groups to politicians and other individuals requires individual level
data concerning both agents, however, the literature on ethnicity and economic
outcomes tends to aggregate the ethnicities of a group of people living in the
same geographic location [Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria & i Miquel , 2011,
Do, Nguyen & Tran , 2013, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou , 2013]. Some studies
base their categorisation of ethnicities on ethnographic atlases that were created
in the late 1960 but which have been dismissed by anthropologists since their cre-
ation [Moradi, 2013]97. Data based on historical locations of ethnic groups might
be wrong due to subsequent migration of individuals from those groups to other
areas.
Other studies use the majority ethnic group as a measure of the likely ethnicity
of the politician [Isaksson , 2013]. Doing this makes the results subject to mea-
surement error because it is possible for minority ethnic politicians to be elected to
political positions; and it is possible for minority ethnic groups to be more active
in a business environment. Such criticisms should be taken seriously given that the
share of the largest ethnic group, in some cases, is less than 0.2; e.g. Tanzania and
Kenya [Ibid.]. In cases such as Nigeria, where the share of the largest ethnic group
is higher (0.33), there exist other ethnic groups that maintain a considerable size
(0.21 and 0.22) which make it likely for a politician to hail from one of these ethnic
groups. Moreover, using the largest ethnic group as a proxy for the ethnicity of
the politician seems to be in contradiction with the literature that uses geographic
location as a proxy for ethnicity. If the majority group lives in one part of the
country and the other groups live in other parts then being of a minority group
does not necessarily mean that the local politician will not be a co-ethnic.
Furthermore, when considering the issue of corruption along ethnic lines, an
assumption that a majority ethnic group will only vote in a member of the same
ethnic group seems to imply that, upon election, the official will show a preference
to his/her own (majority) group. This nullifies the need for a study on favouritism
along ethnic lines because it begs the question. Using individual-level data on
97Correspondence with Author.
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ethnicities allows one to see the effect of within-region variation in ethnicity on
the occurrence of corruption. Studies that use regional aggregated data concerning
ethnic groups only allow for a between-region analysis of ethnicity and corruption.
Other work [Isaksson , 2013] uses the home language spoken by an individual
as a proxy for their ethnic group. The current study goes one step further by
using data on all languages spoken by the individual; and the self-reported eth-
nicity of the individual. Finally, while capturing aspects of diversity, indices of
fractionalisation and polarisation do not measure individual level differences be-
tween politicians and the populace [Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat &
Wacziarg , 2003, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol , 2005b, Alesina & La Ferrara , 2005].
The current study bypasses all of these problems because it measures ethnic group
via self-reported survey responses. The survey used in the current study also asks
the languages spoken by each individual.
6.3 Data And Variables
This section describes the data used in this study and the construction of variables.
The data used in the analysis comes from three main sources. One of the main
sources for the firm level data is the Nigerian Bureau Of Statistics (NBS) and the
Economic And Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Business Survey On Crime
And Corruption And Awareness Of EFCC In Nigeria (2007). Individual level
data is taken from the Centre For Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN) 2010
National Crime And Safety Survey. These datasets were augmented by retrieving
primary data about the ethnicity, religion, gender, state of origin, and lingualism
of the business managers. The NBS/EFCC survey contains the information about
bribery; the CLEEN survey contains information that is used to create the indices
of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF) within Nigeria at the state level; and
local government level. The primary data is also used to create indices of state
and local government level ELF within Nigeria.
6.3.1 Information On Individuals For The Construction Of Individual-
Level Index Of Ethnic Fractionalisatioon
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no data exists for the current level of ethnic
diversity in Nigeria. Most of the current sources of information are either unob-
served98; old [Taylor & Hudson , 1972]; or uncomprehensive [Central Intelligence
Agency , 2013]. These sources do not represent a necessarily accurate view of
the 250+ ethnic groups contained within the nation . This lack of recent data in
ethnicities poses a potential problem for the analysis of ethnicity and bribery. In
98Correspondance with the National Population Commission (2010).
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order to solve the problem of lack of data on ethnicities in Nigeria this study uses
information from a representative household survey that was conducted in all 36
geo-political states and the Federal Capital Territory. The survey was conducted
by the CLEEN Foundation between February and May 2010. Information on this
data is given in Section 2.5.
6.3.2 Information On Company Characteristics (Including Bribes Paid)
The firm-level survey contains a set of questions relating to bribery: whether or
not the firm has paid a bribe; how much was paid and what the bribe was paid for.
Different types of bribe are measured: bribes during police investigations; bribes
to avoid traffic offences; bribes to customs officials to clear goods faster; and bribes
to the court, were some of the different measures that are included in the data.
The survey also included the street address of each company. This study
matches these addresses to their respective local government area using LG in-
formation from the Independent National Electoral Commission [INEC , 2010]
and the City Population database [Brinkhoff , 2013]. The INEC [2010] database
contains information on all the political wards within Nigeria, matched to their
respective local government area, which in turn are matched to their respective
geo-political state. The Brinkhoff [2013] database contains a geographical map-
ping of similar information; it shows the physical location of each LGA within each
state in Nigeria.
Information concerning whether or not the company was a victim of crime;
and whether or not the company reported the crime is also used. Companies
were asked whether they had been a victim of theft; vandalism; theft of vehicles;
theft from vehicles; robbery; assault; theft/fraud by employees; or theft/fraud by
outside stakeholders in the past year, respectively. Regarding each crime, they
were also asked if they reported the act to the police. The current study uses this
data by constructing a dummy indicating whether or not the firm was a victim of
at least one of the crimes mentioned; and another dummy indicating whether or
not at least one crime went unreported.
6.3.3 Information On Company Managers - Ethnicity; State Of Origin;
Languages Spoken; Religion; And Gender
The primary data on the ethnic group; gender; religion; languages spoken; and
state of origin of the managers of the respective companies in the NBS/EFCC
survey is used in this study. This data was collected by the author, by contacting
the companies directly. Telephone calls were made between November 2012 to
December 2012 to each of the 2,110 businesses in the sample. Out of the 2,110
companies, 1,267 companies were successfully contacted, this represents 60% of
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the total sample. Results from all 1,267 managers were analysable. Since the
NBS/EFCC survey was conducted in 2007, information was collected about the
managers in 2007; and not the current manager.
Information about the ethnicity and state of origin of the managers allows this
study to account for the movement of labour within the borders of Nigeria, it also
removes the restriction of assigning one ethnic group to a geographic area. This
study combines the data on ethnicity with the information on the LGA of the
company to create indices of ELF at the state; and local government levels as well
as measures of ethnic networks at the local government level.
As previously discussed, the current study benefits from the fact that it uses
micro data on the ethnicities of business managers and local government politi-
cians. This data is useful because it allows one to test for whether a match between
the ethnicity of the manager and the politician has any impact on the propensity
to bribe, and the size of bribe payment. The previous literature (discussed in Sec-
tion 6.2) makes use of aggregate data on ethnic diversity, corruption and economic
outcomes. Whilst potentially useful, aggregate studies fail to take into account
the unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level which might not show up at the
regional level. The data on ethnicity allows this study to investigate this issue
which has not been a feature of the previous literature.
A common ethnicity between the business manager and local politician might
reduce the propensity the bribe, increase the propensity to bribe, or have no effect
on the propensity to bribe. In the case of discrimination against other ethnicities,
the match would be associated with a reduced probability of bribing. In the case
of revenue sharing [Angelucci, de Giorgi & Rasul , 2012] (where a manager is more
willing to pay a bribe to his or her own ethnic group) the match would lead to
an increased propensity to bribe. There might be other reasons for the effect to
be pushed one way or another; for example politicians from some ethnic groups
might be better at extracting bribes from managers of other ethnic groups; another
potential reason is that managers from some ethnic groups might be less willing to
part with their money (in order to pay a bribe) than managers from other groups.
The main variable of interest in this study is an indicator that measures whether
or not the ethnic group of the firm manager is the same as the ethnic group of
the local government politician. This variable, labelled “Similar Ethnicity”, is
a dummy variable equal to one if the ethnicities are the same, 0 otherwise. The
ethnicities of the local politicians were acquired by using their names to derive their
ethnic origin [Nicoll, Bassett & Ulijaszek , 1986, Coldman, Braun & Gallagher ,
1988, Angelucci, de Giorgi, Rangel & Rasul , 2010, Angelucci, de Giorgi & Rasul
, 2012].
The firm level dataset consists of 61 ethnic groups and the individual level
dataset has 99 groups. In order to make the information more useable; and reduce
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the number of potentially empty cells, this study categorises the ethnicities into 4
main groups. These are the 3 most populous ethnic groups in the country: Hausa;
Yoruba; and Ibo, and another group, Other, that captures all other ethnic groups
contained in the dataset. Covariates measuring factors influencing the propensity
to pay a bribe based on Chapter 3 [Svensson , 2003] are also included in the
analysis.
6.4 Methodology
This section describes the methodology used in the subsequent analysis. Similar-
Ethnicity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ethnicity of the firm manager,
as defined in Section 6.3.3, is the same as the ethnicity of the local government
chairperson, 0 otherwise. This is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Similar Ethnicity
Ethnicity Of Local Politician
Yoruba Igbo Hausa Other
Ethnicity Of
Firm
Manager
Yoruba 1 0 0 0
Igbo 0 1 0 0
Hausa 0 0 1 0
Other 0 0 0 1
ELF is defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from
a population will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Considering a
country that has a population of N individuals who are distinguished by K ethno-
linguistic groups, representing each group by i = 1, ..., K. Each individual belongs
to one group only and the number of people in group i is represented by Ni.
The current study allows for flexibility by not imposing any restrictions on the
geographical location of any member of a group, therefore, individuals of ethnolin-
guistic group i can all live in the same region or be seperated and live in different
regions. Since each individual belongs to only one group the sum of group popula-
tions will be equal to the size of the total population: N =
∑K
i=1Ni. The share of
the population belonging to ethnolinguistic group i can be expressed as the ratio
of the size of ethnic group to the total population: si =
Ni
N
. Therefore the sum of
population shares will equal 1:
∑K
i=1 si = 1
ELF is defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals will
not belong to the same group. Formally:
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ELF =1−
K∑
i=1
s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si −
K∑
i=1
s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si − s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si (1− si)
(6.4.0.1)
The index of ELF satisfies the primary requirements of a diversity measure as
stated by Shannon [1948]:
 For a fixed number of groups, the measure reaches a maximum when all
group sizes are equal
 If all groups sizes are equal, then the index increases with the number of
groups in a society
Using the notation of Chapter 3, the following model99 is estimated:
Pr[Bribe Dummyi = 1] = Φ(β1Similari+β2ELFl+β3(Similari×ELFl)+β ′CCi)
(6.4.0.2)
Where Bribe Dummyi is a dummy equal to one if the firm paid a bribe, 0
otherwise; Similari is the value of Similar-Ethnicity for firm i; ELFl is the index of
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation for local government area l; (Similari ×ELFl) is
the Similar-Ethnicity-ELF interaction term; Ci is a vector of explanatory variables
denoting control rights of public officials over firms; and Φ is the standard normal
distribution function.
6.5 Results
This section presents and interprets the results from the data. Additional tables
and figures are located in Appendix A.4. Definitions and descriptions of the main
variables are included in Table 6.2. Summary statistics are shown in Tables 6.3 to
99The relationship between corruption and ELF, at the state and local government levels,
respectively, is investigated the Appendix A.4 Section A.4.3. At these levels, the following model
is estimated: Corruptions = β0 + β1ELFs + β2ELF
2
s + β3X
′
s + ξs.
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6.5. The results from the main set of estimations are displayed in Tables 6.6 to
6.8. A map of Nigeria showing the different geo-political zones and states is shown
in Figure 15. A map of Nigeria showing the ethnic composition of the country
using firm level data and individual level data, respectively, is shown in Figure 16.
All probit estimations use Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
unless otherwise stated. The sample size for the entire country consists of 2,110
firm managers. The sample size for the individual level data, used to compute the
ethnic composition of the country and regional indices of ethnic fractionalisation,
is 10,228. All ethnicities were treated as seperate when constructing the Similar-
Ethnicity variable. This is in contrast to Table 6.1 and Figure 16 which combine
all ethnic groups that are neither Hausa, Igbo nor Yoruba into the group: “Other”.
Figure 15: A Map Of Nigeria Indicating The Different Geo-Political Zones
(NC,NE,NW,SE,SS,SW)
Source: Nairaland.com
Summary statistics for the firm-level variables are shown in Table 6.3. This
table shows data concerning the 1,267 firms which have information on ethnicity;
and the 843 firms which do not have information on ethnicity. There are no sig-
nificant differences between the two groups in revealed propensity to import or
export directly (“Trade”) or in the usage of security services (“Security”). Nev-
ertheless, there seem to be significant differences in the paying of bribes; number
of employees; degree of foreign ownership; and age of the firms. On average, firms
with data on ethnicity are 0.045 probability points more likely to pay bribes while
firms without data on ethnicity have more employees; are 0.06 probability points
more likely to be owned by a foreign individual or company; and are 4 years older
than the others.
Concerning the 1,267 firms with information on ethnicity, 28.7% admitted to
having paid a bribe in the year leading up to the survey; the median firm had
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less than 50 employees; 7% of the firms had engaged in the direct importing of
exporting of goods and/or services in the previous year; 11% had foregin ownership
which was equal to or exceeded 25% of the firm’s shares; 99% spent money on
some form of security in the previous year; the mean age among the 1,267 firms
was slightly above 16 years; and 62.7% of the sample had firm managers with the
same ethnicity as that of the local government chair (“Similar-Ethnicity”).
Table 6.2: Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The Firm Level
Category Variable Name Definition Measurement
Dependent
Variable
Bribe Dummy Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise {0;1}
Independent
Variables
Similar Ethnicity Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager=ethnicity of local gov-
ernment chairperson, 0 otherwise
{0;1}
Different Ethnicity 1-Similar Ethnicity {0;1}
Employee number (category) of paid employees {Less Than 50; 50 to
100; 100 to 250; Over 250}
{1; 2; 3; 4}
Trade Dummy=1 if firm engages in international trade, 0 otherwise {0;1}
Foreign Dummy=1 if foreign ownership ≥25%, 0 otherwise {0;1}
Security Dummy=1 if company using security service, 0 otherwise {0;1}
Lage Log of firm’s age
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Table 6.3: Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Firm Level: Se-
lected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample
Variable Statistic Firms
with
Data on
Ethnicity
Firms
without
Data on
Ethnicity
All Firms Test of Relation-
ship (P and Z Val-
ues)
Bribe
Dummy
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .287 .242 .269
0.022+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .45 .43 .27
Employee Min 1 1 1
Max 4 4 4
Mean 1.53 2.18 1.79
0.000+Median 1 2 1
Std. Dev. .95 1.29 1.15
Trade Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .07 .09 .08
0.167+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .26 .28 .26
Foreign Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .11 .17 .13
0.000+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .316 .372 .34
Security Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .99 .99 .99
0.594+Median 1 1 1
Std. Dev. .08 .09 .08
Age Min 0 0 0
Max 90 90 90
Mean 16.3 20.26 17.9
0.000−Median 14 17 15
Std. Dev. 13.2 15.43 14.26
Lage Min 0 0 0
Max 4.50 4.50 4.50
Mean 2.45 2.68 2.54
0.000−Median 2.64 2.86 2.71
Std. Dev. .94 .94 .94
Similar Eth-
nicity
Min 0
Max 1
Mean .627
Median 1
Std. Dev 0.484
N 1,267* 843* 2,110*
In each column, for each variable, the table reports the minimum, maximum, mean, median
and standard deviation for each (sub)sample. The last row details the number of observations
for each (sub)sample. ∗Only 1255, 834, and 2,089 observations for “Lage”, respectively, due
to log(0) being undefined. + P-Value was computed using a chi-squared test of independence
between the variable and a “selection” variable equal to 1 if the managers ethnicity is known,
0 otherwise. The test on “employee” has 3 degrees of freedom, the tests on “bribe dummy”,
“trade”, “foreign” and “security” each have 1 degree of freedom. − Z-Value calculated using a
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test.
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Figure 16: Ethnic Composition Of Nigeria
The most dominant ethnicity amongst local politicians in this dataset is the
Yoruba tribe whose politicians take up 37% of the local government chairs for the
local governments of the 1,267 firms selected for the sample. This is followed by
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the Hausa tribe (28%); then the Igbo tribe (18%); and then other tribes (17%).
Amongst firm managers, 32% are Yoruba; 29% are Igbo; 22% come from one of
the other tribes; and 17% are Hausa. Thus, the Yoruba ethnic group make up
the bulk of the managers and LG chairs in this dataset; while, compared to the
Igbo ethnic group, the Hausa group are over-sampled among the set of LG chairs
and under-sampled among the set of firm managers. Elements along the main
diagonal of Table 6.4 constitute firms whose managers share the same ethnicity as
the local politician, i.e. “Similar-Ethnicity” equals 1. Elements on the off diagonal
constitute firms whose managers are of a different ethnic group than the local
politician, so for these firms “Similar-Ethnicity” is equal to 0.
The majority of the cases where Similar-Ethnicity is equal to 1 (38%) come
from firms in the South-West region of the country (Table 6.5), however, this
region also contains the majority of the firms in the dataset (34%). In order, to
see where the matches are most likely to come from the last column of Table 6.5
also shows the probability of observing a match conditional on being in the region:
(Pr(Similar Ethnicity = 1|Zone = x)).
Table 6.4: Cross Tabulation Of The Ethnicities Of Firm Managers And Local
Government Chiefs
Ethnicity Of Local Government Chief
Yoruba Igbo Hausa Other Total
Ethnicity Of
Firm
Manager
Yoruba 331 6 55 11 403
(%) 26.12 0.47 4.34 0.87 31.81
Igbo 93 192 53 35 373
(%) 7.34 15.15 4.18 2.76 29.44
Hausa 4 3 185 18 210
(%) 0.32 0.24 14.60 1.42 16.57
Other 43 23 64 151 281
(%) 3.39 1.82 5.05 11.92 22.18
Total 471 224 357 215 1,267
(%) 37.17 17.68 28.18 16.97 100.00
Pearson χ29 statistic = 1300. P-value=0.000. Percentages represent the percentage of the
sample of 1,267 firms that exist within the respective cell. The main diagonal represents firm
managers whose ethnicities match those of the local government chief. The off diagonal entries
are firm managers who have a different ethnicity to that of the local government chiefs when
splitting ethnicities into the 4 main groups of: Yoruba; Igbo; Hausa; and Other.
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Table 6.5: Cross-Tabulation Of Ethnic-Match And Zones
Geo-Political Zone
Similar Ethnicity
Total Pr(Match|Zone)
Mismatch Match
NC 120 61 181
0.33
66.30 33.70 100.0
NE 44 54 98
0.55
44.90 55.10 100.0
NW 64 113 177
0.64
36.16 63.84 100.0
SE 17 184 201
0.92
8.46 91.54 100.0
SS 93 78 171
0.46
54.39 45.61 100.0
SW 135 304 439
0.69
30.75 69.25 100.0
Total 473 794 1,267
0.63
37.33 62.67 100.00
Pearson χ25 statistic = 168 P-value=0.000.
6.5.1 Effect Of Similar Ethnicities On Bribery
The summary statistics establish that managers and politicians, respectively, differ
in their ethnicity; and that the probability of sharing the same ethnicity as the
local politician also differs across regions and ethnicities. The primary question
of interest is whether the latter phenomenon is correlated with bribery. Despite
the fact that without exogenous variation in ethnic networks this study cannot
identify the causal impact of ethnicity on bribery, establishing whether the two are
correlated can be a powerful tool to test whether ethnicity captures meaningful
differences across managers, instead of random noise; and to establish the practical
importance of ethnic networks in the study of firm level bribery.
The first main results are shown in Table 6.6. In this table the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to one if the firm admitted to paying a bribe, 0 other-
wise. Similar-Ethnicity is included as an independent variable with other factors
which influence the payment of bribes [Svensson , 2003]. Including the matching
variable with the other independent variables does not significantly alter their sign
or magnitude. Similar-Ethnicity enters negatively and significantly, as expected,
suggesting that the power of discrimination against other ethnic groups is greater
than that of income sharing among members of the same group.
Similar-Ethnicity enters significantly in models 1 to 4 of Table 6.6. Models 1
to 3 control for the zone in which the firm resides. Therefore, when controlling
for zone, the probability of paying a bribe is significantly lower for managers who
share the same ethnicity as the local politicians compared with managers who
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do not share the ethnicity of the local politician. Results from Table 6.7 show
that the inclusion of the ethnicity variable does not significantly alter the sign or
magnitude of the zonal dummies when trying the explain the propensity to bribe.
All zonal dummies have negative coefficients and the omitted zone is the South-
West region, indicating that, on average and ceteris paribus, firms located in the
South-Western region of Nigeria are more likely to pay a bribe compared with
firms located elsewhere within the country. Out of all firms in the sample that
were located in the South-West region, 39% admitted to bribery; whereas the next
highest figure was 29% which was for the North-Central region. The South-West
zone is home to the commercial capital of Lagos, while the North-Central Zone is
home to the Capital city of Abuja. These results add support for the idea that
there is a higher propensity to bribe in areas with greater economic and political
activity. Results from this table do not change when clustering the standard errors
by zone or local government area.
Models 4 and 5 of Table 6.6 investigate this by including only 1 zonal dummy:
for the South-West region (Model 4); and including a dummy variable for Lagos
State along with the 5 original zonal dummies. In model 4 the South-West dummy
has a positive and significant (1%) coefficient. Using the South-West dummy
instead of the 5 other dummies does not alter the signs or statistical significance
of any other coefficient. On the other hand, when the Lagos dummy is entered
into the model along with the 5 original zonal dummies (model 5) the coefficient
on Lagos is positive and significant at the 1% level but the coefficients on the 5
dummy variables are all positive and significant. The coefficient on Lagos is larger
and more significant than the coefficients on the 5 zonal dummies. These results
suggest that the negative coefficients on the zonal dummies in Models 1 to 3 were
driven by Lagos State and not the other states in the SW region.
Another result from this Table is that larger firms (those with over 250 em-
ployees) are less likely to pay bribes, on average and ceteris paribus, than other
firms. This result is consistent with Delavallade [2011] who suggests that smaller
firms are more likely to engage in petty corruption than larger firms, who are more
likely to engage in state capture. The coefficient on international trade is positive
and statistically significant which hints at the role of public officials at ports (e.g.
customs, police) in extracting bribes from firms.
When other firm characteristics (a dummy for foreign ownership; a dummy for
use of a security service; and the log of age) are added to models 3, 4 and 5 (re-
sults omitted) of Table 6.6 the coefficient on Similar-Ethnicity changes by +0.008;
+0.005; and +0.002, respectively. Hence, these coefficients are not significantly
different from the ones presented in the table.
The general results concerning a shared ethnic group and ethnolinguistic frac-
tionalisation can be seen from the results of Table 6.8. These models interact
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Table 6.6: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, With Zonal
Dummies
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4 5
Similar Ethnicity -0.194** -0.164* -0.147* -0.141* 0.032
(0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.080) (0.090)
Trade 1.057*** 1.119*** 1.127*** 0.928***
(0.149) (0.152) (0.150) (0.165)
Employee==50-100 0.139 0.118 0.088
(0.123) (0.121) (0.128)
Employee==100-250 -0.183 -0.185 -0.223
(0.143) (0.144) (0.150)
Employee==Over 250 -0.378** -0.375** -0.382**
(0.155) (0.157) (0.160)
Zone==SW 0.421***
(0.080)
Region==Lagos 1.575***
(0.168)
Constant -0.148* -0.283*** -0.267*** -0.690*** -1.483***
(0.084) (0.088) (0.092) (0.069) (0.168)
Zonal Dummies YES−− YES−− YES−− NO YES++
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.068 0.074 0.069 0.143
Observations 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267
Chi-Squared 46.09 90.96 97.77 89.64 178.23
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. ++(−−): Plusses (minuses) indicate that the coefficients on all zonal
dummies are positive (negative) and significant at, at least, the 5% level. Models 1-5: Heteroskedasticity Robust
Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA
Chair, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected
by the Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC=
{Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra,
Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun,
Ondo, Osun, Oyo}. The excluded zone is SW.
the Similar-Ethnicity variable with the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation,
measured at the state level and the local government level, respectively. Models 1
to 4 use measures of ELF that are calculated at the State Level; while Models 5 to
8 use measures of ELF that are calculated at the local government level. Models
IV and VIII are most comparable to the results in Table 6.6 because they include
zonal dummies.
No significant results appear when using ELF at the state level, this result re-
mains whether using robust standard errors (Model 1) or clustering them by region
(Models 2 to 4). The coefficients only become significant when local government
ELF is used. This suggests that a more disaggregated approach is required when
looking at the relationship between corruption and ELF. In other words, the eth-
nic mix of the local government area is more important than the ethnic mix of
the state when looking at a firms propensity to bribe, and (potentially) other firm
outcomes. Political activities in Nigeria are organised at the National, State and
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Table 6.7: Tests For The Equality Of Coefficients Across Firm Level Models With
Zonal Dummies
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
I II χ21 Test Statistic [P-Value]
Similar Ethnicity -0.147*
[0.086]
Trade 1.132*** 1.119*** 1.83
(0.149) (0.149) [0.1758]
Employees=50-100 0.148 0.139 1.21
(0.122) (0.123) [0.2707]
Employees=100-250 -0.187 -0.183 0.26
(0.142) (0.143) [0.6132]
Employees=Over 250 -0.390** -0.378** 1.42
(0.153) (0.153) [0.2328]
Zone==NC -0.208* -0.260** 2.69
(0.117) (0.121) [0.1011]
Zone==NE -0.634*** -0.659*** 2.02
(0.165) (0.167) [0.1550]
Zone==NW -0.561*** -0.568*** 0.68
(0.127) (0.127) [0.4088]
Zone==SE -0.337*** -0.302** 2.71
(0.116) (0.118) [0.1000]
Zone==SS -0.445*** -0.481*** 2.45
(0.127) (0.129) [0.1177]
Constant -0.369*** -0.267*** 2.93
(0.069) (0.091) [0.0870]
Pseudo R-squared 0.072 0.074
Observations 1267 1267
Chi-Squared 109.92 112.84
P-value 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.Models I-II: Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0 otherwise. Unit of
observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected by the Author. All other
variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC= {Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa,
Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa,
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa
Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo}.
Local government level. It appears to be the case that Ethnic networks at the Lo-
cal Government level are the most important when investigating petty corruption.
amongst firms.
Models 5 and 6 model the effect of local government level ELF on the firms
propensity to bribe, controlling for ethnic networks. The models are calculated
using robust (model 5) and local government area clustered (model 6) standard
errors, respectively. Consistent with the macro literature, ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalisation is positively associated with corruption. In model 5, the marginal
effect of ELF is 0.2, so a 0.1 increase in the ELF of an area is associated with
a 0.02 percentage point increase in the probability of paying a bribe. This result
remains significant in model 6 when clustering standard errors by local government
area. The coefficient on Similar-Ethnicity is negative in models 5 and 6, however,
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Table 6.8: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching And ELF,
With Zonal Dummies
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Similar Ethnicity -0.122 -0.122 -0.486 -0.480* -0.004 -0.004 -0.283* -0.373**
(0.086) (0.079) (0.379) (0.251) (0.087) (0.083) (0.168) (0.158)
Ethnic Fractionalisation (State Level) -0.012 -0.012 -0.544 0.378
(0.156) (0.253) (0.548) (0.703)
Similar Ethnicity * (State Level) ELF 0.846 0.869
(0.849) (0.540)
Ethnic Fractionalisation (LG Level) 0.465*** 0.465* 0.040 0.293
(0.149) (0.249) (0.298) (0.304)
Similar Ethnicity * (LG Level) ELF 0.666* 0.725**
(0.358) (0.328)
Zone==NC -0.552 -0.402**
(0.465) (0.177)
Zone==NE -0.972** -0.804***
(0.434) (0.188)
Zone==NW -0.535 -0.547***
(0.369) (0.178)
Zone==SE -0.008 -0.067
(0.325) (0.197)
Zone==SS -0.873* -0.688***
(0.464) (0.193)
Constant -0.481*** -0.481** -0.209 -0.233 -0.723*** -0.723*** -0.508*** -0.268
(0.102) (0.231) (0.439) (0.320) (0.098) (0.117) (0.157) (0.168)
Zones - - - 0.1158 - - - 0.0138
Pseudo R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.042 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.046
Observations 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267 1267
Chi-Squared 2.40 2.36 2.75 11.53 12.58 3.94 6.31 29.49
P-value 0.301 0.307 0.432 0.173 0.002 0.140 0.097 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.Models 1 and 5 : Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
Models 2, 3 and 4: Standard Errors Clustered By State. Models 6, 7 and 8: Standard Errors Clustered By Local
Government Area. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0
otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected by the
Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC= {Benue, Kogi,
Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe};
NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo};
SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo}.The
base category for “Zones” is “SW”. “Zones” presents the P-value from a Likelihood ratio tests of the equality of
the coefficients on the regional effects.
in neither models does the coefficient on Similar-Ethnicity enter significantly.
Models 7 and 8 allow for more flexibility in the analysis by interacting Similar-
Ethnicity with LG level ELF. This allows one to see whether the effect of ELF
on bribery depends on the ethnic networks in existence in the area. In models
7 and 8 the coeffcient on Similar-Ethnicity is negative and significant; and the
coefficient on ELF is positive but no longer significant. However, the coefficient on
the interaction term of Similar-Ethnicity and local government ELF is positive and
significant. This suggests that a high enough level of fractionalisation will eradicate
the advantage of sharing the same ethnicity as the local government politician.
The ELF index for Lagos is 0.382. Using this figure along with the results for
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Model 7, the impact effect of having a shared ethnicity on the latent propensity
to bribe is calculated as: −0.283 + (0.382 × 0.666) = −0.029 which is 90 percent
smaller than the 0.283 coefficient on the Similar-Ethnicity variable. This adds more
weight to the argument that within a diverse region racial discrimination in the
payments of bribes is significantly reduced. Further specifications that allow for
ELF to influence bribery unconditional on Similar Ethnicity are included in Table
A.89 of Appendix A.4 Section A.4.3. These results seem to tell the same story
as above: LG ELF, but not state level ELF, has a positive and significant effect
on the propensity to bribe when conditioning on observables; the same applies to
religious fracionalisation.
The dataset shows a high correlation, at the state-level and at the local gov-
ernment level, between ELF and the average number of languages spoken within
the region. This suggests a possible mechanism through which the causal effect
might run. In ethnically mixed areas, people become more used to doing business
with other ethnic groups. This might lead people to learn the languages of the
other ethnic groups; this polylingualism might help in building rapport between
people of different ethnic groups which can reduce ethnic discrimination in bribe
payments. The simple correlation between ELF and the average number of lan-
guages spoken by managers is 0.61 (0.35) and is statistically significant at the 1%
level.
Table 6.9 investigates the nature of bribery in the South-Western zone of the
country by running probit estimations on the firms in this zone alone. Regional
dummies are included in models 4 to 6 with Lagos State being the omitted region.
All regional dummies have negative coefficients that are statsitically significant,
which suggests that on average and ceteris paribus, firms in Lagos are more likely
to pay a bribe than firms in other states in the South-West region. Out of the
states in the South-West region, Lagos is the most ethnically diverse and also has
the highest indices of ethnic fractionalisation and polarisation. This coheres with
the argument that shared ethnicities only matter for bribery in more ethnically
homogeneous settings. Lagos also has the least percentage of cases of shared
ethnicities (56%); the state with the next highest percentage of matches is Oyo
State (80%). This is probably why the Similar-Ethnicity variable loses significance
when controlling for the states. These results are consistent with those in Tables
6.6 and 6.8: the incidence of bribery is higher in Lagos; and in ethnically mixed
environments, sharing the same ethnicity as the local politician will not have as
much of an effect on the propensity to bribe compared with areas that are less
ethnically fractionalised.
To further investigate the proposition that bribery only takes on a racial di-
mension in racially uniform areas, Table 6.10 presents result from models focusing
solely on Lagos state, with local government dummies in models 4 to 6. The
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Similar-Ethnicity variable does not enter significantly in any of the models and 13
of the 15 local government dummies are not statistically different from zero (the
base local government is Ikeja). Taken in full these results suggest that, conditional
on covariates, whilst there is variation in bribe payments and a significant effect of
ethnic discrimination on bribe payments across Zones and across States within the
South-Western zone, there is little evidence for these effects within Lagos itself.
Sharing the same ethnicity as the local government politician does not seem to
have any benefit within Lagos State. These results are corroborated in Table 6.11
which controls for zonal heterogeneity in the Similar-Ethnicity variable. Having
the same ethnicity as the local politician reduces the chances of paying a bribe, on
average and ceteris paribus, in the South-Western Zone.
Table 6.9: South-West Zone: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Match-
ing, With Regional Dummies
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1-SW 2-SW 3-SW 4-SW 5-SW 6-SW
Similar Ethnicity -0.508*** -0.452*** -0.424*** -0.003 0.013 0.036
(0.131) (0.134) (0.137) (0.146) (0.148) (0.151)
Trade 0.768*** 0.839*** 0.427* 0.501**
(0.205) (0.211) (0.228) (0.234)
Employees=50-100 0.030 -0.111
(0.191) (0.203)
Employees=100-250 -0.256 -0.415*
(0.213) (0.236)
Employees=Over 250 -0.402* -0.416*
(0.223) (0.248)
State Dummies NO NO NO YES−− YES−− YES−−
Constant 0.065 -0.057 -0.027 0.210* 0.133 0.206
(0.108) (0.114) (0.123) (0.112) (0.120) (0.131)
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.051 0.058 0.233 0.241 0.249
Observations 439 439 439 439 439 439
Chi-Squared 14.96 27.85 32.10 94.71 110.04 119.31
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. ++(−−): Plusses (minuses) indicate that the coefficients on all state
dummies are positive (negative) and significant at, at least, the 5% level. Heteroskedastic Robust Standard
Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0
otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected by the
Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. These estimations are run on
firms that are located in the South-West Zone only.
6.5.2 Robustness Checks
Models I to IV Table 6.8 also shows results from models that use State-Level
ELF as an explanatory variable instead of Local Government level ELF. Using
ELF defined at the state level fails to bring up any statistically significant results,
suggesting that it is the local area which is important in determining the nature
of ethnic discrimination in bribe payments, rather than the wider economy. Ag-
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Table 6.10: Lagos: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, With
Local Government Area Dummies
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1-Lagos 2-Lagos 3-Lagos 4-Lagos 5-Lagos 6-Lagos
Similar Ethnicity -0.026 -0.015 0.004 -0.058 -0.045 -0.013
(0.155) (0.155) (0.158) (0.166) (0.167) (0.170)
Trade 0.264 0.321 0.203 0.278
(0.212) (0.218) (0.220) (0.224)
Employees=50-100 -0.074 -0.121
(0.222) (0.233)
Employees=100-250 -0.313 -0.360
(0.254) (0.261)
Employees=Over 250 -0.282 -0.392
(0.281) (0.295)
LG==agege 0.119 0.108 -0.001
(0.460) (0.462) (0.472)
LG==ajeromi ifelodun 0.238 0.235 0.134
(0.604) (0.597) (0.599)
LG==alimosho -0.028 -0.012 -0.114
(0.337) (0.336) (0.344)
LG==apapa 0.291 0.282 0.289
(0.371) (0.368) (0.377)
LG==eti osa 0.671** 0.665** 0.620**
(0.304) (0.306) (0.310)
LG==ifako ijaye -0.171 -0.190 -0.241
(0.351) (0.354) (0.357)
LG==ikorodu 0.086 0.103 0.062
(0.399) (0.398) (0.397)
LG==kosofe -0.597 -0.574 -0.608
(0.402) (0.405) (0.404)
LG==lagos island 0.417 0.421 0.359
(0.386) (0.390) (0.402)
LG==lagos mainland 0.153 0.160 0.135
(0.386) (0.387) (0.398)
LG==mushin 0.546 0.556 0.538
(0.540) (0.537) (0.515)
LG==ojo 0.802 0.840 0.914
(0.669) (0.670) (0.623)
LG==oshodi isolo -0.267 -0.240 -0.198
(0.360) (0.360) (0.359)
LG==shomolu 0.429 0.430 0.401
(0.567) (0.563) (0.541)
LG==surulere 0.664** 0.657** 0.690**
(0.304) (0.304) (0.310)
Constant 0.223* 0.174 0.224* 0.060 0.017 0.101
(0.116) (0.123) (0.135) (0.209) (0.214) (0.232)
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.058 0.061 0.069
Observations 273 273 273 270 270 270
Chi-Squared 0.03 1.60 3.71 20.39 20.75 25.04
P-value 0.864 0.449 0.593 0.203 0.238 0.200
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if
ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated
using manager data collected by the Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. These
estimations are run on firms that are located in Lagos State only.
gregating things up to the state level seems to wash away all of the significant
effects.
Models I and II present the same model using heteroskedasticity robust stan-
dard errors; and standard errors clustered by region, respectively. Calculating the
standard errors of the coefficients differently does not seem to alter the results
significantly. None of the coefficients in either model are statistically significant.
The same results seem to occur when using either NBS or CLEEN dataset
to calculate the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Figure 16 shows the
ethnic composition of the different regions in Nigeria (Yoruba; Ibo; Hausa; and
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Table 6.11: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, Controlling
For Zonal Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4
Similar Ethnicity -0.194** 0.025 -0.508*** 0.177
(0.084) (0.109) (0.131) (0.207)
Zone==SW 0.065 0.065
(0.108) (0.108)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==NC 0.685***
(0.245)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==NE -0.143 -0.828**
(0.341) (0.376)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==NW 0.656** -0.028
(0.263) (0.308)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==SE 0.622* -0.063
(0.373) (0.406)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==SS 0.555** -0.130
(0.253) (0.300)
Similar Ethnicity*Zone==SW -0.533*** -0.685***
(0.171) (0.245)
Constant -0.148* - 0.065 -
(0.084) - (0.108) -
Zonal Dummies YES−− YES−− YES−− YES−−
Zones 0.0428 0.0000 0.6267 0.0000
Interactions - - 0.2375 0.0217
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.042
Observations 1267 1267 1267 1267
Chi-Squared 46.09 269.85 60.51 270.49
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. ++(−−): Plusses (minuses) indicate that the coefficients on all zonal
dummies are positive (negative) and significant at, at least, the 5% level. Models 1-4: Heteroskedastic Robust
Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA
Chair, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected
by the Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC=
{Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi,
Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo,
Osun, Oyo}.The base category for “Zones” is “SW”. “Zones”; and “Interactions” present the P-value from
Likelihood ratio tests of the equality of the coefficients on the zonal effects and interaction terms, respectively.
Other) using the two datasets, respectively. The two datasets seems to generate
the same results. Both datasets seem to tell a similar story: the Northern region
is mainly populated by the Hausa tribe; the South-Eastern region by the Ibo and
Other tribes; and the South-Western region by the Yoruba tribe.
Table 6.12 includes a dummy (“Similar-Language”) indicating whether or not
the firm manager spoke the same language as the most common ethnic group. The
data on languages was collected by the author; the dummy variable is based on
the survey question that asked the managers what questions they spoke. Using
this data has the advantage that languages spoken is not subject to the error that
occurs when language is inferred from ethnicity. This study is able to identify
which languages are spoken by the manager, as reported by the manager, and use
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this to see whether there is any advantage of speaking the same language as the
politician when conducting operations where a bribe might be extracted from the
manager.
The first model is the same as Model 4 of Table 6.6. The second model sub-
stitutes Similar-Language for Similar-Ethnicity. The third model includes both
dummies in the estimation. Using Similar-Language instead of Similar-Ethnicity
(Model 2) seems to tell the same story, managers who speak the same language as
the majority group are, on average and ceteris paribus, less likely to pay a bribe.
When both dummies are included in the estimation, the coefficients retain their
sign but lose statistical significance, giving more weight to the argument that the
Similar-Ethnicity variable is driven by the level of ethnic and linguistic diversity
within the regions.
Table 6.12: Robustness Checks Using Languages Spoken By The Firm Managers
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3
Similar Ethnicity -0.194** -0.128
(0.084) (0.097)
Similar-Language -0.232** -0.154
(0.099) (0.115)
Zonal Dummies YES−− YES−− YES−−
Constant -0.148* -0.087 -0.065
(0.084) (0.103) (0.104)
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.033
Observations 1267 1267 1267
Chi-Squared 46.09 46.81 48.23
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. ++(−−): Plusses (minuses) indicate that the coefficients on all zonal
dummies are positive (negative) and significant at, at least, the 5% level. Heteroskedastic Robust Standard
Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0
otherwise. Similar-Language: Dummy=1 if the firm manager speaks the same language spoken by the most
common ethnic group, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity and Similar-Language are
calculated using manager data collected by the Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the
NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0
otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC= {Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)};
NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto,
Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo,
Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo}.The base category for “Zones” is “SW”.
6.6 Conclusion
This study set out to investigate the links between ethnicity and bribery amongst
firm managers in Nigeria. It is the first analysis of its kind that identifies the ethnic
groups of firm managers; households; and local government politicians. Using this
information this study constructs indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and
measures of ethnic networks.
177
The main questions that were investigated were: whether belonging to the eth-
nic network of a local politician had a positive or negative effect on the probability
of paying a bribe; whether or not this impact varied based on the level of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation within the area; and whether these factors were related
to victimisation and the reporting of crime.
The problem of acquiring individual-level data on ethnicities was overcome
by contacting the firm-managers directly and asking them for their ethnic group,
state of origin, religion, and the languages that they had knowledge of. Use of
this data allowed for the construction of variables measuring ethnic networks,
linguistic networks, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation; linguistic fractionalisation;
and religious fractionalisation. Measures of polarisation were also used in the
analysis (See Appendix A.4 Section A.4.3). The study used information concerning
over 90 ethnic groups to construct weighted and unweighted measures of ethno-
linguistic fractionalisation. These encorporate the phylogenetic distances between
the ethnic groups in the sample so that the difference between two ethnic groups
will depend on their historical origin. So, for example, Yoruba and Igbo are treated
as more closely related than Yoruba and Hindu.
Results showed evidence that belonging to the same ethnic network as the
local politician significantly reduced the probability of paying a bribe. This result
was robust to a series of model specifications and occurred for the entire sample
of Nigeria; and a sub-sample of south-western states. This result disappeared,
however, within Lagos State. Further analysis suggested that the effect of ethnic
networks is only significant in areas that have low levels of ethnic diversity. In
cosmopolitan areas (like Lagos) the effect of ethnic networks on bribery ceases to
exist. This result corresponds with previous work on discrimination in areas with
ethnic minorities.
Using information concerning the languages spoken by the managers and the
most common ethnic group in the local government area, this study tested whether
speaking the same language as the local politician had any effect on the propensity
to bribe. Results showed that if a manager spoke the same language as a politician
then they were less likely to pay a bribe, ceteris paribus. However, this study was
unable to disentangle this effect from the effect of sharing the same ethnicity as the
politician. 85% of all managers who were non-speakers of the local language did
not share the same ethnicity as the politicians; while 77% of speakers shared the
same ethnicity as the local politician. The two variables are positively corelated
and this relationship is statistically significant at the 10% level. Future research
can try to disentangle the effect of speaking the same language from the effect of
sharing the same ethnic group.
The effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation on corruption was only found to
be statistically significant at the local government level. State-level estimations
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returned insignificant coefficients. The effect of sharing an ethnicity on the propen-
sity to bribe was stronger in the local government level estimations compared with
the state-level estimations.
The study was limited by the use of a cross-section, nevertheless, arguments
were provided for the exogeneity of a shared ethnicity on the propensity to bribe.
The ethnic group that the local politician comes from, in a given area, is stable
and the majority of firms are small-sized family run firms, so the owner of the firm
and the top manager are usually the same person. Therefore, the ethnicity of the
manager is also stable. The median firm age was 14 years; which suggests that firms
in this sample are not re-locating based on frequent changes in local politicians.
Future research could investigate whether managers are likely to migrate to areas
where the local politician shares their ethnicity.
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7 Discussion
The aim of this dissertation was to discuss the nature and workings of firm level
corruption in Nigeria. The analysis focused on the payment of bribes from firm
managers to local public officials. Central to this empirical study of bribery was the
topic of measurement error and how one knows that the reports of firm managers
accurately capture their experiences. This study dwelt on this issue by looking at
different ways of measuring firm-level corruption; and the determinants of under-
reporting of corruption by managers. The determinants of firm-level bribery were
investigated with a focus on firm-specific and public official characteristics. The
first and fourth main chapters focused on the firm and managerial specific factors
influencing the payment of bribery, respectively. The second and third main chap-
ters looked at the self-reporting and underreporting of corruption and business
malpractices.
Contributions to the body of knowledge include: the application of existing
models of corruption to a new setting: West Africa; an increase in the number
of variables that capture public officials meeting with firm managers; a relaxation
of the assumption that public officials extort bribes from firms, this was done by
examining the extent to which firms offer bribes in return for a favour; a compar-
ison of the randomised response and indirect questioning methods in measuring
corruption; an analysis of the causes of underrepoting by firm managers in the
presence of statistical and assured anonymity; an analysis of the impact of ethnic
networks in firm level dealings with the government; and the introduction of indi-
vidual, firm, local government, and state level data in the study of ethnicity and
corruption.
The investigation began with a discussion of the nature of corruption at the
firm level in Nigeria. While still categorised as more corrupt than the median
country, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index,
the level of corruption in the country seems to be decreasing. Much of this change
has been attributed to the institutions of anti-corruption laws and bodies within
the country. Recent measures of corruption rank the level of corruption in the
country as being similar to that of Indonesia and Kenya.
The first main chapter looked at the determinants of the incidence and level
of bribe payments amongst manufacturing firms in Nigeria. This study addressed
the issue of the underreporting of corruption by using data from surveys that
asked managers about their bribery directly and indirectly. Information from two
datasets was used independently of each other. Nevertheless, the results were con-
sistent across both datasets. The determinants of the incidence of bribery were
found to be different to the factors that influenced the size of bribe paid. The
former was determined by the meetings with public officials while the latter was
determined by firm specific characteristics such as profits and capital mobility.
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Also, meetings with officials from the police was found to be the strongest deter-
minant of bribery compared to other organisations. This result is significant for
the literature concerning: the detection of corruption; and the costs of corruption.
Knowing where corruption is most likely to take place can assist in measuring it.
This knowledge can also be used to change the incentives of firm managers by
running targetted anti-corruption efforts. Future research can use a larger sample
to examine the propensity to pay a bribe to an agent conditional on meeting that
type if agent.
The second main chapter investigated the validity of using indirect questioning
methods to measure corruption amongst firms. These methods were compared to
the randomised response method which attaches responses from direct questions
to a probability distribution in order to assure anonymity while also allowing for
an estimate of the mean rate of corruption. The comparison of the point estimates
from the indirect and randomised response questioning methods comprised a gap
in the litarature that compares the estimates from the indirect; direct; and ran-
domised response methods. The results of this study (Chapter 4) show that indi-
rect questioning methods are preferred to randomised question methods; moreover,
despite the assurance of anonymity, evidence is found for a significant proportion
of managers choosing to misreport (underreport) their true status. The third main
chapter seeks to answer why this is the case. Traditional research suggests that in-
dividuals misreport their sensitive behaviour to adhere to social norms. However,
this chapter addresses why anonymity does not eliminate this bias. A host of rea-
sons are investigated, including : education; understanding of the question; profits;
guilt; and interviewer & supervisor effects. None of these variables were signifi-
cant in explaining why managers chose to underreport their status. Nevertheless,
evidence was found for trust and the probability/fear of detection being closely
associated with underreporting (reticence) amongst managers. Trust was treated
as a latent variable which was indicated by the nature of business contracts that
the managers engaged in; fear of detection was measured by the perceived number
of close competitors in the same business as the firm. These results suggest that
more accurate sensitive data can be achieved from larger and less differentiated
populations. These results are significant for the literature on measurement error
in corruption; and survey research methods. The information concerning the de-
terminants of reticence can assist in future survey research on sensitive questions.
Future research can examine these results experimentally by monitoring results
from a random event, attaching the event to a sensitive questionnaire, and mon-
itoring the misreporting behaviour of the managers. Furthermore, a comparison
of the variances derived from the randomised response and indirect questioning
methods can also fill a gap in the literature.
The final main chapter focuses on the links between ethnic networks and cor-
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ruption. This is done by looking at the ethnicities of firm managers of 1,267 firms;
and the local politicians in 351 local government areas in Nigeria. The study inves-
tigated the effect on bribery of sharing the same ethnicity as the local politicians.
It was argued that firm managers who belong to the same ethnic group as the
local politician could be less likely to pay a bribe due to ethnic discrimination of
non co-ethnics; and/or punishment mechanisms existing within one’s kin group.
Alternatively they might be more likely to bribe due to revenue sharing among
one’s kin group. This study also constructed the first set of micro-level measures of
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) for Nigeria and investigated the impact of
ELF on firm level bribery. Results showed that firms whose ethnicity matched that
of the local politicians were less likely to pay a bribe. The findings also confirmed
the results of the macro literature: ELF, measured at the local government level,
is positively and significantly associated with a higher rate of bribery. This result
only shows up at the local government level and not at the state level, suggesting
that local government level activity is more important when looking at the effect
of ethnic networks on firm level behaviour relating to corruption. Another result
came from running the analysis with a Similar-Ethnicity-ELF interaction term.
Results from these models showed that with a high enough level of ELF, the neg-
ative impact of having a co-ethnic politician on bribery disappears. This suggests
that ethnic discrimination in the payment of bribes is an issue for areas that lack
ethnic diversity. In places, such as Lagos, with a relatively high level of ELF the
effect of ethnic networks on the propensity to bribe goes away. These results were
used alongside results from the economics of ethnic discrimination to suggest that
such discrimination is more likely to occur in ethnically uniform societies. This
piece of work can be of importance to the literature on discrimination, in gen-
eral, and ethnic discrimination in particular. An understanding of the impact of
fractionalisation on discrimination can assist in detecting where discrimination is
likely to have its greatest effect. Future research can examine the impact of ethnic
networks on other firm outcomes such as profitability and market capitalisation.
In addition, work can be done to see whether the effect of discrimination is affected
by the level of fractionalisation for different types of discrimination.
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A Appendices
A.1 Appendices For Chapter 1
A.1.1 Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection
The following tables show the results of the Bivariate Probit Analysis of the bribery
of public officials.
Table A.1: Information On Actions Performed By Companies Which Required
Them To Meet With Government Officials
Dataset ES NBS
Actions
 Requested a mainline telephone
connection in the last 2 years
 Requested an electrical connec-
tion in the last 2 years
 Requested a water connection in
the last 2 years
 Requested a construction-
related permit in the last 2
years
 Requested an import license in
the last 2 years
 Requested an operating license
in the last 2 years
 Visited by, inspected by, or re-
quired to meet with tax officials
in the past year
 Cleared Goods Through Cus-
toms
 Obtained Road Worthy Certifi-
cates
 Procurement Of Goods And Ser-
vices From Government
 Obtaining Business Licenses
And Permits
 Procurement Of Goods And Ser-
vices From Private Companies
 Getting Clearance For Environ-
mental Or Sanitary Regulations
 Residence And Work Permits
 Vehicle Registrations
 Police Investigations
 Traffic Offences
 Contact With The Court
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics For Meeting With Government Officials And Brib-
ing Government Officials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dataset ES NBS
Manufacturing Full Sample Manufacturing Full Sample
All
Firms
Met
With
An
Offi-
cial
Bribed
An
Offi-
cial
All
Firms
Met
With
An
Offi-
cial
Bribed
An
Offi-
cial
All
Firms
Met
With
An
Offi-
cial
Bribed
An
Offi-
cial
All
Firms
Met
With
An
Offi-
cial
Bribed
An
Offi-
cial
Met With An Offi-
cial
0.92 1 1 0.92 1 1 0.37 1 1 0.31 1 1
(Mean) Average
Number Of Types
Of Officials Met
With
1.68
(1.22)
1.83
(1.17)
2.26
(1.30)
1.88(1.34)2.04
(1.27)
2.48
(1.33)
1.66
(2.72)
4.43
(2.74)
4.2
(2.50)
1.09
(2.07)
3.49
(2.32)
3.49
(2.33)
Bribery Episode 0.35 0.38 1 0.40 0.43 1 0.14 0.36 1 0.10 0.33 1
(Mean) Number Of
Types Of Bribery
Episodes
0.56
(0.95)
0.61
(0.97)
1.59
(0.95)
0.69
(1.07)
0.75
(1.09)
1.72
(1.04)
0.44
(1.39)
1.16
(2.07)
3.2
(2.31)
0.28 0.90
(1.76)
2.67
(2.12)
Observations 2001 1839 710 3668 3377 1463 331 124 45 2089 651 218
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Table A.3: Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On Man-
ufacturing (ES)
telecoms electric water construction import tax
Outcome Equation
foreign . . . . . -16.988
. . . . . (0.000)
security -0.126 0.213** 0.243 0.103 0.398** 0.228***
(0.153) (0.105) (0.223) (0.225) (0.158) (0.071)
age 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.007 -0.002
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.004)
trade 0.248 0.122 0.430 0.573 0.251 0.150
(0.310) (0.302) (0.870) (0.598) (0.344) (0.206)
Constant -1.610*** -0.725*** -0.696 1.322* -0.785 -0.887***
(0.212) (0.175) (0.486) (0.770) (0.599) (0.082)
Selection Equation
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.366*** -0.494** -0.650*** -1.214*** -0.033 0.230
(0.244) (0.199) (0.240) (0.233) (0.205) (0.179)
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Censored Observations 1759 1372 1759 1837 1599 332
Log-Likelihood -734.5 -1448.9 -753.4 -598.3 -1094.2 -1686.9
Chi-Squared 1.3 4.3 1.9 1.0 7.9 .
P Value 0.732 0.228 0.590 0.809 0.048 .
Rho 0.766 0.441 -0.052 -0.833 0.184 0.943
Wald (Rho=0) 6.71 5.57 0.04 0.76 0.13 8.02
Prob>chi2 0.0096 0.0183 0.8512 0.3827 0.7231 0.0046
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if
firm requested public service (Table A.1), 0 otherwise. Dependent Variable in outcome
equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was requested/expected from the firm, 0 otherwise.
(Huber-White) Heteroscedastic Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The base group for
state-dummies is Abia state. The base group for sector dummies is “Other - Manufacturing”.
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Table A.4: Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On All
Firms (ES)
telecoms electric water construction import tax
Outcome Equation
foreign 0.236 -0.387 -4.534*** -5.278*** -0.329 -0.782
(0.635) (0.740) (0.255) (1.766) (0.723) (0.503)
security 0.191* 0.293*** -0.006 0.223 0.215** 0.146***
(0.100) (0.074) (0.129) (0.183) (0.106) (0.051)
age -0.001 0.008 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)
trade -0.036 -0.114 0.359 0.813 0.003 0.074
(0.285) (0.315) (0.907) (0.669) (0.321) (0.194)
Constant -1.498*** -0.465*** -0.634* 0.312 -0.519** -0.832***
(0.168) (0.179) (0.362) (2.246) (0.251) (0.057)
Selection Equation
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.070*** -0.271* -1.031*** -1.404*** -0.057 0.082
(0.163) (0.150) (0.179) (0.228) (0.158) (0.135)
Observations 3668 3668 3668 3668 3668 3668
Censored Observations 3031 2226 3128 3307 2794 706
Log-Likelihood -1879.6 -3184.0 -1707.7 -1346.5 -2403.4 -3393.5
Chi-Squared 3.9 19.1 324.2 11.7 4.3 10.6
P Value 0.419 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.361 0.031
Rho 0.658 0.106 0.181 -0.286 0.198 0.994
Wald (Rho=0) 10.13 0.28 0.62 0.04 0.93 39.47
Prob > Chi2 0.0015 0.5993 0.4295 0.8385 0.3355 0
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if
firm requested public service, 0 otherwise (Table A.1). Dependent Variable in outcome equation
is Dummy=1 if a bribe was requested/expected from the firm, 0 otherwise. (Huber-White)
Heteroscedastic Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The base group for state-dummies is
Abia state. The base group for sector dummies is “Rest Of Universe - Other”.
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Table A.5: Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On Manufacturing Companies (NBS)
customs road goods gov lic goods priv enviro res work vehicle police traffic court
Outcome Equation
foreign 0.043 0.244 0.643* -0.306 0.506 -0.375 -0.201 0.276 -0.156 -0.080 -6.003
(0.040) (0.307) (0.382) (0.261) (0.566) (0.394) (0.383) (0.296) (21.608) (0.161) (0.000)
security . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
age 0.000 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.009 -0.012 0.007 0.003 0.003 -0.010
(0.003) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.028) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.173) (0.004) (0.015)
trade . -0.211 -0.960** -0.247 -6.043*** 0.068 -0.394 -0.351 0.039 -0.381*** -0.970**
. (0.309) (0.434) (0.292) (1.300) (0.368) (0.330) (0.305) (18.601) (0.108) (0.478)
Constant 0.870*** -1.782*** -1.810*** -1.547*** -2.140*** 0.072 -1.347*** -1.596*** 1.302 -1.153*** -1.115***
(0.104) (0.224) (0.308) (0.193) (0.753) . (0.185) (0.175) (7.254) (0.065) (0.426)
Selection Equation
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.015 -1.822*** -5.789 -1.673*** -5.626*** -0.008 -1.812*** -1.814*** -0.185 -1.448*** -2.286***
(0.349) (0.276) . (0.250) (0.109) (0.505) (0.327) (0.287) (3.467) (0.076) (0.372)
Observations 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331 331
Censored Observations 274 256 305 272 302 271 281 256 293 273 309
Log-Likelihood -154.6 -188.1 -87.0 -161.0 -90.2 -168.0 -137.8 -192.0 -118.8 -173.3 -72.3
Chi-Squared 1.8 1.5 . 4.0 . 1.5 8.0 1.5 . 16.2 .
P Value 0.407 0.679 . 0.261 . 0.685 0.045 0.671 . 0.001 .
Rho -1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.544 1.000 1.000 -1.000 1.000 1.000
Wald (Rho=0) 81.41 56.26 9.03 18.46 7.85 1.9 4.43 0.2 0 20.06 108.63
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.0027 0 0.0051 0.1679 0.0353 0.6553 0.9663 0 0
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm met with public official, 0 otherwise (Table A.1). Dependent Variable in
outcome equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was paid to the public official, 0 otherwise. The base group for state-dummies is Abia state.
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Table A.6: Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Estimations On All Firms (NBS)
customs road goods gov lic goods priv enviro res work vehicle police traffic court
Outcome Question
foreign -0.199 -0.174 0.067 -0.192 0.063 -0.474* -0.153*** -0.099 -0.366** -0.195*** -0.232***
(0.194) (0.254) (0.185) (0.441) (0.259) (0.271) (0.024) (0.266) (0.148) (0.017) (0.003)
security . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
age -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.000 -0.002** 0.004 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
trade . 0.150 0.160 0.243 -0.022 0.161 -0.212*** 0.255 -0.032 -0.295*** -0.051***
. (0.174) (0.162) (0.298) (0.201) (0.273) (0.015) (0.210) (0.107) (0.018) (0.003)
Constant -1.530*** -1.500*** -2.102*** -1.457 -2.174*** -0.407 1.478*** -1.702 -1.654*** 1.636*** 1.489***
(0.380) (0.431) (0.121) (1.443) (0.016) (2.389) (0.014) (1.150) (0.078) (0.014) (0.002)
Selection Equation
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.953*** -2.053*** -1.374*** -1.283*** -1.591*** -1.006** -1.359*** -1.378*** -1.336*** -1.588*** -1.094***
(0.286) (0.276) (0.232) (0.416) (0.248) (0.393) (0.239) (0.224) (0.183) (0.115) (0.003)
Observations 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089
Censored Observations 1935 1821 1950 1813 1942 1852 1917 1756 1877 1880 1964
Log-Likelihood -554.1 -870.4 -540.8 -895.2 -554.5 -799.9 -612.6 -1024.8 -768.3 -743.1 -468.8
Chi-Squared 1.5 1.0 2.0 1.2 2.2 3.1 459.6 2.1 7.2 904.5 56911.5
P Value 0.467 0.804 0.581 0.746 0.532 0.370 0.000 0.544 0.065 0.000 0.000
Rho 0.795 0.569 1.000 0.617 1.000 -0.111 -1.000 0.558 1.000 -1.000 -1.000
Wald (Rho=0) 3.36 1.62 1.12 0.13 2.94 0.01 36.8 0.14 1.08 24.63 7.38
Prob > chi2 0.0669 0.2036 0.2893 0.7174 0.0866 0.9398 0 0.7053 0.2983 0 0.0066
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm met with public official, 0 otherwise (Table A.1). Dependent Variable in
outcome equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was paid to the official, 0 otherwise. The base group for state-dummies is Abia state. The
base group for sector dummies is “Other community, social and personal services”.
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Table A.7: Dummies In Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection
ES Dummies Description NBS Dummies Description
ic telecom Dummy=1 if telecommunications re-
ported as minor, moderate,major, or
very severe obstacle to operations
obs tax regs obstacles for doing good business - tax
regulations
ic elec Dummy=1 if electricity reported as
minor, moderate,major, or very severe
obstacle to operations
obs infl obstacles for doing good business - in-
flation
ic trans Dummy=1 if transportation reported
as minor, moderate,major, or very se-
vere obstacle to operations
obs pol obstacles for doing good business - po-
litical instability
ic land Dummy=1 if access to land for ex-
pansion/relocation reported as minor,
moderate,major, or very severe obsta-
cle to operations
obs change law obstacles for doing good business -
changes in laws and regulations
ic taxrates Dummy=1 if tax rates reported as mi-
nor, moderate,major, or very severe
obstacle to operations
obs crime obstacles for doing good business -
crime and insecurity
ic taxadmin Dummy=1 if tax administration re-
ported as minor, moderate,major, or
very severe obstacle to operations
obs corr obstacles for doing good business - cor-
ruption
ic customs Dummy=1 if customs and trade reg-
ulations reported as minor, moder-
ate,major, or very severe obstacle to
operations
obs bus reg obstacles for doing good business -
complicated business registration
ic laborregs Dummy=1 if labour regulations re-
ported as minor, moderate,major, or
very severe obstacle to operations
obs unclear laws obstacles for doing good business - un-
clear laws
ic educlabour Dummy=1 if inadequately educated
workforce reported as minor, moder-
ate,major, or very severe obstacle to
operations
ic buslic Dummy=1 if business licensing and
permits reported as minor, moder-
ate,major, or very severe obstacle to
operations
ic accfin Dummy=1 if access to finance (e.g.
collateral) reported as minor, moder-
ate,major, or very severe obstacle to
operations
ic costfin Dummy=1 if cost of finance reported
as minor, moderate,major, or very se-
vere obstacle to operations
ic polenviro Dummy=1 if political environment re-
ported as minor, moderate,major, or
very severe obstacle to operations
ic macroenviro Dummy=1 if macroeconomic envi-
ronment reported as minor, moder-
ate,major, or very severe obstacle to
operations
ic corr Dummy=1 if corruption reported as
minor, moderate,major, or very severe
obstacle to operations
ic crime Dummy=1 if crime, theft, and disorder
reported as minor, moderate,major, or
very severe obstacle to operations
ic informal Dummy=1 if practices of competitors
in the informal sector reported as mi-
nor, moderate,major, or very severe
obstacle to operations
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Table A.8: Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On Manufacturing (ES)
telecoms2 electric2 water2 construction2 import2 tax2
Outcome Equation
foreign . . . . . -4.527***
. . . . . (0.197)
security -0.095 0.212* 0.274 -0.010 0.457*** 0.204***
(0.225) (0.112) (0.249) (0.155) (0.168) (0.074)
age -0.007 -0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.008 -0.000
(0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004)
trade 0.363 0.221 0.731 0.541* 0.204 0.176
(0.406) (0.323) (0.677) (0.316) (0.375) (0.210)
ic telecom 0.664** 0.139 0.344 0.097 0.003 0.030
(0.289) (0.116) (0.247) (0.120) (0.162) (0.075)
ic elec 3.548*** 0.332 -0.155 -0.281 -0.293 -0.489**
(0.601) (0.618) (0.452) (0.239) (0.462) (0.216)
ic trans -0.206 0.286 0.052 0.065 -0.028 0.351***
(0.412) (0.223) (0.373) (0.254) (0.289) (0.116)
ic land -0.029 0.099 0.179 -0.039 0.427** -0.119
(0.250) (0.138) (0.240) (0.158) (0.184) (0.080)
ic taxrates 0.939 0.199 0.837** 0.337 0.470* 0.422***
(0.631) (0.185) (0.394) (0.250) (0.269) (0.152)
ic taxadmin -0.355 -0.005 -0.961*** 0.230 -0.267 -0.397***
(0.496) (0.169) (0.340) (0.260) (0.245) (0.112)
ic customs -0.181 0.056 -0.366 -0.042 -0.209 0.011
(0.263) (0.139) (0.233) (0.113) (0.172) (0.086)
ic laborregs 0.017 0.075 0.198 0.251 -0.048 0.184**
(0.265) (0.134) (0.222) (0.162) (0.169) (0.089)
ic educlabour 0.317 0.063 0.189 -0.124 0.146 -0.249***
(0.238) (0.127) (0.220) (0.155) (0.166) (0.081)
ic buslic 0.658** 0.252* 0.425* 0.311** 0.301 0.328***
(0.295) (0.133) (0.233) (0.151) (0.200) (0.084)
ic accfin 0.067 -0.173 0.129 0.134 -0.494* -0.269**
(0.311) (0.166) (0.301) (0.168) (0.253) (0.112)
ic costfin -0.137 0.143 -0.244 -0.184 -0.087 0.062
(0.329) (0.177) (0.337) (0.248) (0.263) (0.123)
ic polenviro -0.212 -0.280** -0.227 -0.220 -0.191 0.087
(0.286) (0.141) (0.256) (0.172) (0.194) (0.092)
ic macroenviro 0.343 -0.152 0.029 -0.107 -0.101 -0.350***
(0.342) (0.157) (0.318) (0.198) (0.199) (0.092)
ic corr -0.360 -0.021 0.157 -0.114 0.661*** 0.104
(0.296) (0.165) (0.309) (0.188) (0.239) (0.106)
ic crime 0.180 0.481*** 0.050 0.118 -0.021 0.287***
(0.333) (0.161) (0.318) (0.133) (0.226) (0.103)
ic informal 0.133 -0.016 -0.037 -0.376 0.158 0.233**
(0.349) (0.147) (0.278) (0.000) (0.217) (0.094)
Constant -5.894*** -1.815*** -0.988 1.726*** -1.085 -0.949***
(0.767) (0.664) (0.864) (0.326) (0.794) (0.258)
Selection Equation Ommitted
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Censored Observations 1759 1372 1759 1837 1599 332
Log-Likelihood -716.0 -1425.9 -739.9 -580.2 -1076.6 -1615.6
Chi-Squared 849.6 40.8 29.7 . 37.1 1037.4
P Value 0.000 0.004 0.075 . 0.011 0.000
Rho 0.346 0.362 -0.105 -1.000 0.077 0.865
Wald (Rho=0) 0.42 4.24 0.11 12.99 0.03 5.02
Prob > chi2 0.5166 0.0394 0.7422 0.0003 0.8732 0.0250
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm requested public service, 0 otherwise (Table A.1).
Dependent Variable in outcome equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was requested/expected from the firm, 0
otherwise. (Huber-White) Heteroscedastic Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The base group for
state-dummies is Abia state. The base group for sector dummies is “Other - Manufacturing”.
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Table A.9: Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On All Firms (ES)
telecoms2 electric2 water2 construction2 import2 tax2
Outcome Equation
foreign 0.079 -0.234 -3.811*** -3.803** -0.504 -0.744
(0.804) (0.716) (0.463) (1.778) (0.794) (0.499)
security 0.257** 0.283*** 0.015 0.163 0.276** 0.131**
(0.124) (0.077) (0.137) (0.183) (0.111) (0.053)
age 0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)
trade 0.260 0.033 0.538 1.022 0.008 0.111
(0.335) (0.333) (0.700) (0.648) (0.330) (0.204)
ic telecom 0.430*** 0.266*** 0.302** 0.067 0.117 0.048
(0.138) (0.079) (0.139) (0.149) (0.105) (0.054)
ic elec -0.648 -0.014 -0.109 -0.173 -0.632** -0.348**
(0.453) (0.300) (0.384) (0.365) (0.280) (0.138)
ic trans -0.027 0.014 0.122 0.003 0.050 0.266***
(0.186) (0.119) (0.185) (0.240) (0.160) (0.078)
ic land 0.031 -0.007 0.213 -0.097 0.167 -0.096*
(0.129) (0.089) (0.146) (0.194) (0.114) (0.056)
ic taxrates 0.223 -0.014 -0.067 0.204 0.231 0.284***
(0.231) (0.118) (0.187) (0.244) (0.158) (0.100)
ic taxadmin -0.031 0.206* 0.035 0.363 -0.010 -0.169**
(0.214) (0.106) (0.185) (0.258) (0.140) (0.079)
ic customs 0.017 -0.062 -0.225 0.173 -0.032 -0.069
(0.126) (0.083) (0.137) (0.179) (0.105) (0.055)
ic laborregs 0.148 0.137 0.031 0.283 0.035 0.236***
(0.151) (0.090) (0.148) (0.212) (0.115) (0.063)
ic educlabour 0.203 -0.009 0.030 -0.152 0.135 -0.188***
(0.142) (0.090) (0.148) (0.174) (0.118) (0.060)
ic buslic 0.279* 0.228** 0.331** 0.639** 0.027 0.227***
(0.150) (0.091) (0.150) (0.323) (0.134) (0.063)
ic accfin 0.339* 0.005 0.441* 0.494 -0.379** -0.092
(0.199) (0.129) (0.243) (0.347) (0.186) (0.095)
ic costfin -0.329 0.227* -0.208 -0.687 0.247 0.005
(0.204) (0.133) (0.231) (0.504) (0.199) (0.100)
ic polenviro -0.304* -0.202** -0.086 -0.308 -0.253** 0.077
(0.166) (0.095) (0.170) (0.204) (0.122) (0.067)
ic macroenviro -0.022 0.051 -0.059 -0.291 0.028 -0.180**
(0.189) (0.105) (0.177) (0.224) (0.146) (0.071)
ic corr -0.062 0.143 0.333* 0.194 0.448*** 0.191**
(0.175) (0.115) (0.201) (0.212) (0.164) (0.078)
ic crime 0.036 0.113 -0.123 -0.283 0.091 0.173**
(0.182) (0.111) (0.180) (0.296) (0.158) (0.077)
ic informal 0.454** 0.177* -0.128 -0.129 0.296** 0.272***
(0.187) (0.103) (0.169) (0.252) (0.140) (0.069)
Constant -1.505** -1.403*** -1.343** 0.455 -0.863** -1.267***
(0.596) (0.358) (0.580) (1.596) (0.404) (0.165)
Selection Equation omitted
Observations 3668 3668 3668 3668 3668 3668
Censored Observations 3031 2226 3128 3307 2794 706
Log-Likelihood -1847.3 -3130.7 -1689.5 -1327.5 -2375.2 -3295.9
Chi-Squared 40.7 110.6 214.4 20.3 47.8 169.4
P Value 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.505 0.001 0.000
Rho 0.315 0.136 0.225 -0.427 0.140 0.920
Wald (Rho=0) 1.33 0.62 0.74 0.14 0.45 2.91
Prob>Chi2 0.2484 0.4301 0.3891 0.7083 0.5033 0.0881
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm requested public service, 0 otherwise. Dependent
Variable in outcome equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was requested/expected from the firm, 0 otherwise.
(Huber-White) Heteroscedastic Robust standard errors in parenthesis. The base group for state-dummies is
Abia state. The base group for sector dummies is “Rest Of Universe - Other”.
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Table A.10: Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further
Estimations On Manufacturing Companies (NBS)
customs2 road2 goods gov2 lic2 enviro2 res work2 vehicle2 police2 traffic2
Outcome Equation
foreign 0.378 0.576 4.327 0.390* 0.742*** 2.561 0.192 7.202 0.153
(0.377) (0.393) . (0.208) (0.260) . (2.559) . (0.127)
security . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
age -0.020 0.004 0.197*** 0.000 -0.035*** -0.481 -0.001 -0.033*** 0.002
(0.021) (0.010) (0.024) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.054) (0.011) (0.008)
trade . -0.572* 7.229 -0.405*** -2.120*** -3.344 -0.007 -12.842 -0.244
. (0.341) . (0.153) (0.446) (0.000) (14.712) (0.000) (0.158)
obs tax regs -0.555*** 0.014 3.985*** -0.511*** -1.718*** -0.142 -0.193 5.987 0.333**
(0.196) (0.331) (0.368) (0.177) (0.384) (0.000) (2.575) . (0.133)
obs infl -1.127*** -0.021 -0.054 -0.168 -5.192 -0.551 -0.423 -9.151 -0.151
(0.424) (0.240) (0.293) (0.244) (0.000) (0.000) (10.413) (0.000) (0.170)
obs pol 0.537 -0.038 15.692 0.016 4.520*** 0.172 0.009 7.774 0.312
(0.356) (0.198) . (0.183) (0.348) . (6.717) . (0.195)
obs change law -1.244*** -0.431 31.387 -0.105 1.651*** -10.019 -0.052 -16.589 -0.220*
(0.460) (0.351) . (0.156) (0.382) (0.000) (9.801) (0.000) (0.128)
obs crime 0.362 0.053 -6.093 0.440 -1.724 -11.477 0.287 6.437 0.160
(0.427) (0.514) (0.000) (0.400) (0.000) (0.000) (0.308) . (0.106)
obs corr -0.729* 0.672 -33.677 -0.457 -0.759 16.254 0.673 -18.582*** -0.137
(0.437) (0.648) (0.000) (0.427) (0.000) . (1.057) (0.178) (0.151)
obs bus reg 0.721*** -0.035 6.170 0.340 3.508*** -0.305 0.103 46.435 0.153**
(0.222) (0.212) . (0.439) (0.297) (0.000) (1.390) . (0.060)
obs unclear laws 1.108** 0.247 -11.837*** -0.057 1.521 3.421 0.141 -25.227 -0.053
(0.506) (0.274) (0.112) (0.129) . . (0.548) (0.000) (0.090)
Constant 0.865 -3.091*** -17.622 1.994*** -2.587*** 4.628 -0.928 23.565 0.481
(0.816) (1.160) (0.000) (0.407) (0.812) . (0.000) . (0.494)
Selection Equation
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -5.836*** -5.546 -4.766*** -5.427*** -5.165*** -4.201*** -5.441 -4.402*** -5.498
(1.565) . (0.074) (0.116) (0.089) (0.097) (17.371) (0.102) .
Pseudo R-squared
Observations 314 309 325 314 309 320 309 320 315
Censored Observations 274 256 305 272 271 281 256 293 273
Log-Likelihood -108.8 -143.9 -63.0 -117.3 -100.4 -99.9 -139.0 -78.7 -129.3
Chi-Squared 38.1 . . 2634580.1 . . 2147.8 . .
P Value 0.000 . . 0.000 . . 0.000 . .
Rho 1.000 1.000 -0.995 -1.000 -1.000 1.000 -1.000 -0.998 -1.000
Wald (Rho=0) 4.76 3.11 . 319.10 213.35 0.10 0.01 0.46 42.64
Prob>Chi2 0.0292 0.0776 . 0.0000 0.0000 0.7561 0.9371 0.4998 0.0000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm met with public official, 0
otherwise (Table A.1). Dependent Variable in outcome equation is Dummy=1 if a bribe was
paid to the official, 0 otherwise. The base group for state-dummies is Abia state.
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Table A.11: Secondary Bivariate Probit Model With Sample Selection - Further Estimations On All Firms (NBS)
customs2 road2 goods gov2 lic2 goods priv2 enviro2 res work2 vehicle2 police2 traffic2 court2
none none none none none none none none none none none
Outcome Equation
foreign -0.016 0.031 0.049 0.056 0.176 -0.151 0.010 -0.107 -0.274 -0.195 -0.424
(0.584) (0.258) (0.060) (0.595) (0.307) (0.341) (0.157) (0.195) (0.182) (0.151) (1.896)
security . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
age -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.018* -0.000 -0.004 -0.007* -0.000
(0.057) (0.006) (0.001) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
trade . -0.062 -0.033 0.094 -0.244 -0.250 -0.433*** 0.256* -0.111 -0.205 -0.219
. (0.222) (0.026) (0.442) (0.255) (0.312) (0.165) (0.153) (0.147) (0.153) (0.929)
obs tax regs 0.045 0.118 -0.032* -0.029 0.200 0.087 0.021 0.079 0.169** 0.033 -0.000
(1.434) (0.120) (0.017) (0.267) (0.167) (0.143) (0.092) (0.087) (0.072) (0.088) (1.317)
obs infl 0.487 -0.167 0.269*** -0.046 0.307 0.175 -0.114 -0.071 0.044 -0.116 -0.266
(2.929) (0.171) (0.044) (0.290) (0.211) (0.200) (0.108) (0.110) (0.149) (0.099) (0.837)
obs pol -0.152 0.263 0.036 0.163 -0.036 0.026 0.241** 0.140 0.079 0.184** 0.023
(0.439) (0.201) (0.054) (0.343) (0.236) (0.213) (0.118) (0.104) (0.114) (0.088) (0.191)
obs change law 0.072 -0.074 0.202*** -0.061 -0.040 -0.032 -0.215 -0.066 -0.052 -0.033 -0.041
(0.387) (0.159) (0.022) (0.298) (0.175) (0.192) (0.200) (0.109) (0.102) (0.083) (0.071)
obs crime -0.385 -0.072 -0.145*** -0.182 -0.427 -0.309 0.027 0.173 0.197 -0.099 0.238
(0.638) (0.234) (0.010) (0.290) (0.327) (0.287) (0.169) (0.170) (0.181) (0.153) (0.426)
obs corr 0.139 0.413* 0.211*** 0.109 0.738** 0.175 0.293 0.230 -0.177 0.205* 0.205
(1.920) (0.216) (0.027) (0.191) (0.346) (0.322) (0.224) (0.146) (0.160) (0.105) (1.290)
obs bus reg -0.035 0.034 -0.055 0.221 0.202 0.377 0.001 -0.080 0.012 -0.052 0.158
(0.111) (0.156) (0.057) (0.396) (0.231) (0.277) (0.088) (0.095) (0.080) (0.086) (0.784)
obs unclear laws -0.053 -0.205 -0.127*** -0.125 -0.213 -0.197 -0.066 -0.020 0.021 0.030 -0.092
(2.357) (0.154) (0.032) (0.238) (0.177) (0.240) (0.147) (0.071) (0.100) (0.071) (0.772)
Constant -2.287 -2.478*** 0.599*** -1.827 -4.277*** -1.966* -2.375*** -3.156*** -2.415*** -1.975*** 0.939
(3.058) (0.519) (0.087) (1.614) (0.858) (1.130) (0.556) (0.532) (0.370) (0.545) (1.157)
Selection Equation omitted
Observations 2035 2004 2045 1996 2044 2010 2035 1980 2025 2028 2050
Censored Observations 1935 1821 1950 1813 1942 1852 1917 1756 1877 1880 1964
Log-Likelihood -374.2 -638.1 -388.3 -640.6 -406.3 -565.7 -432.5 -749.9 -572.9 -551.9 -334.9
Chi-Squared . 7.6 18022.1 4.9 28.7 4.3 51.5 12.1 17.4 20.2 5791.6
P Value . 0.750 0.000 0.937 0.003 0.960 0.000 0.353 0.096 0.042 0.000
Rho 1.000 0.671 -1.000 0.816 1.000 0.430 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.000
Wald (Rho=0) . 2.28 61.01 0.06 132.55 0.19 0.48 6.69 0.67 5.24 0.10
Prob>Chi2 . 0.1309 0.0000 0.8079 0.0000 0.6609 0.4868 0.0097 0.4131 0.0221 0.7562
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent Variable in selection equation is Dummy=1 if firm met with public official, 0 otherwise (Table A.1). Dependent Variable in outcome equation is
Dummy=1 if a bribe was paid to the official, 0 otherwise. The base group for state-dummies is Abia state. The base group for sector dummies is “Other
community, social and personal services”.
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A.1.2 Further Tables
Table A.12: Summary Statistics For NBS
Data
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
yrcomm 336 1,987 13.90 1,946 2,007
male 336 0.905 0.294 0 1
employee 336 2.045 1.180 1 4
obs tax regs 312 1.939 0.756 1 3
obs infl 315 2.594 0.570 1 3
obs pol 312 2.401 0.724 1 3
obs change law 294 2.252 0.747 1 3
obs crime 322 2.699 0.606 1 3
obs corr 315 2.667 0.628 1 3
obs bus reg 293 2 0.717 1 3
obs unclear laws 259 2.116 0.784 1 3
advantage
informal
239 2.318 1.065 1 4
bribe offer official 285 3.144 1.012 1 4
bribe demand
official
283 3.237 0.981 1 4
bribe knowledge
amount
256 3.367 0.940 1 4
bribe offer
foreign official
249 3.695 0.704 1 4
bribe demand
foreign official
246 3.744 0.629 1 4
corr customs 272 3.195 1.029 1 4
corr car 284 3.380 0.934 1 4
corr buy gov 261 3.368 0.966 1 4
corr authorisation 265 3.264 1.014 1 4
corr bus permit 286 3.161 1.067 1 4
corr buy priv 246 3.443 0.878 1 4
corr enviro regs 281 3.231 1.025 1 4
corr sanitary regs 284 3.222 1.024 1 4
corr hs regs 262 3.401 0.941 1 4
corr liti 226 3.619 0.746 1 4
corr permit 248 3.403 0.956 1 4
corr pub proc 233 3.446 0.937 1 4
corr trade lic 237 3.451 0.922 1 4
corr courts 238 3.622 0.768 1 4
bribe dummy direct 336 0.116 0.321 0 1
Table A.13: Summary Statistics For NBS
Data, (cont’d)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
conda 336 0.176 0.381 0 1
condb 336 0.226 0.419 0 1
condc 336 0.0774 0.268 0 1
condd 336 0.185 0.388 0 1
conde 336 0.0863 0.281 0 1
condf 336 0.188 0.391 0 1
condg 336 0.152 0.359 0 1
condh 336 0.229 0.421 0 1
condi 336 0.122 0.328 0 1
condj 336 0.182 0.386 0 1
condk 336 0.0714 0.258 0 1
bribea 336 0.0536 0.226 0 1
bribeb 336 0.0446 0.207 0 1
bribec 336 0.0179 0.133 0 1
bribed 336 0.0476 0.213 0 1
bribee 336 0.00893 0.0942 0 1
bribef 336 0.0565 0.231 0 1
bribeg 336 0.0268 0.162 0 1
bribeh 336 0.0595 0.237 0 1
bribei 336 0.0565 0.231 0 1
bribej 336 0.0923 0.290 0 1
bribek 336 0.0208 0.143 0 1
bribe naira 336 6,262 54,876 0 800,000
bribe dummy
indirect
336 0.176 0.381 0 1
bribe dummy 336 0.226 0.419 0 1
foreign 336 0.295 0.457 0 1
security 336 1 0 1 1
age 336 20.41 13.90 0 61
lage 335 2.686 0.945 0 4.111
trade 336 0.176 0.381 0 1
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Table A.15: Bribery, by Region
Dummy=1 if bribe
paid, 0 otherwise
region 0 1 Total Observations
abia Freq 28.0 26.0 54.0 54
Cell% 1.4 1.3 2.7
Row% 51.9 48.1 100.0
Col% 2.9 2.5 2.7
adamawa Freq 8.0 28.0 36.0 36
Cell% 0.4 1.4 1.8
Row% 22.2 77.8 100.0
Col% 0.8 2.7 1.8
akwa ibom
Freq
9.0 48.0 57.0 57
Cell% 0.4 2.4 2.8
Row% 15.8 84.2 100.0
Col% 0.9 4.7 2.8
anambra Freq 28.0 25.0 53.0 53
Cell% 1.4 1.2 2.6
Row% 52.8 47.2 100.0
Col% 2.9 2.4 2.6
bauchi Freq 42.0 18.0 60.0 60
Cell% 2.1 0.9 3.0
Row% 70.0 30.0 100.0
Col% 4.3 1.7 3.0
bayelsa Freq 4.0 6.0 10.0 10
Cell% 0.2 0.3 0.5
Row% 40.0 60.0 100.0
Col% 0.4 0.6 0.5
benue Freq 0.0 60.0 60.0 60
Cell% 0.0 3.0 3.0
Row% 0.0 100.0 100.0
Col% 0.0 5.8 3.0
borno Freq 26.0 20.0 46.0 46
Cell% 1.3 1.0 2.3
Row% 56.5 43.5 100.0
Col% 2.7 1.9 2.3
cross river Freq 33.0 12.0 45.0 45
Cell% 1.6 0.6 2.2
Row% 73.3 26.7 100.0
Col% 3.4 1.2 2.2
delta Freq 28.0 12.0 40.0 40
Cell% 1.4 0.6 2.0
Row% 70.0 30.0 100.0
Col% 2.9 1.2 2.0
ebonyi Freq 27.0 38.0 65.0 65
Cell% 1.3 1.9 3.2
Row% 41.5 58.5 100.0
Col% 2.8 3.7 3.2
edo Freq 20.0 18.0 38.0 38
Cell% 1.0 0.9 1.9
Row% 52.6 47.4 100.0
Col% 2.1 1.7 1.9
ekiti Freq 18.0 44.0 62.0 62
Cell% 0.9 2.2 3.1
Row% 29.0 71.0 100.0
Col% 1.9 4.3 3.1
enugu Freq 29.0 25.0 54.0 54
Cell% 1.4 1.2 2.7
Row% 53.7 46.3 100.0
Col% 3.0 2.4 2.7
gombe Freq 39.0 23.0 62.0 62
Cell% 1.9 1.1 3.1
Row% 62.9 37.1 100.0
Col% 4.0 2.2 3.1
imo Freq 4.0 34.0 38.0 38
Cell% 0.2 1.7 1.9
Row% 10.5 89.5 100.0
Col% 0.4 3.3 1.9
Table A.16: Bribery, by Region, (cont’d)
Dummy=1 if bribe
paid, 0 otherwise
region 0 1 Total Obs.
jigawa Freq 37.0 27.0 64.0 64
Cell% 1.8 1.3 3.2
Row% 57.8 42.2 100.0
Col% 3.8 2.6 3.2
kaduna Freq 54.0 22.0 76.0 76
Cell% 2.7 1.1 3.8
Row% 71.1 28.9 100.0
Col% 5.6 2.1 3.8
kano Freq 60.0 35.0 95.0 95
Cell% 3.0 1.7 4.7
Row% 63.2 36.8 100.0
Col% 6.2 3.4 4.7
katsina Freq 44.0 17.0 61.0 61
Cell% 2.2 0.8 3.0
Row% 72.1 27.9 100.0
Col% 4.5 1.7 3.0
kebbi Freq 34.0 32.0 66.0 66
Cell% 1.7 1.6 3.3
Row% 51.5 48.5 100.0
Col% 3.5 3.1 3.3
kogi Freq 1.0 32.0 33.0 33
Cell% 0.0 1.6 1.6
Row% 3.0 97.0 100.0
Col% 0.1 3.1 1.6
kwara Freq 22.0 27.0 49.0 49
Cell% 1.1 1.3 2.4
Row% 44.9 55.1 100.0
Col% 2.3 2.6 2.4
lagos Freq 89.0 21.0 110.0 110
Cell% 4.4 1.0 5.5
Row% 80.9 19.1 100.0
Col% 9.2 2.0 5.5
nassarawa Freq 1.0 60.0 61.0 61
Cell% 0.0 3.0 3.0
Row% 1.6 98.4 100.0
Col% 0.1 5.8 3.0
niger Freq 38.0 38.0 76.0 76
Cell% 1.9 1.9 3.8
Row% 50.0 50.0 100.0
Col% 3.9 3.7 3.8
ogun Freq 50.0 30.0 80.0 80
Cell% 2.5 1.5 4.0
Row% 62.5 37.5 100.0
Col% 5.1 2.9 4.0
ondo Freq 27.0 24.0 51.0 51
Cell% 1.3 1.2 2.5
Row% 52.9 47.1 100.0
Col% 2.8 2.3 2.5
osun Freq 34.0 21.0 55.0 55
Cell% 1.7 1.0 2.7
Row% 61.8 38.2 100.0
Col% 3.5 2.0 2.7
oyo Freq 18.0 12.0 30.0 30
Cell% 0.9 0.6 1.5
Row% 60.0 40.0 100.0
Col% 1.9 1.2 1.5
plateau Freq 27.0 24.0 51.0 51
Cell% 1.3 1.2 2.5
Row% 52.9 47.1 100.0
Col% 2.8 2.3 2.5
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Table A.17: Bribery, by Region, (cont’d)
Dummy=1 if bribe paid, 0 otherwise
region 0 1 Total Observations
rivers Freq 7.0 25.0 32.0 32
Cell% 0.3 1.2 1.6
Row% 21.9 78.1 100.0
Col% 0.7 2.4 1.6
sokoto Freq 21.0 19.0 40.0 40
Cell% 1.0 0.9 2.0
Row% 52.5 47.5 100.0
Col% 2.2 1.8 2.0
taraba Freq 0.0 35.0 35.0 35
Cell% 0.0 1.7 1.7
Row% 0.0 100.0 100.0
Col% 0.0 3.4 1.7
yobe Freq 0.0 15.0 15.0 15
Cell% 0.0 0.7 0.7
Row% 0.0 100.0 100.0
Col% 0.0 1.5 0.7
zamfara Freq 27.0 47.0 74.0 74
Cell% 1.3 2.3 3.7
Row% 36.5 63.5 100.0
Col% 2.8 4.6 3.7
FCT (abuja) Freq 38.0 29.0 67.0 67
Cell% 1.9 1.4 3.3
Row% 56.7 43.3 100.0
Col% 3.9 2.8 3.3
Total Freq 972.0 1029.0 2001.0 2,001
Cell% 48.6 51.4 100.0
Row% 48.6 51.4 100.0
Col% 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table A.18: Bribery, by Industry
Dummy=1 if bribe paid, 0 otherwise
industry 0 1 Total Observations
mfg - food Freq 208.0 165.0 373.0 373
Cell% 10.4 8.2 18.6
Row% 55.8 44.2 100.0
Col% 21.4 16.0 18.6
mfg - garments Freq 197.0 148.0 345.0 345
Cell% 9.8 7.4 17.2
Row% 57.1 42.9 100.0
Col% 20.3 14.4 17.2
mfg - textiles Freq 11.0 10.0 21.0 21
Cell% 0.5 0.5 1.0
Row% 52.4 47.6 100.0
Col% 1.1 1.0 1.0
mfg - machinery & equipment Freq 9.0 7.0 16.0 16
Cell% 0.4 0.3 0.8
Row% 56.3 43.8 100.0
Col% 0.9 0.7 0.8
mfg - chemicals Freq 9.0 12.0 21.0 21
Cell% 0.4 0.6 1.0
Row% 42.9 57.1 100.0
Col% 0.9 1.2 1.0
mfg - electronics Freq 5.0 1.0 6.0 6
Cell% 0.2 0.0 0.3
Row% 83.3 16.7 100.0
Col% 0.5 0.1 0.3
mfg - non-metallic minerals Freq 89.0 106.0 195.0 195
Cell% 4.4 5.3 9.7
Row% 45.6 54.4 100.0
Col% 9.2 10.3 9.7
mfg - wood, wood products & furniture Freq 210.0 264.0 474.0 474
Cell% 10.5 13.2 23.7
Row% 44.3 55.7 100.0
Col% 21.6 25.7 23.7
mfg - metal & metal products Freq 149.0 147.0 296.0 296
Cell% 7.4 7.3 14.8
Row% 50.3 49.7 100.0
Col% 15.3 14.3 14.8
mfg - other manufacturing Freq 85.0 169.0 254.0 254
Cell% 4.2 8.4 12.7
Row% 33.5 66.5 100.0
Col% 8.7 16.4 12.7
Total Freq 972.0 1029.0 2001.0 2,001
Cell% 48.6 51.4 100.0
Row% 48.6 51.4 100.0
Col% 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table A.19: Bribery, by Industry, with 95% Confidence Intervals
Dummy=1 if bribe paid, 0 otherwise
industry 0 1 Total Observations
Row% (Std.Err.) 95% C.I Row% (Std.Err.) 95% C.I Row%
mfg - food 61.9 (8.4) [44.6,76.7] 38.1 (8.4) [23.3,55.4] 100.0 373
mfg - garments 57.5 (3.6) [50.3,64.4] 42.5 (3.6) [35.6,49.7] 100.0 345
mfg - textiles 34.7 (12.7) [15.1,61.4] 65.3 (12.7) [38.6,84.9] 100.0 21
mfg - machinery & equipment 46.5 (17.9) [17.5,78.1] 53.5 (17.9) [21.9,82.5] 100.0 16
mfg - chemicals 36.8 (11.3) [18.2,60.2] 63.2 (11.3) [39.8,81.8] 100.0 21
mfg - electronics 89.7 (10.4) [48.8,98.7] 10.3 (10.4) [1.3,51.2] 100.0 6
mfg - non-metallic minerals 55.0 (5.7) [43.8,65.6] 45.0 (5.7) [34.4,56.2] 100.0 195
mfg - wood, wood products & furniture 47.3 (4.1) [39.5,55.3] 52.7 (4.1) [44.7,60.5] 100.0 474
mfg - metal & metal products 56.4 (6.2) [44.0,68.0] 43.6 (6.2) [32.0,56.0] 100.0 296
mfg - other manufacturing 32.5 (5.4) [22.8,43.9] 67.5 (5.4) [56.1,77.2] 100.0 254
Total 51.6 (2.5) [46.7,56.4] 48.4 (2.5) [43.6,53.3] 100.0 2,001
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Table A.20: Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region
0=no bribe, 1=sales,2=ngn,3=missing
region No Bribe Sales Reporter Naira Reporter Total Observations
abia Freq 28.0 18.0 8.0 54.0 54
Cell% 1.4 0.9 0.4 2.7
Row% 51.9 33.3 14.8 100.0
Col% 2.9 2.2 3.5 2.7
adamawa Freq 8.0 19.0 9.0 36.0 36
Cell% 0.4 0.9 0.4 1.8
Row% 22.2 52.8 25.0 100.0
Col% 0.8 2.4 4.0 1.8
akwa ibom Freq 9.0 22.0 26.0 57.0 57
Cell% 0.4 1.1 1.3 2.8
Row% 15.8 38.6 45.6 100.0
Col% 0.9 2.7 11.5 2.8
anambra Freq 28.0 14.0 11.0 53.0 53
Cell% 1.4 0.7 0.5 2.6
Row% 52.8 26.4 20.8 100.0
Col% 2.9 1.7 4.8 2.6
bauchi Freq 42.0 18.0 0.0 60.0 60
Cell% 2.1 0.9 0.0 3.0
Row% 70.0 30.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 4.3 2.2 0.0 3.0
bayelsa Freq 4.0 6.0 0.0 10.0 10
Cell% 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.5
Row% 40.0 60.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.5
benue Freq 0.0 38.0 22.0 60.0 60
Cell% 0.0 1.9 1.1 3.0
Row% 0.0 63.3 36.7 100.0
Col% 0.0 4.7 9.7 3.0
borno Freq 26.0 18.0 2.0 46.0 46
Cell% 1.3 0.9 0.1 2.3
Row% 56.5 39.1 4.3 100.0
Col% 2.7 2.2 0.9 2.3
cross river Freq 33.0 12.0 0.0 45.0 45
Cell% 1.6 0.6 0.0 2.2
Row% 73.3 26.7 0.0 100.0
Col% 3.4 1.5 0.0 2.2
delta Freq 28.0 1.0 11.0 40.0 40
Cell% 1.4 0.0 0.5 2.0
Row% 70.0 2.5 27.5 100.0
Col% 2.9 0.1 4.8 2.0
ebonyi Freq 27.0 31.0 7.0 65.0 65
Cell% 1.3 1.5 0.3 3.2
Row% 41.5 47.7 10.8 100.0
Col% 2.8 3.9 3.1 3.2
edo Freq 20.0 11.0 7.0 38.0 38
Cell% 1.0 0.5 0.3 1.9
Row% 52.6 28.9 18.4 100.0
Col% 2.1 1.4 3.1 1.9
ekiti Freq 18.0 41.0 3.0 62.0 62
Cell% 0.9 2.0 0.1 3.1
Row% 29.0 66.1 4.8 100.0
Col% 1.9 5.1 1.3 3.1
enugu Freq 29.0 17.0 8.0 54.0 54
Cell% 1.4 0.8 0.4 2.7
Row% 53.7 31.5 14.8 100.0
Col% 3.0 2.1 3.5 2.7
gombe Freq 39.0 19.0 4.0 62.0 62
Cell% 1.9 0.9 0.2 3.1
Row% 62.9 30.6 6.5 100.0
Col% 4.0 2.4 1.8 3.1
imo Freq 4.0 18.0 16.0 38.0 38
Cell% 0.2 0.9 0.8 1.9
Row% 10.5 47.4 42.1 100.0
Col% 0.4 2.2 7.0 1.9
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Table A.21: Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region (cont’d)
0=no bribe, 1=sales,2=ngn,3=missing
region No Bribe Sales Reporter Naira Reporter Total Observations
jigawa Freq 37.0 22.0 5.0 64.0 64
Cell% 1.8 1.1 0.2 3.2
Row% 57.8 34.4 7.8 100.0
Col% 3.8 2.7 2.2 3.2
kaduna Freq 54.0 17.0 5.0 76.0 76
Cell% 2.7 0.8 0.2 3.8
Row% 71.1 22.4 6.6 100.0
Col% 5.6 2.1 2.2 3.8
kano Freq 60.0 33.0 2.0 95.0 95
Cell% 3.0 1.6 0.1 4.7
Row% 63.2 34.7 2.1 100.0
Col% 6.2 4.1 0.9 4.7
katsina Freq 44.0 11.0 6.0 61.0 61
Cell% 2.2 0.5 0.3 3.0
Row% 72.1 18.0 9.8 100.0
Col% 4.5 1.4 2.6 3.0
kebbi Freq 34.0 28.0 4.0 66.0 66
Cell% 1.7 1.4 0.2 3.3
Row% 51.5 42.4 6.1 100.0
Col% 3.5 3.5 1.8 3.3
kogi Freq 1.0 32.0 0.0 33.0 33
Cell% 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6
Row% 3.0 97.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.1 4.0 0.0 1.6
kwara Freq 22.0 27.0 0.0 49.0 49
Cell% 1.1 1.3 0.0 2.4
Row% 44.9 55.1 0.0 100.0
Col% 2.3 3.4 0.0 2.4
lagos Freq 89.0 17.0 4.0 110.0 110
Cell% 4.4 0.8 0.2 5.5
Row% 80.9 15.5 3.6 100.0
Col% 9.2 2.1 1.8 5.5
nassarawa Freq 1.0 60.0 0.0 61.0 61
Cell% 0.0 3.0 0.0 3.0
Row% 1.6 98.4 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.1 7.5 0.0 3.0
niger Freq 38.0 33.0 5.0 76.0 76
Cell% 1.9 1.6 0.2 3.8
Row% 50.0 43.4 6.6 100.0
Col% 3.9 4.1 2.2 3.8
ogun Freq 50.0 28.0 2.0 80.0 80
Cell% 2.5 1.4 0.1 4.0
Row% 62.5 35.0 2.5 100.0
Col% 5.1 3.5 0.9 4.0
ondo Freq 27.0 21.0 3.0 51.0 51
Cell% 1.3 1.0 0.1 2.5
Row% 52.9 41.2 5.9 100.0
Col% 2.8 2.6 1.3 2.5
osun Freq 34.0 20.0 1.0 55.0 55
Cell% 1.7 1.0 0.0 2.7
Row% 61.8 36.4 1.8 100.0
Col% 3.5 2.5 0.4 2.7
oyo Freq 18.0 11.0 1.0 30.0 30
Cell% 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5
Row% 60.0 36.7 3.3 100.0
Col% 1.9 1.4 0.4 1.5
plateau Freq 27.0 22.0 2.0 51.0 51
Cell% 1.3 1.1 0.1 2.5
Row% 52.9 43.1 3.9 100.0
Col% 2.8 2.7 0.9 2.5
rivers Freq 7.0 1.0 24.0 32.0 32
Cell% 0.3 0.0 1.2 1.6
Row% 21.9 3.1 75.0 100.0
Col% 0.7 0.1 10.6 1.6
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Table A.22: Bribery Reporting Behaviour, by Region (cont’d)
0=no bribe, 1=sales,2=ngn,3=missing
region No Bribe Sales Reporter Naira Reporter Total Observations
sokoto Freq 21.0 13.0 6.0 40.0 40
Cell% 1.0 0.6 0.3 2.0
Row% 52.5 32.5 15.0 100.0
Col% 2.2 1.6 2.6 2.0
taraba Freq 0.0 17.0 18.0 35.0 35
Cell% 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.7
Row% 0.0 48.6 51.4 100.0
Col% 0.0 2.1 7.9 1.7
yobe Freq 0.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 15
Cell% 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7
Row% 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.7
zamfara Freq 27.0 47.0 0.0 74.0 74
Cell% 1.3 2.3 0.0 3.7
Row% 36.5 63.5 0.0 100.0
Col% 2.8 5.9 0.0 3.7
FCT (abuja) Freq 38.0 24.0 5.0 67.0 67
Cell% 1.9 1.2 0.2 3.3
Row% 56.7 35.8 7.5 100.0
Col% 3.9 3.0 2.2 3.3
Total Freq 972.0 802.0 227.0 2001.0 2,001
Cell% 48.6 40.1 11.3 100.0
Row% 48.6 40.1 11.3 100.0
Col% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table A.23: Correlation Matrix - WB
(1)
eprofit university foreign age security naira ind loc eprofit
eprofit 1
university 0.05∗ 1
foreign 0.01 0.05∗ 1
age -0.008 0.03 -0.004 1
security naira 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03 1
ind loc eprofit 0.2∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.002 -0.04 0.1∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.28: Estimations Using Heckman Two-Step Procedure
m1 m2 m3 m9 (OLS)
main
tax percentage -0.031 -0.020 -1.045 0.051
(0.124) (0.124) (1.507) (0.032)
eprofit 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.153*** 0.094***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.025)
capital labour 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.004 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002)
un sunk cost -165.540* -166.170* 552.696
(91.874) (92.014) (1076.681)
competitors 2 -0.823 -1.477 34.256 -2.717
(13.796) (13.830) (79.221) (7.437)
competitors 3 -5.508 -5.457 24.482 -1.674
(8.666) (8.687) (57.723) (4.518)
competitors 4 -11.208 -11.872 55.515 -7.244*
(10.272) (10.300) (103.909) (4.210)
gov customer 20.929 21.050 -55.304 16.781
(14.112) (14.145) (123.849) (14.474)
regulation realtime -0.594 -0.569 -3.223 0.013
(0.493) (0.494) (4.241) (0.190)
eexternal consultant naira 0.605*** 0.597*** 1.273 0.027
(0.153) (0.153) (1.122) (0.184)
african -3.637 -4.017 54.564 -6.632**
(9.132) (9.151) (90.450) (3.041)
trade -24.885** -16.972***
(11.805) (6.381)
infraserv -30.058 1.160
(43.219) (2.314)
eun sunk cost -88.986***
(24.672)
Constant -132.563 -134.154 689.522 5.397
(97.258) (97.407) (1218.583) (6.422)
bribe dummy
infraserv 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.174***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
trade -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.225) (0.225) (0.225)
tax percentage 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
eprofit 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
capital labour 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
un sunk cost -4.260*** -4.260*** -4.260***
(1.127) (1.127) (1.127)
competitors 2 -0.233 -0.233 -0.233
(0.280) (0.280) (0.280)
competitors 3 -0.204 -0.204 -0.204
(0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
competitors 4 -0.428** -0.428** -0.428**
(0.167) (0.167) (0.167)
gov customer 0.504* 0.504* 0.504*
(0.265) (0.265) (0.265)
regulation realtime 0.017** 0.017** 0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
eexternal consultant naira -0.004* -0.004* -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
african -0.382*** -0.382*** -0.382***
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146)
Constant -3.530*** -3.530*** -3.530***
(1.027) (1.027) (1.027)
Inverse-Mills Ratio 16 17 -253
(28.1) (28.2) (391.4)
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001
Censored Observations 972 972 972
Chi-Squared 711.3 713.4 38.2
F-Stat 4.83
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Dependent variable of selection equation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reported a positive bribe
payment; 0 otherwise. Dependent variable of outcome equation is bribe amount in ’000 Naira.
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Table A.29: IV Regressions
Model 1 (2SLS) Model 2 (GMM)
eprofit 0.195*** 0.000***
(0.072) (0.000)
employee total 0.202 0.014***
(0.156) (0.002)
ecapital stock 0.006 -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
eun sunk cost -154.942*** -4.419***
(53.232) (0.248)
infraserv -3.449 0.043***
(4.575) (0.013)
trade -25.196** -0.102
(10.454) (0.080)
tax percentage -0.063 0.004***
(0.053) (0.000)
Constant -2.858
(14.371)
Observations 1029.000 1029.000
Chi-Squared 34.61099
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent variable is bribe amount in ’000 Naira. 2SLS:
Identifying Instruments: Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder has university level
education; Dummy=1 if firm is foreign owned; age of firm; and amount (in ’000 Naira) spent on
security. GMM: Identifying Instruments: Grouped (Industry-Location) Average Profit Per
Employee (’000 Naira).
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Table A.30: Bribery, by Region (NBS
Data)
Dummy=1 if firm
admitted to bribing;
0 otherwise
region No Yes Total Sample
Size
Abia Freq 5.0 3.0 8.0 8
Cell% 1.5 0.9 2.4
Row% 62.5 37.5 100.0
Col% 1.9 3.9 2.4
Adamawa Freq 2.0 1.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.6 0.3 0.9
Row% 66.7 33.3 100.0
Col% 0.8 1.3 0.9
Akwa ibom
Freq
3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Anambra Freq 6.0 3.0 9.0 9
Cell% 1.8 0.9 2.7
Row% 66.7 33.3 100.0
Col% 2.3 3.9 2.7
Bauchi Freq 10.0 1.0 11.0 11
Cell% 3.0 0.3 3.3
Row% 90.9 9.1 100.0
Col% 3.8 1.3 3.3
Bayelsa Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Benue Freq 2.0 0.0 2.0 2
Cell% 0.6 0.0 0.6
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.8 0.0 0.6
Borno Freq 1.0 2.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.3 0.6 0.9
Row% 33.3 66.7 100.0
Col% 0.4 2.6 0.9
Cross river
Freq
1.0 0.0 1.0 1
Cell% 0.3 0.0 0.3
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.4 0.0 0.3
Delta Freq 4.0 4.0 8.0 8
Cell% 1.2 1.2 2.4
Row% 50.0 50.0 100.0
Col% 1.5 5.3 2.4
Ebonyi Freq 1.0 2.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.3 0.6 0.9
Row% 33.3 66.7 100.0
Col% 0.4 2.6 0.9
Edo Freq 6.0 2.0 8.0 8
Cell% 1.8 0.6 2.4
Row% 75.0 25.0 100.0
Col% 2.3 2.6 2.4
Ekiti Freq 7.0 1.0 8.0 8
Cell% 2.1 0.3 2.4
Row% 87.5 12.5 100.0
Col% 2.7 1.3 2.4
Enugu Freq 3.0 1.0 4.0 4
Cell% 0.9 0.3 1.2
Row% 75.0 25.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 1.3 1.2
Gombe Freq 3.0 1.0 4.0 4
Cell% 0.9 0.3 1.2
Row% 75.0 25.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 1.3 1.2
Table A.31: Bribery, by Region (NBS
Data) (cont’d)
Dummy=1 if firm
admitted to bribing;
0 otherwise
region No Yes Total Sample
Size
Imo Freq 2.0 0.0 2.0 2
Cell% 0.6 0.0 0.6
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.8 0.0 0.6
Jigawa Freq 8.0 0.0 8.0 8
Cell% 2.4 0.0 2.4
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 3.1 0.0 2.4
Kaduna Freq 9.0 1.0 10.0 10
Cell% 2.7 0.3 3.0
Row% 90.0 10.0 100.0
Col% 3.5 1.3 3.0
Kano Freq 19.0 3.0 22.0 22
Cell% 5.7 0.9 6.5
Row% 86.4 13.6 100.0
Col% 7.3 3.9 6.5
Katsina Freq 10.0 4.0 14.0 14
Cell% 3.0 1.2 4.2
Row% 71.4 28.6 100.0
Col% 3.8 5.3 4.2
Kebbi Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Kogi Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Kwara Freq 1.0 4.0 5.0 5
Cell% 0.3 1.2 1.5
Row% 20.0 80.0 100.0
Col% 0.4 5.3 1.5
Lagos Freq 103.0 34.0 137.0 137
Cell% 30.7 10.1 40.8
Row% 75.2 24.8 100.0
Col% 39.6 44.7 40.8
Nassarawa
Freq
4.0 1.0 5.0 5
Cell% 1.2 0.3 1.5
Row% 80.0 20.0 100.0
Col% 1.5 1.3 1.5
Niger Freq 1.0 2.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.3 0.6 0.9
Row% 33.3 66.7 100.0
Col% 0.4 2.6 0.9
Ogun Freq 8.0 1.0 9.0 9
Cell% 2.4 0.3 2.7
Row% 88.9 11.1 100.0
Col% 3.1 1.3 2.7
Ondo Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Osun Freq 7.0 0.0 7.0 7
Cell% 2.1 0.0 2.1
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 2.7 0.0 2.1
Oyo Freq 4.0 1.0 5.0 5
Cell% 1.2 0.3 1.5
Row% 80.0 20.0 100.0
Col% 1.5 1.3 1.5
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Table A.32: Bribery, by Region (NBS Data) (cont’d)
Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
region No Yes Total Sample Size
Plateau Freq 6.0 2.0 8.0 8
Cell% 1.8 0.6 2.4
Row% 75.0 25.0 100.0
Col% 2.3 2.6 2.4
Sokoto Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Taraba Freq 1.0 0.0 1.0 1
Cell% 0.3 0.0 0.3
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 0.4 0.0 0.3
Yobe Freq 3.0 0.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.9 0.0 0.9
Row% 100.0 0.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 0.0 0.9
Zamfara Freq 2.0 1.0 3.0 3
Cell% 0.6 0.3 0.9
Row% 66.7 33.3 100.0
Col% 0.8 1.3 0.9
FCT (Abuja) Freq 3.0 1.0 4.0 4
Cell% 0.9 0.3 1.2
Row% 75.0 25.0 100.0
Col% 1.2 1.3 1.2
Total Freq 260.0 76.0 336.0 336
Cell% 77.4 22.6 100.0
Row% 77.4 22.6 100.0
Col% 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table A.33: Summary Statistics Of Bribery And Meeting With Officials - NBS
Data (Manu. and Full)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing: Bribery/ Meet-
ing With Official
Full Sample: Bribery/ Meeting
With Official
All Firms Met With
An Official
Bribing
Firms
All Firms Met With
An Official
Bribing
Firms
Met With An Official 0.37 1 1 0.31 1 1
(Mean) Average Number Of Types Of
Officials Met With
1.66
(2.72)
4.43 (2.74) 4.20
(2.50)
1.09
(2.07)
3.49 (2.32) 3.49
(2.33)
Bribery Episode 0.14 0.36 1 0.10 0.33 1
(Mean)Number Of Types Of Bribery
Episodes
0.44
(1.39)
1.16 (2.07) 3.20
(2.31)
0.28
(1.07)
0.90 (1.76) 2.67
(2.12)
Observations 331 124 45 2089 651 218
(Mean)Value Of Bribes (’000 )() 0.616
(4.56)
1.65 (7.36) 3.43
(9.49)
0.71
(4.55)
2.28 (7.93) 6.29
(12.25)
The unit of observation is the firm. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table A.34: Cross-Tabulations Of The Payment Of Bribes, By Interactions With
Public Officials (NBS Data)
Conda: Clearing goods through customshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 277 0 277
Yes 41 18 59
Total 318 18 336
P(bribea|conda)=(18/336)÷(59/336)=0.31
Condb: Obtaining Road Worthy CertificateshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 260 0 260
Yes 61 15 76
Total 321 15 336
P(bribeb|condb)=(15/336)÷(76/336)=0.20
Condc: Procurement of goods and services from the governmenthhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 310 0 310
Yes 20 6 26
Total 330 6 336
P(bribec|condc)=(6/336)÷(26/336)=0.26
Condd: Obtaining business licenses and permitshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 274 0 274
Yes 46 16 62
Total 320 16 336
P(bribed|condd)=(16/336)÷(62/336)=0.3
Conde: Procurement of goods and services from private companieshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 307 0 307
Yes 26 3 29
Total 333 3 336
P(bribee|conde)=(3/336)÷(29/336)=0.10
Condf: Getting clearance for environmental or sanitary regulationshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 273 0 273
Yes 44 19 63
Total 317 19 336
P(bribef|condf)=(19/336)÷(63/336)=0.30
Condg: Residence and work permitshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 285 0 285
Yes 42 9 51
Total 327 9 336
P(bribeg|condg)=(9/336)÷(51/336)=0.18
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Table A.35: Cross-Tabulations Of The Payment Of Bribes, By Interactions With
Public Officials (NBS Data) (cont’d)
Condh: Vehicle regulationshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 259 0 259
Yes 57 20 77
Total 316 20 336
P(bribeh|condh)=(20/336)÷(77/336)=0.26
Condi: Police InvestigationshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 295 0 295
Yes 22 19 41
Total 317 19 336
P(bribei|condi)=(19/336)÷(41/336)=0.46
Condj: Traffic OffenceshhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 275 0 275
Yes 30 31 61
Total 305 31 336
P(bribej|condj)=(31/336)÷(61/336)=0.51
Condk: Contact with the courthhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhOperation Performed
Bribe Paid
No Yes Total
No 312 0 312
Yes 17 7 24
Total 329 7 336
P(bribek|condk)=(7/336)÷(24/336)=0.29
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Table A.37: Censored Probit Models - NBS Data
Dependent Variable Conda Bribea Condb Bribeb Condc Bribec Condd Bribed Conde Bribee
employee 0.136** 0.969 -0.048 0.244 0.017 0.116 -0.028 -0.180 -0.125** 1.619
(0.057) (1.779) (0.048) (0.177) (0.062) (0.260) (0.052) (0.171) (0.063) (1.710)
foreign 0.416*** 2.430 -0.190 0.419 -0.184 1.986* -0.105 0.091 -0.130 2.477
(0.144) (5.451) (0.139) (0.596) (0.170) (1.146) (0.138) (0.405) (0.167) (1.607)
lage 0.017 -0.107 0.075 0.069 0.072 -0.316 -0.053 -0.115 0.105* -1.539
(0.059) (0.295) (0.051) (0.273) (0.070) (0.621) (0.052) (0.207) (0.061) (1.677)
trade 1.638*** -3.651 1.629*** 13.030** 1.434*** 1.844 1.513*** -23.999
(0.137) (4.653) (0.161) (5.324) (0.140) (2.373) (0.160) (20.649)
Constant -6.704*** -14.147 -6.255*** 3.302 -0.959* -24.024 -5.997* 1.352 -0.915* 26.230
(1.240) (29.120) (1.972) (5.867) (0.492) (.) (3.429) (2.287) (0.474) (33.770)
Inverse-Mills Ratio 8.806 -2.968 10.520** 2.125 -22.210
(17.385) (4.185) (4.522) (2.465) (18.787)
Industry Dummies YES
State Dummies YES
Region-State Dummies YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.115 0.193 0.176 0.241 0.410 0.177 0.083 0.195 0.178
Observations 864 88 1210 119 904 47 1198 109 997 25
Log-Likelihood -362 -49 -515 -61 -296 -19 -529 -65 -337 -13
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.38: Censored Probit Models - NBS Data (cont’d)
Dependent Variable Condf Bribef Condg Bribeg Condh Bribeh Condi Bribei Condj Bribej Condk Bribek
employee 0.045 -0.057 -0.000 -0.109 -0.011 -0.183 0.148*** -0.106 -0.004 -0.008 0.199*** -0.628
(0.055) (0.191) (0.056) (0.200) (0.047) (0.144) (0.052) (0.235) (0.050) (0.174) (0.066) (0.468)
foreign -0.263* 0.316 0.171 -1.032 -0.172 0.320 -0.141 -0.266 0.037 -0.125 -0.166 0.546
(0.144) (0.511) (0.145) (0.767) (0.126) (0.533) (0.149) (0.492) (0.136) (0.418) (0.181) (0.853)
lage 0.039 -0.360 -0.078 0.337 0.089* 0.249 -0.003 -0.575** 0.121** 0.239 0.161** -1.447
(0.053) (0.233) (0.060) (0.250) (0.050) (0.274) (0.056) (0.234) (0.058) (0.768) (0.077) (0.952)
trade 1.604*** -1.619 1.514*** -12.085*** 1.649*** 1.438 1.613*** -2.464 1.164*** -0.821 1.423*** -4.947**
(0.151) (2.067) (0.140) (3.706) (0.137) (4.023) (0.147) (1.658) (0.132) (6.777) (0.187) (2.084)
Constant -0.929** 9.105*** -6.090*** 12.767*** -0.988** -8.228 -0.959** 11.392** -1.096** -0.919 -6.753*** 13.371**
(0.462) (2.997) (0.999) (4.417) (0.466) (.) (0.464) (5.403) (0.471) (12.667) (2.265) (6.036)
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.603 -10.390*** 1.310 -2.831* 0.388 -4.942**
(1.982) (3.496) (3.634) (1.484) (7.936) (2.480)
Industry Dummies YES
State Dummies YES
Region-State Dummies YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.202 0.160 0.219 0.268 0.179 0.128 0.214 0.149 0.143 0.214 0.256 0.315
Observations 1047 98 945 81 1337 122 1083 82 1087 91 853 20
Log-Likelihood -447 -55 -354 -36 -610 -68 -421 -48 -465 -49 -269 -9
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.39: Censored Probit Models - 1st Stage
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a
industry1 -0.248 0.703*** 0.118 -0.145 0.048
(0.355) (0.246) (0.251) (0.225) (0.270)
industry2 0.666 0.082
(0.594) (0.573)
industry3 0.155 0.252 -0.105 0.248 0.318
(0.390) (0.348) (0.370) (0.268) (0.322)
industry4 0.941*** 1.036*** 0.212 0.381** 0.346
(0.232) (0.215) (0.206) (0.169) (0.213)
industry5 -0.261 0.850*** 0.218 -0.106 0.175
(0.452) (0.274) (0.292) (0.274) (0.311)
industry6 0.410 0.871*** 0.346 0.425** 0.056
(0.288) (0.249) (0.248) (0.207) (0.284)
industry7 0.594** 0.629*** 0.197 0.394** 0.450**
(0.240) (0.223) (0.212) (0.173) (0.215)
industry8 0.285 0.513** -0.135 0.293 0.228
(0.283) (0.251) (0.271) (0.200) (0.253)
industry9 0.570** 0.631*** -0.047 0.188 0.245
(0.245) (0.227) (0.228) (0.181) (0.225)
industry10 0.202 0.374 -0.130 0.086 0.140
(0.279) (0.250) (0.258) (0.200) (0.249)
industry11 0.430 0.555* 0.396 0.164 0.366
(0.333) (0.302) (0.288) (0.262) (0.303)
industry12 0.293 0.403 0.407 -0.080 0.108
(0.324) (0.292) (0.266) (0.259) (0.306)
industry13 0.211 0.428* 0.349 -0.372 0.091
(0.280) (0.248) (0.228) (0.231) (0.254)
industry14 -0.469 0.613*** -0.105 0.106 0.108
(0.340) (0.229) (0.236) (0.186) (0.235)
Constant -1.886*** -1.786*** -1.627*** -1.303*** -1.701***
(0.217) (0.201) (0.180) (0.149) (0.189)
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.033 0.017 0.023 0.011
Observations 2089 2080 2080 2089 2080
Log-Likelihood -508 -773 -502 -797 -525
Chi-Squared 69.5 49.3 17.2 34.3 11.6
P 0.000 0.000 0.190 0.002 0.559
Industry-Chi-Squared 63.7 . . 32.3 .
Industry-P Value 0.000 . . 0.002 .
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.40: Censored Probit Models - 2nd Stage
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b
foreign -0.635 5.539 -6.814 -2.307** 8.031
(1.244) (.) (.) (1.153) (.)
age -0.002 0.272*** -0.081*** -0.008 -1.107***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022) (0.008)
sum bribe 2.885*** 15.997 19.625*** 2.137*** 23.379
(0.658) (.) (0.060) (0.394) (.)
sum cond -1.966*** -3.342*** -4.253*** -1.454*** -0.482***
(0.423) (0.246) (0.058) (0.324) (0.047)
employee 0.031 -5.994 1.191 -0.250 4.687
(0.268) (.) (.) (0.431) (.)
male -2.159** -0.279 -14.645 0.878 -8.864
(0.929) (.) (.) (0.636) (.)
lambdaa 5.103***
(1.145)
trade -3.312 2.892 1.356* -44.995
(.) (.) (0.741) (.)
lambdab 10.607***
(0.398)
lambdac 110.897***
(0.166)
lambdad -1.217
(2.148)
lambdae -61.679
(.)
Region Dummies YES
Constant -10.296*** -19.315 -211.393 1.495 93.449
(1.921) (.) (.) (3.235) (.)
Pseudo R-squared 0.869 1.000 1.000 0.862 1.000
Observations 118 224 99 205 95
Log-Likelihood -10 -0 -0 -17 -0
Chi-Squared . . . . .
P . . . . .
Industry-Chi-Squared
Industry-P Value
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.41: Censored Probit Models - 1st Stage (Cont’d)
Model 6a Model 7a Model 8a Model 9a Model 10a Model 11a
industry1 -0.114 -0.181 0.301 -0.392 -0.131 -0.395
(0.235) (0.316) (0.206) (0.241) (0.244) (0.273)
industry3 0.012 0.732** 0.197 -0.273 -0.286 0.063
(0.304) (0.300) (0.277) (0.319) (0.362) (0.306)
industry4 0.485*** 0.754*** 0.597*** 0.059 0.512*** -0.057
(0.176) (0.218) (0.170) (0.171) (0.180) (0.193)
industry5 0.086 0.118 0.528** 0.325 0.510** 0.305
(0.269) (0.337) (0.235) (0.236) (0.246) (0.258)
industry6 0.169 0.445* 0.353* -0.080 0.220
(0.228) (0.267) (0.214) (0.229) (0.231)
industry7 0.323* 0.428* 0.275 -0.144 0.041 -0.396*
(0.182) (0.228) (0.179) (0.183) (0.195) (0.218)
industry8 0.479** 0.420 0.338* -0.213 -0.316 -0.708**
(0.203) (0.256) (0.203) (0.222) (0.259) (0.322)
industry9 -0.002 0.495** 0.462*** 0.241 0.479** 0.049
(0.196) (0.230) (0.179) (0.176) (0.188) (0.200)
industry10 0.067 0.278 0.259 -0.067 -0.062 0.157
(0.211) (0.255) (0.198) (0.203) (0.225) (0.213)
industry11 -0.061 -0.307 0.368 0.029 0.215 0.390
(0.298) (0.451) (0.253) (0.268) (0.277) (0.263)
industry12 -0.519 0.489* 0.323 0.293 0.149 0.225
(0.341) (0.286) (0.236) (0.228) (0.259) (0.253)
industry13 -0.156 0.235 0.272 0.056 -0.301 -0.002
(0.226) (0.259) (0.199) (0.199) (0.246) (0.222)
industry14 0.245 0.104 0.219 -0.219 -0.069 -0.547**
(0.191) (0.249) (0.187) (0.195) (0.208) (0.246)
industry2 0.225
(0.576)
Constant -1.395*** -1.786*** -1.348*** -1.261*** -1.446*** -1.446***
(0.156) (0.201) (0.152) (0.146) (0.161) (0.161)
Pseudo R-squared 0.029 0.037 0.012 0.018 0.043 0.040
Observations 2080 2080 2080 2080 2089 1980
Log-Likelihood -717 -572 -904 -673 -650 -448
Chi-Squared 39.9 39.9 21.7 24.0 55.7 33.5
P 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.031 0.000 0.001
Industry-Chi-Squared . . . . 54.1 .
Industry-P Value . . . . 0.000 .
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.42: Censored Probit Models - 2nd Stage (Cont’d)
Model 6b Model 7b Model 8b Model 9b Model 10b Model 11b
employee 1.109* -9.681*** -0.636** 0.045 0.544*** -3.409
(0.585) (2.536) (0.287) (0.152) (0.211) (.)
trade -4.546*** -13.172*** -0.099 0.299 -2.255** -10.086
(1.378) (2.542) (0.782) (0.494) (1.028) (.)
foreign -0.420 7.934* 0.417 -0.650* -1.219** 3.902
(.) (4.441) (0.610) (0.380) (0.595) (.)
age -0.078 0.052** 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.003
(0.052) (0.024) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008)
sum bribe 6.574*** 16.591*** 1.776*** 1.011*** 1.559*** 10.262
(2.121) (2.659) (0.271) (0.177) (0.280) (.)
sum cond -1.444** -9.626*** -0.705*** -0.447*** -1.057*** -7.860***
(0.621) (1.460) (0.159) (0.149) (0.170) (0.077)
male 1.898 16.882*** -2.031*** -0.518 0.456 -2.985
(1.305) (3.754) (0.704) (0.471) (0.828) (.)
lambdaf -1.873
(1.800)
lambdag 35.820***
(6.636)
lambdah -4.085**
(1.728)
lambdai 1.409*
(0.738)
lambdaj -1.928**
(0.905)
lambdak 18.172
(.)
Constant -0.078 -70.104*** 5.202* -1.738 1.706 -32.454
(3.063) (12.615) (2.791) (1.732) (1.752) (.)
Region Dummies YES
Pseudo R-squared 0.953 0.930 0.856 0.719 0.796 1.000
Observations 193 133 271 184 179 74
Log-Likelihood -6 -5 -21 -35 -25 -0
Chi-Squared . . 77.0 77.7 61.6 .
P . . 0.000 0.000 0.000 .
Industry-Chi-Squared
Industry-P Value
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.43: Multinomial Logit Models On Perception Of Corruption As An Obstacle To Business Operations - ES
Data
(Model 1 - log-odds ratios) (Model 1 - odds ratios)
no obstacle
(base category)
minor ob-
stacle
moderate
obstacle
major ob-
stacle
very severe
obstacle
no obstacle
(base category)
minor ob-
stacle
moderate
obstacle
major ob-
stacle
very severe
obstacle
infraserv - -0.209 -0.109 0.030 -0.045 - -0.209 -0.109 0.030 -0.045
- (0.143) (0.139) (0.141) (0.191) - (0.143) (0.139) (0.141) (0.191)
trade - 0.745 0.352 0.450 0.730 - 0.745 0.352 0.450 0.730
- (0.563) (0.555) (0.593) (0.651) - (0.563) (0.555) (0.593) (0.651)
tax percentage - 0.002 0.014*** 0.006** 0.002 - 0.002 0.014*** 0.006** 0.002
- (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) - (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
profit - 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
capital labour - 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 - 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
un sunk cost - 1.865 -4.359* -0.422 -1.198 - 1.865 -4.359* -0.422 -1. 98
- (2.642) (2.573) (2.672) (3.222) - (2.642) (2.573) (2.672) (3.222)
competitors (2) - 0.387 -0.014 -0.477 -1.959** - 0.387 -0.014 -0.477 -1.959**
- (0.651) (0.715) (0.710) (0.895) - (0.651) (0.715) (0.710) (0.895)
competitors (3) - -0.135 0.049 -0.282 -1.544*** - -0.135 0.049 -0.282 -1.544***
- (0.465) (0.472) (0.444) (0.425) - (0.465) (0.472) (0.444) (0.425)
competitors (4) - -0.302 0.074 -0.445 -1.442*** - -0.302 0.074 -0.445 -1.442***
- (0.446) (0.455) (0.426) (0.392) - (0.446) (0.455) (0.426) (0.392)
gov customer - -1.067 -0.421 0.217 -0.268 - -1.067 -0.421 0.217 -0.268
- (0.795) (0.601) (0.520) (0.660) - (0.795) (0.601) (0.520) (0.660)
regulation realtime - 0.033 0.038 0.061** 0.094*** - 0.033 0.038 0.061** 0.094***
- (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) - (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
external consultant naira - -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** - -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001**
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
african - 0.346 0.425 0.236 0.835* - 0.346 0.425 0.236 0.835*
- (0.332) (0.312) (0.322) (0.428) - (0.332) (0.312) (0.322) (0.428)
Constant - 0.897 -5.516** -1.207 -1.222 - 0.897 -5.516** -1.207 -1.222
- (2.396) (2.401) (2.431) (2.927) - (2.396) (2.401) (2.431) (2.927)
Industry Dummies YES YES
Region Dummies NO NO
Pseudo R-squared 0.029 0.029
Observations 2001 2001
Log-Pseudolikelihood -3038.9 -3038.9
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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A.1.3 Estimations For The Tobit Specification Test
The following 2 tables show the estimations performed in conducting the specification test for the Tobit model.
Table A.44: Probit Estimations On All Firms
p0 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8 p9 p10
Pseudo R-squared 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.031 0.199
Observations 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Log-Likelihood -1366.4 -1366.7 -1366.7 -1363.9 -1362.2 -1354.0 -1351.4 -1349.4 -1347.4 -1343.4 -1110.8
L -7092.4 -7092.8 -6834.1 -6825.4 -6817.3 -6808.2 -6804.4 -6801.9 -6788.1 -6784 -6468.5
Lrt -1089.6 -1090.4 -772 -770 -767.6 -763.2 -761.6 -757.6 -730.2 -726.6 -568.6
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent Variable is Dummy=1 if bribe paid, 0 otherwise. L is the sum of the log-likelihood for the truncated tobit
model and the log-likelihood for the probit model. This is the log-likelihood for the unrestricted model in the tobit specification test. LRT is the likelihood
ratio test statistic for the tobit model specification test. Control variables are the same as those used in the truncated models in Table A.45
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Table A.45: Truncated Tobit Estimations For Bribing Firms Only
tt0 tt1 tt2 tt3 tt4 tt5 tt6 tt7 tt8 tt9 tt10
model
infraserv 2.228 2.161 -4.309 -4.301 -2.739 -3.121 -2.992 -2.734 -2.491 -2.486 2.589
(3.810) (3.807) (3.642) (3.621) (3.543) (3.566) (3.553) (3.547) (3.453) (3.451) (3.682)
import -18.347
(12.432)
export -0.171
(22.321)
tax percentage -0.086 -0.087 -0.072 -0.077 -0.067 -0.058 -0.054 -0.057 -0.064 -0.064 -0.122*
(0.068) (0.068) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.063)
trade -14.815 -21.103** -25.617*** -23.351** -24.103** -23.773** -23.685** -22.821** -22.811** -12.515
(11.350) (9.578) (9.466) (9.696) (9.624) (9.624) (9.574) (8.892) (8.855) (7.747)
eprofit 0.180*** 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.155***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
capital labour 0.006 0.006 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
eun sunk cost -119.332*** -116.665*** -118.703*** -118.354*** -126.126*** -126.641***
(34.033) (34.604) (34.610) (34.538) (36.019) (36.110)
competitors 2 4.951 4.969 5.512 4.634 4.704 -0.217
(8.796) (8.789) (8.775) (8.743) (8.738) (9.617)
competitors 3 1.063 0.908 0.687 -0.775 -0.506 5.517
(5.010) (5.011) (5.029) (5.136) (5.126) (5.931)
competitors 4 -3.404 -3.775 -3.934 -4.838 -4.571 6.999
(4.494) (4.489) (4.515) (4.582) (4.604) (6.541)
gov customer 17.946 18.120 19.400 19.392 15.720
(15.855) (15.913) (16.193) (16.209) (14.424)
regulation realtime -0.380 -0.757** -0.759** 0.081
(0.266) (0.380) (0.380) (0.456)
eexternal consultant naira 0.649 0.649 0.720
(0.464) (0.464) (0.475)
african -1.870 4.375
(4.096) (3.978)
un sunk cost 20.741
(60.197)
Industry Dummies YES
Region Dummies YES
Constant 45.806*** 45.892*** 17.851*** 17.124*** 6.319 8.169 7.708 9.037 10.664 12.126 63.599
(5.598) (5.602) (6.137) (6.072) (7.149) (8.388) (8.382) (8.349) (7.677) (7.877) (49.687)
sigma 63.161*** 63.170*** 49.125*** 48.843*** 48.543*** 48.498*** 48.442*** 48.417*** 47.865*** 47.863*** 44.160***
(10.604) (10.603) (5.383) (5.372) (5.306) (5.324) (5.332) (5.331) (4.861) (4.859) (4.985)
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.050 0.065
Observations 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029 1029
Log-Likelihood -5726.0 -5726.1 -5467.4 -5461.5 -5455.1 -5454.2 -5453.0 -5452.5 -5440.7 -5440.6 -5357.7
F 1.0 1.1 6.2 5.6 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.4 14.3
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Dependent Variable is Bribe (’000 Naira) per Employee.
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A.1.4 The Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption
Hausman & McFadden [1984] introduced a test of the IIA property of the MNL
model. This test is related to the matrix version of the Hausman test [Hausman ,
1978]. The Hausman-McFadden test obtains the parameter vector of the original
MNL model, θj (for each j category), and a variance-covariance matrix, V (θj).
The sample is then truncated by excluding one of the choices from the dependent
variable (e.g. Sales %). A new parameter vector, θˆj, and variance-covariance ma-
trix, V (θˆj), are obtained from the truncated sample and the relevant test statistic
is calculated as:
τ = [θˆj − θj]′[V (θˆj)− V (θj)]−1[θˆj − θj] ∼ χ2k (A.1.4.1)
The null hypothesis is that the IIA condition holds; in other words, there is no
difference in the estimate of the parameters if an arbitrary category is excluded.
If the random exclusion of a category changes the parameter estimates, then this
implies that the relative risk ratios are affected and are thus not independent. Both
a necessary and sufficient condition for the test to generate an interpretable result
is that the matrix derived from differencing the two variance-covariance matrices
is positive definite.
If θˆj were a fully efficient estimator, then computation of [V (θˆj) − V (θj)]−1
would be simple because in such case: [V (θˆj)−V (θj)]−1 = V (θj)−V (θˆj). However,
this would be inconsistent with the use of Huber/White robust standard errors
in the estimation of the model since the use of such assumes that the variance-
covariance matrix is not efficiently estimated. Using robust standard errors does
not allow for easy computation of the variance-covariance matrix; a bootstrapped
version of the Hausman test can be used instead [Cameron & Trivedi , 2005]
without the efficiency requirement imposed by the standard Hausman test.
The differenced variance-covariance matrices, V (θˆj)−V (θj), is estimated using:
Vˆboot =
1
B − 1
B∑
b=1
[θˆj − θj − θdiff ][θˆj − θj − θdiff ]′ (A.1.4.2)
where θdiff =
1
B
∑
b θˆj − θj.
To deal with the problem of a non-positive definite differenced matrix in the
Hausman-McFadden test, the Small-Hsiao test [Small & Hsiao , 1985] is also used
to test the IIA condition of the MNL model. This test is performed by running the
initial model and taking the log-likelihood of the estimation, Lfull. One category
is then randomly removed and the estimation is run on the truncated sample,
producing a second log-likelihood, Ltrunc. This sample is then duplicated and
added to the removed sample and the estimation is run again, producing a third
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log-likelihood value, Ldup. The test statistic is calculated as: SH = −2[Ldup −
(Lfull + Ltrunc)] ∼ χ2k. In order to improve the strength of the test results and
to deal with the possibility of different excluded categories giving different test
results, both tests are performed multiple times, each time removing a different
category.
Results The differenced variance-covariance matrix of the adjusted Hausman
test is not positive-definite, so this test could not be applied in the present case.
Results from the Small-Hsiao test are shown in Table A.46. All results point to a
rejection of the IIA assumption of the multinomial logit model, this result applies
for both model 11 and 12 when performing the test by omitting each category
respectively.
Table A.46: Small-Hsiao Tests For Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives As-
sumption In Multinomial Logit Model
Model 12 (k=56)
Full Model
n=2001 Lfull -1493.3731
Omit Naira
n=1774 Ltrunc -970.71938
n=3775 Ldup -2594.9804
Small-Hsiao Test Statistic 261.77584
Result Reject IIA
Omit Sales
n=1199 Ltrunc -360.52027
n=3200 Ldup -2242.1706
Small-Hsiao Test Statistic 776.55446
Result Reject IIA
Omit Non-Bribers
n=1029 Ltrunc -380.73979
n=3030 Ldup -2317.6554
Small-Hsiao Test Statistic 887.08502
Result Reject IIA
Results of the Small-Hsiao test do not change when using more sparse multinomial logit models.
Due to the rejection of the IIA assumption, it appears that another model
should be used in order to model the responses to the question on bribery. The
nested logit (NL) model is an alternative model that relaxes the IIA assumption.
The NL model groups the alternatives into subgroups, allowing the variance of the
errors to differ across sub-groups whilst maintaining the IIA assumption within
each group. This might be more suited to the current dataset because of the
nested nature of the data. For example, the firm must first decide whether or not
to report a bribe; if it does report a bribe, then it must decide whether or not to
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report in terms of sales or Naira. This nested nature of the reporting decision is
shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17: The Nested Nature Of The Bribe Decision
Denoting the alternatives by subscripts (j, k), where j represents the group
(level 1) and k represents the choice (level 2) within the group. Figure 17 displays
the 3 alternative choices responses within the 2 subgroups. One of the branches
has only one choice associated with it, so the conditional probability, Pj|Zerobribe =
P0|Zerobribe = 1. The log-likelihood associated with the full information maximum
likelihood estimation of the model is:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
= ln [P (choice|group)i ∗ P (group)i] (A.1.4.3)
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A.2 Appendices For Chapter 2
A.2.1 Appendix A
The Unrelated Question Randomised Response Design The unrelated
question RR design was introduced via papers by Horvitz, Shah, and Simmons
[1967] and Greenberg, Abul-Ela, Simmons & Horvitz [1969]. The design of the
procedure is similar to the one for the original design [Warner , 1965] described
in Section 4.2 with the exception that the second question posed to the manager
is entirely unrelated to the first (sensitive) question and is also unsensitive. For
example:
Question 1: “Have you paid a bribe in the last 12 months?”
Question 2: “Have you used a bus to travel in the past 12 months?”
In this setup, there are 2 unknown parameters to be estimated: pis =the pro-
portion of people who have paid a bribe in past 12 months and pin = the proportion
of people who have travelled by bus in the past 12 months. As with the original
procedure, the manager uses a randomising device to decide which question he/she
answers.
The introduction of this second unknown parameter requires the use of 2 inde-
pendent samples with different probabilities of selection (p2 = 1−p1 and p1 6= p2).
The respective probabilities of observing a “yes” response in each sample is given
by:
λi = pipis + (1− pi)pin for i = (1, 2). (A.2.1.1)
Where i represents the sample. So for each respective sample:
λ1 = p1pis + (1− p1)pin (A.2.1.2)
and
λ2 = p2pis + (1− p2)pin (A.2.1.3)
Solving these equations to get an estimate of the prevalence of the sensitive act
gives:
pˆis =
(
λˆ1(1− p2)− λˆ2(1− p1)
)
p1 − p2 (A.2.1.4)
100
100This estimate has a variance of: V ar(pˆis) =
(
1
(p1−p2)2
)
∗
(
λ1(1−λ1)(1−p2)2
n1
+ λ2(1−λ2)(1−p1)
2
n2
)
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Alternatively, one can simplify this procedure and go back to using only one
sample by using an unrelated non-sensitive question whose population distribution
is already known. For example:
Question 2: “Is your birthday in January?”
has an population occurrence of pin = 31/365, therefore equation (A.2.1.4)
becomes
pˆis =
λˆ− (1− p)pin
p
(A.2.1.5)
101
The two types of unrelated question RR designs differ in the second question
that is asked. In the unrelated question RR with unknown population prevalence
of the non-sensitive attribute, the distribution of the non-sensitive question is un-
known, so two independent samples are required in order to estimate the sensitive
trait. In the unrelated question RR with known population prevalence, the distri-
bution of the non-sensitive question is known, so only one sample is required to
estimate the occurrence of the sensitive trait.
Indirect Questions Ercolani [2006] uses data from the Labour Force Survey to
study absence from work due to sickness. The author attempts to overcome four
potential problems: identifying sickness rather than shirking behaviour; reducing
the potential underreporting that might occur due to the stigma associated with
being sick; generating measures that are consistent over the period being sampled;
and overcoming the potential need to recall absences over long periods of time. The
author tries to resolve these issues as follows: instead of asking about the number
of days that the manager was sick, the interviewer uses answers to a question about
usual hours worked per week versus actual hours worked in the week before the
interview. Any difference in these two variables prompts a question concerning the
reason for this difference somewhat later on in the survey; in the later question
sickness is one of 13 response categories. Confidence in the survey responses is
created by the fact that the survey is conducted away from the managers place
of work and by an institution that is independent of the manager’s employer.
Despite this, potential issues are created when one considers that some workers
choose to attend work even when sick; furthermore, any absences due to shirking
work might be attributed to sickness due to the potential threat of admitting to
shirking; finally, some employees might choose to use their holiday entitlement for
sick leave. Therefore, in practice, the indirect measure of sickness might fail to be
an accurate measure.
101Which has a variance of V ar(pˆis) =
λ(1−λ)
np2
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A.2.2 Appendix B
Figure 18: Sum Score Cumulative Distribution Function With Wald Binomial
Confidence Intervals
Frequency (%) is measured on the vertical axis.
Figure 19: Maximum Likelihood Estimate Of Distribution of Responses Compared
To The Actual Distribution And The Angels Assumption
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Table A.47: Logit Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Estimation Marginal
& Im-
pact
Effects
Sum Score: Q1-
Q6
0.365*** 0.082***
(0.025) (0.006)
Sum Score=1 (d) 1.551*** 0.368***
(0.221) (0.049)
Sum Score=2 (d) 2.052*** 0.471***
(0.203) (0.040)
Sum Score=3 (d) 2.254*** 0.508***
(0.199) (0.038)
Sum Score=4 (d) 2.297*** 0.518***
(0.203) (0.037)
Sum Score=5 (d) 2.380*** 0.524***
(0.231) (0.036)
Sum Score=6 (d) 3.381*** 0.616***
(0.337) (0.025)
Question 1 (d) 0.470*** 0.106***
(0.085) (0.019)
Question 2 (d) 0.505*** 0.115***
(0.085) (0.019)
Question 3 (d) 0.051 0.011
(0.082) (0.019)
Question 4 (d) 0.471*** 0.107***
(0.082) (0.019)
Question 5 (d) 0.478*** 0.109***
(0.083) (0.019)
Question 6 (d) 0.213*** 0.048***
(0.081) (0.018)
owner male (d) 0.128 0.029 0.110 0.024 0.134 0.030
(0.112) (0.025) (0.114) (0.024) (0.113) (0.025)
Age:Under 30 (d) -0.310** -0.067** -0.317** -0.067** -0.310** -0.068**
(0.131) (0.027) (0.131) (0.027) (0.132) (0.028)
Age:31-45 (d) -0.070 -0.016 -0.064 -0.014 -0.069 -0.016
(0.095) (0.022) (0.097) (0.021) (0.096) (0.022)
Age:Over 55 (d) -0.108 -0.024 -0.130 -0.028 -0.132 -0.029
(0.139) (0.031) (0.139) (0.030) (0.140) (0.031)
secondary (d) -0.159* -0.036* -0.173** -0.038** -0.157* -0.035*
(0.082) (0.018) (0.083) (0.018) (0.082) (0.019)
tertiary (d) -0.240 -0.052 -0.268 -0.057 -0.221 -0.048
(0.209) (0.044) (0.206) (0.041) (0.208) (0.044)
manu (d) 0.030 0.007 0.074 0.016 0.017 0.004
(0.094) (0.021) (0.095) (0.021) (0.094) (0.021)
retail (d) 0.171 0.039 0.227* 0.051* 0.151 0.035
(0.121) (0.028) (0.123) (0.029) (0.121) (0.028)
medium (d) 0.102 0.023 0.079 0.018 0.087 0.020
(0.104) (0.024) (0.104) (0.023) (0.104) (0.024)
large (d) 0.857 0.209 0.781 0.188 0.789 0.192
(0.600) (0.148) (0.630) (0.157) (0.618) (0.154)
south (d) -0.069 -0.016 -0.060 -0.013 -0.067 -0.015
(0.082) (0.019) (0.083) (0.018) (0.083) (0.019)
wave2 (d) -0.001 -0.000 0.027 0.006 0.006 0.001
(0.085) (0.019) (0.085) (0.019) (0.086) (0.019)
Constant -1.539*** -2.557*** -1.539***
(0.184) (0.262) (0.185)
Pseudo R-squared 0.056 0.075 0.062
Observations 3100 3100 3100
Log-Likelihood -1906.4 -1868.6 -1893.5
Chi-Squared 232.5 210.4 250.9
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Dependent variable is the response to the last RR
question (0=no; 1=yes).
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Table A.48: Calculations Of Misclassification Errors
Dichotomous Measures Of Reticence
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Region Obs. Reticent(%)
7 + 3 Nos
Reticent(%)
7 + ≥2 Nos
Reticent(%)
7 + ≥1 No
Reticent(%)
(7 Nos)
Reticent(%)
(≥6 Nos)
Reticent(%)
(≥5 Nos)
Reticent(%)
(≥4 Nos)
Lower Bound
Reticent
(CKM)(%)
(Based on
question 10)
Alternative
Lower Bound
(%) (Based On
Question 2)
Percentage
of Reticent
(Validation
Data)
F
irst
W
a
v
e
Abia 92 4.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 23.9 43.5 62.0 13 6.5 34.4
Abuja 94 3.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 12.8 29.8 53.2 10.6 2.1 28.7
Anambra 100 12.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 29.0 49.0 60.0 32.0 14.0 39.6
Bauchi 88 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 6.8 20.5 43.2 6.8 0.0 14.9
Cross River 89 2.2 3.4 10.1 11.2 22.5 48.3 64.0 34.8 21.3 46.8
Enugu 95 1.1 4.2 6.3 8.4 27.4 44.2 70.5 41.1 34.7 52.9
Kaduna 92 1.1 2.2 3.3 4.3 19.6 39.1 62.0 30.4 19.6 42.2
Kano 140 0.0 0.7 0.7 1.4 6.4 17.1 41.4 10.0 0.0 16.2
Lagos 154 1.9 5.2 7.8 8.4 20.8 36.4 59.7 18.2 3.9 31.2
Ogun 133 6.8 9.0 12.8 14.3 27.8 42.9 67.7 57.9 2.3 29.2
Sokoto 61 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 4.9 23.0 52.5 21.3 11.5 33.7
S
eco
n
d
W
a
v
e
Adamawa 83 6.0 7.2 9.6 10.8 13.3 21.7 56.6 13.3 6.0 27.1
Akwa Ibom 78 3.8 5.1 12.8 30.8 35.9 48.7 62.8 38.5 33.3 48.0
Bayelsa 86 3.5 9.3 9.3 10.5 22.1 40.7 61.6 30.2 14.0 38.1
Benue 78 2.6 2.6 5.1 12.8 21.8 32.1 50.0 12.8 17.9 38.2
Borno 86 11.6 14.0 15.1 16.3 26.7 39.5 65.1 27.9 11.6 35.3
Delta 73 0.0 2.7 5.5 6.8 11.0 38.4 72.6 31.5 15.1 41.5
Ebonyi 92 8.7 13.0 15.2 15.2 27.2 40.2 59.8 21.7 8.7 35.4
Edo 44 6.8 9.1 11.4 11.4 15.9 31.8 56.8 13.6 0.0 15.6
Ekiti 82 51.2 61.0 62.2 62.2 69.5 78.0 90.2 78.0 63.4 74.7
Gombe 91 9.9 9.9 9.9 13.2 24.2 36.3 57.1 38.5 9.9 36.9
Imo 82 2.4 3.7 14.6 19.5 40.2 52.4 74.4 36.6 39.0 53.3
Jigawa 89 6.7 7.9 10.1 11.2 22.5 44.9 61.8 28.1 25.8 48.2
Katsina 88 0.0 0.0 4.5 4.5 10.2 28.4 51.1 0 2.3 34.1
Kebbi 96 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 6.3 27.1 47.9 0 18.8 45.3
Kogi 87 37.9 41.4 43.7 43.7 59.8 70.1 83.9 72.4 63.2 74.1
Kwara 76 6.6 7.9 7.9 7.9 11.8 38.2 56.6 31.6 21.1 43.9
Nasarawa 84 52.4 54.8 56.0 56.0 65.5 75.0 83.3 64.3 57.1 70.5
Niger 88 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.3 8.0 20.5 45.5 11.4 2.3 33.1
Ondo 90 1.1 3.3 5.6 5.6 11.1 21.1 43.3 15.6 0.0 27.8
Osun 82 2.4 2.4 3.7 3.7 13.4 25.6 48.8 9.8 2.4 33.6
Oyo 55 7.3 10.9 10.9 14.5 34.5 63.6 87.3 70.9 63.6 75.6
Plateau 62 24.2 27.4 30.6 32.3 48.4 54.8 71.0 54.8 38.7 57.8
Rivers 50 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 16.0 40.0 0 4.0 26.2
Taraba 66 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 10.6 22.7 59.1 30.3 0.0 23.6
Yobe 81 4.9 7.4 7.4 7.4 13.6 34.6 53.1 35.8 1.2 29.2
Zamfara 93 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.2 6.5 23.7 57.0 11.8 18.3 44.7
National 3200 7.6 9.7 11.6 12.9 22.4 38.1 60.0 27.8 15.0 39.5
First Wave 1,138 3.2 5.4 7.1 7.8 18.8 35.8 57.8 25.5 5.4 32.7
Second
Wave
2,062 10.0 12.0 14.0 15.8 24.4 39.4 61.2 29.1 20.3 43.3
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Table A.49: Summary Statistics For Full Sample And Size, Sector, Region Groups
Group Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min Max SkewnessKurtosis
1:Small; Manu; South 537 0.017 0.028 0 0.15 2.000 6.808
2:Small; Manu; North 877 0.031 0.042 0 0.15 1.150 3.082
3:Small; Retail; South 235 0.021 0.036 0 0.15 1.969 6.231
4:Small; Retail; North 218 0.022 0.035 0 0.15 1.633 4.927
5:Small; Other; South 314 0.021 0.036 0 0.15 2.076 6.740
6:Small; Other; North 354 0.032 0.041 0 0.15 1.334 3.981
7:Medium; Manu; South 190 0.013 0.024 0 0.1 2.079 6.914
8:Medium; Manu; North 150 0.042 0.044 0 0.15 0.650 2.166
9:Medium; Retail; South 39 0.015 0.021 0 0.06 1.071 2.431
10:Medium; Retail; North 42 0.035 0.045 0 0.1 0.650 1.546
11:Medium; Other; South 156 0.017 0.029 0 0.15 2.004 6.866
12:Medium; Other; North 77 0.049 0.041 0 0.1 0.050 1.402
13:Large; Manu; South 5 0 0 0 0 . .
Full Sample 3200 0.025 0.037 0 0.15 1.500 4.329
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A.3 Appendix For Chapter 3
Table A.50: Data Description
Category Variable Name Definition
Owner And
Manager
Characteristics
owner male Dummy=1 if owner is male
owner age what is the age bracket of the sole owner or majority shareh
owner educ what is the highest level of education... highest shareholde
male mgr Dummy=1 if top manager is male
mgr age what is the age bracket of the top manager?
mgr educ what is the highest level of education of the top manager?
mgr experience how many years of experience ... does the top manager
have?
Nature Of
Contracts
(Variables
Related To
Trust)
sales paid before delivery % sales paid for before delivery?
sales paid on delivery % sales paid for on delivery?
sales paid after delivery % sales paid for after delivery?
mat paid before delivery % materials paid for before delivery?
mat paid on delivery % materials paid for on delivery?
mat paid after delivery % materials paid for after delivery?
orders written % purchase orders were written
orders oral nowitness % purchase orders were oral, without witness
orders oral witness % purchase orders were oral, with witness
intermediate sales what % of total sales came from selling intermediate prod-
uct
principal buyer who was the principal buyer for establishment’s output?
primary supplier for how many years have you known the primary supplier
of ma
subcontract in 2006, did you subcontract any part of your production?
Table A.51: Data Description
Variable Name Definition
wave Wave of questionnaire: 1 or 2
intcode interviewer
super supervisor
size:small size==small (5-19 employees)
size:medium size==medium (20-99 employees)
size:large size==large (100 employees and more)
competitors 1 No Competitors
competitors 2 1 Competitor
competitors 3 2-5 Competitors
competitors 4 6+ Competitors
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Table A.52: Data Description
Category Variable Name Definition
Randomised
Response
(RR)
Questions
rr personal taxes Have you ever paid less in personal taxes than you should have under
the law?
rr business taxes Have you ever paid less in business taxes than you should have under
the law?
rr job
app misstatement
Have you ever made a misstatement on a job application?
rr office phone Have you ever used the office telephone for personal business?
rr promotion Have you ever inappropriately promoted an employee for personal rea-
sons?
rr not pay Have you ever deliberately not given your suppliers or clients what was
due them
rr lie Have you ever lied in your self interest?
rr hire Have you ever inappropriately hired a staff member for personal reasons?
rr late Have you ever been purposely late for work?
rr dismissal Have you ever unfairly dismissed an employee for personal reasons?
RR
Variables
understood rr Dummy=1 if manager understood how randomised response questions
were working
sum rr sensitive Index (0-7) of the sum of 7 sensitive randomised response questions
reticence (Reticence) Dummy=1 if sum rr sensitive=0, 0 otherwise
sum rr all Index (0-10) of the sum of all 10 randomised response questions
sum rr unsensitive Index (0-3) of the sum of the unsensitive RR questions
Table A.53: Data Description
Variable Name Definition
university Dummy=1 if owner/majority shareholder has a university degree,
0 otherwise
validation stax Dummy=1 if firm underreports sales for tax purposes, 0 otherwise
validation ltax Dummy=1 if firm under-declares workforce (for tax purposes)
validation tax Dummy=1 if firm underreports sales, or workforce, for tax pur-
poses
Table A.54: Data Description
Category Variable Name Definition
RR
Variables
(cont’d)
s1 1st sensitive question
s2 2nd sensitive question
s3 3rd sensitive question
s4 4th sensitive question
s5 5th sensitive question
s6 6th sensitive question
s7 7th sensitive question
sum ss6 Total Number of for 1st 6 sensitive questions
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Table A.55: Data Description
Variable Name Definition
secondary Owner has secondary education
tertiary Owner has tertiary education
manu Dummy=1 if firm is in Manufacturing sector
retail Dummy=1 if firm is in retail sector
wave2 Dummy=1 if wave=2
industry-location population Number of firms (population) in this observation’s industry-
location cell
Table A.56: Data Description
Category Variable
Name
Definition
Owner And
Manager
Characteristics
oage 1 owner age==30 years or less
oage 2 owner age==31-45
oage 3 owner age==46-55
oage 4 owner age==55 and more
african Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is African, 0 otherwise
indian Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is Indian, 0 otherwise
lebaneseme Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is Lebanese or Middle
Eastern, 0 othe
oasian Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is from another Asian
Country, 0 othe
european Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is European/Caucasian,
0 otherwise
other Dummy=1 if sole owner/majority shareholder is from another ethic
group, 0 otherw
Table A.57: Data Description
Variable Name Definition
buyer 1 principal buyer==your parent company or affiliated establishment
buyer 2 principal buyer==large firms (more than 100 workers)
buyer 3 principal buyer==medium private firms ( 20-100 workers)
buyer 4 principal buyer==small private firms (less than 20 workers)
buyer 5 principal buyer==individuals
buyer 6 principal buyer==government or government agencies (including state-owned ent
buyer 7 principal buyer==others
south Dummy=1 if region==south
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A.3.1 Appendix A
Table A.58: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
owner male 3,101 0.843 0.364 0 1
owner age 3,100 2.350 0.870 1 4
owner educ 3,097 4.821 1.830 1 11
male mgr 492 0.882 0.323 0 1
mgr age 492 1.884 0.748 1 4
mgr educ 3,098 4.827 1.744 1 11
mgr experience 3,197 11.49 7.046 1 45
sales paid before delivery 3,200 33.66 33.63 0 100
sales paid on delivery 3,200 54.34 36.88 0 100
sales paid after delivery 3,200 12.00 20.94 0 100
orders written 3,200 33.85 41.61 0 100
orders oral nowitness 3,200 38.35 42.09 0 100
orders oral witness 3,200 27.80 38.79 0 100
intermediate sales 1,758 7.449 17.68 0 100
mat paid before delivery 3,200 29.83 36.87 0 100
mat paid on delivery 3,200 54.63 41.42 0 100
mat paid after delivery 3,200 15.53 26.00 0 100
primary supplier 3,174 7.148 6.211 0 151
subcontract 1,761 0.125 0.331 0 1
wave 3,200 1.644 0.479 1 2
intcode 2,062 307.4 143.3 3 509
super 2,062 34.83 24.54 1 205
size:small 3,200 0.792 0.406 0 1
size:medium 3,200 0.204 0.403 0 1
size:large 3,200 0.00344 0.0585 0 1
Table A.59: Summary Statistics (cont’d)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
competitors 1 1,763 0.0312 0.174 0 1
competitors 2 1,763 0.0159 0.125 0 1
competitors 3 1,763 0.185 0.389 0 1
competitors 4 1,763 0.767 0.423 0 1
rr personal taxes 3,200 0.503 0.500 0 1
rr business taxes 3,200 0.425 0.494 0 1
rr job app misstatement 3,200 0.429 0.495 0 1
rr office phone 3,200 0.505 0.500 0 1
rr promotion 3,200 0.404 0.491 0 1
rr not pay 3,200 0.379 0.485 0 1
rr lie 3,200 0.518 0.500 0 1
rr hire 3,200 0.407 0.491 0 1
rr late 3,200 0.478 0.500 0 1
rr dismissal 3,200 0.361 0.480 0 1
sum rr sensitive 3,200 2.909 1.727 0 7
reticence 3,200 0.129 0.336 0 1
sum rr all 3,200 4.411 2.100 0 10
sum rr unsensitive 3,200 1.502 0.958 0 3
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Table A.60: Summary Statistics (cont’d)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
s1 3,200 0.503 0.500 0 1
s2 3,200 0.425 0.494 0 1
s3 3,200 0.429 0.495 0 1
s4 3,200 0.404 0.491 0 1
s5 3,200 0.379 0.485 0 1
s6 3,200 0.407 0.491 0 1
s7 3,200 0.361 0.480 0 1
sum ss6 3,200 2.548 1.541 0 6
university 3,200 0.0388 0.193 0 1
Table A.61: Summary Statistics (cont’d)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
oage:≤30 3,100 0.154 0.361 0 1
oage: 31-45 3,100 0.452 0.498 0 1
oage:46-55 3,100 0.284 0.451 0 1
oage≥55 3,100 0.110 0.313 0 1
african 3,200 0.958 0.200 0 1
indian 3,200 0.00344 0.0585 0 1
lebaneseme 3,200 0.00156 0.0395 0 1
oasian 3,200 0.000313 0.0177 0 1
european 3,200 0.000313 0.0177 0 1
other 3,200 0.0362 0.187 0 1
buyer 1 3,179 0.00723 0.0848 0 1
buyer 2 3,179 0.00849 0.0918 0 1
buyer 3 3,179 0.0242 0.154 0 1
buyer 4 3,179 0.0780 0.268 0 1
buyer 5 3,179 0.862 0.345 0 1
buyer 6 3,179 0.00975 0.0983 0 1
buyer 7 3,179 0.0101 0.0998 0 1
south 3,200 0.462 0.499 0 1
Table A.62: Summary Statistics (cont’d)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
secondary 3,200 0.484 0.500 0 1
tertiary 3,200 0.0709 0.257 0 1
manu 3,200 0.551 0.497 0 1
retail 3,200 0.167 0.373 0 1
wave2 3,200 0.644 0.479 0 1
industry-location population 3,200 153.8 113.8 8 556
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A.3.2 Appendix B
Table A.63: Tabulation Of Trust-Related Variables, By Reticence
Percentage
Variable Categories Possibly Candid Reticent
Who was the principal
buyer for this
establishment’s output?
Your parent company or affili-
ated establishments
0.61 1.46
Large private firms (more than
100 workers)
0.72 1.70
Medium private firms ( 20-100
workers)
2.20 3.89
Small private firms (less than 20
workers)
7.33 10.95
Individuals 87.10 80.29
Government or government
agencies (including state-owned
enterprises)
0.94 1.22
Others 1.08 0.49
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Table A.64: Correlation Matrix
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r 1
mgr experience 0.07∗∗∗ 1
mgr exp2 0.05∗∗ 1.0∗∗∗ 1
sales paid before delivery 0.03∗ 0.1∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 1
sales paid on delivery -0.04∗ -0.1∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.8∗∗∗ 1
orders written 0.1∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.008 0.2∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗ 1
orders oral nowitness -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ -0.6∗∗∗ 1
orders oral witness -0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04∗ -0.1∗∗∗ 0.2∗∗∗ -0.5∗∗∗ -0.5∗∗∗ 1
subcontract -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.2∗∗∗ 0.03 0.07∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 1
competitors 1 0.1∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.05∗ 0.03 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.04 -0.006 -0.009 1
competitors 2 0.08∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.003 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 1
competitors 3 0.07∗∗ -0.005 -0.005 0.03 -0.007 -0.04 -0.02 0.06∗∗ -0.06∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.06∗ 1
competitors 4 -0.1∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.05∗ 0.02 0.03 -0.05∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.3∗∗∗ -0.2∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.4 Appendix For Chapter 4
A.4.1 Appendix 1
Figure 20: Example Of Questionnaire Used For The Survey Of Managers
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A.4.2 Appendix 2
Further Estimations - Introduction A second stage analysis is performed to
investigate the reporting of crime amongst firms that have been a victim of some
sort of crime. Findings revel that, amongst the crime victims, bribe paying firms
are more likely to refrain from reporting the crime to the police. This study sug-
gests that corrupt firms do this because they wish to hide their malpractices from
detection. These results indicate that the level of crime is probably underreported
in areas with higher levels of corruption.
Further Estimations - Methodology If Similar-Ethnicity is a significant de-
terminant of bribe payments then it might be useful to use this as an instrument
for bribery in a two-stage model; since bribery can be endogenous to many vari-
ables, Similar Ethnicity can be used as an instrument in a first stage estimation
in order to see the effects of bribery on firm outcomes. The current investigation
seeks to assess whether bribe paying firms are less likely to report crime to the
police when they have been a victim of crime. This exercise consists of: an esti-
mation to model whether or not a firm pays a bribe; and an estimation to model
whether or not a firm reports a crime, given that it is a victim of crime and pays a
bribe. However, in order to allow flexibility into the estimation strategy, it might
be useful to model the propensity to bribe and the propensity to be a victim of
crime simultaneously. This is because one might raise the criticism that the errors
from these two models might be correlated; i.e. that firms located in areas with
high levels of crime might be more likely to be a victim of crime and this might
affect their propensity to commit a crime (e.g. pay a bribe). Or firms might feel
that they need to pay the police (or the police might demand bribes) in order to
give them added protection from the crime in the area. On the other hand, firms
that are located in areas with a relatively high police presence might be less likely
to be a victim of crime but might also be more likely to be extorted by the police
for bribes.
These ideas suggest that the errors determining the payment of bribes and
being a victim of crime might be correlated. It might also be the case that the
unobservables which determine whether one is a victim of crime affect ones propen-
sity to report a crime. An area with a large mob might have higher crime rates
but firm owners might fear that if they report the crime against them, then the
mob will retaliate. This would be associated with a negative correlation between
the errors in the victim and reporting equations. So, jointly considering the pos-
sible simultaneity between the payment of bribes and being on the receiving end
of criminal activity; and the potential selectivity in the experiencing of criminal
activity and the reporting of criminal activity, it seems plausible to firstly model
the payment of bribes and being a victim of crime simultaneously, then model
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the reporting of crime as a second stage, controlling for potential selection in the
reporting of crime.
To do this, this study first runs a bivariate probit model to consider the two
binary outcomes of: paying a bribe (y1); being a victim of crime (y2). The inves-
tigation models the two outcomes as being determined by two unobserved latent
variables:
y∗1 = x
′
1β1 + 1
y∗2 = x
′
2β2 + 2
(A.4.2.1)
where 1 and 2 are jointly normally distributed errors both having a zero mean
and a unit variance; their correlation is represented by ρ. The binary outcomes
are observed under the following conditions:
y1 =
{
1 if y∗1 > 0
0 if y∗1 ≤ 0 , and y2 =
{
1 if y∗2 > 0
0 if y∗2 ≤ 0 ,
with 4 possible outcomes: y00, y11, y10 and y01.
Fitted values for Pr(y1 = 1|x) are used in a second stage estimation that
models the propensity to underreport a crime on the payment of bribes. This
estimation is run on a reduced sample of firms for whom y2 = 1:
Pr(At least one crime unreported) = f( ˆbribe, x
′
i) (A.4.2.2)
where the probability of underreporting crime is determined by a latent variable
y∗3:
y∗3 =
{
x
′
3β3 + 3 if y2 = 1
− if y2 = 0 ,
Using these three models to investigate ethnicity, bribe payments and the un-
derreporting of crime allows this study to test for correlation between 1 and 2;
and between 2 and 3.
Further Estimations - Results This investigation now uses the Similar-Ethnicity
variable as an instrument for bribery to see if this can be used to explain other
economic outcomes for the firm. Table A.65 shows results from a bivariate probit
estimation of the determinants of bribery and being a victim of crime. The coef-
ficients on the model for bribery do not significantly change when estimating the
model jointly as a bivariate model. Similar-Ethnicity is negatively related to being
a victim of crime, but not significantly so. Nevertheless, the correlation between
the errors of the two equations is positive (0.165) and significant at the 1% level,
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suggesting that firm-level corruption tends to occur in areas where other crimes
against companies are also prevalent.
Fitted values from the bribery, (y1), estimation are used in Table A.65 to
estimate the effect of bribery on the propensity to report crimes. This is done
in the last four columns of Table A.65. The models in this table are estimated
only on firms that were victims of criminal activity. Results show a positive effect
of bribery on a firm not reporting a crime. This suggests that corrupt firms are
likely to underreport criminal activity performed against them, perhaps because
they do not want the investigative authorities to discover any criminal acts that
they have performed; or any illegal practices within their company. These results
suggest that it is plausible to believe that the downward bias in the reporting
of business malpractice is stronger than the upward bias. However, this result is
only significant when clustering the standard errors by Similar-Ethnicity. When
clustering the standard errors by zone, Similar-Ethnicity-zone, or using robust
standard errors, the coefficient on the fitted values is not significant at the 10%
level.
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Table A.65: Second Stage Models Of Bribery And Crime On Matching, With Zonal Dummies
Model: Bivariate Probit With Sample Selection Robust Standard Errors Clusterered S.E (Similar Ethnicity) Clusterered S.E (Zone) Clusterered S.E. (Similar Ethnicity-Zone)
Dependent Vari-
able
Unreported Crime Victim of Crime Unreported Crime Unreported Crime Unreported Crime Unreported Crime
Pr(bribeˆ dummy=1) 0.889 2.014 2.014*** 2.014 2.014
(1.850) (1.903) (0.177) (2.261) (1.718)
Similar Ethnicity -0.083
(0.079)
Zone==NC -0.227 0.247** -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(0.226) (0.114) (0.243) (0.105) (0.211) (0.165)
Zone==NE 0.688 0.118 1.170** 1.170*** 1.170** 1.170***
(0.553) (0.141) (0.484) (0.088) (0.501) (0.383)
Zone==NW 0.204 0.240** 0.600 0.600** 0.600 0.600
(0.447) (0.113) (0.397) (0.290) (0.432) (0.432)
Zone==SE 0.120 0.287*** 0.441 0.441** 0.441* 0.441*
(0.309) (0.110) (0.281) (0.176) (0.265) (0.267)
Zone==SS -0.169 0.417*** 0.228 0.228** 0.228 0.228
(0.385) (0.115) (0.372) (0.092) (0.396) (0.305)
Constant 0.538 -0.253*** -0.628 -0.628*** -0.628 -0.628
(0.864) (0.081) (0.743) (0.030) (0.874) (0.662)
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
Observations 571 1267 571 571 571 571
Chi-Squared 17.40 18.94 . . 140.94
P-value 0.008 0.004 . . 0.000
Rho -0.790
P-value 0.2023
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Sample Selection Model: Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of
manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0 otherwise. Bribe Dummy: Dummy=1 if firm paid a bribe in the previous year, 0
otherwise. Victim Of Crime: Dummy=1 if firm was a victim on crime in the previous year, 0 otherwise. Unreported Crime:
Dummy=1 if at least one crime went unreported, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using
manager data collected by the Author. All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC= {Benue, Kogi, Kwara,
Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano,
Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo,
Rivers} ; SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo}. The omitted zone is SW.
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Further Estimations - Robustness Checks In order to consider the possi-
bility that the errors from the first stage victim model, 2, are correlated with the
errors relating to the propensity to report crimes, a Bivariate Probit Model With
Sample Selection is run in Table A.66. Results from the two stages of this model
are shown in the first 2 columns of numbers in Table A.65. The coefficient of cor-
relation between the errors of the two equations, ρ, is negative but not statistically
significant. Thus, the sub-sample probit estimation seems like a plausible option
to estimate the reporting model.
Table A.66: Firm Level Bivariate Probit Estimations Of Bribery And Crime On
Matching, With Zonal Dummies
Dependent Vari-
able:
Bribe Dummy Victim of Crime
Similar Ethnicity -0.194** -0.080
(0.084) (0.078)
Zone==NC -0.345*** 0.246**
(0.121) (0.114)
Zone==NE -0.747*** 0.117
(0.163) (0.142)
Zone==NW -0.582*** 0.242**
(0.125) (0.113)
Zone==SE -0.295*** 0.284***
(0.114) (0.109)
Zone==SS -0.571*** 0.416***
(0.127) (0.115)
Constant -0.147* -0.254***
(0.084) (0.081)
Observations 1267
Chi-Squared 69.35
P-value 0.000
Rho 0.165
P-value 0.001
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if
ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of LGA Chair, 0 otherwise. Bribe Dummy: Dummy=1
if firm paid a bribe in the previous year, 0 otherwise. Victim Of Crime: Dummy=1 if firm was
a victim on crime in the previous year, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar
Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected by the Author. All other variables are
calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey. “Zone==...” is a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm is located in said geo-political zone, 0 otherwise. Zones are defined as: NC= {Benue, Kogi,
Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger, Plateau, FCT (Abuja)}; NE={Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe,
Taraba, Yobe}; NW={Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara}; SE={Abia,
Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo}; SS={Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Rivers} ;
SW={Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo}. The omitted zone is SW.
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Further Estimations - Conclusions Amongst firms who have been the vic-
tim of crime, bribe paying firms tend to underreport the crimes committed against
them to the police. The proposed reason was because of a fear that their busi-
ness malpractices might be discovered. This result suggests that crime might be
underreported in areas with higher levels of corruption. Future research could
investigate whether the nature of underreporting differs amongst different crimes,
conditional on being a victim of those crimes.
A.4.3 Appendix 3
This section documents the results from running aggregated estimations of the
effect of ethnic; religious; and linguistic diversity on corruption at the local gov-
ernment and state levels. Different measures of corruption are created using the
conceptual framework of Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda [2010]. Weighted and unweighed
measures of diversity are also created using the methodology first outlined in
Greenberg [1956].
Ethnicity And Economic Outcomes The early papers of Mauro [1995] and
Easterly & Levine [1997] found some evidence for a negative association between
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and economic performance, however, since these
studies there has been relatively little success in showing a negative direct effect
of fractionalisation on growth. Some authors argue for a conditional effect of ELF
[Easterly , 2001], i.e. that ELF is bad for growth only in economies with suffi-
ciently poor institutions. In support of this idea, Bluedorn [2001] and Alesina,
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg [2003] show evidence that the neg-
ative relationship between ELF and growth is more stronger in more autocratic
countries. Posner [2004] suggests that the effect of ELF on economic activity is
only strong when one excludes politically irrelevant ethnic groups. In other words,
the negative effect of diversity on growth is only supported by a restricted diversity
index.
The economic literature has also studied the relationship between religious
diversity; autocracy; and economic outcomes. Collier & Hoeﬄer [2002] find no
causal effect of religious diversity on the risk of conflict. Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg [2003] argue for a negative effect of ethnic and
linguistic fractionalisation on the quality of government, but for a zero effect of
religious fractionalisation. The authors also use the regression of Easterly & Levine
[1997] to provide evidence for a zero effect of religious diversity on growth. The
result that seems to be coming out of this strand of literature is that religious
fractionalisation has no causal effect on the quality of government or economic
performance.
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Later research [Montalvo & Reynal-Querol , 2005b] argues that there is a weak
direct effect of ELF on growth and that the literature should study the effects of
ethnic polarisation, instead of ethnic fractionalisation, on economic performance.
In summary, whilst the early literature argued in favour of a direct effect of ELF
on growth, this has been challenged and the later literature has turned to finding
out the methods by whuch diversity might affect economic performance. The
current work contributes to this literature by using the traditionally used measure
of diversity, ELF, and complementing this by adding other measures of diversity,
including polarisation, doing this should help to identify which of these channels,
if any, is the main factor leading to an effect of ethnic diversity on economic
outcomes.
More recent research has investigated ethnic and hometown favouritism amongst
politicians [Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria & i Miquel , 2011, Do, Nguyen &
Tran , 2013]. Both studies suggest that more public funds are directed to the
hometown of the politicians in power and to regions with a significant population
of people who share the same ethnicity as the politicians in power. The cur-
rent study builds on this work by including individual level information about the
etnicities of the agents within the economy. By using the ethnicity of the firm
managers this study is able to relax the assumptions that: a) all people within the
hometown of a given politicians are treated equally; and b) all people that live in
an area dominated by the ethnic group of the local politician are treated equally.
Relaxing these two assumptions might allow for this study to be more in line with
the literature on ethnic favouritism, which seems to emphasise the ethnicity of a
person rather than where the person lives. Relaxing these two assumptions allows
for people living in the same local area but of different ethnicities to be treated
differently. For example, people in Lagos state might have access to better public
services (such as roads and hospitals) than people in Ebonyi state, however, the
treatment that people receive when accessing those public services might vary de-
pending on their ethnic group. People from regions other than Lagos might receive
a poorer service than people originally from Lagos state.
The Potential Endogeneity Of Ethnic Diversity Most of the above-
mentioned literature implicitly assumes that ethnic groups are mutually exclusive
objective categories that individuals can be classified into. Moreover, it assumes
that this classification is commonly shared amongst members of populations, and
that this classification is exogenous. These assumptions can be questioned. Firstly,
it might not be a priori clear what the relevant ethnic groups are; i.e. the bound-
aries of the ethnic groups that people are supposed to classify others into might
not be objectively known to all members of all groups. A second point is that,
under most definitions and measures of ethnic diversity, it is usually the case that
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these measures are determined by economic choices or policies. In other words,
ethnic diversity might not be exogenous but can be determined within the system.
The freeing up of national borders in order to allow the free movement of labour in
and out of a country is likely to affect the ethnic mix of that country, immigrants
might move in to work and indigenes might migrate away from the country for the
same reason. However, the policy of liberalising one’s borders is likely to be driven
by economic considerations, therefore, whilst the ethnic composition of a country
might have an impact on economic outcomes, the economy might drive certain
policies to be made that affect the ethnic mix of the country. These can range
from the extreme policies, e.g. ethnic cleansing102, to the less extreme choices, e.g.
creating costs/benefits for certain ethnic groups to remain in a location [Alesina
& La Ferrara , 2005]. Moreover, economic policies can create incentives for the
relocation/migration of people of certain ethnicities into certain area, with the
effect that the ethnic mix of these areas are adjusted. In Nigeria, the National
Youth Service Corps., which requires graduates of Nigerian universities to serve
for one year in a location within the country that is away from their state of origin,
can have this effect of changing the ethnic mix of a particular region. However, a
policy does not necessarily have to relate to ethnicity in order to change the ethnic
mix of a region. For example, many of the Fulani tribe are farmers and herders,
thus any agricultural policy in Lagos which affects the trade of cattle is likely to
lead to a change in the composition of the Fulani tribe in Lagos.
In Nigeria, much of the commercial activity occurs in Lagos, which is also
one of the most ethnically diverse cities in the country. There is much inward
migration due to the economic prospects of setting up a business within Lagos.
The same can be said for Abuja (the capital city). These ideas tend to suggest that
fractionalisation might be endogenous to economic activity; and that the ethnic
mix of an economy can change over time, albeit at a relatively slow pace.
Ethnic Identity Previous research has assumed that ethnic groups can be
easily identifiable and are independent of one another. Furthermore, these ethnic
groups are assumed to be homogeneous units. Despite this, some recent litera-
ture has questioned this assumption. Horowitz [2001] and Humphreys, Posner &
Weinstein [2002] report cases from Burundi; Sri Lanka; and Ethiopia, where it
was tougher to distinguish members of different ethnicities despite conflict being
purported to be on ethnic grounds. In these cases, the ability to fake an accent
or to dress in different clothes made it sometimes impossible for one to identify
somebody’s ethnicity, even if they resided in the same locality.
Furthermore, self reported ethnicities might be dependent on economic/governmental
policies. If questions of ethnicity are politically charged, and if this is common
102An example of this might be Germany during World War II.
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knowledge, for example if the government favours (disfavours) a particular ethnic
group, then it may be beneficial to report (or refuse to report) that one belongs to
that group. Wilkinson [2002] reports two case studies, one from a Bohemian town
where a third of self reported Germans in the 1910 Census chose to report them-
selves as Czech in the 1921 census in order to avoid discrimination. The second
came from the state of Punjab, in India, where, in an attempt to stop a poposed
partitioning of the state, many Hindu Punjabi speakers self-reported that they
spoke Hindi. This led to a 20 percentage point fall in the self-reports of Punjabi
speakers in the 1961 census .
Prominent Versus Negligible Ethnic Differences Ethnicity is often given
as the reason behind many conflicts. However, when looking at economic outcomes,
ethnicity does not always appear to be a good predictor. For example, Sub Sa-
haran Africa is the most ethnically heterogeneous area in the world. However the
actual occurence of conflicts is much lower than would be predicted by the level
of ethnic fractionalisation. It thus appears that ethnicity might matter in some
instances and not in others. Posner [2002] looks at the drawing of the boundaries
of Malawi and Zambia, which disected the habitation of 2 ethnic groups: Chewas
and Tumbukas, both of whose population was seperated so that 2/3 remained in
Malawi and 1/3 was in Zambia. In Malawi, both groups represent a relatively
large proportion of the population whilst in Zambia they do not. He notes that
the two groups are political allies in Malawi, while hostile to each other in Zambia.
His interpretation of this is that ethnic and cultural differences do not inherently
shape economic outcomes, but the political and economic competition drives the
salience of cultural ties.
Moreover, ethnic ties can become salient over time within the same institutional
structure. An example of this occurring is in Somalia, which, before the civil war
in 1991, was regarded as relatively ethnically homogeneous due to 85% of its
population belonging to the Somali ethnic group. However, with the onset of the
war, the relevant level of aggregation was shifted to the clan, therefore making the
country more fractionalised [Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg
, 2003]. The issue of which level of aggregation is relevant for the analysis of
ethnic fractionalisation is discussed by Fearon [2003] and Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın,
Wacziarg [2009].
Migration Finally, in spite of the previous discussion, another potential
source of endogeneity is migration. Urbanisation and changes in economic growth
have induced migration that is likely to have altered the ethnolinguistic fraction-
alisation of economies. Economic policies are likely to have a role in this as well.
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The Measurement Of Ethnic Diversity: Determining The Aspect Of
Diversity To Measure The method in which one is to categorise ethnic groups
is of importance, but is accompanied by great difficulty; many judgement calls;
and political influence. When individuals within a population can be different in
the colour of their skin; their language; their place of birth; and their religion,
the question of how to distinguish between different ethnicities becomes somewhat
trickier. In some countries the relevant dimension might be language, in others it
might be skin colour.
The data used in [Easterly & Levine , 1997] comes from the Atlas Narodov
Mira [USSR , 1964] which was compiled based on data from 1960 describing the
historical origins of linguistic groups. One potential flaw with this data is that
linguistic diversity is not necessarily equivalent to ethnic diversity. An example
of this potential disparity is found in most countries of Latin America: where
a similar language is spoken by many different ethnic/racial groups. Such het-
erogeneity in the manifestation of diversity amongst different countries has been
addressed by the literature in different ways [Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat & Wacziarg , 2003, Fearon , 2003]. Fearon [2003] attempts to choose the
most relevant cleavages in order to construct his index of fractionalisation whilst
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg [2003] use the breakdown
of ethnicities as reported by the original sources. The first method has the ad-
vantage of being closer to the conceptual framework; the second method has the
advantage of avoiding the potential error that can occur from making judgement
calls. The correlation between the 2 measures is 0.76 [Alesina & La Ferrara , 2005],
suggesting some similarities but not absolute convergence.
A second flaw with the Atlas data is in the way it categorises groups. Some
groups, which operate as distinct political actors, are aggregated into one ethnic
group. For example, the Acholi and Lango groups in Uganda are combined into
a single group despite their documented history of political rivalry [Kasfir , 1976].
This grouping of political competitors also occurs with the Nyamwezi and Sukuma
groups of Tanzania; and the Hutu and Tutsi groups of Rwanda and Burundi. The
corollary of this critique is that some groups, whose distinction has no economic
or political relevance, are listed under seperate categories [Posner , 2004, Alesina
& La Ferrara , 2005].
The Measurement Of Ethnic Diversity:The Choice Of Index Much
of the economic literature on ethnicity uses an index of ethnic fractionalisation as
a measure of diversity:
ELF = 1−
∑
i
s2i (A.4.3.1)
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where si is the proportion of group i in the population. This measure captures
the probability that 2 randomly selected individuals from a population will not
be from the same group. The index reaches a maximum value of 1 when every
individual in a population belongs to a different group and a minimum of 0 when
all members of a population are of the same group.
Despite the use of this measure, many authors have suggested that polarisaion,
not fractionalisation, is the important measure of diversity that has an effect on
economic outcomes. With this in mind, Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol [2002]
proposed an index of polarisation:
POL = 1−
N∑
i=1
(
1/2− si
1/2
)2
si (A.4.3.2)
which reaches a maximum when the population comprises of two groups of
equal size. Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol [2002] find that this measure of
polarisation is correlated with ELF at low levels of ELF, but that this correlation
declines as ELF increase; at high levels of ELF the two measures are negatively
correlated. Some studies find that ethnic polarisation is a better explainer of
economic outcomes [Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol , 2002] while others find
that ELF is the preferred measure [Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat &
Wacziarg , 2003].
Something that is omitted from both measures but is still potentially useful
is the distance between the groups of interest [Caselli & Coleman , 2002]. How-
ever, this is somwhat difficult to do in practice. One method, used to calculate
linguistic diversity, is to use the linguistic distance between groups in the language
tree [Greenberg , 1956, Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Wacziarg , 2009, Desmet, Ortun˜o-
Ort´ın, Weber , 2009]. Another possible method is to use differences in average
income levels between the groups [Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi , 2004]. However,
this methodology remains relatively unattempted in the literature. The current
study builds on this literature by using the language tree to construct measures of
linguistic distances between languages.
Nepotism And Discrimination Nepotism refers to showing favouritism
to one’s own kin or group; it has usually been used to refer to such favouritism
amongst bureaucrats in the public sector, however, it can also be used to describe
the relationship between government employee and firm manager when describing
behaviour when parties are informed about the other person’s ethnic identity.
Several studies look at nepotism as a type of discrimination [Brandts & Sola`,
2010, Slonim & Garbarino , 2008, Belot & van de Ven , 2009]. Others make
a distinction between nepotism and discrimination [Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe ,
1995, Fershtman, Gneezy & Verboven , 2005].
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Regionalism And Ethnicity In Politics In Nigeria One of the things
that has existed in Nigeria’s history and continues to do so within the political
makeup of the country is the numerous inter-ethnic tensions which are driven by
different perceptions and values and also by clashes of interest between the various
groups that exist within the nation’s borders. The most important tensions are
the result of economic, geographical, political and religious differences that were
mostly created along ethnic and regional lines within the twentieth century. They
are not necessarily because of historic differences between ethnicities or dislike of
other cultures and/or traditions.
At the start of the twentieth century, other than on isolated occasions, the
dominant ethnic groups of Nigeria had relatively little contact with each other.
Measures that were put into place during the colonial period created more incen-
tives for the dominant groups to compete with each other for resources. Differ-
ences in the capacity of each group to exploit the opportunities provided by the
modernisation process and nationhood was followed by differences in the rates of
economic development, modernisation and education among the various groups.
Some groups, notably those within the Northern states, preferred to stick to tradi-
tion rather than vie for key roles in the government and trade & industry. Other
groups were more willing to seize such opportunities.
The differences in willingness to grasp new opportunities led some southern
groups to achieve a disproportionate amount of wealth and power within Nigeria.
The education and willingness of some tribes to migrate allowed them to win
many high positions in the Northern states. These included positions in the local
government councils. The differences between some of the southern groups were
primarily the result of competitions for economic resources an political power. The
strive to acquire a position permeated into state corporations, the civil service, and
university faculty positions. Ethnic support was sought in these personal conflicts,
a huge part of the reason for this is due to the fact that there were few divisions
along the lines of class, religion, or economic group. Therefore, if the chairman of
an organisation was a particular ethnic group, it was generally assumed that every
job in that institution would go to a person of that same ethnic group. Similarly, if
a government minister was from a particular tribe, it was automatically assumed
that a predominant share of the Ministry posts and assignments would go to
candidates from that same tribe.
Some minority groups also distinguished themselves from the three main ethnic
groups. These sentiments were driven by a number of things, including: discrimi-
nation, history, tradition, and religious & cultural differences. However, the level
of harmony between the three main groups and the many minority ethnic groups
varied. A major landmark was achieved by the minorities in the Western Region
with the creation of the Mid-Western Region which contained the non-Yoruba
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inhabitants [Ndaguba , 1995].
Methodology - State & Local Government Level This section spells out
the methodology used in this study. It also explains the research questions that
are addressed in the analysis.
Measuring Corruption When studying corruption one of the most impor-
tant things to consider is how it is measured. Different authors use different
measures to study the causes and effects of corruption. At the micro-level, an im-
portant question to ask is whether a business that makes 10 corrupt transactions
per annum each involving 5,000 should be regarded as more, less, or equally
corrupt as a business involved in 2 corrupt transactions per annum each involving
25,000. Does their behaviour makes them significantly different from one another
from the point of view of the economics of corruption? The current investigation
will use different measures of corruption in order to try to answer this sub-question.
The issue of the definition and measurement of corruption applied to a business
is important for both theoretical and empirical work. Different measures have
popped up in the literature, for example Reinikka & Svensson [2003] discuss the
use of survey data to measure corruption whilst Svensson [2003] and Rand & Tarp
[2010] use firm-level data to look at the behaviour of businesses with regards to
bribery incidence; bribe level; and (in)formality. Olken [2007] uses the log of the
ratio of reported expenditure to actual expenditure to measure corruption (missing
expenditure) in Indonesian road projects.
There does not seem to be an a priori reason to choose one measure/definition
instead of another. However, a problem arises when we ask whether or not results
would have changed if we chose a different measure. Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda [2010]
address this problem theoretically by constructing three different measures of cor-
ruption which capture the general definition of corruption. Their results show that
the effect of policy on corruption can depend on which measure one uses.
Specifically, the authors define 3 measures of corruption: corruption index (CI);
relative corruption index (CRI); and total corruption rents (CR). These are defined
as follows:
1. Corruption Index: Measures the number of times that a corrupt deal is
observed within an economy.
2. Relative Corruption Index: Measures the number of times that a corrupt
deal is observed relative to the number of deals within the economy.
3. Corruption Rents: Measures the total amount of bribes collected by public
officials.
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The current study builds on the work of Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda [2010] by empiri-
cally looking at different measures of corruption using information from a business
survey of companies in Nigeria. Doing this will help to see if the data is consis-
tent with their proposed theory. However, it should be noted that their results
suggest that the 3 measures of corruption might behave differently under certain
conditions in response to policy, not that they will necessarily behave differently.
Therefore, any results that show an empirical consistency between the 3 measures
do not necessarily refute the work of Me´ndez & Sepu´lveda [2010] but serves to
justify the use of different measures of corruption that have been proposed in the
literature. In measuring the effect of ethnicity on bribery; the current study uses
all three measures to serve as a robustness check.
The previous analysis spelled out three distinct measures of corruption: corrup-
tion index (CI); relative corruption index (CRI); and corruption rents (CR). This
study shall estimate two types of corruption index (CI). The first is the proportion
of bribing firms within the economy; i.e. the proportion of firms that admitted to
paying a bribe. So, if, in a LGA, 30 percent of firms admitted to paying any type
of bribe, then that LGA will have a CI(1) of 0.3. The second measure of CI is
the number of different purposes for which a bribe was paid. E.g. paying a bribe
to: deal with traffic offences; deal with customs officials; deal with environmental
regulations. A company which paid bribes in two of these situation will have a
corruption index(2) of 2. The mean average of these values across a region (LGA
or state) will form the second corruption index, CI(2).
To measure the relative corruption index (CRI), this study uses the ratio of
the number of different purposes for which a bribe was paid to the total number
of purposes for which the business could have paid a bribe. Managers gave details
about the different types of government officials that they had met with and the
different types of officials that they had bribed. The latter of these will form the
numerator in the CRI and the former will form the denominator. So, if a manager
met with 7 different types of government officials and paid bribes to 3 types; then
that firm will be given a relative corruption index of 3
7
. The mean average of these
values across a region (LGA or state) will form the relative corruption index, CRI.
An estimate of the revenue collected in bribes (CR) will be generated by adding
all bribe reports by the companies in the sample. This will be analysed nationally,
by state and by LGA. The log of these values will form the measure of corruption
rents (CR).
Corruption And Ethnic Diversity ELF is defined as the probability that
two randomly selected individuals from a population will not belong to the same
ethnolinguistic group. Considering a country that has a population of N individ-
uals who are distinguished by K ethnolinguistic groups, representing each group
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by i = 1, ..., K. Each individual belongs to one group only and the number of
people in group i is represented by Ni. The current study allows for flexibility
by not imposing any restrictions on the geographical location of any member of
a group, therefore, individuals of ethnolinguistic group i can all live in the same
region or be seperated and live in different regions. Since each individual belongs
to only one group the sum of group populations will be equal to the size of the
total population:
N =
K∑
i=1
Ni (A.4.3.3)
The share of the population belonging to ethnolinguistic group i can be ex-
pressed as the ratio of the size of the ethnic group to the total population:
si =
Ni
N
(A.4.3.4)
Therefore the sum of population shares will equal 1:
∑K
i=1 si = 1
ELF is defined as the probability that two randomly selected individuals will
not belong to the same group. Formally:
ELF =1−
K∑
i=1
s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si −
K∑
i=1
s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si − s2i
=
K∑
i=1
si (1− si)
(A.4.3.5)
The index of ELF satisfies the primary requirements of a diversity measure as
stated by Shannon [1948]:
 For a fixed number of groups, the measure reaches a maximum when all
group sizes are equal.
 If all groups sizes are equal, then the index increases with the number of
groups in a society.
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Much of the story surrounding corruption and ethnic fractionalisation stems
from the seminal work of Shleifer & Vishny [1993]. Using an industrial organisa-
tion framework, they compare a situation where public officials collect bribes (set
a bribe price) to that of an oligopolist setting the price for a good/service. The
result being that bribe maximisation is occurs under similar conditions to profit
maximisation in a collusive oligopoly, i.e. when an increase in the market bribe
amount can be more easily detected and punished. An example of such a case
might be a homogenous society where any movement in the bribe price from the
normal amount might become known to the kin group.
In his seminal paper on corruption and growth, Mauro [1995] suggests that
more heterogeneous societies countries will experience more corruption due to bu-
reaucrats favouring their own ethnic group; in the context of the current study,
this will mean bureaucrats collecting fewer or smaller bribes from their own ethnic
group; and more or larger bribes from other ethnic groups. He uses an index of
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) as an instrument for corruption. More re-
cent work has questioned the strength of identification in Mauro’s paper. [Shaw,
Katsaiti and Jurgilas , 2011] find Mauro’s instruments to be “weak” as defined by
the economics literature. The current study address this issue by looking at the
link between bribery and ethnic fractionalisation within an economy. It focuses on
the ethnic groups of business owners in relation to that of: local government chair-
men and; the majority ethnic group of the state103. If the assumption is correct
and ELF is a statistically strong determinant of corruption, then business owners
whose ethnicity matches that of local government chiefs should be expected to
pay fewer bribes than those who have a mismatch. Also, business owners whose
ethnicity matches that of the majority (in the state) will have a lower propensity
to bribe than those whose ethnicity do not match that of the state majority. This
study tests the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on the amount of bribe that is paid.
According to the ELF assumption [Shleifer & Vishny , 1993] regions with a higher
ELF index should see a lower (mean) average bribe level and a higher incidence of
bribery. Furthermore, regions with a lower ELF index (more homogenous states)
should have a higher aggregate bribe payment but a lower incidence of bribery.
The study thus adds to the literature on the causes of corruption and also that
of the role of ethnicity and gender in African trade networks [Fafchamps , 2000,
2003]. The preceding ideas drive hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1 Test Of ELF As A Determinant Of Corruption (a):
Regions with a higher index of ELF will have a higher proportion
of bribing firms
103These are usually identical.
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Hypothesis 2 Test Of ELF As A Determinant Of Corruption (b):
Regions with a higher index of ELF will have a smaller amount
of money collected in bribes
It is important to note that these hypotheses only speak of the occurrence of
bribery and the total amount of money collected in bribes, respectively; they do
not mention the size of the average bribe payment amongst firms. Hypothesis 1
relates to the occurrence of bribery: CI; whereas Hypothesis 2 is about the total
amount of money collected as bribe: CR. These hypotheses, if useful, provide
a further justification for having different measures of corruption, each measure
potentially captures something different, therefore allowing for different hypotheses
to be tested.
This study follows much of the literature by using the probability that two
randomly selected individuals are not of the same group as a measure of frac-
tionalisation. With the current dataset this can be applicable to ethnicity; and
religion. Using the same notation, this is defined as:
F = 1−
K∑
i=1
s2i (A.4.3.6)
where si is the share of the population belonging to the ith group; and K is the
total number of groups. Heterogeneity increases in F so that a value of 0 indicates
a perfectly homogeneous group whilst a value of 1 indicates perfect heterogeneity.
This chapter uses similarity indices (See Section A.4.3) to weight different eth-
nicities according to how related they are. This measure is conducted using in-
formation from Barrett, Kurian & Johnson [2001]. Barrett, Kurian & Johnson
[2001] classifies ethnocultural groups using a 6 character alphanumeric code that
identifies race, geographic race, major culture area, stylized colour, ethnocultural
family, and unique people. This is shown in table A.67.
Relative Similarity Between Ethnic Groups The previous analysis treats
each ethnic group as being distinct. This is useful for trying to find out the level of
diversity within an economy. One shortcoming of this approach is that it does not
take into account the similarities between ethnicities. For example, the Ebira and
Igbriran tribes are more closely related than the Ebira and Fulani tribes. To take
another example, a Yoruba and a Hindu person are less ethnically similar than a
Yoruba and a Hausa person; yet all these ethnicities are present within Nigeria
and all are present within the current dataset. Not taking into account the het-
erogeneity in the (dis)similarity between ethnicities might be a source of bias in
the construction of an index of fractionalisation. This is because two populations:
one with a 50/50 mix between Yorubas and Igbos, the other with a 50/50 mix
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Table A.67: Codes For The Classification Of Ethn-ocultural Groups
Race Geographical Race Major Culture
Area
Ethnocultural
Family
People
(biological
grouping)
(continental race) (stylized colour) (local race) (subfamily)
A: Australoid A: African B: Black
01-71 a-z
B: Capoid E: European G: Grey
C: Caucasoid F: Afro-American N: Brown
M: Mongoloid I: American Indian R: Red
N: Negroid L: Latin American T: Tan
M: Middle Eastern W: White
N: Indo-Iranian Y: Yellow
O: Oceanic
P: Pacific
R: Arctic Mongoloid
S: Asian
U: Austro-Asiatic
Y: Early African
between Yorubas and Chinese; would receive the same index of fractionalisation,
however, one might call the population consisting of a solely African population
(Yoruba/Igbo) less fractionalised as the one consisting of an African and Asian pop-
ulation (Yoruba/Chinese). The current study takes the (dis)similarities between
the ethnic groups into account by classifying them based on their ethnocultural
groups.
Each ethnic group in the sample is coded in the same manner as the previ-
ous literature [Fearon , 2003], according to the codebook of the World Christian
Encyclopedia [Barrett, Kurian & Johnson , 2001]. The methodology for this clas-
sification is displayed in Table A.67. Each ethnic group’s code consists of a 5-6
alphanumeric code. The first 3 characters are letters, the next 2 are numbers and
the sixth character , when present, is a letter. The first character,{A,B,C,M,N},
denotes the racial/biological grouping of the people within the ethnic group, ei-
ther: Australoid, Capoid, Caucasoid, Mongoloid, or Negroid. The second charac-
ter, {A,E,F,I,L,M,N,O,P,R,S,U,Y}, denotes the geographical/continental race of
the people: African, European, Afro-American, American Indian, Latin American,
Middle Eastern, Indo-Iranian, Oceanic, Pacific, Arctic Mongoloid, Asian, Austro-
Asiatic, and Early African. The next character, {B,G,N,R,T,W,Y}, denotes the
major cultural area of the group, or its stylized colour: Black, Grey, Brown, Red,
Tan, White, and Yellow. The next 2 characters are numbers from 01 to 71 and
denote the ethnocultural family, or local race, of the group. When there are dif-
ferent types of people within a local race a 6th character is used, from a to z, to
denote this subfamily.
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Similarity between any two ethnic groups is measured as the share of common
code that they have. So, the Yoruba tribe (code: NAB59n) and the Urhobo
tribe (code:NAB59z) will have a similarity index of 5/6. Furthermore, the Yoruba
tribe and the English (code:CEW19i) will share a similarity index of 0/6. Different
weights will be used to calculate dissimilarity measures (see Section A.4.3) to place
greater emphasis on either on large differences (deep cleavages), e.g. the difference
between the Yoruba and the English; or on smaller differences (finer distinctions),
e.g. the difference between the Yoruba and the Urhobo [Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın,
Wacziarg , 2009].
Fractionalisation Versus Dominance Recent literature has made a dis-
tinction between ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic dominance. Fractionalisation
is the situation where society is divided into separate ethnic groups. Dominance,
on the other hand, occurs when at least one minority group faces a majority. The
argument goes that: whilst ethnic fragmentation might give rise to competing eth-
nic groups and an inability to co-operate, it is ethnic dominance that causes the
victimisation of individuals [Collier , 2001]. In the context of the current study,
both fractionalisation and dominance might have an impact on whether or not a
randomly selected firm pays a bribe to a public official. This study argues that the
distinction between the two is not significant in explaining the bribing behaviour
of different ethnic groups. To the extent that factionalisation is more of a measure
of heterogeneity, the index of ELF should suffice as a description of the ethnic
makeup of the population of firm managers.
Ethnic fractionalisation (EF) increases as the number of ethnic groups in-
creases, therefore, the more groups in a society, the more fractionalised it is, ceteris
paribus. EF also increases as the groups become more equal in size, so a society
that consists of different groups of the same size is more fractionalised than a group
with the same number of groups but of unequal size.
In addition to the test of the ELF assumption that is inherent in Hypotheses
1 and 2, this study looks at the ways in which the polarisation of one or more
ethnic groups might be related to bribery. In doing this, the study tests the effect
of polarisation (or group dominance) on the propensity to bribe.
Hypothesis 3 Discrimination In The Propensity To Bribe: Within
each region, managers who belong to the dominant ethnic group
will be less likely to pay bribes than managers who do not belong
to the dominant ethnic group
Hypothesis 4 Discrimination In The Amount Of Bribe Paid: Within
each region, bribe paying managers who belong to the dominant
ethnic group, will , on average, pay less in bribes than the bribing
managers who do not belong to the dominant ethnic group
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Hypotheses 3 and 4 can also be applied to groupings of individuals based on
categories other than ethnicity. For example: migrant status104; religion; and
gender. Doing this allows one to see whether discrimination along ethnic lines is
stronger than religious or gender discrimination.
Polarisation In order to measure the degree of ethnic polarisation/dominance,
this study uses the index of polarisation (RQ) proposed by Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol [2005a]:
RQ =
K∑
i=1
s2i (1− si) (A.4.3.7)
The RQ measure of polarisation and the traditional measure of ELF both share
the feature that they do not take into account distances between different ethnic
groups. Therefore, the difference between Yoruba and Hausa is equivalent to the
difference between Yoruba and English. The RQ index of polarisation reaches a
maximum when there are two groups of the same size.
Corruption And Linguistic Diversity Previous literature that use ELF
as a measure of diversity conflate two distinct concepts: ethnicity diversity and
linguistic diversity. Measures of ELF taken from the Atlas Narodov Mira [USSR
, 1964] are subject to this problem. This study addresses this problem by using
seperate measures of ethnic and linguistic diversity. Traditional measures of lin-
guistic diversity can be constructed by assigning each individual to a language
group (usually their mother tongue) and using the same method as the calculation
of ELF (equation (A.4.3.5)). This method, however, has two problems, which the
current study seeks to address. The first problem is the fact that it treats all
languages as being equally distant from one another. The second problem is that
is does not allow for people to speak more than one language.
The current study follows Greenberg [1956], Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Wacziarg
[2009] and Esteban, Mayoral & Ray [2012] and uses the linguistic distance between
firm managers within the population to construct a measure of linguistic diversity.
This allows for the linguistic fractionalisation index to be weighted by how closely
related the languages are to one another.
By using the weighted versions of the linguistic diversity index, this investiga-
tion captures how related the languages are to each other, which provides more
information than treating all languages and dialects as independent. Two lan-
guages from the Indo-European family of languages can be said to be more related
104An individual is defined as a migrant if their current location/state of residence is different
from their state of origin. They are defined as a non-migrant if they originated from their current
state of residence.
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than a language from the Afro-Asiatic family and another from the Sino-Tibetan
lineage. For example, French and Spanish are more closely related to each other
than Arabic and Mandarin. With this in mind, a country that contained people
who only spoke either French or Spanish would not be as diverse as a country
whose members spoke Arabic or Mandarin since in the latter case the languages
are much less related than in the former case.
An example of a typical language tree is shown in Figure 21. Each language,
within a dataset, is found on the end branch within a tree. The weights are
constructed as follows. The languages of the world can be organised into a language
tree that captures their lineage, as shown in Figure 21. For example, all Afro-
Asiatic languages will have a common subtree, with further splits creating more
sub-subtrees all the way to the current map of languages. Modern research notes
a potential maximum of 15 steps [Esteban, Mayoral & Ray , 2012]. Cultural
diversity can be approximated by a lack of closeness on the language tree. One
can define the proximity between 2 languages k and l, ckl, as the ratio of the
number of common branches to the largest number of branches for any language
in the dataset, ckl ≡ nk=lm . Where 0 < m ≤ 15 is the maximum possible number
of branches. In the current study m = 11. If k and l are the same, then c is set
to equal 1; and if the two language trees diverge at the first node, then c is set
to equal 0. Using this definition, as in Fearon [2003] and Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın,
Wacziarg [2009], the dissimilarity between the two languages can be defined as:
dkl = 1− cδkl for some δ > 0. This measure of linguistic diversity looks at language
families in addition to individual languages. Such an approach can provide more
information due to the fact that some languages are more closely related to each
other than to other languages; and that this closeness can also be reflected in a
similarity of culture. A country that looks diverse when focusing on the number
of different languages might cease to appear diverse when taking the family of
languages into account.
A problem arises when the number of branches varies among different language
families and subfamilies. For example, in Figure 21, the English language has 4
branches while Fulani has 9 branches. To rectify this problem the current study
uses the methodology of Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Wacziarg [2009], who extend the
tree by assuming that all modern languages are equally distant from the root,
where distance is defined as the number of branches between the language and the
root. In the current study, this will imply that 7 fictitious branches from levels
5 to level 11, will be added to the English language so that the total number of
branches is equal for all languages. Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Wacziarg [2009] find
that this method is not significantly different from other alternatives.
260
Figure 21: Phylogenetic Tree Of The Most Common Languages In The Nigeria Dataset
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A natural problem to address is the choice of δ. Previous literature has used
δ = 0.5 [Fearon , 2003]; δ = 0.05 [Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Wacziarg , 2009, Desmet,
Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Weber , 2009, Esteban, Mayoral & Ray , 2012]; and effectively
δ =∞ [Montalvo & Reynal-Querol , 2005a]. The choice of δ is not trivial since it
determines how much weight is given to linguistic dissimilarity. Low values of δ will
distinguish languages with few branches in common; as δ increases , more weight is
attached to small differences whilst larger differences are weighted proportionally
less. In limδ→∞ the smallest differences is indistinguishable from relatively deeper
language cleavages. This study uses both δ = 0.05 and δ = 0.5.
The second problem that this study addresses is polylingualism. Standard
measures of linguistic diversity assign individuals of a population to one group
each; and compare the distances between the different groups [Desmet, Ortun˜o-
Ort´ın, Wacziarg , 2009, Desmet, Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, Weber , 2009, Esteban, Mayoral
& Ray , 2012, Bossert, D’Ambrosio & La Ferrara , 2011]. The problem with
this is polylingualism, where an individual can speak more than one language.
By assigning individuals to only one group some information might be lost. The
current investigation uses measures of linguistic diversity proposed by Greenberg
[1956] to account for polylingualism in the country. These are: the weighted
split-personality method; and the unweighted split personality method.
These methods treat every bilingual individual as two seperate individuals;
every trilingual person as three separate persons; and so on in that fashion. For
the unweghted version, fractionalisation is calculated in the same way as ELF. The
weighted version uses distance weights before calculating the index. This study is
the first study, to the best of the author’s knowledge, that allows for polylingualism
in its measure of linguistic diversity. Therefore, this chapter solves two problems:
polylingualism and related languages.
To calculate linguistic diversity, this study uses the measures proposed by
Greenberg [1956] which take into account the possibility of polylingualism: the
weighted split-personality method; and the unweighted split personality method.
The weighted version controls for the degree of relatedness between two languages.
These methods are described in turn.
In a standard model of linguistic diversity where each individual understands
only one language, so
∑K
i=1 si = 1, the probability of randomly successively select-
ing a speaker of language i, and a speaker of language j is the product: sisj. In
this case, linguistic diversity is measured as:
LD =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
sisj (A.4.3.8)
In the weighted versions of the diversity indices, this product is multiplied by
a measure of lingual distance,dij (Section A.4.3). Weighted linguistic diversity is
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calculated as:
LDw =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
sisjdij (A.4.3.9)
Equation A.4.3.8 is equivalent to: 1−∑Ki s2i ; and Equation A.4.3.9 is equivalent
to 1−∑Ki=1∑Kj=1 sisjcδij where cδij is the measure of similarity (closeness) between
languages i and j.
From this setup one can derive the result that the weighted measure of linguistic
diversity, LDw will be no greater than the unweighted measure, LD.
Since:
LDw =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
sisjdij
=
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
sisj(1− cδkl)
(A.4.3.10)
Recall that the measure of closeness between two languages, c, is greater than
or equal to zero; and less than or equal to 1. Also, the weight attached to the
degree of closeness, δ, is greater than zero:
0 ≤ c ≤ 1; and
δ > 0
(A.4.3.11)
Therefore,
0 ≤ LDw ≤
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
sisj (A.4.3.12)
This result can be reasoned intuitively. Excluding weights means that all lan-
guages are treated as equally distant from one another. For the sake of analysis,
one can define this distance as being equal to 1; moreover, the only difference
between the unweighted and the weighted versions of the index is that the un-
weighted version uses Equation A.4.3.9 and sets dij = 1 (or ckl = 0) for all i, j. In
other words, an unweighted index treats two languages within the same subtree
as entirely seperate languages. By including positive weights that represent the
degree of closeness between two languages one allows for some languages to be
closer than others, giving a less fractionalised picture of the economy than the
unweighted version
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Polylingualism The split personality method uses the same methodology
shown in Equations A.4.3.8 and A.4.3.9. However, in this case the unit of ob-
servation changes from the individual to the instance of the language. In other
words, every individual who speaks 2 languages is counted as 2 seperate people;
and similarly for trilingual people and so on. In the weighted version, all multiples
are weighted by their linugistic distance to one another. This means that both
‘between’ individual differences and ‘within’ individual differences are weighted.
Corruption And Diversity In order to formally test the effect of diversity
on corruption, this study builds on the work of Oguzhan [2008]. The current
study uses a similar methodology; but contributes to the literature by including
linguistic diversity to the analysis.
As in the previous literature, the following models are estimated:
Corruptions = α0 + α1Polarisations + α2X
′
s + s (A.4.3.13)
Corruptions = β0 + β1Fractionalisations + β2Fractionalisation
2
s + β3X
′
s + ξs
(A.4.3.14)
where Corruptions is the set of corruption measures, that were described in
Section A.4.3, in state/LGA s. Polarisations is the set of ethnic and religious
polarisation measures (Section A.4.3); Fractionalisations is the set of ethnic, re-
ligious, and linguistic fractionalisation measures (Section A.4.3); and Xs is a set
of explanatory variables. The previous literature suggests that β1 > 0.
Results This section presents and discusses the results of the analysis on diver-
sity and corruption. The impact of ethnic; religious; and linguistic diversity on
corruption is presented via the methods described in the previous section. The
analysis is conducted at the national level; regional level; state-level; local govern-
ment level; and at the firm level.The raw data is collected at the firm level and
aggregated up in order to run the estimations at the higher levels of aggregation.
Data definitions are given in Tables A.68 and A.69 for the aggregated data and
the firm level data, respectively. Summary statistics for the state and local gov-
ernment level data are shown in Tables A.70 and A.71, respectively. Summary
statistics for the firm level data is shown in Table A.72.
Tables A.73 and A.74 have a combination of local government data and firm
level data. Tables A.75 and A.76 show corruption measures and diversity measures,
respectively, by region. Finally Figure 22 shows the relatioship between 3 of the
main aggregated measures of corruption.
264
Tables A.77 to A.82 present the results from the estimations that are run at
the state level of aggregation. Tables A.83 to A.88 show the results from the
local government level estimations. Tables A.89 to A.92 show the results from
the firm level estimations and Figure 15 provides information on how some of the
geographical regions were aggregated into zones.
Results show no strong relationship between the state level measures of diver-
sity and corruption, this applies to ethnic diversity, religious diversity and linguistic
diversity. Also, this result remains when using either fractionalisation or polarisa-
tion as measures of diversity. This result also remains when using unweighted and
weighted measures of linguistic diveristy.
Figure 22: Relationship Between The Main Measures Of Corruption
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Table A.68: Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The State Level
And The Local Government Level
Category Variable Name Definition Measurement
Measure
Of
Corruption
Corruption Index (1) CI: Proportion Of Bribing Firms,
By Region
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
Corruption Index (2) CI2: Average No. Of Types
Of Bribes Transactions (Poten-
tial Max=11)
0 ≤ x ≤ 12
Relative Corruption Index CRI: Average ’Bribe Per Meet-
ing’, By Region
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
Log (corruption rents) log(Corruption Rents) log(Naira)
Measures
Of
Diversity
Ethnic Polarisation Ethnic Polarisation
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
Religious Polarisation Religious Polarisation
Linguistic Polarisation Linguistic Polarisation
Ethnic Fractionalisation (Un-
weighted) (EF)
Ethnic Fractionalisation
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ =
.5) (EF05)
Weighted Ethnic Fractionalisa-
tion
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ =
.05) (EF005)
Weighted Ethnic Fractionalisa-
tion
Religious Fractionalisation
(RF)
Religious Fractionalisation
Linguistic Fractionalisation
(Unweighted) (LFU)
Unweighted Linguistic Fraction-
alisation
Linguistic Fractionalisation
(δ = .5) (LF05)
Weighted Linguistic Fractionali-
sation
Linguistic Fractionalisation
(δ = .05) (LF005)
Weighted Linguistic Fractionali-
sation
Linguistic Polarisation Linguistic Polarisation Measure
EF Squared EF Squared
RF Squared RF Squared
LFU Squared LFU Squared
Manufacture (Share) Proportion of Firms in the man-
ufacturing industry, by region
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
Trade (share) Proportion of firms engaging in
international trade, by region
Avg. No. Of Languages Spo-
ken
Number of languages that the
manager understands (Max=5)
1 ≤ x ≤ 5
x represents the variable.
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Table A.69: Data Definitions - Variables That Are Measured At The Firm Level
Category Variable
Name
Definition Measurement
Dependent
Variable
Bribe
Dummy
Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise {0;1}
Independent
Variables
Similar
Ethnicity
Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager=ethnicity of local
government chairperson, 0 otherwise
{0;1}
Ethnic
Mismatch
1-Similar Ethnicity {0;1}
Employee number (category) of paid employees {Less Than 50;
50 to 100; 100 to 250; Over 250}
{1; 2; 3; 4}
Trade Dummy=1 if firm engages in international trade, 0
otherwise
{0;1}
Foreign Dummy=1 if foreign ownership ≥25%, 0 otherwise {0;1}
Security Dummy=1 if company using security service, 0 oth-
erwise
{0;1}
Lage Log of firm’s age
Table A.70: Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The State Level
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Corruption Index (1) 37 0.211 0.135 0 0.582
Corruption Index (2) 37 0.320 0.338 0 1.381
Relative Corruption Index 35 0.299 0.226 0 0.808
Corruption Rents 37 541.9 1,332 0 7,180
Log (Corruption Rents) 35 4.838 1.951 -0.693 8.879
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) 37 0.407 0.276 0.0120 0.821
EF Squared 37 0.240 0.239 0.000143 0.674
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ = .5) (EF05) 37 0.070 0.052 0.003 0.199
EF05 Squared 37 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.040
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ = .05) (EF005) 37 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.068
EF005 Squared 37 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.005
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) 37 0.259 0.173 0.0185 0.507
RF Squared 37 0.0962 0.0945 0.000341 0.257
Linguistic Fractionalisation (Unweighted) (LFU) 37 0.650 0.0783 0.500 0.800
LFU Squared 37 0.428 0.101 0.250 0.640
Linguistic Fractionalisation (δ = .5) (LF05) 37 0.599 0.0593 0.500 0.698
Linguistic Fractionalisation (δ = .05) (LF005) 37 0.567 0.0647 0.482 0.669
Ethnic Polarisation 37 0.117 0.0562 0.00599 0.187
Religious Polarisation 37 0.126 0.0847 0.00917 0.249
Linguistic Polarisation 37 0.206 0.0271 0.139 0.250
Avg. No. Of Languages Spoken 37 2.324 0.219 2 2.800
Manufacture (Share) 37 0.135 0.115 0 0.615
Trade (Share) 37 0.0425 0.0452 0 0.165
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Significant relationships between diversity and corruption begin to show up
when running the estimations at the local government level. This applies to both
ethnic and religious diversity, which both seem to have a relatively strong associa-
tion with the proportion of corrupt firms and the log of the total amount of Naira
paid (collected) in bribes. This result also applies to the firm level, where local
government level averages of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity are highly
correlated with the individual firms propensity to bribe.
Relatively strong evidence is found for an ethnic/political network effect. A
firm manager whose ethnicity matches that of his/her local government chairperson
is less likely to pay a bribe than a manager of a different ethnicity to their local
government chairperson. This result holds for the payment of bribes but not
for the amount of bribe paid. No significant relationship was found between a
shared ethnicity and the amount of bribe paid. Including the Similar-Ethnicity
variable (a dummy equal to one if the manager’s ethnicity is the same as that
Table A.71: Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Local Government
Level
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
Corruption Index (1) 350 0.198 0.298 0 1
Corruption Index (2) 350 0.228 0.609 0 5.500
Relative Corruption Index 200 0.262 0.337 0 1
Corruption Rents 350 57.48 234.6 0 3,000
Log (Corruption Rents) 152 3.376 1.817 -0.693 8.006
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) 350 0.320 0.354 0 1
EF Squared 350 0.228 0.329 0 1
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ = .5) (EF05) 350 0.028 0.044 0 0.207
EF05 Squared 350 0.003 0.006 0 0.043
Ethnic Fractionalisation (δ = .05) (EF005) 350 0.003 0.006 0 0.072
EF005 Squared 350 0.000 0.000 0 0.005
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) 350 0.247 0.326 0 1
RF Squared 350 0.167 0.311 0 1
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LF) 292 0.583 0.0971 0 0.807
LF Squared 292 0.350 0.112 0 0.651
Linguistic Fractionalisation (δ = .5) (LF05) 292 0.547 0.0722 0 0.720
Linguistic Fractionalisation (δ = .05) (LF005) 292 0.527 0.0705 0 0.720
Ethnic Polarisation 350 0.0729 0.0886 0 0.250
Religious Polarisation 350 0.0651 0.0922 0 0.250
Linguistic Polarisation 292 0.228 0.028 0 0.250
Avg. No. Of Languages Spoken 292 2.272 0.393 1 4
Manufacture (Share) 350 0.137 0.267 0 1
Trade (Share) 350 0.0521 0.163 0 1
Language data is available for 1,267 firms. These 1,267 firms are located in 292 Local
government areas. 198 local government areas had a total corruption rent of zero, hence, there
are only 152 (350-198) observed values for the log of corruption rents.
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Table A.72: Summary Statistics For Variables Measured At The Firm Level: Se-
lected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample
Variable Statistic Firms
with
Data on
Ethnicity
Firms
without
Data on
Ethnicity
All Firms Test of Relation-
ship (P and Z Val-
ues)
Bribe
Dummy
Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .287 .242 .269
0.022+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .45 .43 .27
Employee Min 1 1 1
Max 4 4 4
Mean 1.53 2.18 1.79
0.000+Median 1 2 1
Std. Dev. .95 1.29 1.15
Trade Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .07 .09 .08
0.167+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .26 .28 .26
Foreign Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .11 .17 .13
0.000+Median 0 0 0
Std. Dev. .316 .372 .34
Security Min 0 0 0
Max 1 1 1
Mean .99 .99 .99
0.594+Median 1 1 1
Std. Dev. .08 .09 .08
Age Min 0 0 0
Max 90 90 90
Mean 16.3 20.26 17.9
0.000−Median 14 17 15
Std. Dev. 13.2 15.43 14.26
Lage Min 0 0 0
Max 4.50 4.50 4.50
Mean 2.45 2.68 2.54
0.000−Median 2.64 2.86 2.71
Std. Dev. .94 .94 .94
Similar Eth-
nicity
Min 0
Max 1
Mean .627
Median 1
Std. Dev 0.484
N 1,267* 843* 2,110*
In each column, for each variable, the table reports the minimum, maximum, mean, median and
standard deviation for each (sub)sample. The last row details the number of observations for
each (sub)sample. ∗Only 1255, 834, and 2,089 observation for “Lage”, respectively, due to log(0)
being undefined. + P-Value was computed using a chi-squared test of independence between the
variable and a “selection” variable equal to 1 if the managers ethnicity is known, 0 otherwise. The
test on “employee” has 3 degrees of freedom, the tests on “bribe dummy”, “trade”, “foreign” and
“security” each have 1 degree of freedom. − Z-Value calculated using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
(rank-sum) test.
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Table A.73: Summary Statistics Of Ethnicities Of Local Government Chairs: For
Selected & Unselected Subsamples; And For Entire Sample
Ethnicity of Local
Government Chairman
Selected For Analysis
Total
Selected Not Selected
Hausa 357 295 652
% 54.8 45.2 100.0
Igbo 224 112 336
% 66.7 33.3 100.0
Yoruba 471 273 744
% 63.3 36.7 100.0
Other 215 163 378
% 56.9 43.1 100.0
Total 1,267 843 2,110
% 60.0 40.0 100.0
Pearson χ23 statistic = 18.626. P-value=0.000.
Table A.74: Cross Tabulation Of The Ethnicities Of Firm Managers And Local
Government Chiefs
Ethnicity Of Local Government Chief
Yoruba Igbo Hausa Other Total
Ethnicity Of
Firm
Manager
Yoruba 331 6 55 11 403
(%) 26.12 0.47 4.34 0.87 31.81
Igbo 93 192 53 35 373
(%) 7.34 15.15 4.18 2.76 29.44
Hausa 4 3 185 18 210
(%) 0.32 0.24 14.60 1.42 16.57
Other 43 23 64 151 281
(%) 3.39 1.82 5.05 11.92 22.18
Total 471 224 357 215 1,267
(%) 37.17 17.68 28.18 16.97 100.00
Pearson χ29 statistic = 1300. P-value=0.000. Percentages represent the percentage of the
sample of 1,267 firms that exist within the respective cell. The main diagonal represents firm
managers whose ethnicities match those of the local government chief. The off diagonal entries
are firm managers who have a different ethnicity to that of the local government chiefs when
splitting ethnicities into the 4 main groups of: Yoruba; Igbo; Hausa; and Other.
of the local government chair, and 0 otherwise) does not significantly alter the
other independent variables in the model. This seems to suggest that the Similar-
Ethnicity variable is picking up something new that was not previously within the
data on firm level characteristics.
Also, when controlling for regional heterogeneity in the matching effect by
including zonal dummies and interaction terms, the effect seems to appear only
for the South-West region, which includes Lagos State, the commercial hub of
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Nigeria and one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the country. This seems
to suggest that much of the effect of ethnic networks on corruption might come
from this region.
Summary Statistics
State Level Information Summary statistics for the variables that are mea-
sured or aggregated at the state level are given in Table A.70. The Corruption
Index-1 (CI:1) represents the average number of bribing firms in each region. The
mean value of 0.211 for the CI:1 indicates that the average proportion of bribing
firms across all states was 0.21. The maximum value for any state is 0.582, which
occurred in Lagos State. The minimum CI:1 was 0, which occurred in Jigawa and
Yobe states. A skewness/kurtosis test for normality of this variable is unable to
reject the null hypothesis of normality (χ22 = 1.19;P-velue=0.5528).
Corruption Index-2 (CI:2) represents the number of different types of bribe
transactions that the firm engages in over the course of the previous year. The
potential maximum number is 11 which corresponds to the 11 questions which
asked about different types of bribe transaction. The actual range of values for
the state level averages went from a minimum of 0 to a maximum value of 1.281,
with a mean of 0.32 and a median of 0.24.
The relative corruption index measures the number of bribe transactions as
a share of the total number of transactions that the firm engaged in (and was
asked about) that had the potential for a bribe to take place. This variable has
a potential range from 0 (representing the case where the firm met with public
officials but did not report paying a bribe) to 1 (where the firm reported paying
a bribe to every type of public official that it met with). The values in the data
range from 0 to 0.808, with a mean of 0.299. A normality test on this variable also
fails to reject the null of normality (χ22 = 3.19; P-value=0.2033). This variable
has 2 missing values corresponding to the two states where no firms declared that
they had met with a public official.
Finally, the corruption rents measures the total amount of bribes paid by firms
within each state in ‘000 Naira. This is truncated at 0 (Yobe and Jigawa States)
with a maximum of 7,180,000 (Lagos State), a mean of 542,000 and a median
value of 151,000.
The three main linguistic (ethnic) fractionalisation measures reveal that weight-
ing languages (ethnicities) by their similarity, represented by the number of com-
mon branches (code) that they share on the language tree (ethnicity code), reduces
the measure of linguistic (ethnic) diversity in this case. The mean value of the
state-level average number of languages spoken is 2.3, with a minimum of 2 and a
maximum of 2.8. The null of normality cannot be rejected with this variable. An
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average of 13.5% of firms are in the manufacturing sector within each state; Kano
State had the maximum value with 61% of its firms belonging to the manufactur-
ing sector. 4.25% of firms engage in the direct importing or exporting of goods
as part of their business, Lagos State had the maximum value for the share of its
firms engaging in internationlal trade with 16% of them doing so.
Local Government Level Information Summary statistics for the vari-
ables that are measured or aggregated at the local government level are given in
Table A.71. These variables are the same variables as described in Section A.4.3,
the only difference is that they are constructed at the local government level. There
are a total of 351 local government areas (LGAs) in the sample, this represents
45% of Nigeria’s 774 Local Government Areas. Data on ethnicity exists for all
351 LGAs whilst data on language is only available for firms existing in 292 of the
LGAs. Notable differences at this level of disaggregation include the maximum
value for the total amount of Naira paid in bribes being 3 million. Also, the
mean values for the diversity indices have generally reduced in magnitude whilst
the maximum values have increased. Both results can be explained by the smaller
cell size and lower level of aggregation when looking at the local government level,
compared to the state-level. 198 local government areas contained firms who all
reported paying zero bribes, therefore the log of corruption rents only exists for
152 observations.
Firm Level Information Summary statistics calculated at the firm level are
displayed in Table A.72. This table shows summary statistics for the firms with
data on ethnicity, firms without data on ethnicity and both groups combined. The
following information relates to the 1,267 sub-sample of firms that have data on the
ethnicity of their senior managers. Amongst these firms, 28.7% of them reported
that they had paid a bribe. Information on the number of employees within each
company was constructed using a categorical variable, the categories are: less than
50; 50-100; 100-250; and over 250. The median and mode values for the number
of employees within the firm, amongst the sample of firms with ethnicity data, lie
within the “less than 50” category. 7% of firms engage in international trade and
11% of firms had foreign owners whose share of ownership was greater than or equal
to 25%. The majority of firms (99%) used a security service. The mean average
age was 16 years, with a median of 14 years. Finally, 63% of the managers in this
sub-sample belonged to the same ethnicity as the local government chairperson in
the location of the company.
Local Government And Firm Level Information Table A.73 divides
the data into 2 samples. Firms with information on the manager’s ethnicity (Se-
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lected) and firms without information on ethnicity (Not Selected). The table cross
tabulates this data along with the ethnicity of the local government chairperson
of the local government area that the firm is located in. Ethnicity is divided into
four categories: Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, and Other. These categories were chosen
because they are the most common ethnicities within the firm-level dataset; the
individual level dataset and within Nigeria.
Using this information, the table shows the degree to which the respective
ethnicities are selected into the sample. The data shows that firms in Hausa-
headed LGAs are approximately equally selected as those in “Other”-Ethnic Group
Headed LGAs, with 55-57% of the firms in each category being selected into the
sample. Also, firms in Igbo headed LGAs are roughly equally selected into the
sample as firms with Yoruba-headed LGAs, with 63-67% of the firms in each
category being selected into the sample.
Table A.74 shows a cross-tabulation of the ethnicities of the local government
chair and the ethnicity of the firm manager, for the selected sub-sample of firms
that has information on the firm manager’s ethnicity. The table shows the number
of firms existing in each cell and also the percentage of the total sample that exists
within that cell. Numbers along the main diagonal represent firms whose manager
has the same ethnicity as the local politician. Conversely, firms existing in cells
on the off diagonal represent firms whose managers have a different ethnicity to
their local government chairperson. The firms existing in the main diagonal of this
table comprise 67.79% of the sample of 1,267 firms. This is higher than the 63%
of firms for whom it was previously stated that their manager’s ethnicity matched
that of the local government chief (Section A.4.3). This disparity occurs due to
the aggregation of managers that are not Yoruba, Hausa or Igbo into the “Other”
category. Doing this leads to an overestimate of the proportion of firms with a
similar ethnicity. In the estimations, the variable describing whether or not the
firm manager shares the same ethnicity as the local government chief (“Similar-
Ethnicity”) is constructed using data on ethnicities without aggregation. Table
A.74 shows the aggregated data for ease of explanation.
Constructed Indices Information on the corruption measures for each state
are shown in Table A.75. Table A.76 shows the diversity measures for each state.
Figure 22 plots information about 3 of the corruption measures: CI(2), CRI and
CR. The data shows a relatively strong positive correlation between the three
measures which helps with the argument that they are picking up similar things.
Measures Of Corruption Overall 28.7% of the 1,267 firms reported paying
a bribe of some kind. CI(2) was constructed from businesses reporting the type
of public official that they had paid bribes to. Firms were asked about a total
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of 11 types of public official. These options are not an exhaustive list of every
type of person that a business might pay a bribe to, however, it does help to see
the heterogeneity in bribe behaviour with different types of government officials;
and to see the control rights that each type of official commands over the business.
Also, the list of 11 variables used to construct CI(2) is similar to the set of variables
used in previous literature [Hunt , 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, Hunt & Laszlo , 2012].
170 businesses (out of 1,267) reported that they had bribed at least one of the 11
types of officials. The maximum number of officials bribed was 9 (out of a possible
11). The mean average was 2.65 for those who reported bribing one of the 11
official-types; and 0.36 for the entire sample.
This study utilises the use of an official as a measure for the level of transactions
in the economy. CRI is constructed by dividing the number of official types bribed
by the number of official types used. Therefore, CRI can take on values between
0 and 1 inclusive. Values for CRI ranged from 0 to 0.81 with a mean of 0.31. The
mean average for businesses who reported bribing one of the 11 official types is
0.42.
CR was generated by summing the amount of bribe collected in each region,
this is a Naira figure and can be any non-negative value. The median regional
total bribe revenue was 151,000 (mean=542,000). Excluding states with a
total bribe revenue of more than 2,000,000 reduces these figures to 133,000
(mean=190,000).
Figure 22 shows a scatter plot of the CI(2) and CRI measures of corruption
incidence and relative corruption incidence, respectively, for each region. The
symbols are weighted by the CR measure of corruption revenue, so larger circles
denote a larger amount received in total revenue within the state. The data shows
a relatively strong positive relationship between CI(2) and CRI. The correlation
coefficient between the two values is 0.76 which is statistically significant at the
1% level. Most regions lie within the 95% confidence regions with the exceptions
of Rivers state (above) and Zamfara state (below). I.e. Rivers state has a higher
corruption index than predicted by the data and Zamfara has a lower corruption
index than predicted by the data.
Corruption And (Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic) (Polarisation/Fractionalisation):
State Level Results Results from the regressions of corruption on diversity are
shown in Tables A.77, A.78, A.79, A.80, A.81, and A.82.
Despite the fact that ethnicity data is only available for a sub-sample of firms,
corruption data is available for all firms. The diversity measures in the aforemen-
tioned tables are constructed using individual level data from the CLEEN survey.
Tables A.77,A.79 and A.81 use the full sample of firms to generate the corruption
indices while Tables A.78, A.80 andA.82 use the sub-sample of 1,267 firms which
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have ethnicity data.
Table A.77 shows the results from regressing the four main corruption mea-
sures (CI(1); CI(2); CRI; CR) on the 3 unweighted measures of diversity (ethnic;
religious; and linguistic fractionalisation). The measures of ethnic and religious
fractionalisation are constructed in the traditional way whilst the measure of lin-
guistic fractionalisation is created using the unweighted split personality method.
Results are shown for the four corruption measures: 2 absolute corruption indices;
the relative corruption index; and the log of corruption rents. The regressions also
control for the share of firms that are in the manufacturing sector and the share of
firms that engage in international trade. Observations are at the state level. Re-
sults show no statistically significant effect of any fractionalisation measure on any
measure of corruption. All but one of the models are not statistically significant
at the 10% level.
Similar results occur when using the subsample of 1,267 firms to generate the
corruption indices. This is done in Table A.78, in these models none of the diversity
variables return significant coefficients. One result that occurs quite often is the
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable for the share of
firms that engage in trade. This suggests that one factor influencing the level
of corruption in an economy is international trade. More specifically, the factors
which influence whether or not a firm engages in the direct importation of export
of good and/or services are positively and significantly associated with level of
corruption measured as the proportion of bribing firms; the respective number
and proportion of transactions that attract bribes; and the total amount of bribes
paid. The variable denoting trade has a positive association with the propensity
to pay a bribe (CI(1)) and the amount of bribe paid (CR).
We see similar results when using polarisation as a measure of diversity (Ta-
ble A.79). The majority of the models show no statistically significant effect of
polarisation on corruption. Models V and VIII show negative effects of religious
polarisation on the second corruption index and the relative corruption index that
are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. These coefficients retain their
sign and become more statistically significant when focusing on the sub-sample of
1,267 firms (Table A.80).
Tables A.81 and A.82 look at the effect of the different (weighted and un-
weughted) measures of linguistic fractionalisation on the different indices of cor-
ruption. The models of Table A.81 do not return many significant coefficients on
the indices of linguistic diversity. Only 1 model (Table A.82, Model II) shows a
positive effect of linguistic fractionalisation on corruption (Corruption Index 1).
This result occurs when using the unweighted measure of linguistic fractionali-
sation that does not take into account the distances between languages. When
weighting linguistic fractionalisation this effect disappears. Furthermore, all other
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models in this table show no significant effect of linguistic fractionalisation on cor-
ruption. The effect of trade on corruption amongst states in Nigeria is positive
and statistically significant for all models in Tables A.81 and A.82.
Corruption And (Ethnic/Religious/Linguistic) (Polarisation/Fractionalisation):
Local Government Level Results Tables A.83, A.84, A.85, A.86, A.87 and
A.88 show results from the estimations run at the local government level. In gen-
eral, these estimates return a greater number of statistically significant coefficients
than those run at the state level. Moreover, many of the significant coefficients
are in the models that use the relatively simpler measures of corruption - the cor-
ruption index; and the corruption rents. The corruption index (1) represents the
proportion of bribing firms; the corruption rents represent the amount of money
collected in bribes. These measures are used more often in the literature than CI
(2) and CRI.
Table A.83, uses the full sample of firms to regress the different measures of
corruption on diversity at the local government level. Model I shows a statistically
significant relationship between ethnic fractionalisation (EF) & EF squared and
corruption. The coefficients suggest a non-linear relationship between diversity
and corruption.
CI =α1 + α2EF + α3EF
2 + X′β + i
δCI
δEF
=α2 + (2 ∗ α3EF ) = 0.341 + (2 ∗ (−0.361))EF
δCI
δEF
=0.341− 0.722EF
(A.4.3.15)
In this sample, CI (1) ranges from 0 to 1 with an mean average value of 0.320
and a standard deviation of 0.354 (Table A.71). At this level of EF, an infinites-
mally small increase in ethnic fractionalisation will lead to a 0.11 increase in the
proportion of bribing firms (CI(1)). Therefore, at the average level of ethnic frac-
tionalisation amongst local government areas in Nigeria, there seems to be evidence
of a positive association between ethnic diversity and the occurrence of corruption.
Despite this, the model also suggests that this relationship reaches a peak where
EF = 0.472, after this point an increase in the diversity of a local government
area is associated with a fall in the incidence of corruption. This suggests that the
capital of Abuja, with an EF value of 0.807 (Table A.76) will see a fall in this type
of corruption if migrants from different parts of the country continue to flow into
its borders. However, Lagos, with an EF of 0.382 will see an increase in the level
of bribery by companies if it becomes more diverse than it is at the moment. This
relationship is shown in Figure 23 which plots the fitted values from the estimation
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against EF. An inverse-U shaped relatiosnhip can be seen in the graph. Hence,
the results of this study mirror those of Oguzhan [2008], who also finds an inverse
U-shaped relatiosnhip between ethnic fractionalisation and corruption.
Model X of Table A.83 shows a similar result for the effect of EF on the amount
of money collected in rents. In this case, the marginal effect of a small change in
the level of fractionalisation is:
Log(CR) =β1 + β2EF + β3EF
2 + X′γ + υi
δLog(CR)
δEF
=β2 + (2 ∗ β3EF ) = 5.646 + (2 ∗ (−5.3))EF
δLog(CR)
δEF
=5.646− 10.6EF
(A.4.3.16)
Thus, at the mean EF values of 0.320, a small change in the EF is associated
with an increase in the log of bribe payments of 2.254. This is equivalent to an
increase of 180,000 which is equal to £720. This function reaches a maximum at
an EF level of 0.533, after which any increase in EF is associated with a reduction
in the total amount of bribes paid. As before, Lagos finds itself on the positively
sloped side of the curve while Abuja is on the negatively sloped side.
Similar results are found for the effect of religious diversity on the amount of
money collected in corruption rents. In Model XI of Table A.83 both religious frac-
tionalisation and its squared term have statistically significant coefficients. Start-
ing at the mean value of religious fractionalisation (0.259) a 1 standard deviation
(0.173) increase in the level of fractionalisation is associated with an increase in
the total amount of Naira collected in bribes of log(0.382), which is equivalent
to an increase of 1,500. Similar results are found when looking at the reduced
sample (table A.84), however, the coefficients on religious fractionalisation and its
square are insignificant for these estimations.
The results from tables A.85 and A.86, which look at the effect of the differ-
ent measures of polarisation on the different measures of corruption, suggest that
ethnic polarisation and linguistic polarisation work in opposite directions. Most
of the coefficients on ethnic polarisation are positive whilst most of the coefficients
on linguistic polarisation are negative. For religious polarisation, half of the coeffi-
cients are positive and half are negative, however, the only statistically significant
coefficients are positive. These results suggest that higher ethnic and religious
polarisation are associated with higher levels of corruption, in terms of the pro-
portion of bribe paying firms and the total amount of Naira collected in bribes,
while higher linguistic polarisation is associated with lower levels of corruption.
The standard explanation for ELF and corruption can be used to explain the pos-
itive coefficients on ethnic and religious polarisation, respectively. An explanation
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for the negative coefficient on linguistic polarisation could be that, ignoring En-
glish, the lack of a common language might be a barrier to engaging in a (corrupt)
transaction. In this setting the lack of a common language might drive distrust
between both parties and might reduce the chance that a corrupt transaction takes
place due to the possibility of being reported by the other party.
The coefficient on the share of firms in the local government area in the man-
ufacturing sector is not statistically different from zero in the models that have a
corruption index as a dependent variable. However, the coefficients on the share
of manufacturing firms is positive and statistically significant in models X to XII
of Table A.86 (the reduced sample). The coefficient on the “trade” variable is pos-
itive and statistically significant in models I to VI of both tables A.85 and A.86.
Among all local government areas, the average proportion of firms that engaged
in some form of international trade as part of ther operations was 5%. Therefore,
the results from table A.86 indicate that, on average and ceteris paribus, a 10 per-
centage point higher share of firms engaging in international trade is associated
with a 5 percentage point higher rate of bribery. The models seem best suited to
explaining the models with corruption indices CI1 and CI2; and the corruption
rents as dependent variables. The models seem least able to explain the relative
corruption index. The models explaining the corruption index (CI1) and corrup-
tion rents are all statistically significant whilst the highest goodness of fit comes
from the models explaining the second corruption index, CI2 (R-Squared=0.18).
Tables A.87 and A.88 show the results from the estimations of corruption on
the weighted and unweighted measures of linguistic fractionalisation. The coeffi-
cients on trade are positive and statistically significant in explaining the corruption
indices (CI1 and CI2). The average number of languages spoken does not seem to
be a significant explanatory variable when trying to explain the differences in the
corruption levels across local government areas. Most of the coefficients for the av-
erage number of languages spoken are positive but none are statistically significant.
The coefficients on the unweighted measure of linguistic fractionalisation (LF) and
the weighted measure using the split personality method with δ = 0.5 (LF05) are
not statistically significant in the models explaining the corruption indices (CI1
and CI2) and the relative corruption index. The coefficients on LF and LF05 are
positive and statistically significant when entered into the models explaining the
corruption rents. This suggests that, for a fixed number of languages, the more
equally spread that the instances of the language are, the higher the total amount
of money collected as bribe payments. Alternatively, other things being equal, the
more languages spoken, the larger the amount of money collected in bribes.
The coefficients on the weighted measure of linguistic fractionalisation with
δ = 0.05 (LF005) are negative in the models explaining the corruption indices
and positive in the model explaining the amount of bribes collected. Therefore,
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linguistic polarisation is negatively associated with the total amount of bribes paid
while linguistic fractionalisation has a positive effect. Despite this result, it might
be useful to keep in mind that the result for linguistic polarisation is only significant
at the 5% level when using the full sample of firms to measure corruption. When
using the reduced sample the coefficient on linguistic polarisation is not significant.
Nevertheless, looking at the data aids in seeing a potential reason for this result.
This is done in Figure 24.
The y-axis displays the index number while the x-axis displays the number
of groups. “Fractionalisation” and “Polariation” show the indices consistent with
groups of equal size. I.e. “Fractionalisation” shows how the unweighted index
of fractionalisation changes as the number of group sizes increases, keeping the
share of each group within the population equal between groups. The same goes
for “Polarisation”. The difference between this theoretical trend and the observed
values for linguistic fractionalisation (LFU) and polarisation (LP) indicates the
effect of differing group sizes. So the spread of instances of languages is not equal
among the population. In addition to this, under the theoretical indices, fraction-
alisation and polarisation move closer together for when there are more than 2
groups. This is not the case with the observed data, which shows a divergence of
LFU and LP as the number of groups increases. A similar story emerges when the
weighted measures of fractionalisation are plotted as well. A potential reason for
the opposite effects of linguistic fractionalisation and polarisation on the amount
of money collected in bribes is that the two variables tend to be moving in opposite
directions in Figure 24.
Another potentially interesting result it that the negative effect of linguis-
tic fractionalisation on the corruption indices is only significant when using the
weighted measure of linguistic fractionalisation with δ = 0.05. This study now
examines each of these results in turn. Relatively low levels of δ seperate the
languages that have no (or very few) branches in common from the rest of the
languages, higher values of δ give a greater weight to smaller difference, while
larger differences play a relatively less important role. In the limit, as δ → ∞,
the measure of fractionalisation becomes one of polarisation and the most minute
difference between languages is treated as complete seperateness and is not distin-
guishable from greater linguistic differences. The results from Table A.88 suggest
that it is the deeper linguistic cleavages that matter when trying to explain the
effect of diversity on the level of bribery rather than smaller differences in lan-
guage. The coefficient for the effects of weighted linguistic diversity (δ = 0.05)
on the corruption indices are the opposite sign of the coefficient for the effect of
linguistic diversity on the amount of bribe rents. This is consistent with previous
literature which finds an inverse relationship between the propensity to bribe and
the amount of bribe paid [Shleifer & Vishny , 1993]. In this case, the factors af-
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Figure 23: A Plot Of Fitted Values For The Corruption Index (1) Against Ethnic
Fractionalisation For Model I Of LG Estimations (Full Sample)
fecting the aggregate propensity to bribe have an opposite effect in explaining the
size of bribe payment.
Conclusion This study has added to the body of knowledge by investigating
the effect of ethnic; religious; and linguistic diversity on corruption. The analysis
focused on businesses in the Nigerian economy. One of the main contributions
of this study was to seperate ethnic diversity from linguistic diversity, this was
achieved by finding out the respective ethnic group of; and languages spoken by,
business managers. These were used along with information on the ethnic and
religious mix of the different regions in the country to construct state level indices of
polarisation and fractionalisation based on ethnicity; religion; and language. This
study also accounted for the similarity between languages by constructing weighted
indices of linguistic fractionalisation. This added to the literature by providing a
measure of how related the languages were. Also, by using information about
agents (individuals and firms) and not regions; this study was able to overcome
the measurement error that occurs when assigning an ethnic/religious identity to
all of the individuals located in a region.
Four separate measures of corruption were constructed which were based on
those used or described by previous literature. These were: the proportion of
280
Figure 24: The Relationship Between Fractionalisation And Polarisation: Theo-
retical And Empirical Results
Y-axis: index value. X-axis: number of groups in population. The blue (red) line represents the relationship
between the index of fractionalisation (polarisation) and the number of groups within the population, holding
the share of each group within the population equal among groups. The green X’ (orange circles) show the
actual data on fractionalisation (polarisation), where the groups shares are can vary.
bribing firms in a region; the average number of bribe types paid per firm in
a region; the average number of bribe types paid as a fraction of total possible
bribe types; and the (log of the) total amount of bribes collected, in Naira, in a
region. These were defined as: corruption index (1); corruption index (2); relative
corruption index; and corruption rents, respectively.
Results show no robust relationship between the measures of diversity and the
measures of corruption. There was some evidence for a negative effect of religious
and linguistic polarisation on corruption. There was also some weak evidence for a
positive effect of unweighted linguistic fractionalisation on corruption. This result
suggests that the positive effect of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation on corruption
that is found or assumed in the literature might be a result of: conflating two
seperate things, ethnicity and linguism; and treating all groups as being equally
distant from one another. When weighting linguistic groups by their distance to
each other, using a language tree, no significant relationship shows up between
fractionalisation and corruption. These results remained when using measures of
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ethnic fractionalisation that encorporated racial distance. Future work can use
other methods to calculate ethno-linguistic diversity, e.g. random-speaker method
(weighted and unweighted); random speaker-hearer method; and index of commu-
nication. Comparing results from the different measures will aid in determining
the best one to use when looking at the effect of diversity on corruption.
Table A.75: Corruption Measures, By Region
Region CI(1) CI(2) CRI CR LCR
Abia 0.326 1.087 0.615 199 5.291
Adamawa 0.235 0.294 0.333 883 6.784
Akwa ibom 0.323 0.710 0.808 78 4.361
Anambra 0.317 0.878 0.459 174 5.159
Bauchi 0.250 0.350 0.252 151 5.020
Bayelsa 0.100 0.450 0.500 20 2.996
Benue 0.286 0.143 0.094 5 1.674
Borno 0.300 0.400 0.311 125 4.828
Cross River 0.083 0.167 0.333 2 0.693
Delta 0.242 0.394 0.407 81 4.388
Ebonyi 0.313 0.625 0.503 202 5.308
Edo 0.148 0.185 0.126 387 5.960
Ekiti 0.038 0.077 0.100 14 2.645
Enugu 0.290 0.355 0.567 381 5.942
Gombe 0.080 0.120 0.156 3094 8.037
Imo 0.137 0.275 0.262 55 4.002
Jigawa 0.000 0.000 . 0 .
Kaduna 0.154 0.269 0.211 260 5.560
Kano 0.154 0.000 0.000 109 4.689
Katsina 0.333 0.444 0.579 3299 8.102
Kebbi 0.167 0.917 0.667 55 4.007
Kogi 0.429 0.048 0.077 279 5.631
Kwara 0.346 0.000 0.000 447 6.101
Lagos 0.582 0.432 0.337 7180 8.879
Nassarawa 0.200 0.040 0.014 441 6.088
Niger 0.389 0.056 0.250 142 4.954
Ogun 0.029 0.235 0.143 1 0.693
Ondo 0.037 0.000 0.000 158 5.064
Osun 0.051 0.051 0.200 34 3.518
Oyo 0.175 0.125 0.317 101 4.616
Plateau 0.326 0.279 0.114 725 6.586
Rivers 0.333 1.381 0.587 495 6.205
Sokoto 0.300 0.800 0.389 251 5.525
Taraba 0.111 0.000 0.000 22 3.110
Yobe 0.000 0.000 . 0 .
Zamfara 0.118 0.176 0.667 23 3.135
FCT (Abuja) 0.118 0.088 0.100 177 5.178
CI(1): The proportion of bribing firms in the region. CI(2): The regional average number of different purposes
for which a bribe was paid (potential max=11). CRI: The regional average of: The number of different purposes
for which a bribe was paid as a fraction of the number of different purposes for which a bribe could have been
paid (i.e. the number of bribe types divided by the number of different types of public officials met with). CR:
The total amount of bribes paid by firms within the region (in ’000 Naira). LCR: Log of: the total amount of
bribes paid by firms within the region.
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Table A.76: Diversity Measures, By Region
Region Ethnic Polari-
sation
Religious
Polarisation
Linguistic Po-
larisation
Ethnic Frac-
tionalisation
(Unweighted)
Ethnic Frac-
tionalisation
(δ = .5)
Ethnic Frac-
tionalisation
(δ = .05)
Religious Frac-
tionalisation
Linguistic
Fractionali-
sation (Un-
weighted)
Linguistic
Fractionalisa-
tion (δ = .5)
Linguistic
Fractionalisa-
tion (δ = .05)
Abia 0.035 0.023 0.221 0.074 0.014 .002 0.046 0.607 0.559 0.524
Adamawa 0.158 0.220 0.196 0.477 0.093 0.010 0.457 0.693 0.670 0.651
Akwa Ibom 0.187 0.010 0.192 0.742 0.136 0.015 0.021 0.708 0.565 0.504
Anambra 0.033 0.016 0.227 0.070 0.012 0.001 0.032 0.591 0.548 0.524
Bauchi 0.134 0.152 0.210 0.361 0.077 0.008 0.308 0.655 0.646 0.636
Bayelsa 0.162 0.030 0.184 0.461 0.051 0.006 0.061 0.706 0.603 0.505
Benue 0.183 0.037 0.185 0.605 0.119 0.013 0.075 0.709 0.638 0.587
Borno 0.168 0.178 0.201 0.742 0.199 0.068 0.363 0.704 0.684 0.666
Cross River 0.175 0.009 0.152 0.633 0.103 0.011 0.018 0.785 0.576 0.482
Delta 0.170 0.026 0.182 0.440 0.052 0.006 0.053 0.726 0.574 0.494
Ebonyi 0.006 0.109 0.250 0.012 0.003 0.000 0.237 0.500 0.500 0.500
Edo 0.135 0.123 0.180 0.821 0.055 0.006 0.265 0.720 0.580 0.510
Ekiti 0.066 0.078 0.242 0.142 0.014 0.001 0.158 0.535 0.513 0.501
Enugu 0.031 0.094 0.213 0.065 0.012 0.001 0.193 0.630 0.566 0.530
Gombe 0.186 0.219 0.207 0.541 0.119 0.013 0.453 0.656 0.645 0.635
Imo 0.017 0.021 0.211 0.035 0.005 0.001 0.041 0.642 0.576 0.523
Jigawa 0.088 0.059 0.238 0.203 0.045 0.005 0.120 0.548 0.548 0.547
Kaduna 0.154 0.239 0.193 0.454 0.096 0.011 0.484 0.705 0.677 0.662
Kano 0.121 0.133 0.231 0.296 0.064 0.007 0.272 0.589 0.589 0.589
Katsina 0.040 0.034 0.218 0.084 0.019 0.002 0.069 0.619 0.612 0.607
Kebbi 0.090 0.097 0.195 0.208 0.042 0.005 0.200 0.697 0.677 0.659
Kogi 0.174 0.249 0.139 0.727 0.084 0.009 0.503 0.800 0.643 0.547
Kwara 0.051 0.248 0.221 0.108 0.014 0.002 0.505 0.609 0.577 0.552
Lagos 0.155 0.216 0.206 0.382 0.045 0.005 0.444 0.661 0.572 0.521
Nassarawa 0.145 0.221 0.173 0.798 0.151 0.017 0.462 0.731 0.695 0.669
Niger 0.163 0.208 0.204 0.617 0.127 0.014 0.430 0.675 0.658 0.649
Ogun 0.056 0.243 0.247 0.121 0.013 0.001 0.507 0.514 0.506 0.501
Ondo 0.087 0.077 0.236 0.187 0.018 0.002 0.158 0.551 0.520 0.503
Osun 0.033 0.249 0.241 0.068 0.009 0.001 0.498 0.536 0.512 0.501
Oyo 0.109 0.229 0.231 0.244 0.028 0.003 0.469 0.574 0.528 0.503
Plateau 0.155 0.049 0.164 0.756 0.143 0.016 0.099 0.749 0.698 0.661
Rivers 0.172 0.042 0.178 0.738 0.098 0.011 0.088 0.711 0.603 0.511
Sokoto 0.134 0.091 0.240 0.325 0.070 0.008 0.189 0.544 0.544 0.544
Taraba 0.158 0.189 0.202 0.771 0.143 0.016 0.378 0.684 0.670 0.656
Yobe 0.153 0.161 0.225 0.715 0.135 0.015 0.333 0.599 0.595 0.593
Zamfara 0.110 0.101 0.215 0.246 0.054 0.006 0.216 0.631 0.619 0.604
FCT (Abuja) 0.136 0.186 0.178 0.807 0.120 0.013 0.373 0.737 0.676 0.642
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Table A.77: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) -0.042 -0.379 -0.272 1.833
(0.283) (0.479) (0.363) (3.440)
EF Squared 0.047 0.216 -0.071 -1.389
(0.304) (0.568) (0.424) (3.694)
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) -0.208 -0.640 -0.324 3.764
(0.527) (0.899) (0.895) (4.345)
RF Squared 0.746 0.320 0.012 -2.539
(0.968) (1.579) (1.607) (7.019)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (Unweighted) (LFU) 2.514 2.882 8.808* 43.254
(5.604) (4.995) (5.145) (31.400)
LFU Squared -1.830 -2.638 -7.428* -32.158
(4.455) (3.860) (3.994) (24.829)
Manufacture (Share) -0.341* -0.399* -0.297 -1.274*** -0.932** -1.356*** -0.990*** -0.653** -1.067*** -3.511** -5.372*** -3.313*
(0.185) (0.197) (0.201) (0.359) (0.421) (0.388) (0.223) (0.288) (0.204) (1.614) (1.735) (1.695)
Trade (share) 1.212* 1.467** 1.108 3.170*** 2.327** 3.371*** 1.777*** 1.211 2.095*** 15.939*** 20.960*** 15.310***
(0.634) (0.660) (0.656) (0.974) (1.054) (0.917) (0.649) (0.857) (0.615) (3.966) (4.150) (3.911)
Constant 0.179*** 0.149** -0.678 0.375*** 0.406*** -0.470 0.437*** 0.376*** -2.241 4.667*** 4.317*** -9.257
(0.055) (0.060) (1.739) (0.085) (0.103) (1.570) (0.068) (0.094) (1.621) (0.548) (0.632) (9.705)
R-squared 0.153 0.234 0.171 0.323 0.364 0.301 0.380 0.246 0.304 0.302 0.378 0.317
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35
F-Stat 1.24 1.61 1.46 7.76 3.42 4.56 9.43 3.50 7.90 5.56 7.38 7.60
P-value 0.313 0.195 0.237 0.000 0.019 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations for Models 1-9:
37. These 37 observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on all 2,110 firms
in the sample. Models 10-12 contain 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe
State.
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Table A.78: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) 0.016 -0.376 0.068 -0.524
(0.297) (0.682) (0.457) (4.418)
EF Squared 0.080 0.329 -0.287 2.058
(0.338) (0.797) (0.552) (4.665)
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) -0.601 -1.053 -0.626 7.462
(0.486) (1.148) (0.909) (8.007)
RF Squared 1.287 0.605 0.162 -8.243
(0.995) (1.993) (1.628) (15.776)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (Unweighted) (LFU) 1.661 5.743 8.911 121.425
(5.339) (6.545) (6.155) (79.924)
LFU Squared -0.895 -4.530 -6.986 -91.261
(4.238) (5.052) (4.800) (62.397)
Manufacture (Share) -0.063 -0.028 -0.022 -0.789** -0.634* -0.822** -0.625** -0.423 -0.605** 1.447 -0.140 1.062
(0.152) (0.153) (0.150) (0.364) (0.364) (0.370) (0.260) (0.252) (0.232) (2.051) (2.016) (2.051)
Trade (share) 1.483*** 1.503*** 1.400*** 3.193*** 2.737*** 3.196*** 1.507* 1.221 1.552* 18.370** 19.318*** 15.544***
(0.536) (0.502) (0.506) (1.024) (0.921) (1.030) (0.811) (0.766) (0.840) (6.837) (5.146) (5.606)
Constant 0.131* 0.183*** -0.541 0.365*** 0.504*** -1.497 0.351*** 0.445*** -2.493 3.552*** 2.851*** -35.833
(0.065) (0.050) (1.654) (0.127) (0.143) (2.061) (0.091) (0.088) (1.929) (0.979) (0.844) (25.390)
R-squared 0.248 0.267 0.306 0.277 0.401 0.275 0.232 0.349 0.223 0.192 0.238 0.275
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35 35 35 35
F-Stat 2.45 2.56 3.39 3.83 4.37 3.73 3.21 4.10 3.27 2.04 4.31 2.29
P-value 0.066 0.057 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.026 0.009 0.025 0.114 0.007 0.083
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations for Models 1-6:
37. These 37 observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on 1,267 firms
for which ethnicity, religion, and language data were available. Models 7-9: 35 Observations due to the dependent variable being
undefined for Jigawa and Yobe (division by zero). Models 10-12: 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being
undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe State.
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Table A.79: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Polarisation 0.025 -0.861 -1.267** 3.506
(0.345) (0.613) (0.521) (3.657)
Religious Polarisation 0.397 -0.967** -0.660* 4.823*
(0.297) (0.370) (0.353) (2.565)
Linguistic Polarisation -0.389 1.411 2.448*** -3.899
(0.828) (0.941) (0.792) (4.930)
Manufacture (Share) -0.341* -0.443** -0.299 -1.254*** -0.947** -1.350*** -0.910*** -0.651** -1.093*** -3.495** -5.226*** -3.370**
(0.175) (0.183) (0.196) (0.386) (0.394) (0.367) (0.238) (0.277) (0.198) (1.515) (1.581) (1.643)
Trade (share) 1.202* 1.521** 1.130* 3.226*** 2.337** 3.381*** 1.902*** 1.201 2.203*** 15.811*** 20.800*** 15.748***
(0.630) (0.640) (0.665) (0.930) (1.021) (0.885) (0.696) (0.843) (0.614) (3.878) (4.005) (4.230)
Constant 0.170*** 0.120*** 0.252 0.368*** 0.394*** -0.019 0.440*** 0.377*** -0.204 4.673*** 4.426*** 5.868***
(0.051) (0.044) (0.172) (0.080) (0.081) (0.200) (0.066) (0.064) (0.164) (0.497) (0.447) (1.017)
R-squared 0.153 0.218 0.159 0.312 0.366 0.295 0.306 0.248 0.272 0.302 0.373 0.281
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35
F-Stat 1.43 2.11 1.35 6.76 4.77 7.19 9.19 4.79 14.74 6.81 9.39 6.23
P-value 0.250 0.117 0.276 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations models 1-9:
37. These 37 observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on all 2,110 firms
in the dataset. Models 10-12: 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe State.
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Table A.80: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Polarisation 0.400 -0.399 -0.422 3.818
(0.365) (0.929) (0.629) (5.999)
Religious Polarisation 0.177 -1.509*** -1.121*** 6.217
(0.283) (0.469) (0.310) (4.003)
Linguistic Polarisation -1.446* 0.310 0.519 -10.274
(0.774) (1.560) (1.194) (13.735)
Manufacture (Share) -0.080 -0.100 -0.009 -0.799** -0.666* -0.810** -0.575** -0.429* -0.592** 1.104 0.281 1.460
(0.151) (0.154) (0.149) (0.371) (0.338) (0.348) (0.235) (0.238) (0.234) (2.073) (1.802) (1.945)
Trade (share) 1.448*** 1.452*** 1.429*** 3.230*** 2.704*** 3.286*** 1.646* 1.203 1.686** 17.552** 19.758*** 17.522**
(0.509) (0.512) (0.509) (0.983) (0.895) (1.016) (0.812) (0.737) (0.826) (6.593) (5.362) (6.468)
Constant 0.114* 0.141*** 0.450*** 0.338*** 0.486*** 0.226 0.347*** 0.442*** 0.192 3.463*** 3.125*** 5.969**
(0.060) (0.046) (0.161) (0.117) (0.121) (0.342) (0.087) (0.073) (0.241) (0.948) (0.651) (2.776)
R-squared 0.247 0.232 0.300 0.272 0.403 0.269 0.197 0.353 0.189 0.174 0.231 0.181
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35 35 35 35
F-Stat 3.05 2.90 3.89 4.77 6.00 5.17 3.71 5.62 3.49 2.46 5.62 2.47
P-value 0.042 0.050 0.017 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.022 0.003 0.027 0.081 0.003 0.081
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations for models
1-6: 37. These 37 observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on 1,267
firms for which ethnicity, religion, and language data were available. Models 7-9: 35 Observations due to the dependent variable being
undefined for Jigawa and Yobe (division by zero). Models 10-12: 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being
undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe State.
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Table A.81: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisation - Full Sample
Dependent
Variable:
Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Avg. No. Of
Languages
Spoken
0.011 -0.151 -0.114 0.663
(0.082) (0.191) (0.143) (0.520)
Linguistic
Fractional-
isation (Un-
weighted)(LFU)
0.163 -0.507 -0.738** 1.910
(0.254) (0.326) (0.296) (1.566)
Linguistic
Fraction-
alisation
(δ = .5)(LF05)
0.151 -0.846 -0.860* 5.031***
(0.256) (0.574) (0.479) (1.816)
Linguistic
Fractionali-
sation (δ =
.05)(LF005)
0.080 -0.853 -0.608 5.667**
(0.257) (0.579) (0.477) (2.166)
Manufacture
(Share)
-0.336* -0.292 -0.330* -0.347* -1.281*** -1.349*** -1.263*** -1.150*** -0.885*** -1.048*** -0.891*** -0.788*** -3.440** -3.236* -3.424** -4.080***
(0.178) (0.191) (0.179) (0.176) (0.439) (0.385) (0.401) (0.383) (0.239) (0.209) (0.262) (0.263) (1.571) (1.609) (1.487) (1.453)
Trade (share) 1.199* 1.116* 1.190* 1.216* 3.193*** 3.382*** 3.190*** 2.986*** 1.792** 2.128*** 1.811** 1.641* 16.182*** 15.521*** 16.099*** 17.244***
(0.644) (0.654) (0.643) (0.633) (0.986) (0.928) (0.966) (0.951) (0.765) (0.669) (0.782) (0.810) (4.134) (4.089) (3.862) (3.998)
Constant 0.147 0.065 0.082 0.128 0.623 0.601*** 0.777** 0.750** 0.558* 0.778*** 0.809*** 0.634** 3.509** 3.815*** 2.036* 1.867
(0.193) (0.168) (0.152) (0.145) (0.461) (0.216) (0.346) (0.334) (0.327) (0.194) (0.288) (0.269) (1.281) (1.073) (1.083) (1.231)
R-squared 0.153 0.162 0.158 0.154 0.292 0.297 0.314 0.323 0.195 0.250 0.244 0.219 0.289 0.288 0.337 0.371
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35 35
F-Stat 1.36 1.40 1.69 1.51 3.61 5.52 4.26 3.62 6.37 12.73 5.49 4.53 5.84 6.52 10.22 8.86
P-value 0.274 0.261 0.189 0.231 0.023 0.003 0.012 0.023 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations for models
1-12: 37. These 37 observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on all 2,110
firms in the dataset. Models 13-16: 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe
State.
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Table A.82: State Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Avg. No. Of Lan-
guages Spoken
0.111 -0.014 0.079 0.467
(0.095) (0.225) (0.154) (1.512)
Linguistic Fractional-
isation (Unweighted)
(LFU)
0.511* -0.077 -0.058 4.166
(0.255) (0.515) (0.411) (4.730)
Linguistic Fractionali-
sation (δ = .5) (LF05)
0.341 -0.694 -0.571 8.013
(0.328) (0.757) (0.574) (4.803)
Linguistic Fractional-
isation (δ = .05)
(LF005)
0.025 -1.081 -0.731 7.005
(0.325) (0.752) (0.533) (4.334)
Manufacture (Share) -0.063 -0.018 -0.088 -0.088 -0.796* -0.804** -0.789** -0.697* -0.568** -0.578** -0.556** -0.502** 1.106 1.421 0.827 0.396
(0.145) (0.145) (0.151) (0.165) (0.392) (0.359) (0.377) (0.353) (0.220) (0.230) (0.245) (0.246) (2.014) (1.914) (1.872) (2.023)
Trade (share) 1.416** 1.418*** 1.356** 1.378** 3.292*** 3.291*** 3.348*** 3.457*** 1.757** 1.706** 1.737** 1.820** 17.155** 17.557** 16.603** 15.910**
(0.525) (0.503) (0.545) (0.543) (1.023) (1.016) (0.974) (1.009) (0.849) (0.836) (0.766) (0.758) (6.655) (6.446) (6.534) (6.707)
Constant -0.098 -0.179 -0.039 0.150 0.320 0.339 0.700 0.881* 0.107 0.333 0.634* 0.695** 2.837 1.146 -0.826 0.100
(0.221) (0.169) (0.185) (0.171) (0.564) (0.336) (0.460) (0.444) (0.363) (0.278) (0.352) (0.304) (3.675) (3.245) (3.027) (2.526)
R-squared 0.252 0.304 0.242 0.220 0.268 0.268 0.283 0.309 0.192 0.187 0.209 0.231 0.164 0.188 0.222 0.216
Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
F-Stat 3.24 4.23 3.14 2.72 4.40 4.74 5.02 4.78 2.88 3.19 3.60 3.77 2.31 2.49 2.37 2.43
p-value 0.035 0.012 0.038 0.060 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.052 0.037 0.024 0.020 0.096 0.079 0.090 0.084
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
.Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations for models 1-8: 37. These 37
observations correspond to the 37 geo-political states in Nigeria. The 37 states are generated using data on 1,267 firms for which ethnicity, religion, and
language data were available. Models 9-12: 35 Observations due to the dependent variable being undefined for Jigawa and Yobe (division by zero). Models
13-16: 35 observations due to the dependent variable [log(0)] being undefined for Jigawa State and Yobe State.
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Table A.83: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) 0.341** 0.320 0.006 5.646***
(0.148) (0.274) (0.221) (1.278)
EF Squared -0.361** -0.455* -0.173 -5.300***
(0.157) (0.257) (0.223) (1.291)
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) 0.208 -0.032 -0.109 4.636***
(0.146) (0.267) (0.210) (1.358)
RF Squared -0.245 -0.151 -0.061 -4.684***
(0.150) (0.244) (0.210) (1.306)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LF) -1.191*** 0.170 0.100 -2.774
(0.360) (0.553) (0.436) (3.184)
LF Squared 1.261*** -0.031 -0.193 7.098*
(0.388) (0.623) (0.570) (3.604)
Manufacture (Share) -0.027 -0.030 -0.014 0.051 0.066 0.094 -0.066 -0.039 -0.067 0.839 0.332 0.771
(0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.131) (0.134) (0.166) (0.081) (0.081) (0.097) (0.618) (0.657) (0.788)
Trade (share) 0.295** 0.300** 0.376** 0.840** 0.850** 0.742** -0.016 -0.010 -0.072 1.731 1.840 3.163*
(0.148) (0.148) (0.177) (0.393) (0.395) (0.368) (0.126) (0.126) (0.161) (1.154) (1.247) (1.865)
Constant 0.164*** 0.180*** 0.443*** 0.186*** 0.215*** 0.115 0.313*** 0.307*** 0.304*** 2.404*** 2.742*** 2.057***
(0.025) (0.024) (0.096) (0.055) (0.051) (0.161) (0.049) (0.042) (0.090) (0.236) (0.225) (0.786)
R-squared 0.041 0.034 0.048 0.061 0.063 0.032 0.027 0.026 0.004 0.155 0.109 0.134
Observations 350 350 292 350 350 292 200 200 180 152 152 140
F-Stat 2.61 1.84 3.63 5.67 5.90 1.46 1.84 1.64 0.22 7.35 4.93 4.91
P-value 0.035 0.121 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.214 0.122 0.166 0.929 0.000 0.001 0.001
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations: 351. These
351 observations correspond to the 351 local government areas in the sample. The 351 local government areas are formed using data on
all 2,110 firms in the sample. The models in this table correspond to the Models in Table A.77. Models 7 & 9: 150 Observations
dropped due to division by zero. Models 10-12: 198 Oservations dropped due to log(0) being undefined.
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Table A.84: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Fractionalisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Fractionalisation (EF) 0.311 0.230 0.406 4.710**
(0.212) (0.464) (0.320) (2.197)
EF Squared -0.302 -0.329 -0.724* -4.125
(0.291) (0.634) (0.412) (2.937)
Religious Fractionalisation (RF) 0.110 0.840 0.591 4.967
(0.324) (0.747) (0.526) (3.361)
RF Squared 0.054 -2.234 -1.540 -4.891
(0.656) (1.456) (1.017) (6.506)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LF) -2.891*** 0.572 0.896* -0.121
(0.375) (0.475) (0.488) (3.774)
LF Squared 2.697*** -0.375 -0.801 4.373
(0.409) (0.591) (0.636) (4.408)
Manufacture (Share) -0.065 -0.072 -0.052 0.005 0.026 0.007 -0.100 -0.056 -0.088 2.456** 2.107* 2.137*
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.167) (0.169) (0.164) (0.109) (0.111) (0.110) (1.133) (1.167) (1.285)
Trade (share) 0.494*** 0.495*** 0.517*** 2.178** 2.172** 2.186** 0.096 0.106 0.111 0.821 0.793 1.063
(0.161) (0.162) (0.162) (0.975) (0.975) (0.974) (0.159) (0.159) (0.162) (1.212) (1.182) (1.223)
Constant 0.165*** 0.178*** 0.936*** 0.180*** 0.198*** -0.013 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.061 2.324*** 2.524*** 1.453
(0.028) (0.026) (0.097) (0.056) (0.050) (0.149) (0.055) (0.048) (0.098) (0.305) (0.281) (0.903)
R-squared 0.077 0.072 0.097 0.175 0.180 0.175 0.025 0.024 0.011 0.135 0.126 0.112
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 160 160 160 119 119 119
F-Stat 3.83 3.30 17.64 1.66 2.25 3.32 1.67 1.42 1.86 5.11 5.16 3.93
P-value 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.160 0.064 0.011 0.160 0.229 0.121 0.001 0.001 0.005
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations: 351. These
351 observations correspond to the 351 local government areas in the sample. The 351 local government areas are formed using data on
1,267 firms for which ethnicity, religion and language data were available. The models in this table correspond to the Models in Table
A.78. Models 7 & 9: 132 Observations dropped due to division by zero. Models 10-12: 173 Oservations dropped due to log(0) being
undefined.
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Table A.85: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Full Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Polarisation 0.431** 0.384 -0.107 5.787***
(0.180) (0.328) (0.264) (1.567)
Religious Polarisation 0.267 -0.026 -0.173 4.646***
(0.166) (0.287) (0.233) (1.583)
Linguistic Polarisation -1.336*** -0.596 0.196 -15.262**
(0.482) (1.024) (0.744) (6.873)
Manufacture (Share) -0.026 -0.035 -0.015 0.046 0.049 0.093 -0.069 -0.057 -0.066 0.939 0.394 0.759
(0.063) (0.064) (0.067) (0.131) (0.135) (0.166) (0.082) (0.082) (0.097) (0.638) (0.667) (0.759)
Trade (share) 0.296** 0.298** 0.373** 0.836** 0.838** 0.744** -0.040 -0.042 -0.066 1.809 1.863 3.085
(0.148) (0.148) (0.176) (0.390) (0.391) (0.367) (0.123) (0.123) (0.160) (1.207) (1.280) (1.893)
Constant 0.159*** 0.172*** 0.495*** 0.154*** 0.179*** 0.339 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.248 2.590*** 2.807*** 6.430***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.108) (0.040) (0.038) (0.225) (0.043) (0.038) (0.161) (0.206) (0.200) (1.517)
R-squared 0.042 0.033 0.051 0.055 0.052 0.032 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.119 0.096 0.122
Observations 350 350 292 350 350 292 200 200 180 152 152 140
F-Stat 3.54 2.38 4.24 2.52 1.74 1.99 0.34 0.41 0.23 7.37 4.71 3.33
P-value 0.015 0.070 0.006 0.058 0.159 0.116 0.797 0.749 0.874 0.000 0.004 0.021
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations: 351. These
351 observations correspond to the 351 local government areas in the sample. The 351 LGAs are generated using data on all 2,110
firms in the sample. The models in this table correspond to the Models in Table A.79, excluding the models with linguistic
polarisation. Models 7 & 9: 150 Observations dropped due to division by zero. Models 10-12: 198 Oservations dropped due to log(0)
being undefined.
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Table A.86: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Polarisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ethnic Polarisation 0.359* 0.093 -0.090 5.692***
(0.200) (0.445) (0.321) (2.076)
Religious Polarisation 0.277 -0.392 -0.277 5.619***
(0.191) (0.401) (0.279) (1.861)
Linguistic Polarisation -2.038*** -0.374 0.465 -11.508
(0.623) (1.255) (0.843) (7.239)
Manufacture (Share) -0.063 -0.073 -0.057 0.008 0.033 0.010 -0.083 -0.056 -0.085 2.597** 2.158* 2.515*
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.165) (0.168) (0.163) (0.110) (0.112) (0.111) (1.155) (1.166) (1.279)
Trade (share) 0.496*** 0.494*** 0.513*** 2.184** 2.190** 2.187** 0.117 0.114 0.110 0.807 0.826 0.946
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.975) (0.978) (0.972) (0.159) (0.159) (0.161) (1.192) (1.181) (1.224)
Constant 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.659*** 0.183*** 0.212*** 0.275 0.309*** 0.321*** 0.198 2.442*** 2.564*** 5.533***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.140) (0.054) (0.048) (0.286) (0.053) (0.045) (0.181) (0.295) (0.266) (1.607)
R-squared 0.076 0.072 0.097 0.175 0.176 0.175 0.008 0.013 0.010 0.118 0.128 0.092
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 160 160 160 119 119 119
F-Stat 4.85 4.39 7.49 2.16 1.85 2.33 0.40 0.66 0.48 5.67 7.15 2.82
P-value 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.093 0.139 0.074 0.752 0.579 0.696 0.001 0.000 0.042
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Number of Observations: 351. These
351 observations correspond to the 351 local government areas in Nigeria. The 351 LGAs are generated using data on the 1,267 firms
for which data on ethnicity, religion and language are available. The models in this table correspond to the Models in Table A.80,
excluding the models with linguistic polarisation. Models 7 & 9: 132 Observations dropped due to division by zero. Models 10-12: 173
Oservations dropped due to log(0) being undefined.
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Table A.87: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisation - Full Sample
Dependent
Variable:
Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Avg. No. Of
Languages
Spoken
0.030 0.016 -0.033 0.157
(0.047) (0.085) (0.076) (0.460)
Linguistic
Fractionali-
sation (Un-
weighted)
(LF)
0.236 0.135 -0.111 4.800***
(0.185) (0.324) (0.246) (1.693)
Linguistic
Fraction-
alisation
(δ = .5)(LF05)
-0.104 -0.444 -0.432 6.731***
(0.198) (0.335) (0.296) (2.575)
Linguistic
Fractionali-
sation (δ =
.05)(LF005)
-0.384** -0.819** -0.518* 5.496**
(0.181) (0.341) (0.294) (2.158)
Manufacture
(Share)
-0.011 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 0.095 0.094 0.093 0.095 -0.068 -0.067 -0.069 -0.066 0.964 0.840 0.857 0.900
(0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166) (0.165) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.095) (0.840) (0.795) (0.757) (0.778)
Trade (share) 0.369** 0.367** 0.364** 0.366** 0.743** 0.742** 0.740** 0.745** -0.070 -0.069 -0.074 -0.067 2.771 3.002 2.931 2.821
(0.177) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.368) (0.367) (0.369) (0.368) (0.159) (0.159) (0.158) (0.157) (1.962) (1.830) (1.858) (1.914)
Constant 0.122 0.052 0.247** 0.392*** 0.166 0.124 0.447** 0.635*** 0.367** 0.359** 0.534*** 0.568*** 2.723** 0.156 -0.692 0.158
(0.109) (0.113) (0.115) (0.103) (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.199) (0.179) (0.158) (0.177) (0.168) (1.087) (1.068) (1.480) (1.173)
R-squared 0.036 0.040 0.035 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.004 0.004 0.013 0.017 0.056 0.124 0.139 0.110
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 180 180 180 180 140 140 140 140
F-Stat 1.56 2.06 1.48 2.94 1.71 1.87 1.98 3.17 0.28 0.29 0.88 1.18 1.62 4.68 4.39 4.09
P-value 0.199 0.105 0.219 0.034 0.164 0.135 0.117 0.025 0.836 0.836 0.452 0.320 0.187 0.004 0.006 0.008
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
.Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
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Table A.88: Local Government Level Estimations Of Corruption On Linguistic Fractionalisation - Reduced Sample
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index Corruption Index (2) Relative Corruption Index Log Of Corruption Rents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Avg. No. Of Lan-
guages Spoken
0.013 0.022 0.000 0.114
(0.054) (0.090) (0.088) (0.547)
Linguistic Fractionali-
sation (LF)
0.162 0.148 0.028 4.468**
(0.258) (0.381) (0.288) (1.879)
Linguistic Fractionali-
sation (δ = .5)(LF05)
-0.273 -0.489 -0.325 7.090**
(0.304) (0.444) (0.394) (2.783)
Linguistic Frac-
tionalisation
(δ = .05)(LF005)
-0.596** -0.911** -0.488 6.348***
(0.263) (0.451) (0.407) (2.360)
Manufacture (Share) -0.056 -0.058 -0.054 -0.051 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.017 -0.083 -0.083 -0.081 -0.079 2.674** 2.146* 2.075* 2.263*
(0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.163) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (1.343) (1.283) (1.169) (1.202)
Trade (share) 0.501*** 0.502*** 0.496*** 0.500*** 2.189** 2.188** 2.182** 2.188** 0.120 0.122 0.112 0.117 0.701 0.978 0.919 0.785
(0.162) (0.162) (0.161) (0.160) (0.974) (0.972) (0.973) (0.973) (0.161) (0.160) (0.159) (0.158) (1.251) (1.209) (1.213) (1.227)
Constant 0.164 0.100 0.344** 0.508*** 0.140 0.103 0.457* 0.668*** 0.300 0.283 0.482** 0.560** 2.774** 0.338 -0.897 -0.302
(0.126) (0.156) (0.173) (0.146) (0.213) (0.228) (0.252) (0.250) (0.209) (0.184) (0.232) (0.229) (1.302) (1.167) (1.603) (1.290)
R-squared 0.066 0.068 0.069 0.083 0.175 0.175 0.176 0.180 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.019 0.057 0.108 0.137 0.120
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 160 160 160 160 119 119 119 119
F-Stat 3.40 3.57 3.63 5.18 1.90 2.43 1.84 2.46 0.38 0.39 0.58 0.81 1.50 3.94 4.29 4.69
P-value 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.129 0.066 0.139 0.063 0.765 0.762 0.631 0.490 0.219 0.010 0.007 0.004
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
.Models are estimated using an OLS regression. Huber-White Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
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Table A.89: Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Fractionalisation
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ethnic Fractionalisation (State Level) 0.131
(0.250)
Ethnic Fractionalisation (LG Level) 0.421*
(0.219)
Religious Fractionalisation (State Level) 0.764
(0.763)
Religious Fractionalisation (LG Level) 0.630**
(0.313)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (Unweighted)
(State Level)
1.933*
(1.055)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (Unweighted) (LG
Level)
1.248**
(0.631)
Employees=50-100 0.168* 0.149 0.183* 0.166 0.176* 0.160
(0.095) (0.136) (0.096) (0.136) (0.095) (0.137)
Employees=100-250 -0.138 -0.147 -0.162 -0.129 -0.148 -0.147
(0.120) (0.152) (0.118) (0.158) (0.119) (0.153)
Employees=Over 250 -0.312* -0.313* -0.317 -0.317** -0.313* -0.312*
(0.189) (0.162) (0.196) (0.162) (0.189) (0.160)
Trade 1.187*** 1.167*** 1.169*** 1.164*** 1.180*** 1.175***
(0.232) (0.175) (0.256) (0.186) (0.231) (0.177)
Foreign ownership ≥ 25% -0.063 -0.075 -0.076 -0.098 -0.086 -0.078
(0.153) (0.143) (0.171) (0.139) (0.152) (0.143)
Dummy=1 if company using security service 0.526 0.512 0.606 0.639 0.458 0.464
(0.461) (0.608) (0.450) (0.636) (0.452) (0.624)
Log of age -0.051 -0.049 -0.050 -0.046 -0.049 -0.044
(0.064) (0.045) (0.060) (0.047) (0.064) (0.045)
Constant -1.085 -1.169* -1.341*** -1.296** -2.231** -1.772**
(0.728) (0.608) (0.493) (0.639) (0.881) (0.770)
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.056 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.054
Observations 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255
Chi-Squared 84.88 76.97 101.96 99.72 84.68 74.90
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Coefficients are from a Probit Estimation. Region (Models 1, 3 & 5) & Local Government Area (Models 2, 4 & 6) Clustered Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
12 Observations dropped due to log(0) being undefined. The base category for “Employees” is “Less than 50”.
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Table A.90: Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Polarisation
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ethnic Polarisation (State Level) 3.035
(2.101)
Ethnic Polarisation (LG Level) 2.175***
(0.768)
Religious Polarisation (State Level) 1.552
(1.559)
Religious Polarisation (LG Level) 1.300**
(0.649)
Linguistic Polarisation (State Level) -4.377
(2.747)
Linguistic Polarisation (LG Level) -5.178***
(1.879)
Employees=50-100 0.152 0.120 0.183* 0.166 0.175* 0.163
(0.101) (0.133) (0.096) (0.136) (0.094) (0.138)
Employees=100-250 -0.171 -0.158 -0.162 -0.129 -0.144 -0.149
(0.114) (0.153) (0.118) (0.158) (0.120) (0.154)
Employees=Over 250 -0.305 -0.312* -0.317 -0.320** -0.316* -0.313*
(0.196) (0.164) (0.196) (0.162) (0.188) (0.160)
Trade 1.166*** 1.138*** 1.169*** 1.164*** 1.186*** 1.175***
(0.252) (0.178) (0.256) (0.186) (0.231) (0.178)
Foreign ownership ≥ 25% -0.108 -0.082 -0.076 -0.096 -0.077 -0.086
(0.170) (0.143) (0.171) (0.139) (0.150) (0.143)
Dummy=1 if company using security
service
0.429 0.482 0.609 0.640 0.483 0.451
(0.500) (0.597) (0.448) (0.637) (0.447) (0.627)
Log of age -0.039 -0.047 -0.050 -0.046 -0.050 -0.043
(0.058) (0.045) (0.061) (0.047) (0.064) (0.045)
Constant -1.316** -1.246** -1.341*** -1.300** -0.091 0.133
(0.568) (0.596) (0.491) (0.640) (0.873) (0.718)
Pseudo R-squared 0.062 0.063 0.058 0.057 0.054 0.058
Observations 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255
Chi-Squared 92.41 85.54 100.57 100.39 84.08 76.45
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Coefficients are from a Probit Estimation. Region (Models 1, 3 & 5) & Local Government Area (Models 2, 4 & 6) Clustered Standard
Errors In Parenthesis. 12 Observations dropped due to log(0) being undefined.
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Table A.91: Firm Level Estimations Of Bribery On Linguistic Fractionalisation
Dependent Variable: Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1 2 3 4 5 6
Linguistic Fractionalisation (State Level) (Un-
weighted)
1.933*
(1.055)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LG Level) (Un-
weighted)
1.248**
(0.631)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (State Level) (δ =
.5)(LF05)
-0.116
(1.636)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LG Level) (δ =
.5)(LF05)
-0.150
(0.710)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (State Level) (δ =
.05)(LF005)
-1.485
(1.673)
Linguistic Fractionalisation (LG Level) (δ =
.05)(LF005)
-1.444**
(0.731)
Employees=50-100 0.176* 0.160 0.165* 0.166 0.162* 0.167
(0.095) (0.137) (0.094) (0.138) (0.095) (0.136)
Employees=100-250 -0.148 -0.147 -0.132 -0.131 -0.124 -0.124
(0.119) (0.153) (0.124) (0.154) (0.125) (0.154)
Employees=Over 250 -0.313* -0.312* -0.313* -0.313** -0.308 -0.309*
(0.189) (0.160) (0.190) (0.159) (0.193) (0.159)
Trade 1.180*** 1.175*** 1.185*** 1.186*** 1.185*** 1.189***
(0.231) (0.177) (0.229) (0.176) (0.240) (0.178)
Foreign ownership ≥ 25% -0.086 -0.078 -0.055 -0.055 -0.051 -0.049
(0.152) (0.143) (0.151) (0.142) (0.160) (0.144)
Dummy=1 if company using security service 0.458 0.464 0.549 0.551 0.601 0.594
(0.452) (0.624) (0.428) (0.618) (0.433) (0.621)
Log of age -0.049 -0.044 -0.052 -0.052 -0.049 -0.055
(0.064) (0.045) (0.063) (0.046) (0.061) (0.047)
Constant -2.231** -1.772** -0.988 -0.970 -0.295 -0.312
(0.881) (0.770) (1.486) (0.775) (1.505) (0.760)
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.054 0.050 0.050 0.053 0.053
Observations 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255
Chi-Squared 84.68 74.90 103.53 74.19 149.37 75.37
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
.Coefficients are from a Probit Estimation. Region (Models 1, 3 & 5) & Local Government Area (Models 2, 4 & 6) Clustered Standard Errors In Parenthesis.
12 Observations dropped due to log(0) being undefined.
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Table A.92: South-West Zone: Firm Level Probit Estimations Of Bribery On Matching, With Regional Dummies
Dependent Vari-
able:
Dummy=1 if firm admitted to bribing; 0 otherwise
1-SW 2-SW 3-SW 4-SW 5-SW 6-SW
Similar Ethnicity -0.508*** -0.452*** -0.424*** -0.003 0.013 0.036
(0.131) (0.134) (0.137) (0.146) (0.148) (0.151)
Trade 0.768*** 0.839*** 0.427* 0.501**
(0.205) (0.211) (0.228) (0.234)
Employees=50-100 0.030 -0.111
(0.191) (0.203)
Employees=100-
250
-0.256 -0.415*
(0.213) (0.236)
Employees=Over
250
-0.402* -0.416*
(0.223) (0.248)
Reg==Ekiti -1.976*** -1.993*** -2.065***
(0.462) (0.438) (0.434)
Reg==Ogun -2.096*** -2.035*** -2.004***
(0.444) (0.445) (0.445)
Reg==Ondo -1.994*** -1.929*** -1.935***
(0.463) (0.465) (0.466)
Reg==Osun -1.840*** -1.819*** -1.877***
(0.347) (0.342) (0.342)
Reg==Oyo -1.142*** -1.078*** -1.124***
(0.246) (0.248) (0.247)
Constant 0.065 -0.057 -0.027 0.210* 0.133 0.206
(0.108) (0.114) (0.123) (0.112) (0.120) (0.131)
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.051 0.058 0.233 0.241 0.249
Observations 439 439 439 439 439 439
Chi-Squared 14.96 27.85 32.10 94.71 110.04 119.31
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
. Heteroskedastic Robust Standard Errors In Parenthesis. Similar Ethnicity: Dummy=1 if ethnicity of manager matches ethnicity of
LGA Chair, 0 otherwise. Unit of observation is the firm. Similar Ethnicity is calculated using manager data collected by the Author.
All other variables are calculated using data from the NBS/EFCC survey.
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